Scholar

Pakistan has never voted a military ruler out of office. That could change following Monday’s parliamentary elections. Though President Pervez Musharraf was not on the ballot, the election was about his fate.

The people voted overwhelmingly against Mr. Musharraf. Even though the election was held under rules that favored his political allies, almost every candidate who served in his government lost. So did all major leaders of the Kings Party that Mr. Musharraf cobbled together with the help of his security services soon after taking power in a 1999 military coup. The Islamists, who Mr. Musharraf used as bogeymen to garner Western support, were trounced. This is good news for everyone worried about an Islamist takeover of the world’s only nuclear-armed, Muslim-majority nation.

The result was a posthumous victory for former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. This victory vindicated the sacrifice of every Pakistani who was imprisoned or exiled during eight years of autocratic rule but continued demanding freedom. Bhutto returned to the country seeking its return to democracy, only to be assassinated by terrorists on Dec. 27.

Pakistan’s powerful army, now under the command of Gen. Ashfaq Kiyani, is beginning to distance itself from politics. The army’s refusal to side with Mr. Musharraf’s political allies sealed their fate. Now, the army must help put Pakistan back on the constitutional path by undoing the arbitrary constitutional amendments decreed by Mr. Musharraf as army chief a few days before he relinquished his command.

The depth of opposition to Mr. Musharraf, coupled with his tendency to change or break rules to stay in power, had raised serious concerns that Mr. Musharraf would manipulate the election results in favor of his allies. In the end, international pressure, represented by the presence of three prominent U.S. senators — John Kerry (D., Mass.), Joe Biden (D., Del.) and Chuck Hagel (R., Neb.) — on Election Day helped stay Mr. Musharraf’s hand. Mr. Musharraf also seemed to think that tilting the rules in his party’s favor would be enough for victory, and thus fraud on polling day would be unnecessary.

That does not mean, however, that Mr. Musharraf might not still try to manipulate the situation to cling to power. He could try and create rifts between the various opposition parties by negotiating separately with them, and by using his intelligence services to bribe or blackmail individual politicians. Late last year, Mr. Musharraf had himself “elected” president by Pakistan’s outgoing parliament, which was itself chosen through a dubious election in 2002. He then fired 60% of superior court judges to forestall judicial review of the presidential election.

Trying such antics again would be a disastrous mistake. Some members of the Bush administration have repeatedly described Mr. Musharraf as an indispensable ally in the war against terrorism. Economic and military assistance from the U.S. and other Western countries has been crucial for Mr. Musharraf’s political survival thus far, and has probably contributed to his arrogance.

This might be the moment for Mr. Musharraf’s Western backers to help him understand that annulment or alteration of the election results would plunge Pakistan deeper into chaos. Mr. Musharraf should not only abide by the verdict of his people but also recognize that Pakistan — not he — is the crucial ally the world needs to defeat terrorists.

Pakistan faces an al-Qaeda-backed insurgency along its border with Afghanistan, which is spilling over into other parts of the country. Any attempt by Mr. Musharraf to insist on retaining absolute power — rather than allowing opposition leaders Nawaz Sharif and Asif Zardari to return Pakistan to normal constitutional governance — would only anger the vast majority of Pakistanis who have just voted for moderate, antiterrorist parties. The ensuing chaos could strengthen the violent Islamist insurgents.

Pakistan’s two major opposition parties — the pro-Western, center-left Pakistan Peoples Party now led by Bhutto’s widower Asif Zardari, and the center-right Pakistan Muslim League — together could have a two-thirds majority in the 342-seat National Assembly. Mr. Musharraf’s allies have been virtually wiped out. The opposition can now form a government that is no longer subservient to Mr. Musharraf.

Even if he remains president, Mr. Musharraf will no longer remain the most powerful man in Pakistan. He has said in the past that he would rather step down than face the ignominy of being impeached by the newly elected parliament, which is now possible. The opposition would be well advised to exercise restraint. At the same time, Mr. Musharraf would have to reverse many of his arbitrary decisions in order to qualify for the opposition’s minimal cooperation.

Since 9/11, Mr. Musharraf has marketed himself to the West as the man most capable of saving Pakistan from a radical Islamist takeover. But under his rule Pakistan has become more vulnerable to terrorists than before. Mr. Musharraf’s government has squandered good will through its arbitrary actions against the political opposition and judiciary. Furthermore, only a small sliver of the country’s 160 million people have benefited from the economic achievements of the past eight years.

The recent election campaign was marred by violence, which the government blames on terrorists. But the targets of violence have been the secular opposition parties — the most notable victim being Bhutto, who became an icon of democracy for Pakistanis after her assassination. Opposition politicians justifiably questioned why the terrorists have not attacked pro-Musharraf groups, if he was the one fighting terror.

Mr. Musharraf must now accept the consequence of defeat, and work out an honorable exit or a workable compromise with the opposition. The two parties that have emerged with popular support from this election should get full backing from the international community in restoring democracy to Pakistan. This might prove more effective in combating terrorism than continuing to prop up a discredited and despised dictator.

This article appeared in Wall Street Journal on February 20, 2008

Here is a quiz question for all readers. Who told London’s Sunday Times, “It is wholly wrong to say that I resorted to Emergency to keep myself in office. The extra-constitutional challenge was constitutionally met.” The “emergency was declared to save the country from disruption and collapse”; it had “enabled us to put through the new economic programme” and led to “a new sense of national confidence.”

If you guessed General (retired) Pervez Musharraf, you guessed wrong. It was Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in 1975. She also told the Saturday Review of New York, “What has been done… is not an abrogation of democracy but an effort to safeguard it.”

Although she came from a democratic dynasty, Mrs Gandhi fell into the authoritarian temptation when on June 26, 1975 she imposed Emergency in India. Most observers thought she was acting to avoid the consequences of the judgement by the Allahabad High Court annulling her election to parliament from Rae Bareilly in 1971.

Mrs Gandhi, who considered herself indispensable for her country, explained the imposition of emergency as an opportunity to clean up accumulated mess and lay the foundations of a bold new order. India was not a strategic ally of the US and Britain and, therefore, international public opinion was not a consideration.

Still she had to explain her action to India and the world. Her statements from that period strongly resemble the recent pronouncements of General Musharraf and his henchmen.

Mrs Gandhi said, “The president has declared emergency. There is nothing to panic about.” She claimed, “This was a necessary response to the deep and widespread conspiracy which has been brewing ever since I began to introduce certain progressive measures of benefit to the common man and woman of India.”

Mrs Gandhi’s explanation of the Emergency reads uncannily similar to Musharraf’s recent statements though, given his general aversion to extensive reading, it is unlikely that he had read Mrs Gandhi’s statements before making his own.

After administering what she described as ‘bitter medicine’ necessary for the good of a sick ‘child’, Mrs Gandhi decided to secure a mandate from what she expected to be a grateful Indian populace.

Elections were held in the third week of March 1977 and when results were announced on March 20, the ruling Congress party had been routed by an unusual alliance of all anti-Indira forces joined under the banner of the Janata Party. Indira Gandhi lost her own seat in parliament from Rae Bareilly.

For all her authoritarian disposition, Mrs Gandhi did not have it in her to try and rig a general election. India’s strong democratic tradition and its independent Election Commission and judiciary would have made it difficult, if not impossible, to thwart the will of the people as expressed at the ballot box.

Over the next three years, Mrs Gandhi reorganised her party and apologised to the Indian people for the excesses under Emergency rule. The Janata Party’s internal cracks led to the collapse of its government and in the subsequent election, a chastened Mrs Gandhi and Congress returned to power.

In Pakistan’s case, General Musharraf is not a politician willing to lose power for a few years to return to office in a subsequent election. Pakistan’s Election Commission and post-Emergency judiciary are mere instruments in the hands of the executive branch of government, which is firmly controlled by Musharraf.

Public opinion polls indicate that 70 per cent of Pakistanis want Musharraf to quit. The latest poll by US-based Terror Free Tomorrow shows 38 per cent support for PPP, 25 per cent for PML-N and only 12 per cent for PML-Q.

In the 2002 election, Pakistan’s poll manipulators gave the religious alliance MMA almost 21 per cent of seats in the National Assembly with only 11 per cent of the popular vote in a low turnout election.

This time, efforts are under way to depress the turnout with attacks on opposition rallies. Every opposition party has had some of its members killed in mysterious terrorist attacks that, for some strange reason, have not targeted the ruling PML-Q or its major ally, the MQM.

Will Musharraf learn from Indira Gandhi and let the people vote him out by letting the opposition win a two-thirds majority on election day as the polls clearly indicate or will he compound Pakistan’s misery by rigging the polls and creating a new round of confrontation? The future of Pakistan hinges on the answer to that question.

This article appeared in Indian Express on February 13, 2008

Here is a quiz question for all readers. Who told London’s Sunday Times, “It is wholly wrong to say that I resorted to Emergency to keep myself in office… The extra-constitutional challenge was constitutionally met.”

The “emergency was declared to save the country from disruption and collapse;” it had “enabled us to put through the new economic programme” and led to “a new sense of national confidence”.

If you guessed General (retired) Pervez Musharraf, you guessed wrong. It was Indian prime minister Indira Gandhi in 1975. She also told the Saturday Review, “What has been done… is not an abrogation of democracy but an effort to safeguard it”.

Although she came from a democratic dynasty, Indira Gandhi fell into the authoritarian temptation when on June 26, 1975 she imposed Emergency in India.

Most observers thought she was acting to avoid the consequences of the judgement by the Allahabad High Court annulling her election to parliament from Rae Bareilly in 1971.

Gandhi’s explanation of the Emergency reads uncannily similar to Musharraf’s recent statements though, given his general aversion to extensive reading, it is unlikely that he had read Gandhi’s statements before making his own. Quite clearly all rulers in authoritarian mode think alike instinctively and do not need to read the other’s words to be influenced by them.

After administering what she described as “bitter medicine” necessary for the good of a sick “child”, Gandhi decided to secure a mandate from what she expected to be a grateful Indian populace.

Routed

Elections were held in the third week of March 1977 and when results were announced on March 20, the ruling Congress party was routed by an unusual alliance of all anti-Indira forces joined under the banner of the Janata Party. Indira Gandhi lost her own seat in parliament from Rae Bareilly.

For all her authoritarian disposition, Gandhi did not have it in her to try and rig a general election. India’s strong democratic tradition and its independent Election Commission and judiciary would have made it difficult, if not impossible, to thwart the will of the people as expressed at the ballot box.

Over the next three years, Gandhi reorganised her party and apologised to the Indian people for the excesses under Emergency rule and in the subsequent election, a chastened Gandhi and Congress were returned to power.

In Pakistan’s case, Musharraf is not a politician willing to lose power for a few years to return to office in a subsequent election.

Pakistan’s Election Commission and post-Emergency judiciary are mere instruments in the hands of the Executive branch of government, which is firmly controlled by Musharraf.

Public opinion polls indicate that 70 per cent of Pakistanis want Musharraf to quit.

Will Musharraf learn from Indira Gandhi and let the people vote him out by letting the opposition win a two-thirds majority on election day as the polls clearly indicate or will he compound Pakistan’s misery by rigging the polls and creating a new round of confrontation? The future of Pakistan hinges on the answer to that question.

The article was published in Gulf News on February 13, 2008

The recent reminders by the Pakistani authorities that the media should stay “within limits” reflect the mindset of an authoritarian regime. As the legitimacy of the regime erodes further in the eyes of Pakistanis and the international community, the more its henchmen are likely to question the patriotism of those criticising it.

In case of General (retired) Pervez Musharraf the tendency to equate national interest with his opinions or interests is not new. Soon after the 1999 coup that brought him to power, Musharraf addressed newspaper editors in Islamabad and urged them to promote the national interest.

He could not understand the question when an editor asked, “But what if you and I have different ideas about what constitutes national interest?”

In a constitutional democracy, national interest is defined by elected representatives of the people who debate every domestic and foreign policy issue. Out of different views of national interest emerges the view of the majority.

Take the debate that has raged in the United States and Europe over the war in Iraq for several years. President George W. Bush and former British Prime Minister Tony Blair went to the war with reasonable levels of public support within their respective countries.

As elected officials, leaders of democracies owe their jobs to voters, not to the armies or secret services they command. Having been elected, they also have the constitutional right to go ahead with unpopular policies until the next election.

Blair stepped down amid declining popularity because his Labour Party wanted a fresh face to lead it in the next election.

Bush’s Republican Party paid a price for his unpopularity during Congressional elections in 2006 and might suffer a setback again in this year’s polls.

The ability to remove unpopular rulers without bloodshed and debating alternative visions of what is good for the country is the beauty of constitutional democracy.

The authoritarian mindset is very different. It assumes that there is only one valid course that serves the interest of the State and those advocating an alternative course can only be deemed as enemies of the State. But the State and nation are two different concepts.

Before independence, the State in what is today Pakistan, India and Bangladesh was controlled by a foreign nation, Great Britain. The aspirations of the nation were articulated by Mahatma Gandhi and Mohammad Ali Jinnah who wanted to radically alter the State by expelling its British masters.

Point of view

From the point of view of the British State, leaders of the independence movements were acting against the national interest but in the nation’s opinion they were the only true voice of the nation’s interest.

In case of Pakistan, representative political leaders were eliminated from the process of post-independence governance by the permanent employees of the State machinery.

But the first generation of Pakistan’s generals, civil servants and intelligence officials had joined the service of the British-run State and, therefore, could not be legitimate definers of the interest of an independent Pakistani nation.

As the State inherited from the British insisted on shaping the Pakistani nation, rather than the Pakistani nation being allowed to mold the Pakistani State, a battle between State and nation began that continues to this day.

But Pakistan would be better off if constitutional and political mechanisms are allowed to run their course. To make that possible an absolutely free and fair election and reversing arbitrary amendments to the constitution are necessary.

Imposition of a narrowly defined view of national interest by permanent employees of the State has done incalculable harm to Pakistan’s evolution as a nation.

It is a positive sign that serving and retired military officers are now recognising the value of political processes and respecting the right of dissent.

Given that Musharraf’s claim to power rested on his command of the military perhaps the institution also has a responsibility to help undo the harm done by his – and earlier authoritarian rulers’ – mindset.

The article was published in Gulf News on February 6, 2008

Recent reminders by the Pakistani authorities that the media should stay ‘within limits’ reflect the mindset of an authoritarian regime. The more the legitimacy of the regime erodes in the eyes of Pakistanis and the international community, the more its henchmen are likely to question the patriotism of those criticising it.

In the case of General (retired) Pervez Musharraf the tendency to equate the national interest with his opinions or interests is not new. Soon after the 1999 coup that brought him to power, Musharraf addressed newspaper editors in Islamabad and urged them to promote the national interest. He could not understand the question when an editor asked, “But what if you and I have different ideas about what constitutes national interest?”

In a constitutional democracy, national interest is defined by elected representatives of the people who debate every domestic and foreign policy issue. Out of different views of national interest emerges the view of the majority.

Take the debate that has raged in the US and Europe over the war in Iraq for several years. President Bush and former British Prime Minister Tony Blair went into the war with reasonable levels of public support within their countries.

As elected officials, leaders of democracies owe their jobs to voters, not to the armies or secret services they command. Having been elected, they also have the constitutional right to go ahead with unpopular policies until the next election.

Spain’s Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar and Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi lost their jobs because of their support for the Iraq war. Tony Blair stepped down amid declining popularity because his Labour Party wanted a fresh face to lead it in the next election. President Bush’s Republican Party paid a price for his unpopularity during Congressional elections in 2006 and might suffer a setback again in this year’s polls.

The ability to remove unpopular rulers without bloodshed and debating alternative visions of what is good for the country is the beauty of constitutional democracy. Irrespective of the outcome of the debate, the real victor in each political contest is the process that allows disagreement.

The authoritarian mindset is very different. It assumes that there is only one valid course that serves the interest of the state and those advocating an alternative course can only be deemed as enemies of the state. But the state and nation are two different concepts. Before independence, the state in what is today Pakistan, India and Bangladesh was controlled by a foreign nation, the British. The aspirations of the nation were articulated by Gandhi and Jinnah who wanted to radically alter the state by expelling its British masters.

From the point of view of the British state, leaders of the independence movements were acting against the national interest, but in the nation’s opinion they were the only true voice of the nation’s interest.

In case of Pakistan, representative political leaders were eliminated from the process of post-Independence governance by the permanent employees of the state machinery. But the first generation of Pakistan’s generals, civil servants and intelligence officials had joined the service of the British-run state and, therefore, could not be legitimate definers of the interest of an independent Pakistani nation.

In the eyes of the British generation of Pakistan’s civil and military leaders, the state’s interests were no different after independence than they were before. Representatives of the people, reflecting different visions of Pakistan, saw national interest very differently from the narrow definitions offered by those who had been on the wrong side of the independence struggle. As the state inherited from the British insisted on shaping the Pakistani nation, rather than the Pakistani nation being allowed to mould the Pakistani state, a battle between state and nation began that continues to this day.

It is a positive sign that serving and retired military officers are now recognising the value of political processes and respecting the right of dissent.

Given that Musharraf’s claim to power rested on his command of the military perhaps the institution also has a responsibility to help undo the harm done by his — and earlier authoritarian rulers’ — mindset.

The article was Published in The Indian Express on 6 Feb 2008. The writer is director of Boston University’s Centre for International Relations haqqani@bu.edu

Most heads of state paint a positive picture of their nation. During his recent tour of Europe, General (retired) Pervez Musharraf did the exact opposite. According to him, Pakistan’s people are “ill disciplined”, “tribal” and “feudal”, and certainly not ready for modern democracy. Pakistan’s politicians, in his view, are “corrupt”.

Its Supreme Court judges are “politicised”, “inept”, “corrupt” and “nepotistic”. Its most respected media personalities are “undermining our forces and [their] own country”. Pakistan’s religious leaders, we have repeatedly been told, are “extremists”.

The impact of Musharraf’s assertions was reflected in the question posed to me by a European intellectual in the Conference Centre Lounge of the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland. “When he has so much contempt for his own nation why does Musharraf want to lead it?” he wondered.

Before arriving in Davos, Musharraf gave a longish speech in Brussels during which he argued that Pakistan should not be judged by European standards of human rights.

He pleaded with members of the European Parliament to have “more patience” with his unique brand of constitution-suspending “democracy”.

Musharraf’s exact words were, “We are for democracy and I have introduced the essence of democracy, but we cannot be as forward looking as you are [in the West]. Allow us some time to reach that state.”

Describing the West’s concern with democracy in developing countries as an “obsession”, he said, “You have taken centuries to reach where you have come. Allow us time for going for the value that you have reached for yourself.”

The problem with that line of reasoning is that it raises questions about Pakistan’s preparedness for modernity.

Problem

If Pakistan is modern enough to be a nuclear weapons power and an attractive destination for foreign investment, why does it have a problem embracing modern democracy?

If it needs time to be “forward looking” then why should the backwardness apply selectively to human rights and democracy and not to the other characteristics of being a modern power?

Apart from muddying the waters about the prospect of human rights and democracy in Pakistan, Musharraf also confused interviewers and audiences about Pakistan’s priorities in the war against terrorism.

He told his audience at the French Institute for International Relations that it is more important for Pakistani troops to be on the Afghan border to root out the Taliban than search for Al Qaida leaders.

The problem is many Westerners remember that from 2002 onwards Musharraf’s line used to be “We are going after Al Qaida but the Taliban are not such a priority.” His latest U-turn is bound to result in many new research papers and articles in days to come.

Musharraf should not have wasted time touring European capitals to try and convince Western governments of Pakistan’s stability and his own good intentions. He should, instead, have faced the evaporation of support for his authoritarian regime at home.

His trip has helped project Pakistan as a troubled country and his own attitude during that trip has not helped his own battered image.

A simple browsing of all the interviews Musharraf gave during this trip reveals an unwillingness to make adjustments or acknowledge mistakes.

Demonstrations

Similarly, there would have been less embarrassment for the government if handfuls of Musharraf supporters had not been asked to face much larger demonstrations by his critics.

On occasion of Musharraf’s meeting with British Prime Minister Gordon Brown at No. 10 Downing Street, the media reported that 30 pro-Musharraf demonstrators showed up with his portraits to face several hundred opponents.

The one is to ten ratio of supporters to opponents in Londonistan exposed Musharraf’s lack of support in Pakistan even further.

The article was published in Gulf News on January 30, 2008

Most heads of state paint a positive picture of their nation. During his recent tour of Europe, General (retired) Pervez Musharraf did the exact opposite. According to him, Pakistan’s people are “ill disciplined,” “tribal” and “feudal,” and certainly not ready for modern democracy. Pakistan’s politicians, in his view, are “corrupt.”

Its Supreme Court judges are “politicised,” “inept,” “corrupt,” and “nepotistic.” Its most respected media personalities are “undermining our forces and [their] own country.” Pakistan’s religious leaders, we have repeatedly been told, are “extremists.”

The impact of Musharraf’s assertions was reflected in the question posed to me by a European intellectual in the Conference Centre Lounge of the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland. “When he has so much contempt for his own nation why does Musharraf want to lead it?” he wondered.

Before arriving in Davos, Musharraf gave a longish speech in Brussels during which he argued that Pakistan should not be judged by European standards of human rights. He pleaded with members of the European Parliament to have “more patience” with his unique brand of constitution-suspending “democracy.” Musharraf’s exact words were, “We are for democracy and I have introduced the essence of democracy, but we cannot be as forward looking as you are [in the West]. Allow us some time to reach that state.”

Describing the West’s concern with democracy in the third world as an “obsession,” he said, “You have taken centuries to reach where you have come. Allow us time for going for the value that you have reached for yourself.”

The problem with that line of reasoning is that it raises questions about Pakistan’s preparedness for modernity. If Pakistan is modern enough to be a nuclear weapons power and an attractive destination for foreign investment, why does it have a problem embracing modern democracy? If it needs time to be “forward looking” then why should the backwardness apply selectively to human rights and democracy and not to the other characteristics of being a modern power?

Apart from muddying the waters about the prospect of human rights and democracy in Pakistan, Musharraf also confused interviewers and audiences about Pakistan’s priorities in the war against terrorism. He told his audience at the French Institute for International Relations that it is more important for his Pakistani troops on the Afghan border to root out the Taliban than searching for Al-Qaeda leaders.

The problem is many westerners remember that from 2002 onwards, Musharraf’s line used to be “We are going after Al-Qaeda but the Taliban are not such a priority.” His latest U-turn is bound to result in many new research papers and articles in days to come.

Musharraf should not have wasted time touring European capitals to try and convince western governments of Pakistan’s stability and his own good intentions. He should, instead, have faced the evaporation of support for his authoritarian regime at home. His trip has helped project Pakistan as a troubled country and his own attitude during that trip has not helped his own battered image.

A simple browsing of all the interviews Musharraf gave during this trip reveals an unwillingness to make adjustments or acknowledge mistakes.
He told one interviewer that he would leave power when he is convinced that the people of Pakistan want him to quit. But it would only be his “feeling”, not the results of an election or opinion poll that would determine when the people no longer support him. Such reasoning might have impressed Musharraf’s own entourage, it only attracted sighs or giggles from outsiders.

When Nik Gowing of BBC World TV asked him about the statement by 100 retired senior military officers demanding his resignation, Musharraf’s response was that only 10 people had signed the statement. This made him appear like a ruler out of touch with reality. His description of the statement’s signatories as “insignificant personalities” some of whom had “served under me and I kicked them out” showed him to be arrogant. The dignified response from Musharraf to a statement by senior retired military men would have been silence.

On the occasion of Musharraf’s meeting with British Prime Minister Gordon Brown at 10 Downing Street, the media reported that 30 pro-Musharraf demonstrators showed up with his portraits to face several hundred opponents.

The one is to 10 ratio of supporters to opponents in Londonistan exposed Musharraf’s lack of support in Pakistan even further.

The article appeared in Indian Express, on January 30, 2008

The first opinion poll, conducted by Gallup after the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, showed that nearly half of the sample suspected government agencies (23 per cent) and government allied politicians (25 per cent) of killing Bhutto.

Seventeen per cent suspected Al Qaida or the Taliban, while 16 per cent suspected external forces — principally the United States (12 per cent) and India (4 per cent).

The poll raised a fundamental question. If so many people mistrust their own government, how can that government be an effective partner to the US in fighting terrorism and winning hearts and minds against Jihadists?

The suspicions of the Pakistanis about their government can’t be good news for those in the Bush administration who still consider Pervez Musharraf their best bet for keeping Pakistan stable.

For their part, Musharraf and his Western backers offer a simplified thumbnail history lesson that paints Pakistan as a tribal and feudal backwater that can only be held together through military rule.

According to this account of Pakistan’s history and politics, as recounted by retired Colonel Ralph Peters of the US military, “From its founding, Pakistan has been plagued by cults of personality, by personal, feudal loyalties that stymied the development of healthy government institutions (provoking coups by a disgusted military)”.

Thus, Bhutto’s loss is not huge for Pakistan from the point of view of those who think only of managing Pakistan — under military rule and with Western support.

But Pakistan is not a company to be managed. It is a nation that must be united and that is where politicians such as Benazir Bhutto came in.

With Bhutto gone, Pakistan’s faultlines are looking more exposed than ever.

Musharraf, who knows little about winning hearts and minds, and sees politics as an inconvenience in his “sound” administrative approach, is only aggravating Pakistan’s divisions.

He just does not have the healing touch that Pakistan needs. For example, he could end the controversy over who killed Bhutto by accepting an international investigation without any limitations.

His refusal is keeping rumours alive and, as a consequence, the gulf between the government and the people is widening.

Pakistan’s problem has not been the paucity of good civilian leaders. Pakistani politicians are flawed, but so are politicians all over the world.

Pakistan’s problem is the complicated relationship between politicians who cannot be wished away, a military that has a strongly politicised component and successive US governments that seem to prefer military-intelligence control for strategic reasons than to allow the normal functioning of a constitutional democracy.

Created in a hurry under difficult circumstances at the end of the British departure from India, Pakistan inherited a larger army than it resources allowed to maintain.

In the eyes of some, conflict with India necessitated the retention of that army.

Britain and the US were lured to support the military because of strategic concerns during the Cold War. Pakistan became a strategic rentier — a country living off international (mainly American) subsidies.

It remains so under Musharraf though with diminishing internal strength.

The transactional relationship between Pakistan’s military and the United States that Musharraf’s rule has accentuated started soon after Pakistan’s independence — primarily at the initiative of the military leadership.

Pakistan’s military served as an ally in America’s fight du jour (the Cold War, the anti-Soviet Jihad in Afghanistan and now the war against terror) in return for large amounts of aid.

Since 1954, the US has given Pakistan about $21 billion in aid, of which $17.7 billion was given under military rule and only $3.4 billion to elected governments.

In the course of all this, Pakistan also developed its capacity (including nuclear weapons) to compete with India.

But the army could not rule unless it had a fig leaf of domestic legitimacy. For that, it turned to Islam and, at one point, radical Islam.

This is where the Bhutto family comes in. Benazir Bhutto’s father, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, was the first Pakistani leader to call for an end to military rule.

His slogan “Bread, clothing, shelter” resonated with the unwashed masses. His Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) became the country’s largest political movement.

The military could not keep him out of power, especially after Pakistan’s disastrous defeat in the 1971 war with India.
While Bhutto Sr. got power, he did not have full control.

The army, and its intelligence services, continued to conspire against him. He made his share of mistakes, but then, which politician doesn’t?

In 1977, he was removed from power in a military coup and sent to the gallows. Benazir Bhutto, who had never desired a political career, stepped into his shoes.

The struggle against military domination of Pakistan’s politics continued.

Cutout saviours

One third of Pakistan’s 160 million people live below poverty and another one-third are considered vulnerable to poverty.

These people loved Bhutto — both father and daughter — because they symbolised their hope of inclusion in the State of Pakistan instead of being marginalised from it.

The views of Musharraf’s supporters have been shaped by a small clique of international diplomats, parachute journalists and elite Pakistanis.

These people have always liked Pakistan’s generals better than politicians.

Third World dictators have often benefited from “playing” people in the US by painting their own societies as inherently dangerous and themselves as the only people who can save a particular country for the United States.

But now concerns about Musharraf being able to continue his difficult juggling act are making even his supporters somewhat jittery.

Contrary to the view of some in the US, Pakistan’s Islamist problem is a creation of its intelligence service, the ISI.

Like India, Pakistan could also have developed a moderate, democratic state if politicised generals (such as Musharraf) had not wanted to sideline politicians and rally the nation under their command.

The political generals’ refusal to submit to civilian control has resulted in a policy paradigm in which the US is the source of military hardware, India is the eternal enemy and Islam is the national unifier and ideological motivator.

Coup makers’ excuse

Opposite Pakistan’s politicised generals (distinct from professional soldiers who want to defend the country as well as its constitution) are the country’s politicians, often feudal or from the business community.

They would run the country a bit like the US was run in the 19th century or Italy for many years after the Second World War — through compromises among competing factions.

There is corruption under both but in case of the civilians, corruption is invoked as an excuse by coup-makers to thwart the constitutional order.

Politicians are never flawless. To many Pakistanis, and people everywhere, the alleged flaws of popular leaders are just the cost of the business of politics and democracy.

That realisation appears to have dawned on most officers of the Pakistan military.

The new Chief of Army Staff, General Ashfaq Kayani, is responding to the national mood by calling for the military’s withdrawal from politics.

The only remaining question is: at what point does the military withdraw support from Musharraf, who, after all, is now only a widely discredited, faltering politician and not the army chief.

The Bush administration would most likely continue supporting Musharraf a little longer but if, as seems likely, Musharraf’s domestic credibility hits such new lows that he cannot sustain himself in power, Washington’s withdrawal of backing would also follow.

Of course, Musharraf has an honourable way out but he seems disinclined to take it.

He could agree to a transparent international investigation of the Bhutto murder, remove his cronies from top positions as intelligence chiefs and ensure that the February 18 election is totally above board.

Then he could negotiate with Pakistan’s elected leadership and save Pakistan prolonged crisis.

The two leading political figures in post-Bhutto Pakistan — PPP Co-Chairman Asif Zardari and PML-N leader Nawaz Sharif — have both shown remarkable maturity in their words and deeds since Bhutto’s tragic assassination.

If only Musharraf could also rise to the occasion.

Article published in Gulf News on January 17, 2008

Pakistan is a nation in need of healing. The last one year has highlighted the many fissures that have festered below the surface for years. Unity of command, so effective in running a disciplined force like a military unit, has ended up dividing the Pakistani nation.

The first opinion poll, conducted by Gallup, after the assassination of Benazir Bhutto showed that nearly half of the sample suspected government agencies (23 per cent) and government allied politicians (25 per cent) of killing Bhutto.

The response to such widespread mistrust of the government is not dismissive statements by the country’s rulers. A serious effort is now needed to bridge the gap between Pakistan’s state and society.

General (retired) Pervez Musharraf has repeatedly shown that he lacks the ability to heal. He could end the controversy about Bhutto’s death by accepting an international inquiry. But Musharraf thinks like an administrator and insists that since he, as boss, knows there is nothing wrong therefore there is no need for a wider investigation.

At a time when the new army chief, General Ashfaq Kayani, is trying to restore harmony between the army and the people it is imperative that the perception of the military favouring or opposing any political faction or leader is completely erased.

The Citizens Group on Electoral Process (CGEP), in its recent report, has termed the pre-poll electoral process in Pakistan highly unfair, giving it a score of 26 on a scale of 100 in respect of overall fairness of the pre-poll environment spanning over 12 months.

Not free

The judiciary is not free to pronounce on the fairness or otherwise of the election. When Musharraf alone is the decider of what the people want, how will the people ever be able to tell him that they no longer want him?

The thoughtful US politician, Senator Joseph Lieberman, understood the problem with the election process in one visit to Pakistan, something Musharraf is unable to do after running the country for eight years.

Lieberman said, “Opposition parties have little trust the polls will be fair… If there are some bases after the elections for concluding that they were not fair and credible, the consequences, I fear here in Pakistan, will be more division and not the unity that the country needs at this critical moment in its history, facing a serious external threat, now increasing, from Al Qaida.”

A politician would know when some of his staff and officials have become a liability for him. But Musharraf insists on retaining intelligence operatives who are widely despised by the opposition and who are only exacerbating hatred against the government. The political role of intelligence services must end immediately. Pakistan is not a company to be managed. It is a nation that must be brought together.

The need of the hour is a “grand national compromise” that brings to an end the vilification and demonisation of some politicians, restores the military’s prestige and ends its political role, limits the intelligence agencies to external security functions and results in a government that unites the Pakistani nation against terrorism and disintegration.

Musharraf can become part of the Grand National Compromise, salvage some respect, and voluntarily give up on issues relating to a free and fair election. Or he could remain the major wound that must be dealt with before the healing of Pakistan can begin.

The article was published in Gulf Newson January 16, 2008

Pakistan is in need of healing. The last one year has highlighted the many fissures that have festered below the surface for years. Unity of command, so effective in running a disciplined force like a military unit, has ended up dividing the Pakistani nation.

The first opinion poll, conducted by Gallup, after the assassination of Benazir Bhutto showed that nearly half of the sample suspected government agencies (23 per cent) and government allied politicians (25 per cent) of killing her.

The response to such widespread mistrust of the government is not dismissive statements by the country’s rulers. A serious effort is now needed to bridge the gap between Pakistan’s state and society.

Pervez Musharraf has repeatedly shown that he lacks the ability to heal. He could end the controversy about Bhutto’s death by accepting an international inquiry. After all, if the government has nothing to hide why take refuge behind technicalities in clearing up the matter? But Musharraf thinks like an administrator and insists that since he, as boss, knows there is nothing wrong, there is no need for a wider investigation. The government has also limited the scope of the Scotland Yard investigation, which would only keep the controversy and the suspicions stemming from it alive.

Pakistan’s armed forces, once beloved of the people, have suffered a loss of reputation because of their being mired in politics by people like Musharraf. At a time when the new army chief, General Ashfaq Kayani, is trying to restore harmony between the army and the people it is imperative that the perception of the military favouring or opposing any political faction or leader is completely erased.

Musharraf’s lack of healing ability has become obvious in several other self-serving statements. He says he would step down if the people wanted him to quit but he refuses to identify the method whereby the people’s wishes would be determined.

He does not accept opinion polls that show 67 per cent Pakistanis wanting him out. In the civilised world, a free and fair election is the only way to find out what the people want. Musharraf refuses to concede a free election. The Citizens Group on Electoral Process (CGEP), in its recent report, has termed the pre-poll electoral process in Pakistan highly unfair, giving it a score of 26 on a scale of 100 in respect of overall fairness of the pre-poll environment spanning over 12 months.

The judiciary is not free to pronounce on the fairness or otherwise of the election. When Musharraf alone can decide what the people want, how will the people ever be able to tell him that they no longer want him?

The thoughtful US politician, Senator Joseph Lieberman, understood the problem with the election process in one visit to Pakistan, something Musharraf is unable to do after running the country for eight years. Lieberman said, “Opposition parties have little trust the polls will be fair. If there are some bases after the elections for concluding that they were not fair and credible, the consequences, I fear here in Pakistan, will be more division and not the unity that the country needs at this critical moment in its history, facing a serious external threat, now increasing, from Al Qaeda.”

A politician would know when some of his staff and officials have become a liability for him. But Musharraf insists on retaining intelligence operatives who are widely despised by the opposition and who are only exacerbating hatred against the government. Some members of Pakistan’s intelligence services have tortured, blackmailed, pressured or undermined too many civilian politicians, journalists and civil society activists to be credible any more as protectors of the state. The political role of intelligence services must end immediately.

Pakistan is not a company to be managed. It is a nation that must be brought together. Politicians alone can manage popular sentiment as PPP co-chairman Asif Zardari recently demonstrated when his comments about the federation, the military and Punjab calmed down an outraged Sindhi and Baloch population.

The need of the hour is a ‘grand national compromise’ that brings to an end the vilification and demonisation of some politicians, restores the military’s prestige and ends its political role, limits the intelligence agencies to external security functions and results in a government that unites the Pakistani nation against terrorism and disintegration.

Politicians and the permanent state apparatus must become partners, bringing to an end the subordinate relationship that the Musharraf-bred system has created with electable politicians. Pakistan must be run according to its constitution. An independent judiciary and a free media should be the guardians against abuse of power by elected officials.

Musharraf can become part of the grand national compromise, salvage some respect, and voluntarily give in on issues relating to a free and fair election. Or he could remain the major wound that must be dealt with before the healing of Pakistan can begin.

Article was published in Indian Express on January 16, 2008