Op-Eds

Indian Express , November 16, 2007

Between them, Pakistan’s four military rulers since 1958 have virtually created a new concept in political science that can best be termed ‘the divine right of army chiefs’. It is patterned on the ‘divine right of kings,’ the absolutist doctrine that asserted that a monarch derived his right to rule from the will of God.

According to the doctrine of divine right, a king’s authority could not be restricted by the will of his subjects, the aristocracy, the judiciary or a Constitution. Any attempt to depose the king or to restrict his powers was deemed as rebellion against the will of God. A similar philosophy appears to be at work in Pakistan. Only a belief in the divine right of army chiefs can explain some of the assertions made by General Pervez Musharraf in his press conference over the weekend. Quite clearly, he sees his decisions as the law of the land.

His statements also indicate his belief that the army chiefs, and not judges, have the ultimate authority to interpret the law. But he is not the first military chief to consider himself above the law. Field Marshal Ayub Khan abrogated the 1956 Constitution and then introduced a Constitution in 1962, which began with words to the effect, “I, Field Marshal Ayub Khan, do hereby give the Islamic Republic of Pakistan the following Constitution.”

That language was unusually similar to the one used by King John of England in the preface of the Magna Carta in 1215! In 1969, Ayub Khan abrogated the 1962 Constitution and handed power over to the next army chief in a move akin to abdication in a monarchy.

And after elections in 1970 created a split mandate, Major General Yahya Khan came to believe that he had been assigned a mission by the Almighty to save Pakistan from politicians he believed to be corrupt. That led to civil war, Indian intervention and ultimately the division of Pakistan in 1971.

The lesson should have been to acknowledge that the complex problems of a nation such as Pakistan cannot be solved by the simple though straightforward approach of a soldier with a sense of God-given mission. But that did not prevent General Zia ul Haq from assuming power in 1977 and ruling with an iron hand. Zia ul Haq added enforcement of Islam and promotion of violent jihadism to the list of his God-given tasks, creating many lasting problems in Pakistan.

General Musharraf, too, has repeatedly demonstrated that his status as army chief somehow places him above the rest of the citizenry in understanding and solving Pakistan’s problems.

Musharraf has, however, never shown much awareness of matters political and constitutional. His ignorance of history was revealed when, while visiting the Gandhi memorial during the course of the Agra summit in 2001, he asked his Indian hosts, “so how did Gandhi die?” Even now, he has expelled three reporters from Britain’s Daily Telegraph because of an editorial in the paper that used “foul and abusive language” to allude to General Musharraf. The Telegraph editorial referred to language reportedly used by former US president Franklin D. Roosevelt in expressing Washington’s grudging support for Nicaragua’s then dictator Anastasio Somoza. Anyone well versed in political history and debates over US support for strongmen would have known the reference and taken it in its political context.

In 1999, General Musharraf explained his military takeover by blaming Pakistan’s politicians and insisted that he needed to correct the country’s course by changing its politics. Now he maintains that he alone knows how to correct the course of Pakistan’s judiciary. Musharraf must recognise, sooner rather than later, that he and the rulers of Myanmar will be the only ones left in the world who believe that a coup-making general can successfully lead a country forever. The rest of the world left behind ideas about the divine right of rulers, whether kings or generals, a long time ago.

Wall Street Journal , November 8, 2007

When Gen. Pervez Musharraf suspended Pakistan’s Constitution, declared a state of emergency and put the nation once again under martial law, he expected limited civilian resistance and only ritual international condemnation, in view of his role in the war against terrorism. On both counts, Mr. Musharraf appears to have badly miscalculated.
Police officers clash with lawyers outside the district courts in Multan, Pakistan, on Nov. 6, 2007.
Pakistan’s burgeoning civil society, led by lawyers and encouraged by judges ousted from the Supreme Court, is refusing to be cowed. Protests are spreading despite thousands of arrests and the use of tear gas and batons against peaceful demonstrators. More than 1,700 attorneys have been jailed but still more are taking to the streets. University students have joined the lawyers, and former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto has vowed to violate a ban on public meetings by leading a rally on Friday.

There are a number of important reasons why Pakistan’s attorneys are leading the protests against Mr. Musharraf. They have a long tradition of activism for rule of law and human-rights issues. In 1968-69, the lawyers started the campaign that resulted in the ouster of Pakistan’s first military ruler, Field Marshal Ayub Khan. They also were at the forefront of the campaign against Mr. Zia-ul-Haq, whose 11-year military rule ended when he died in a 1988 plane crash.

The legal fraternity has another advantage, in that they can afford to confront the government without fearing starvation for their families. Some 65 million of Pakistan’s 160 million people subsist on less than $1 a day, while another 65 million survive just above the poverty line. The poor are willing to participate in organized rallies, such as the one that welcomed Ms. Bhutto back to Pakistan on Oct. 18 (and was targeted by a suicide terrorist), but they generally avoid protest demonstrations where getting arrested and missing work is almost inevitable.

That could change in the days and weeks to come. Although Mr. Musharraf has taken all private and international television channels off the air, images of the protests are being seen all over Pakistan through the Internet and with satellite dishes. Middle-class Pakistanis, and increasingly the poor, are making it clear that they want political freedom, along with an improvement in their economic prospects, and do not consider prosperity and democracy to be mutually exclusive.

The international community has also responded more strongly than Mr. Musharraf expected. The Netherlands has suspended aid, and several donors are reviewing their policy on military and economic assistance. The Bush administration is hoping to defuse the situation through assertive diplomacy. But withdrawal of aid, supported by several congressional leaders, remains a possibility.

Since 9/11, Mr. Musharraf has positioned himself as the key Western ally in the global war against terrorism. But in recent months, he has been too distracted with domestic politics to play an effective role. The U.S., in particular, does not want anti-Musharraf sentiment to result in a fresh wave of anti-Americanism in Pakistan that further fuels terrorism. While some in the U.S. argue about America’s limited options in dealing with the crisis in Pakistan, one could argue that Mr. Musharraf’s options are even more limited.

The more he has to repress critics and political opponents, the less Pakistan will be able to fight terrorism. After all, when troops have to be deployed to detain Supreme Court judges, journalists, lawyers and politicians, there are fewer troops available to fight terrorists. Pakistan’s intelligence services can either spy on dissenting Pakistani civilians or focus their energies on finding Osama bin Laden and his ever increasing number of deputies and operatives around Pakistan. But Pakistan needs to fight terrorism for Pakistan’s sake. Mr. Musharraf cannot endlessly blackmail Washington by hinting that he would withdraw antiterror cooperation if the U.S. pressures him on other issues, including democracy and human-rights violations.

One thing is clear: Mr. Musharraf’s authoritarianism is being challenged by diverse elements in Pakistani society. His self-cultivated image as a benign dictator is a thing of the past, and his recent harsh measures have failed to frighten Pakistan’s civil society and political opposition into submission.

The defiance of the judiciary and the media might not immediately topple Mr. Musharraf, but it could render him ineffective to a point where the military rethinks its options. The army will soon recognize that the only thing keeping the general and his civilian cronies in power is the army’s support. It risks further alienating the Pakistani people and losing their respect as long as it continues to act solely in the interests of Mr. Musharraf and his small band of political allies. At some point, the professional soldiers will wonder whether they should risk their institution’s position to keep him in power.

The army is Mr. Musharraf’s support base. It is a major beneficiary of U.S. security assistance, having received $17 billion since 1954 with equipment worth several hundred million dollars currently in the pipeline. Since 2002, the U.S. has subsidized the Pakistani army to the tune of $150 million per month. The army is also a stakeholder in Pakistan’s growing economy, which benefits from international aid and investment. If Mr. Musharraf’s autocratic policies threaten Pakistan’s prosperity, the army is likely to be less unanimous in its support of its commander.

Already, there are signs of economic fallout from the political turmoil. Rumors of an anti-Musharraf military coup on Monday caused the biggest one-day decline in 16 months on the Karachi Stock Exchange, resulting in losses of an estimated $1.3 billion. Pakistan’s credit rating has been revised downward in anticipation of further civic unrest and international sanctions.

Pakistanis are used to coups d’état where the army takes the helm of government. Things are different this time. In the past, generals have suspended the constitution to remove from power unpopular rulers, usually weakened civilians rightly or wrongly accused of corruption (as was the case when Mr. Musharraf ousted Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in October 1999). This is the first time an unpopular military ruler has suspended the constitution to preserve his own rule. In doing so, Mr. Musharraf has clearly overplayed his hand.

Mr. Musharraf cannot blame a civilian predecessor for bringing the country to the brink. If there is internal chaos in Pakistan today, it is of the general’s making. After all, it was his arbitrary decision to remove Supreme Court Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammed Chaudhry in March that initiated the political crisis which has led to the current “state of emergency.”

Justice Chaudhry, on the other hand, has become a symbol of resistance to arbitrary rule — the man who refused to roll over and disappear, unlike earlier judges who cooperated with military rulers or simply went home when their conscience dictated otherwise. Justice Chaudhry’s call upon the legal fraternity to “Go to every corner of Pakistan and give the message that this is the time to sacrifice” for the supremacy of Pakistan’s Constitution has drawn elements disillusioned with existing political leaders to anti-Musharraf protests.

Among Pakistani political leaders, Ms. Bhutto has emerged as the viable civilian alternative to Mr. Musharraf, with public support at home and acceptance abroad. As the only politician in Pakistan to publicly describe Islamist extremism and terrorism as the principal threat to the nation, Ms. Bhutto was initially measured in her response to Mr. Musharraf’s reckless actions. She demanded that he restore the constitution and call elections as scheduled. She hoped to change his attitude with the threat of putting hundreds of thousands of supporters in the streets, without actually doing so. But Mr. Musharraf’s stubbornness is changing that position.

Like many in the U.S., Ms. Bhutto appears worried about directing attention away from fighting terrorism and destabilizing Pakistan further. But leaving the anti-Musharraf campaign leaderless is not an option. She has positioned herself as an opposition leader who represents the sentiment of the people, but is also willing to accept a negotiated settlement that restores the constitution, ends persecution, and results in free and fair elections leading to full civilian rule.

So far Mr. Musharraf has shown no inclination to negotiate in good faith with Ms. Bhutto or the international community. With each passing day, the Bush administration’s hopes — that with its help there could be a transition to democracy in Pakistan with a continuing role for Mr. Musharraf — are diminishing. Unless Mr. Musharraf changes course quickly, the U.S. will be compelled to start looking beyond him to a more legitimate leader.

Mr. Musharraf seems determined to put his own political survival before the rule of law — actions that warrant the label dictator. Pakistan’s attorneys, and increasingly the rest of its citizenry, seem equally determined to prevent this from happening.

Gulf News November 6, 2007

While effectively placing Pakistan under martial law last weekend, General Pervez Musharraf used words similar to those used by another military ruler, General Yahya Khan, when he ordered the 1971 crackdown against civilians in erstwhile East Pakistan. Musharraf said that he had imposed martial law “for the good of Pakistan” and “to preserve the unity of Pakistan” – the exact words used by Yahya Khan 36 years ago.

Like Yahya Khan he insisted that the country faced a “critical and dangerous situation” and argued that “extremists are becoming confident” and “security forces demoralised”. And as if quoting directly from Yahya Khan, Musharraf said: “It would have been suicidal not to act.”

For those who remember Pakistani history, Yahya Khan’s decision to ignore the results of the December 1970 elections and instead to use force against popular political forces led, nine months later, to the transformation of East Pakistan into the independent state of Bangladesh.

Things might not turn that dire this time around but Musharraf has risked dividing an already polarised nation further.

His decision to suspend the constitution, shut down the independent media and arrest everyone he does not like, whether liberal or Islamist, has cancelled his self-cultivated image as a benign authoritarian ruler at a time when his need for a positive aura was greater than when he first took power.

It might be too late for Musharraf to be able to act sufficiently harshly to frighten Pakistan’s civil society and political opposition into submission.

It is apparent to most people that Musharraf’s action was motivated by his desire to keep himself and his civilian cronies in power and had little to do with saving Pakistan from terrorism or internal chaos. If Musharraf’s position was not threatened by the prospect of an adverse Supreme Court judgment against him holding the dual offices of president and chief of army staff, he would most likely not have acted. Musharraf has been in charge for eight years and cannot blame anyone else for anarchy in the country. If there is internal chaos in Pakistan today, it is of Musharraf’s making.

Bad advice

Ironically, Musharraf has turned to the army and his position as army chief to bail him out of a crisis created by the bad advice of his civilian advisers. Even now, the virtual imposition of martial law appears to be aimed at protecting the interests of the unelectable Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz and the King’s Party, Pakistan Muslim League (PML-Q).

Musharraf’s civilian allies are incapable of winning a free and fair election and have resented the prospect of any arrangement that allows Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif to contest, and defeat them at the polls.

Bhutto has pointed out the incongruence of Musharraf’s decision to purge the Supreme Court while keeping the parliament, provincial legislatures and ministries in their position. How can legislatures and ministries continue to exist when “the constitution under which they were created has itself been suspended?” she asked.

But for Musharraf the weakness of his argument hardly matters. His actions reflect the calculation that he can get away with anything as long as the Pakistan army remains behind him.

Musharraf also seems to assume that the international community would not go beyond ritual condemnation of his decision. But the US could reach the conclusion that Musharraf is too distracted with domestic politics to play an effective role in fighting terrorism any longer and the army might feel that it is getting blamed for one man’s power play.

Washington does not need or want anti-Musharraf sentiment to result in a fresh wave of anti-Americanism in Pakistan that further fuels terrorism. The more Musharraf has to repress critics and political opponents at home, the less Pakistan will be able to fight terrorism.

Pakistan is being described by some around the world as “the most dangerous country” on Earth. That characterisation can be contested by Pakistanis only if Pakistan moves along the path of certainty. A sudden suspension of the constitution, and images of mistreatment of judges and lawyers, add to the doubts already being expressed about Pakistan’s future.

Wall Street Journal, October 25 , 2007

After more than a decade in exile, Benazir Bhutto, a former prime minister of Pakistan, returned home to Karachi last week to throngs of cheering supporters. Her triumphal arrival was marred by a terrorist bombing that killed more than 130 people, and underscored this fact: Terrorism is a threat to Pakistan and its people, and not merely a response to the foreign policy of a distant superpower.

For too many Pakistanis, this is a hard fact to accept. Many seem to believe that the war on terrorism is America’s war and that if it did not stand with the U.S., then Pakistan would be safe from attack. This is not true. Pakistan has been a terrorist target since the 1980s, when its security services got involved in proxy wars in Afghanistan and Kashmir.

A compilation of published figures shows the trends. In 2006, 1,471 people were killed in terrorist attacks in Pakistan. Of these, 608 were civilians, 325 were security personnel and 538 were terrorists. That’s an increase over 2005, when the number of fatalities was much lower: 430 civilians, 137 terrorists and 81 security personnel.

This year terrorists stepped up their attacks even before Ms. Bhutto’s return. In the first 10 months of the year, a reported 2,037 people were killed. The number of suicide bombings in Pakistan is also up compared to previous years.

Pakistan clearly has a terrorist problem and needs to fight the organizations that carry out these attacks for the sake of its own people.

The willingness of the United States to provide economic and military aid for fighting terrorism is incidental. Those who punish men for not growing a beard, or who wish to subjugate women, or who behead human beings like animals are not open to persuasion. They will not stop if Pakistan were to distance itself from the U.S.

The attack against Ms. Bhutto reflects a deep-seated anger among global jihadis who shake at the thought of a woman leading the world’s only nuclear-armed, majority-Muslim country. It’s not the first time this anger has been directed at Ms. Bhutto. When she was elected prime minister for the first time in 1988, fatwas were issued by radical clerics condemning her and the decision to elect her. Ramzi Yousef, mastermind of the 1993 attack on New York’s World Trade Center, has also admitted to plotting an attack on Ms. Bhutto in 1989.

Ms. Bhutto is clearly a brave and courageous woman who cannot and will not be deterred easily by either the threats of terrorists, or the machinations of those within Pakistan’s covert security services who have consistently conspired against her. Even after the attacks, Ms. Bhutto did not change her stance against terror, nor did she back away from her demand for restoration of democracy and free and fair elections.

Ms. Bhutto’s suspicion is that certain elements within Pakistan’s ruling establishment might be behind the bid to kill her. These fears should not be disregarded, even though it is difficult for Gen. Pervez Musharraf to accept that some of his close friends and associates may be complicit or tolerant of mass murder. Ms. Bhutto’s fears come from almost two decades of being hounded by jihadis and their allies in Pakistan’s security establishment. It’s crucial for Pakistan to address her concerns.

Mr. Musharraf needs to open his heart to genuine democracy. And that must include listening to the complaints lodged by the people’s representatives against his friends and allies in the establishment. In any case, Mr. Musharraf has wasted six critical years in the war against terrorism by failing to purge the government and intelligence services of hard-liners who supported jihadis in the past, and who have maneuvered behind the scenes to stop true democrats from gaining power.

The massive demonstration of support for Ms. Bhutto and her Pakistan Peoples Party last Thursday confirms that her popularity remains undiminished by the political developments of the past two decades.

Before Ms. Bhutto’s return, the conventional wisdom offered by many pundits and some politicians was this: Ms. Bhutto is seen to be too pro-American and too pro-Musharraf to be popular in Pakistan. But neither of these suggestions, nor the charges of corruption and misrule that have been repeatedly lodged against her over the past 19 years, seemed to carry much weight with the millions of people enthused about Ms. Bhutto’s return.

From America’s point of view, the good news is that the people who were cheering in the streets of Pakistan for Ms. Bhutto will likely cheer against terrorism under a government run by her. Pakistan’s war against terrorism will likely make better progress with the support of the people than it has in recent years under an embattled military dictator.

Gulf News October 24, 2007

The tragedy that marred Benazir Bhutto’s trium-phant return to Pakistan brought home several truths that have either been played down or simply ignored over the past several years.

The first is that terrorism is a threat to Pakistan and Pakistanis and not merely a response to the foreign policy of a distant superpower.

Too many Pakistanis have convinced themselves that the war against terrorism is America’s war and any harm faced by Pakistan as its consequence is the result of Pakistan’s decision to join the US in this war.

But Pakistan has faced terrorism, first in the form of sectarian killings and later in the shape of orchestrated bombings ever since its security services got involved in proxy wars in Afghanis-tan and Kashmir since the 1980s.

Pakistan needs to fight terrorism for the sake of its own people and not just because the US is willing to provide large amounts of economic and military aid for fighting terrorists.

Those who punish men for not growing a beard and behead human beings like animals because their understanding of religion does not coincide with that of the extremists will not stop even if Pakistan distances itself from the Washington.

The second lesson of the unfortunate terrorist attacks on the Pakistan Peoples Party’s rally is that Bhutto is a courageous woman who cannot and will not be deterred easily either by threats of terrorists or machinations of those who have consistently conspired against her.

Even after the attacks, Bhutto did neither change her stance against terror nor did she back away from her demand for restoration of democracy and free and fair elections.

It is true that it is difficult for Pakistan President General Pervez Musharraf to believe charges of complicity or tolerance of mass murder against some close friends and associates. But it is equally true that the victim’s concerns must not be ignored.

Allaying Bhutto’s fears, resulting from almost two decades of being hounded by the establishment, is crucial if terrorism is to be defeated through a combination of popular support and law enforcement authority.

The third lesson of October 18 is that the popularity of Bhutto and the PPP remain undiminished. Before Bhutto’s return, the conventional wisdom offered by many pundits and some politicians was that “Benazir Bhutto is now seen as pro-American and pro-Musharraf”.

But neither these suggestions nor the charges of corruption and misrule that have been repeated over the past 19 years seemed to carry much weight with the millions enthused about Bhutto’s return.

The US (or for that matter the Pakistani establishment) could not have put the massive crowd that turned up to welcome her in the streets. The spirit of the PPP’s workers, which remained undiminished even after the terrorist attack, is impossible to orchestrate.

Manipulated elections are easy when alternative means of gauging public support do not exist, which explains the desire of the King’s Party (the Pakistan Muslim League-Quaid) to ban public rallies and popular manifestations of political support altogether.

Why did so many members of Pakistan’s intelligentsia fail to predict that Bhutto’s return from exile would generate an enthusiasm similar to the PPP’s shows of popular support in the past?

Explanation

One explanation might lie in the fact that over the years two Pakistans have evolved, with very different understandings and certainly divergent priorities.

One Pakistan consists of the middle and upper classes, estimated by one former World Bank economist to number 30 million or so, who think in the terms that have shaped the Pakistani political discourse of the last few months.

The other Pakistan, estimated to number 130 million, comprises the poor and the dispossessed who still consider the PPP their party.

Well-to-do Pakistan has gone hoarse condemning Bhutto for her failings in and out of power and most recently for negotiating with Musharraf. But the masses seem unaffected by these arguments.

Indian Express , October 23, 2007

The tragedy that marred Benazir Bhutto’s triumphant return home reinforced several truths that have either been played down or simply ignored over the last several years. The first and foremost of these is the fact that terrorism is a threat to Pakistan and Pakistanis, and not merely a response to the foreign policy of a distant superpower.

Too many Pakistanis have convinced themselves that the war against terrorism is America’s war. But Pakistan has faced terrorism, first in the form of sectarian killings and later in the shape of orchestrated bombings, ever since its security services got involved in proxy wars in Afghanistan and Kashmir since the 1980s.

Even before the October 18 carnage in Karachi, 2007 had become the worst year for terrorist activity in Pakistan. More people have died in terrorist violence during the first ten months of this year than in preceding years. So far the number of reported fatalities for the year stands at 2037. The number of suicide bombings in Pakistan has been continually on the rise.

Pakistan needs to fight terrorism for the sake of its own people and not just because the US is willing to provide large amounts of economic and military aid for fighting terrorists, because extremists will not stop even if Pakistan distances itself from the Washington.

The second lesson of the unfortunate terrorist attacks on the PPP rally is that Bhutto is a brave and courageous woman who cannot and will not be deterred easily by either the threats of terrorists or the machinations of those who have consistently conspired against her. Even after the attacks, Bhutto did not change her stance against terror nor did she back away from her demand for restoration of democracy and free and fair elections. Bhutto’s suspicion that certain elements within Pakistan’s ruling establishment might be behind the bid to kill her should not be disregarded.

It is true that it is difficult for General Pervez Musharraf to believe charges of complicity or tolerance of mass murder against some close friends and associates. But it is equally true that the victim’s concerns must not be ignored. Allaying Bhutto’s fears, resulting from almost two decades of being hounded by the establishment, is crucial if terrorism is to be defeated through a combination of popular support and law enforcement authority.

The third lesson of October 18 is that the popularity of Benazir Bhutto and the PPP remain undiminished by the political developments of the last two decades. The US (or for that matter the Pakistani establishment) could not have put the massive crowd that turned up to welcome Bhutto in the streets. The spirit of the PPP’s workers, which remained undiminished even after the terrorist attack, is impossible to orchestrate.

Why did so many members of Pakistan’s intelligentsia fail to predict that Bhutto’s return from exile would generate an enthusiasm similar to the PPP’s shows of popular support in the past? One explanation might lie in the fact that over the years two Pakistans have evolved with very different understandings and certainly divergent priorities.

Well-to-do Pakistan has gone hoarse condemning Bhutto for her failings in and out of power and most recently for negotiating with Musharraf. But the masses seem unaffected by these arguments

Indian Express, October 17, 2007

Pakistan is a land of many incongruities. The military, and to a lesser extent the civil bureaucracy, wield power but lack foresight and public support. The politicians who enjoy popular backing do not always have power, which limits their experience in governance. Intellectuals and professionals articulate a vision for their country but lack the stamina for politics.

The result is constant experimentation with the system and form of government instead of moving forward on the basis of a clearly defined constitutional pattern. After eight years of military rule that began with promises of “setting things right once and for all,” Pakistan is once again at a crossroads.

Recently, General Pervez Musharraf joined opposition leader Benazir Bhutto in agreeing to an arrangement that could help bridge the traditional divide between the military-dominated establishment and populist politicians. But the B-grade politicians who have benefited from becoming the civilian face of military rule are already screaming at the top of their lungs to preempt a break from past precedent.

Professionals, such as banker Shaukat Aziz, who have ended up in positions that should normally go to elected politicians are also uneasy about a new order that could result in their relinquishing high office.

Then there are the analysts and commentators who insist on drawing the wrong conclusions from the tragedy of Pakistan’s fourth military regime. Some of them are now openly calling for another military intervention to complete what, in their view, could not be completed by generals Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan, Zia ul Haq and Pervez Musharraf.

On the other extreme are commentators cum revolutionaries, who want nothing short of a revolutionary transformation, but without the military and compromising politicians.

Much scorn has been heaped by all categories of critics on the National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO) and the possibility of withdrawal of corruption charges against Bhutto. There is no recognition of the futility of the cases at this stage when none of them has been proven after a lapse of eleven years since their initiation. And some of the pundits even don’t get their facts straight.

An elderly sage devoted a column to the Swiss case against Bhutto and her husband Asif Zardari. He wrote, “Vincent Fournier, one of the three judges, has confirmed his office is about to pass on the case to the prosecutor” and then went on to say, “crystal clear, is it not? The couple stand convicted of corruption.” But there was no explanation of what is it that needs to be sent to the prosecutor if Bhutto and Zardari are convicted of corruption? After all, “approved for prosecution” is not the same thing as “conviction.”

If the case had been as open and shut or “crystal clear” as is claimed, it should not still be in the “is there sufficient basis to prosecute?” stage.
Instead of demanding a return to the drawing board to carve out a new grand plan for Pakistan’s future, let the key actors on Pakistan’s stage recognise their limitations and define their roles. The army must go back to the barracks. The civil servants must execute policy that is framed by elected politicians with inputs from intellectuals and professionals.

And thinking Pakistanis must line up with existing political parties and to try and strengthen Pakistan’s political system.

Gulf News October 17, 2007

Pakistan is a land of many incongruities. In most modern nations, politicians wield power; the military and civil service execute policies and experts help set the nation’s priorities. In

Pakistan, the military, and to a lesser extent the civil bureaucracy, wield power but lack foresight and public support.

The politicians who enjoy popular backing do not always have power, which limits their experience in governance. Intellectuals and professionals, including those who have attained success abroad, articulate a vision for their country but lack the stamina for politics.

The result is constant experimentation with the system and form of government instead of moving forward on the basis of a clearly defined constitutional pattern. After eight years of military rule that began with promises of “setting things right once and for all”, Pakistan is once again at a crossroads.

Pakistan has been at a similar point several times in its short history of 60 years.

One would think that by now the military and civilian bureaucracy would have learnt the lesson that their limited administrative skills are not a substitute for the politicians’ ability to garner popular support.

The politicians, too, should have figured out that compromise and working within established parameters is better than constantly playing a zero-sum game.

The professionals and intellectuals should know that instead of concocting new schemes for a fresh start what Pakistan needs is to tread along a well worn path long enough for everyone to know and obey the rules of that road.

And everyone should have understood by now that if the US is to be Pakistan’s provider and protector of last resort then there should be some acceptance of Americans expressing concerns about Pakistan’s overall direction. But the rhetoric that passes off for discourse in Pakistan is still proceeding as if nothing has been learnt from history.

Recently, President General Pervez Musharraf joined opposition leader Benazir Bhutto in agreeing to an arrangement that could help bridge the traditional divide between the military-dominated establishment and populist politicians. But the B-grade politicians who have benefited from becoming the civilian face of military rule are already screaming at the top of their lungs to preempt a break from past precedent.

Professionals, such as banker Shaukat Aziz, who have ended up in positions that should normally go to elected politicians are also uneasy about a new order that could result in their relinquishing high office.

Wrong conclusions

Then there are the analysts and commentators who insist on drawing the wrong conclusions from the tragedy of Pakistan’s fourth military regime. Some of them are now openly calling for another military intervention to complete what, in their view, could not be completed by generals Ayoub Khan, Yahya Khan, Ziaul Haq and Pervez Musharraf.

On the other extreme are commentators cum revolutionaries who want nothing short of a revolutionary transformation, without the military and without compromised and compromising politicians.

Much scorn has been heaped by all categories of critics on the National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO) and the possibility of withdrawal of corruption charges against Bhutto. There is no recognition of the futility of the cases at this stage when none of them has been proven after a lapse of 11 years since their initiation. And some of the pundits even don’t get their facts straight.

If the Bhutto-Zardari case had been as open and shut or “crystal clear” as is claimed it should not have taken 11 years to still be in the “Is there sufficient basis to prosecute?” stage.

Instead of demanding a return to the drawing board to carve out a new grand plan for Pakistan’s future, let the key actors on Pakistan’s stage recognise their limitations and define their roles. The army must go back to the barracks. The civil servants must execute policy that is framed by elected politicians with inputs from intellectuals and professionals.

Instead of waiting, and calling, for a new military saviour or hoping unrealistically that a new political leadership will be born in time for the forthcoming election, thinking Pakistanis must line up with existing political parties and try to strengthen Pakistan’s political system.

Gulf News, October 10, 2007

Unless the Supreme Court of Pakistan rules otherwise, General Pervez Musharraf has been “elected” to a five-year term as Pakistan’s president.

There was nothing normal about the presidential “election” of October 6. Legal challenges, street protests, political deals and international manoeuvres preceded the vote and will most likely continue as Musharraf tries desperately to legitimise his power.

The only hope for normality returning to Pakistan lies in national reconciliation, which Musharraf has promised and some of Pakistan’s major international backers appear to have guaranteed.

But Pakistanis, used as they are to political confrontation and polarisation are having difficulty believing that national reconciliation is possible. Some of Musharraf’s supporters and opponents both suspect that it would be business as usual once the dust of the presidential “election” settles.

Musharraf has the option of acting like Turkish general Kenan Evren, who took power in a 1980 military coup and tried to reshape Turkey’s politics by excluding the major political leaders of the time – Suleyman Demirel, Bulent Ecevit and Necmettin Erbakan – from the political arena.

Evren declared himself president after a referendum in 1982 and ruled as a strongman until he realised that his scheme for controlling politics simply was not working.

After free and fair parliamentary elections, Evren gradually took a back seat and allowed politics to take its course. First Demirel returned to the political centre-stage and then Ecevit and Erbakan followed suit.

Evren completed his presidential term and retired to a Turkish Mediterranean resort town where he took up painting and still lives. If Musharraf truly follows Evren’s model, Pakistan too could have a transition to democracy.

The first step towards that transition had to be reconciliation between Musharraf’s military regime and Benazir Bhutto’s Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP). The stage is now set for Bhutto’s return to Pakistan, and the rejuvenation of the PPP which is already Pakistan’s largest political party.

Musharraf’s arrangement with Bhutto involved the promulgation of the National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO) that ends corruption prosecutions that have not matured into convictions or confessions after pending for many years, in some cases over a decade.

Other elements of the agreement relate to assurances of a free and fair parliamentary election and an end to the ubiquitous role of the military-intelligence machinery in the political arena.

The NRO is being attacked by two principal groups. On the one hand are Musharraf’s supporters and assorted advocates of a clean slate who insist that Bhutto, her husband and other politicians of the 1990s were corrupt and should not be given any quarter.

But the loud noises about “We should not let the looters go scot free” belie a major reality. But their accusers have failed so far to obtain a single valid conviction against them at home or abroad.

The other group expressing dissatisfaction with the prospect of national reconciliation comes from Pakistan’s nascent civil society and the media. Their argument is that by opting for a negotiated transition, Bhutto has thwarted a revolutionary transformation to save her skin.

Major flaws

There are two major flaws in this line of reasoning. First, given that the cases against Bhutto and her associates were far from proven it is wrong to claim that these were the PPP leader’s major consideration. Second, there is little evidence that the anti-Musharraf campaign could have brought the regime down.

In situations when the adversary is weak but your side is unable to deliver a decisive blow either, the best strategy is to negotiate and secure a worthwhile settlement. And that is precisely what Bhutto seems to have done.

The outcome remains to be seen and should not be prejudged in extreme terms.

Indian Express , October 10, 2007

Unless the Supreme Court of Pakistan rules otherwise, General Musharraf has been “elected” to a five-year term as Pakistan’s president. Now, the only hope for normality returning to Pakistan lies in national reconciliation, which Musharraf has promised and some of Pakistan’s major international backers appear to have guaranteed. But Pakistanis, used as they are to political confrontation and polarisation, are having difficulty believing that national reconciliation is possible. Some of Musharraf’s supporters and opponents both suspect that it would be business as usual once the dust of the presidential “election” settles.

Musharraf has the option of acting like Turkish General Kenan Evren, who took power in a 1980 military coup and tried to reshape Turkey’s politics by excluding the major political leaders of the time — Suleyman Demirel, Bulent Ecevit and Necmettin Erbakan — from the political arena. Evren declared himself president after a referendum in 1982 and ruled as a strongman until he realised that his scheme for controlling politics simply was not working. After free and fair parliamentary elections, Evren gradually took a back seat and allowed politics to take its course. First, Demirel returned to the political centre-stage and then Ecevit and Erbakan followed suit. General Evren completed his presidential term and retired to a Turkish Mediterranean resort town where he took up painting and still lives. If Musharraf truly follows Evren’s model, Pakistan too could have a transition to democracy.

The first step towards that transition had to be reconciliation between Musharraf’s military regime and Benazir Bhutto’s Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP). After painstaking negotiations lasting several months, Musharraf and the military-intelligence apparatus that keeps him in power finally appears to have reached an agreement with Bhutto.

In return for the government dropping graft charges that have never been proven, members of the PPP did not join the rest of Musharraf’s opposition in resigning from the federal and provincial legislatures. The stage is now set for Bhutto’s return to Pakistan, and the rejuvenation of the PPP, which is already Pakistan’s largest political party.

Musharraf’s arrangement with Bhutto involved the promulgation of the National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO) that ends corruption prosecutions that have not matured into convictions or confessions after pending for many years, in some cases over a decade. Other elements of the agreement relate to assurances of a free and fair parliamentary election and an end to the ubiquitous role of the military in the political arena.

The NRO is being attacked by two principal groups. On the one hand are Musharraf’s supporters and assorted advocates of a clean slate who insist that Bhutto, her husband and other politicians of the 1990s were corrupt and should not be given any quarter. The other group comes from Pakistan’s nascent civil society and the media. Their argument is that by opting for a negotiated transition, Bhutto has thwarted a revolutionary transformation they believe was under way to save her skin and her allegedly ill-gotten millions.

There are two major flaws in this line of reasoning. First, given that the cases against Bhutto and her associates were far from proven, it is wrong to claim that these were the PPP leader’s major consideration. Second, there is little evidence that the anti-Musharraf campaign that started with the lawyers’ movement over the chief justice issue could have brought the Musharraf regime down. In situations when the adversary is weak but your side is unable to deliver a decisive blow either, the best strategy is to negotiate. And that is precisely what Bhutto did.

The PPP has not bargained away its long struggle for democracy and civilian rule and the party’s negotiations with General Musharraf could still yield an orderly transition to democracy within Pakistan’s constitutional structure. The outcome remains to be seen and should not be prejudged in extreme terms.