Politics catches up with the general

Indian Express, March 28, 2007

After a week of violent protests marking the lowest point in his relations with the judiciary, media and civil society, General Pervez Musharraf is currently in damage control mode. He may well succeed in riding out the current storm, with the resources of the state at his command, and the ability to coax, cajole, threaten and bribe widely.

The disaster that began with Musharraf’s decision to sack Supreme Court Chief Justice, Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry, has exposed the house of cards over which General Musharraf presides. If Musharraf and his fellow generals do not learn the real lessons of their current predicament, Pakistan will continue to hurtle from crisis to crisis.

After initially insisting that he had done nothing wrong, Musharraf claimed at the end of last week that the protests against his government were the result of a “conspiracy.” Musharraf was most likely misguided in his decision to move against the Supreme Court chief justice by a scary report from an intelligence agency. If there was indeed a conspiracy against Musharraf, it came from quarters closest to him.

Citibanker Shaukat Aziz, who serves as prime minister with little public support, drew attention to the Musharraf-Aziz regime’s principal source of weakness when he said that his government would not allow anyone to “politicise” the public’s anger over judicial manipulation. Both the decision to fire the chief justice and the reaction to it are already political. By denying that they overstepped their limits and took an action that led to the expression of simmering discontent, Musharraf and Aziz betrayed their lack of understanding of political processes.

The general and his technocrat deputy both look upon governance as a management function devoid of politics, hence their expression of surprise at the political reaction to their judicial coup. But the general and the technocrat fail to recognise that governance is a function of politics and it is just their good fortune and the result of the past mistakes of Pakistan’s political class that they have averted political calamity so far.

Now politics is catching up with them and unless they wake up to the value of politics, their little road show backed by billions of dollars in US aid money is headed for a rough patch.

The apocryphal story is told of how Pakistan’s first military ruler, Field Marshal Ayub Khan, learnt that the nation had turned against him when one of his grandchildren came home chanting “Ayub kutta hai hai” (Down with the dog Ayub). The child told the grandfather that this was the popular chant at his elementary school though he was too young to know its meaning.

Ayub Khan initiated talks with opposition politicians after five months of street protests and in the end handed power to another general. But he could never understand why the nation for which he had done so much in terms of military build-up and development turned against him.

Ayub Khan’s attitude was not very different from that of the British viceregal apparatus that complained against the ingratitude of South Asians. The natives demanded independence under indigenous leaders who, in British eyes, did not compare favourably with the Raj’s track record of laying down railway lines, building irrigation systems, institutionalising education and developing modern governance.

Both Ayub Khan and the British missed out the value of politics, which was defined by sociologist Max Weber as “striving to share power or striving to influence the distribution of power, either among states or among groups within a state.”

General Musharraf’s mindset is, in many ways, not different from that of Ayub Khan or the British officers preceding him. This mindset considers politics as a lowly occupation and legitimacy a minor technicality. Its other beliefs include the view that a government must be judged by its “performance,” not its constitutionality. That is why it considers charges of receiving kickbacks (that is, financial corruption) as worse than violating or even suspending the constitution.

Pakistan’s generals and their English-speaking, drawing room dwelling supporters have tried repeatedly to make the nation walk in a straight line but their efforts have come to naught. Politics is simply not the army’s job. It is not trained for it and is as incongruent in the political arena as an engineer in a hospital trying to fill the doctor’s shoes on grounds of the doctor’s incompetence.

The fiasco following Musharraf’s attempt to fire the chief justice and to silence the media should result in something more than short term damage control. It should lead to a grand national bargain that diminishes the role of the army and the intelligence services in the nation’s life. Politics — the striving to share power or striving to influence the distribution of power among groups within the state must be allowed to run its course.

US ties with Pakistan show a specific pattern

Gulf News, March 28, 2007

Pakistan’s military regime headed by General Pervez Musharraf remains a close ally of the United States and the US remains unwilling to criticise Musharraf out of fear of losing his cooperation.

When Musharraf fired the Supreme Court Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry, prompting massive demonstrations, the US State Department’s comments called for “restraint on all sides”. The department spokesman insisted that Musharraf was “acting in the best interests of Pakistan and the Pakistani people”.

There is a pattern in US-Pakistan relations. For 60 years, they have gone through cycles of massive aid, followed by threats of sanctions and then application of sanctions.

Pakistan has been an ally of the United States during the Cold War, in the war of resistance against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and currently in the global war against terror. Each period of close US-Pakistan ties began with great hopes and ended up in tremendous disappointment for both sides.

The reasons are not difficult to identify. During each period of close ties, the US depended on an army general to deliver on a specific laundry list of expectations.

The general in question sought US economic and military assistance, which prolonged his rule and improved Pakistan’s position in its military competition with the much larger neighbour, India.

Close relations between Pakistan and the United States are in the interest of both nations. But the relationship between the two countries must go beyond the exchange of aid and policy concessions that has characterised their interaction thus far.

Currently, the Bush administration seems desirous of continuing its reliance on Musharraf, assuming that increased aid would somehow increase American leverage with a weakening military regime in Pakistan.

Restrictions

Congress, on the other hand, seems to be contemplating restrictions on aid and the prospect of sanctions. Neither approach is likely to serve even the short-term purpose of securing Pakistan’s cooperation in the global war against terrorism.

Soon after the fall of East Pakistan and the emergence of Bangladesh in 1971, Air Marshal Nur Khan – a war hero and former Pakistan Air Force chief – told an American diplomat that Pakistan had suffered because its elite was “addicted to aid”.

US Congressman Gary Ackerman, Chairman of the Middle East and South Asia subcommittee of the US House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs echoed a similar view when he observed at a recent hearing, “There doesn’t seem to be any problem in Pakistan that can’t be cured with a little more US assistance.”

Actual and budgeted amounts of US aid for Pakistan during the period 2001-08 total $5.174 billions. It is estimated that an additional $80-$100 million are given each month in coalition support funds – a total of $4.75 billion until August 2006. There are no publicly available estimates for covert transfers of funds to Pakistan’s army and intelligence services.

Most of the American aid money has gone towards Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and Econ-omic Support Fund (ESF). Very little of it has flowed in ways that are visible to the Pakistani people as altering their daily lives.

For comparison, actual and budgeted USAID figures for 2001-2007 reflect $1.2 billion in FMF, $1.9 billion in ESF, $111.7 million for Child Survival and Health and a token $64 million for democracy promotion.

The allocation for Child Survival and Health amounts to less than a dollar per person, given the size of Pakistan’s population.
The United States is viewed by most Pakistanis as being firmly behind army rule in their country. The three periods of significant flow of US aid to Pakistan have all coincided with military rule in Pakistan.

According to figures provided by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) between 1954 and 2002, the US provided a total of $12.6 billion in economic and military aid to Pakistan. Of these $9.19 billion were given during 24 years of military rule while only $3.4 billion were provided to civilian regimes covering 19 years.

On average, US aid to Pakistan amounted to $382.9 million for each year of military rule compared with only $178.9 per annum under civilian leadership for the period until 2002.

The largesse towards the Musharraf regime almost doubles the average figure of annual aid under military rule to $760 million per year for each year of military rule.

Pakistan and the United States would be better served by a policy of nuanced engagement, in which US officials frankly share their concerns with Pakistan’s rulers and go beyond them to engage Pakistan’s people.

It would be far better than the current policy of portraying one individual – Musharraf – and one institution – the Pakistan army – as America’s best bet.

The General in Question

Indian Express, March 28, 2007

Pakistan’s military regime headed by General Pervez Musharraf remains a close ally of the United States and the US remains unwilling to criticise Musharraf out of fear of losing his cooperation. When Musharraf fired the chief justice, prompting massive demonstrations, the US state department’s comments called for “restraint on all sides”. The department spokesman insisted that Musharraf was “acting in the best interests of Pakistan and the Pakistani people”.

There is a pattern in US-Pakistan relations. For sixty years, they have gone through cycles of massive aid, followed by threats of sanctions and then application of sanctions.

Pakistan has been an ally of the United States during the cold war, in the war of resistance against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and currently in the global war against terror. Each period of close US-Pakistan ties began with great hopes and ended up in tremendous disappointment for both sides.

The reasons are not difficult to identify. During each period of close ties, the US depended on an army general to deliver on a specific laundry list of expectations. The general in question sought US economic and military assistance, which prolonged his rule and improved Pakistan’s position in its military competition with the much larger neighbour, India.

Close relations between Pakistan and the United States are in the interest of both nations. But the relationship between the two countries must go beyond the exchange of aid and policy concessions that has characterised their interaction thus far.

Currently, the Bush administration seems desirous of continuing its reliance on General Musharraf, assuming that increased aid would somehow increase American leverage with a weakening military regime in Pakistan.

Congress, on the other hand, seems to be contemplating restrictions on aid and the prospect of sanctions. Neither approach is likely to serve even the short-term purpose of securing Pakistan’s cooperation in the global war against terrorism.

Soon after the fall of East Pakistan and the emergence of Bangladesh in 1971, Air Marshal Nur Khan — a war hero and former Pakistan air force chief — told an American diplomat that Pakistan had suffered because of its elite was “addicted to aid”.

US Congressman Gary Ackerman, chairman of the Middle East and South Asia subcommittee of the US House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, echoed a similar view when he observed at a recent hearing, “There doesn’t seem to be any problem in Pakistan that can’t be cured with a little more US assistance.”

Actual and budgeted amounts of US aid for Pakistan during the period 2001-2008 total $5.174 billion. It is estimated that an additional $80-100 million is given each month in coalition support funds — a total of $4.75 billion until August 2006. There are no publicly available estimates for covert transfers of funds to Pakistan’s army and intelligence services.

Most of the American aid money has gone towards Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and Economic Support Fund (ESF). Very little of it has flowed in ways that are visible to the Pakistani people as altering their daily lives.

For comparison, actual and budgeted USAID figures for 2001-2007 reflect $1.2 billion in FMF, $1.9 billion in ESF, $111.7 million for Child Survival and Health and a token $64 million for democracy promotion. The allocation for Child Survival and Health amounts to less than a dollar per person, given the size of Pakistan’s population.

The United States is viewed by most Pakistanis as being firmly behind army rule in their country. The three periods of significant flow of US aid to Pakistan have all coincided with military rule in Pakistan.

According to figures provided by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) between 1954 and 2002, the US provided a total of $12.6 billion in economic and military aid to Pakistan. Of these $9.19 billion were given during 24 years of military rule while only $3.4 billion were provided to civilian regimes covering 19 years.

On average, US aid to Pakistan amounted to $382.9 million for each year of military rule compared with only $178.9 per annum under civilian leadership for the period until 2002. The largesse towards the Musharraf regime almost doubles the average figure of annual aid under military rule to $760 million per year for each year of military rule.

Pakistan and the United States would be better served by a policy of nuanced engagement, in which US officials frankly share their concerns with Pakistan’s rulers and go beyond them to engage Pakistan’s people. It would be far better than the current policy of portraying one individual (General Musharraf) and one institution (the Pakistan army) as America’s best bet.

Musharraf in the eye of a judicial storm

Gulf News, March 21, 2007

After a week of violent protests marking the lowest point in his relations with the judiciary, the media and civil society, Pakistan’s President General Pervez Musharraf is currently in damage control mode.

He may well succeed in riding out the current storm, with the resources of the state at his command, and the ability to coax, cajole, threaten and bribe widely.

The disaster that began with Musharraf’s decision to sack Supreme Court Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry has exposed the house of cards over which Musharraf presides.

If Musharraf and his fellow generals do not learn the real lessons of their current predicament, Pakistan will continue to hurtle forward from crisis to crisis.

After initially insisting that he had done nothing wrong, Musharraf claimed at the end of last week that the protests against his government were the result of a “conspiracy”.

Musharraf was most likely misguided in his decision to move against the Supreme Court Chief Justice by a scary report from an intelligence agency. If there was indeed a conspiracy against Musharraf, it came from quarters closest to him.

Citibanker Shaukat Aziz, who serves as prime minister with little public support, drew attention to the Musharraf-Aziz regime’s principal source of weakness when he said that his government would not allow anyone to “politicise” the public’s anger over judicial manipulation.

Overstepped their limits

Both the decision to fire the Chief Justice and the reaction to it are already political. By denying that they overstepped their limits and took an action that led to the expression of simmering discontent, Musharraf and Aziz betrayed their lack of understanding of political processes.

The general and his technocrat deputy both look upon governance as a management function devoid of politics, hence their expression of surprise at the political reaction to their judicial coup.

But the general and the technocrat fail to recognise that governance is a function of politics and it is just their good fortune and the result of the past mistakes of Pakistan’s political class that they have averted political calamity so far.

Now politics is catching up with them and unless they wake up to the value of politics, their little road show backed by billions of dollars in United States aid money is headed for a rough patch.

The apocryphal story is told of how Pakistan’s first military ruler, Field Marshal Ayoub Khan, learnt that the nation had turned against him when one of his grandchildren came home chanting “Ayoub kutta hai hai” (Ayoub the dog, shame, shame).

The child told the grandfather that this was the popular chant at his elementary school though he was too young to know its meaning.

Ayoub Khan initiated talks with opposition politicians after five months of street protests and in the end handed power to another general. But he could never understand why the nation for which he had done so much in terms of military build-up and development turned against him.

Ayoub Khan’s attitude was not very different from that of the British vice-regal apparatus that complained against the ingratitude of South Asians.

The natives demanded independence under indigenous leaders who, in British eyes, did not compare favourably with the Raj’s track record of laying down railway lines, building irrigation systems, institutionalising education and developing modern governance.

Both Ayoub Khan and the British missed out the value of politics, which was defined by Sociologist Max Weber as “striving to share power or striving to influence the distribution of power, either among states or among groups within a state”.

Mindset

Musharraf’s mindset is, in many ways, not different from that of Ayoub Khan or the British officers preceding him. This mindset considers politics a lowly occupation and legitimacy a minor technicality.

Its other beliefs include the view that a government must be judged by its “performance”, not its constitutionality. That is why it considers charges of receiving kickbacks (ie financial corruption) as worse than violating or even suspending the constitution.

Pakistan’s generals and their English-speaking, drawing room dwelling supporters have tried repeatedly to make the nation walk in a straight line but their efforts have come to naught.

Politics is simply not the army’s job. It is not trained for it and is as incongruent in the political arena as an engineer in a hospital trying to fill the doctor’s shoes on grounds of the doctor’s incompetence.

The fiasco following Musharraf’s attempt to fire the Chief Justice and to silence the media should result in something more than short term damage control.

It should lead to a grand national bargain that diminishes the role of the army and the intelligence services in the nation’s life. Politics – the striving to share power or striving to influence the distribution of power among groups within the state -must be allowed to run its course.

Injustice in Pakistan

Gulf News, March 14, 2007

Reality is catching up furiously with those who believe that Pakistan’s principal problem is a poor international image. The world can hardly be expected to admire a country where, in addition to frequent terrorist attacks and violence, the executive branch of government succeeds in sacking three chief justices in less than a decade.

Apolitical Pakistani professionals and technocrats often join the establishment in arguing that if only everyone highlighted the positive, things would look good and the flaws and weaknesses of the Pakistani State would somehow disappear.

But how can anyone find anything positive in General Pervez Musharraf’s sacking of Supreme Court Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry, the latest assault on an already weakened and docile judiciary?

Here are the facts as an outsider would see them: Pakistan’s army chief, who took power seven-and-a-half years ago after sacking an elected prime minister because the prime minister wanted to replace the army chief, has now “suspended” the country’s chief justice. The chief justice was allegedly involved in misconduct, just as the sacked prime minister was termed “corrupt” and “undermining national security”.

Earlier, the sacked prime minister had got rid of another chief justice by getting supporters of the ruling party to storm the supreme court building. And the army chief who removed the latest chief justice had earlier got rid of another chief justice by insisting that the chief justice and his fellow judges swear an oath of loyalty to him before the court could decide the constitutionality (or otherwise) of the army chief’s coup d’etat.

How many countries in recent times have a track record like that?

Musharraf appointed Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry as chief justice almost two years ago and clearly found nothing wrong with him at that time. But Justice Chaudhry proved to be a maverick, all too willing to take cases that the government did not want heard. He gave judgments that made life complicated or plain embarrassing for the military-intelligence bureaucracy (such as the one relating Pakistan’s “disappeared”.)

This unprecedented event — the firing of the chief justice followed by keeping him incommunicado — proves that regime survival has trumped national survival under Pakistan’s authoritarian rulers. The result has been the erosion of all Pakistani institutions, including the army, which has lost effectiveness through politicisation.

The uproar resulting from the removal of the chief justicecomes on the heel of a burgeoning loss of credibility in Pakistan’s status as a frontline American ally in the war against terrorism.

Pakistani officials arrested Taliban official Mullah Obaidullah Akhund in Quetta while the US Vice-President Dick Cheney was visiting Pakistan to encourage Musharraf’s fulfillment of his promises in dealing with the Al Qaida and Taliban menace. Instead of impressing the Americans, Mullah Obaidullah’s arrest raised several questions.

For the last four years, Pakistani officials had denied reports, including statements by Afghan officials, about the presence of senior Taliban figures in Quetta.

Now suddenly, with Cheney in Islamabad, the Taliban No. 3 appeared as if out of nowhere in the city where for four years no Taliban presence was known to Pakistani authorities.

It is contradictions such as these, in addition to the general lack of adherence to constitutional or legal norms reflected in the chief justice’s high-handed removal.

Apart from his role in the war against terrorism, Musharraf has invoked the economic performance of his regime as a substitute for legitimacy and as justification for his remaining in power. But concerns are now surfacing over the rapidly increasing trade deficit and simultaneously declining textile exports.

It now appears that the much touted economic miracle of the last five years was less a function of the wizardry of Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz and more a reflection of America’s largesse towards a crucial ally.

In addition to the over $5 billion received from the US in economic and military assistance, Musharraf’s regime has been receiving an additional $100 million per month from Washington as reimbursement for costs incurred on Pakistan’s counter-terrorism activities.

That brings the transfer of funds from the US to Pakistan to a total of at least $10 billion. The exact amount of covert payments is not known even to the US researchers and most Congressional aides.

Pakistan’s image cannot improve until its elite understands the value and importance of straightening out the country’s politics — deciding once and for all who will wield power, under what terms and for how long — as the central question facing the country. At this point in time, Pakistan’s image is a secondary issue that can be addressed once the reality improves.

Pakistan Doesnt’ Have An Image Problem

ndian Express, March 14, 2007

Reality is catching up furiously with those who believe that Pakistan’s principal problem is a poor international image. The world can hardly be expected to admire a country where, in addition to frequent terrorist attacks and violence, the executive branch of government succeeds in sacking three chief justices in less than a decade.

Apolitical Pakistani professionals and technocrats often join the establishment in arguing that if only everyone highlighted the positive, things would look good and the flaws and weaknesses of the Pakistani state would somehow disappear. But how can anyone find anything positive in General Pervez Musharraf’s sacking of Supreme Court Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry, the latest assault on an already weakened and docile judiciary?

Here are the facts as an outsider would see them: Pakistan’s army chief, who took power seven and a half years ago after sacking an elected prime minister because the prime minister wanted to replace the army chief, has now “suspended” the country’s chief justice. The chief justice was allegedly involved in misconduct, just as the sacked prime minister was termed “corrupt” and “undermining national security.”

Earlier, the sacked prime minister had got rid of another chief justice by getting supporters of the ruling party to storm the Supreme Court building. And the army chief who removed the latest chief justice had earlier got rid of another chief justice by insisting that the chief justice and his fellow judges swear an oath of loyalty to him before the court could decide the constitutionality (or otherwise) of the army chief’s coup d’etat.

How many countries in recent times have a track record like that?

General Pervez Musharraf appointed Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry as chief justice almost two years ago and clearly found nothing wrong with him at that time. But Justice Chaudhry proved to be a maverick, all too willing to take cases that the government did not want heard. He gave judgments that made life complicated or plain embarrassing for the military-intelligence bureaucracy (such as the one relating to Pakistan’s “disappeared.”)

This unprecedented event — the firing of the chief justice followed by keeping him incommunicado — proves that regime survival has trumped national survival under Pakistan’s authoritarian rulers. The result has been the erosion of all Pakistani institutions, including the army, which has lost effectiveness through politicisation.

The uproar resulting from the removal of the chief justice of Pakistan comes on the heel of a burgeoning loss of credibility in Pakistan’s status as a frontline American ally in the war against terrorism.

Pakistani officials arrested Taliban official Mullah Obaidullah Akhund in Quetta while US Vice President Dick Cheney was visiting Pakistan to encourage General Musharraf’s fulfillment of his promises in dealing with the Al-Qaeda and Taliban menace. Instead of impressing the Americans, Mullah Obaidullah’s arrest raised several questions.

For the last four years, Pakistani officials had denied reports, including statements by Afghan officials, about the presence of senior Taliban figures in Quetta. Now suddenly, with Cheney in Islamabad, the Taliban No. 3 appeared as if out of nowhere in the city where for four years no Taliban presence was known to Pakistani authorities. It is contradictions such as these, in addition to the general lack of adherence to constitutional or legal norms, that are reflected in the chief justice’s high-handed removal.

Apart from his role in the war against terrorism, General Musharraf has invoked the economic performance of his regime as a substitute for legitimacy and as justification for his remaining in power. But concerns are now surfacing over the rapidly increasing trade deficit and simultaneously declining textile exports.

It now appears that the much touted economic miracle of the last five years was less a function of the wizardry of Shaukat Aziz and more a reflection of America’s largesse towards a crucial ally. In addition to the over 5 billion dollars received from the US in economic and military assistance, General Musharraf’s regime has been receiving an additional $100 million per month from Washington as reimbursement for costs incurred on Pakistan’s counter-terrorism activities. That brings the transfer of funds from the US to Pakistan to a total of at least $10 billion. The exact amount of covert payments is not known even to US researchers and most Congressional aides.

Pakistan’s image cannot improve until its elite understands the value and importance of straightening out the country’s politics — deciding once and for all who will wield power, under what terms and for how long — as the central question facing the country. At this point in time, Pakistan’s image is a secondary issue that can be addressed once the reality improves.

But where’s the state

Indian Express, March 1, 2007

Developments of the last fortnight can be seen as a sort of balance sheet reflecting the strengths and weaknesses of the Pakistani state. Pakistan successfully tested the latest version of its long-range nuclear-capable missile, Shaheen II. It has the capability to hit major cities in India, according to Pakistan’s military. For those who measure Pakistan’s success in terms of a military balance against India, this addition to Pakistan’s arsenal is a sign of the country’s expanding strength.

Other events, however, indicate that Pakistan’s supposed ability to externally project its power is not matched with the potency of an effective state at home. Up to 17 people, including a senior civil judge, were killed and 30 wounded in a powerful suicide bombing in the Quetta district courts compound on February 17. The next day, two children were killed and three security force personnel seriously injured in two landmine explosions in Balochistan. The same day, at least 67 people were killed and over 50 wounded in a fire that swept through two coaches of the India-Pakistan Samjhauta Express. In the relatively sleepy central Punjab town of Cheechawatni, three suspected militants were killed when a bomb they were carrying on a bicycle accidentally exploded.

On February 20 an Islamist “fanatic” shot and killed the Punjab provincial Social Welfare Minister Zile Huma Usman in an open court in Gujranwala. The attacker said he wanted to punish the woman minister for not covering her face, which he considers obligatory in his interpretation of Islam’s concept of hijab.

A couple of days later, at least seven people were seriously injured in two separate landmine explosions in Balochistan while unknown assailants blew up a gas pipeline in the restive province. Several hundred female students from an Islamic seminary in the centre of Islamabad have been holed up for the last month inside a public library, and their supporters have threatened a campaign of suicide bombings if forcibly evicted from the occupied library.

Five private English medium schools providing co-education in Peshawar were told that suicide bombers might target co-education private schools. A school for girls in Mardan was warned that its building would be bombed if teachers and students did not start observing hijab or wearing veils. In other news with bad implications, an editor of an Urdu daily, Sohail Qalander, and his friend, Mohammad Niaz, managed to escape from captors who had kidnapped them almost two months ago. Their kidnappers demanded the journalists “stop writing against smugglers, kidnappers and mafia groups.”

The negative news stories of the last fifteen days affirm what official Pakistan refuses to acknowledge, the gradual weakening of the Pakistani state. Notwithstanding the possession of nuclear weapons and missiles, Pakistan is far from being an effective state. In fact, in the process of building extensive military capabilities, Pakistan’s successive rulers have allowed the degradation of essential internal attributes of statehood.

An important attribute of a state is its ability to maintain monopoly, or at least the preponderance, of public coercion. The proliferation of insurgents, militias, mafiosi and high ordinary criminality reflect the state’s weakness in this key area.

Discussions of Pakistan’s politics are almost always about personalities rather than the issues. As the Pakistani state falters, it is time not to talk only in terms of whether one individual is better for the country or another. It is time to identify where the Pakistani state has lost its direction.

A modern state is distinguished by impersonal rule. Personalisation, corruption, familial dominance and re-tribalisation are considered signs of weakening of the state. Failures of rule of law, weak judiciaries, failures of regulation and the dominance of a lawless executive, coupled with the failure to maintain public goods (education, environment, public health, electricity and water supply) are all considered indicators of state failure. Autonomists, secessionists, irredentists and vacuum fillers emerge wherever the dimensions of being a state begin to weaken.

Instead of focusing all their energies on maintaining military power, Pakistan’s rulers must recognise the weakening of essential qualities of being a state. Adherence to the constitution, restoration of rule of law, normal contestation for power, and the rebuilding of civilian institutions are essential if Pakistan is to avoid a slide into anarchy.