Lone’s Assassination Part of a Wider Plan

Indian Express and Gulf News, May 26, 2002

The assassination of All Parties Hurriyet Conference (APHC) leader Abdul Ghani Lone is the latest in a series of actions by those who seek to stoke the fires of military confrontation between India and Pakistan.

It is a warning to other Kashmiri leaders against speaking out so clearly and openly against ‘foreign militants’ whose vision of global Jihad is not shared by Kashmiri nationalists. Abdul Ghani Lone was outspoken in pointing out that the Kashmir issue can best be resolved without its hijacking by the extremist internationalist ideology of Al Qaida and its fellow travellers.

The Indian leadership will almost certainly blame Lone’s assassination on Pakistan. Islamabad, on the other hand, will describe it as a black operation of India’s own security services, something like Germany’s Reichstag fire that provided Hitler with an excuse to impose his will on his nation.

But the assassination, as well as other recent militant attacks, are probably designed for exactly that effect. The Jihadi extremists are implementing their apocalyptic vision of a battlefield that stretches from Kabul to Kolkata. And Pakistan falls right in the middle of that battlefield.

General Pervez Musharraf refuses or is unable to recognise the fact that he and Kashmiri moderates are equal targets for the Jihadis. Indian Home Minister Advani and other BJP hardliners are also reluctant to distinguish between the indigenous and the pan-Islamic components of Kashmir militancy.

The general’s dithering allows the extremists to strike out on their own. The BJP’s perceived antipathy towards Muslims provides them cover in Kashmir and elsewhere.

The pan-Islamist Jihadis are pushing India and Pakistan towards conflict as part of their plan to polarise the region between Muslim and non-Muslim. Their irrational approach, expressed in their many publications and on their several websites, talks of the final conflict between Iman (belief) and kufr (disbelief).

And that final conflict, according to Jihadi folklore must take place in the region known in much of Islamic history as Khurasaan (present day Afghanistan) and Hind (India). An India-Pakistan war can only draw in the United States, which from the Jihadis’ point of view, serves their purpose of internationalising their struggle.

Pakistan’s security capabilities are over-stretched at the moment. The Indian border and the line of control are hot and getting hotter every day. Furthermore, Pakistani troops are engaged in the tribal areas and along the Afghan border, supporting U.S. forces searching for Al Qaida and Taliban remnants.

And the Jihadis are putting pressure within Pakistan against General Musharraf’s alliance with the United States. The general has failed to secure the support of the country’s mainstream politicians to offset his breaking of ranks with the Jihadis’ global agenda.

An Indian decision to take punitive action against Pakistan would help the Jihadis in attaining their objective of intensifying polarisation. The extremists do not care if Pakistan suffers as a result of their actions. They have no state to protect.

They only seek bases and territory to operate from. Al Qaida used Afghanistan as a base and took advantage of their relationship with its Taliban regime. Their actions attracted the U.S. attack on Afghanistan but Al Qaida’s members dispersed once Afghanistan came under attack. To this day, the U.S. is searching for Al Qaida, describing it as an elusive enemy.

The international Jihadis have a similar attitude towards Pakistan and the Kashmir valley. The Pakistanis need to protect their nation-state, putting the onus on the country’s leaders to avoid war.

Kashmiris, as Abdul Ghani Lone did, also have the future of their people to think about. But the Jihadis only want to expedite the final conflict. Fomenting war between states is their means to an irrational end, which cannot always be understood by rational state actors.

General Musharraf may want to distinguish between global Jihadis and anti-India militants but no such distinction exists in the mind of the Jihadis themselves. The better course for India would be to resist the temptation of “teaching Pakistan a lesson”.

 

Pakistan, on the other hand, must understand that the time for using the Jihadis as an instrument of bleeding India is over.

Now it is the Jihadis who are thinking of using and discarding states. They brought havoc for Afghanistan and, in their scheme of things, it would not be a big deal if Pakistan was also destabilised.

The Lone assassination could stop an Indian-Kashmiri dialogue in its tracks and fuel the tensions that already exist between India and Pakistan. Instead, it should serve as a reminder to both India and Pakistan that their relations should not be hostage to the agenda of the global Jihadis. Abdul Ghani Lone had started understanding, and exposing, the anarchist character of the international Jihadis.

The sooner General Musharraf and India’s leaders understand it too, the easier it will be for them to join hands against the terrorists.

Lone’s assassination is part of the plan that started unfolding with attacks such as the one on Parliament in New Delhi and was moved forward with the bombing of French naval engineers in Karachi. For those who care to take note, the targets of the Jihadis are now on both sides of the India-Pakistan border.

Draw Back from the Brink

Asian Wall Street Journal, May 23, 2002

Last week’s terrorist attack on an Indian military camp in the disputed territory of Kashmir has led to India expelling the Pakistani high commissioner to New Delhi. Members of India’s parliament have called for appropriate retaliation, some demanding war. Ironically, each side is looking toward the United States to bring pressure on the other to resolve the current crisis.

Pakistan, a Cold War ally and the current staging ground for attacks against al Qaeda in Afghanistan, expects U.S. diplomatic efforts to prevent Indian military retaliation. India has expressed disappointment that the U.S. cannot force Islamabad to clamp down on militant Islamists operating from Pakistan territory. But Washington may be unable to fulfill either side’s desire for action. At best it can act as an honest broker and help them end the current military standoff. In the end, the two neighbors must overcome their own history of mutual mistrust and the legacy of three wars in 54 years.

This is not the first time that the U.S. has been torn between Pakistan and India, and failed to satisfy either. In return for offering military bases and intelligence cooperation during the Cold War, Pakistan expected Washington’s support for its position in the dispute over the Himalayan territory of Kashmir. The U.S. initially backed Pakistan in the United Nations but did not support its ally’s failed military effort against India in 1965. In 1971, Washington was unable to save Pakistan from dismemberment during the Bangladesh war.

It is unrealistic for Pakistan’s military ruler, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, to now expect U.S. support for the militant insurgency in Kashmir as repayment for military and intelligence cooperation in the Afghan war. Pakistan may be an American ally, but India pulls more weight in Washington. With the end of the Cold War, American suspicions of a non-aligned India with close ties to the Soviet Union have dissipated. India’s economic reforms have moved the country away from its quasi-socialist practices, opening a huge market to U.S. businesses. From the American point of view, Pakistan may be America’s wartime ally, but it is India that offers the prospect of long-term friendship.

In a showdown involving conventional warfare, Pakistan would be at a disadvantage. Its military has received no new weapons from America in a decade. Indigenously manufactured weapons and arms supplied by China might not be sufficient to effectively ward off an attack by India, which has been buying modern weapons from a variety of sources in the international market. This military imbalance means that the possibility of Pakistan resorting to nuclear weapons in the event of war cannot be completely excluded.

Islamabad cannot afford to depend exclusively on the U.S. to defuse tensions between India and Pakistan. It will have to act decisively against Islamic militants allegedly involved in attacks in India and Kashmir. Proposals for joint India-Pakistan monitoring of the Line of Control in Kashmir, to stop infiltration of militants ostensibly acting on their own, must also be seriously considered. Pakistan’s most significant diplomatic successes in its dispute with India, including U.N. resolutions calling for a plebiscite in Kashmir, were attained during times of peace. Contrary to the conventional wisdom in Pakistan, militancy and militarist solutions have not helped in mobilizing international support for Kashmiri self-determination.

India’s response to the current situation also should be rational, not emotional. It is simply not possible to “eliminate” or “liquidate” a neighbor with nuclear weapons, as some extremists in Mr. Vajpayee’s ruling coalition have demanded. At a time when extremists are under pressure globally, India’s insistence on rubbing Pakistan’s nose in the ground would be counter-productive. Not only would it impair Pakistan’s ability to cooperate in the war against terrorism, it could even give a boost to Pakistani militants. Conflicts with India tend to unite Pakistanis. If Gen. Musharraf’s regime is seen as acting under Indian duress, support for the militants opposing him could increase.

Gen. Musharraf’s refusal to expand his support base beyond the military makes his domestic position precarious. While supporting Gen. Musharraf in his efforts against Islamic extremists, the U.S. also needs to ensure that it would still be able to count on Pakistani help in the anti-terror effort even if there is a change of regime in Pakistan. In the past, India and Pakistan have managed to avoid military confrontation whenever civilians were in power in Islamabad, and a civilian, democratic government in Pakistan would be less dependent on the military and the Islamic militants for support.

The current crisis provides an occasion to address the root causes of violence between India and Pakistan. America is already using its influence with Pakistan to force action against Islamic extremists. It should also persuade India to get serious about resolving the dispute over Kashmir. Pakistan needs to root out Islamic extremism for its own sake, not just to fulfil Indian and U.S. demands. But India also must wake up to the fact that it will continue to have a Kashmir problem even after the current militancy there is brought under control. Sooner or later India will have to discuss the future of Kashmir, both with the people of living there and with Pakistan. So why not do it now, so that a comprehensive solution to South Asia’s security problems can be implemented?

Instead of rattling sabers or hoping for U.S. intervention, the leaders of India and Pakistan should consider renewing their dialogue directly. India’s lack of enthusiasm for diplomacy is attributed to Pakistan’s failure to live up to its commitments in the past. New Delhi appears to have calculated that brinkmanship and the threat of war will yield better results for India by forever diminishing Pakistan’s military might. Gen. Musharraf’s government would almost certainly fall if Pakistan loses a limited war. On the other hand, if the military build-up forces Gen. Musharraf to back down, his position as Pakistan’s strongman will be seriously compromised.

For peace to prevail in South Asia, India and Pakistan must draw back from the brink. The U.S. seems to have less leverage with India than it does with Pakistan. In the past, New Delhi has rejected the notion of third-country mediation in its relations with Islamabad. When U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage goes to the region in early June, he should seek a reduction in the current Indian military build-up while insisting on verifiable Pakistani steps against Islamic militancy. Above all, he should ensure that the U.S. alliance with Pakistan and friendship with India are not misinterpreted by either side as an excuse to do as it pleases. These neighbors need to be prevented from going to war again. They also need to be encouraged to engage in self-sustaining dialogue.

Domestic Agenda Dooms Musharraf’s Terror Fight

International Herald Tribune, May 21, 2002

ISLAMABAD, Pakistan While the recent terrorist attack on a military camp in Indian-controlled Kashmir, which killed 35 people, has led to further deterioration in relations between India and Pakistan, terrorist attacks such as the recent suicide bombing in Karachi, which killed 11 French naval engineers, demonstrate Pakistan’s own vulnerability as a front-line state in the war against terrorism.

President Pervez Musharraf called the bombing an attempt to destabilize Pakistan and “weaken its resolve” in the fight against terrorism. But his decision to create a new anti-terrorism task force and the arrest of more than 400 militant Islamists are unlikely to deter future terrorist attacks in India or Pakistan.

Musharraf needs international help in dealing with the terrorist threat. To be effective, such support should go beyond the economic and military assistance that has already been promised. It needs to involve advice on breaking Musharraf’s isolation at home and in ending Pakistan’s standoff with India.

Musharraf does not seem to understand the link between terrorism and his mistaken domestic and regional agenda. It is time for the United States and other Western nations to explain to him that his support for the campaign against terrorism is being undermined by other elements of his own policies.

Over the years law enforcement has become ineffective in Pakistan. The resources of police and intelligence-gathering agencies have been over-stretched as governments use them to stay in power.

Only recently, for example, almost the entire machinery of state was deployed to help Musharraf win an uncontested referendum to prolong his presidency. Political distractions leave little time or resources for actual police or intelligence work. The terrorists know that and take advantage of it.

It is wrong for Pakistan to claim that the recent terrorist attacks are a consequence of its support for the United States in the war against terrorism. Al Qaeda and other Islamic militant groups have operated in Pakistan for years and the country was a target of their attacks well before Sept. 11. Only the frequency and impact of the attacks has accelerated in recent months.

Islamabad’s support for the Taliban and its acceptance of militants operating in Indian-controlled Kashmir helped to create an underground extremist network throughout Pakistan itself. It is this network the Musharraf regime must now eliminate. But to do so, the government has to consolidate its support within Pakistani society while rebuilding the police, intelligence and judicial services.

The government’s energy is being sapped by Musharraf’s crusade against Pakistan’s politicians. Massive resources have been spent on corruption investigations aimed at politicians, civil servants and businessmen. Islamic militants, on the other hand, have been released from detention for want of evidence.

Washington could help Pakistan by securing a stand-down of forces massed on the India-Pakistan border. But Washington will also have to persuade Musharraf to convince India of his good intentions by withdrawing support from Islamic militants in Kashmir. Pakistan has a valid case on Kashmir. It should be pursued without attracting charges that Islamabad supports extremists.

There is a self-destructive cycle at work. Pakistan runs the risk of further destabilization if domestic terrorism and deteriorating relations with India are not immediately brought under control.

General Distracted Terror on Target

Indian Express, Gulf News and The Nation(Pakistan), May 15, 2002

Last week?s terrorist bombing in Karachi, which left 14 people including 11 French engineers dead, demonstrates Pakistan?s continued vulnerability. General Pervez Musharraf has called the bombing an attempt to destabilise Pakistan and ??weaken its resolve?? in the fight against terrorism.

But his decision to create a new anti-terrorism task force and the arrest of over 400 Islamists is unlikely to deter future terrorist attacks.

General Musharraf needs international help in dealing with the terrorist threat.

In addition to money and material, the international community must explain to Musharraf the links between terrorism and his mistaken domestic and regional policies. Pakistan has, over the years, become a soft state with ineffective law enforcement. Resources of the police and intelligence-gathering agencies have been over-stretched as governments use them to stay in power and not just to keep crime and terrorism in check.

Only recently, almost the entire machinery of state was deployed to help General Musharraf win his uncontested referendum. Police in many cities were busy commandeering private vehicles to transport the audience for General Musharraf?s political rallies.

Intelligence agencies probably kept tabs on the country?s political opposition while the terrorists who struck in Karachi were busy preparing for their latest strike. Political distractions leave little time, or resources, for actual police work. The terrorists know that and take advantage of the state?s weakness.

It is incorrect on the government?s part to claim that the recent terrorist attacks are exclusively linked to Pakistan?s support for the United States in the war against terrorism.

Al Qaeda and other Islamic militant groups have operated in Pakistan for years and the country has been a target of their attacks before September 11. Karachi witnessed the gunning down of US consulate officials as well as employees of the American oil company Union Texas a few years ago.

Sectarian and ethnic murders as well as unexplained bombings have been a common occurrence even when Pakistan was not a US ally.

Before September 11, terrorists took advantage of poor law enforcement and the government?s support for the Taliban to operate inside Pakistan. Islamabad?s acceptance of militants operating in Kashmir as freedom fighters helped in the forging of underground extremist networks throughout the country. One can understand the Musharraf government?s need to put a brave face on its virtual impotence against terrorism but its spokesmen should not try to insult the intelligence of informed commentators by making inaccurate statements.

Take the example of government claims after the latest bombing. Information Minister Nisar Memon reportedly said, ??We will (catch) those who were responsible for this act. We arrested the killers of Daniel Pearl and we will act similarly in this case.?? The fact, however, remains that seven of Pearl?s killers have not been arrested despite their identities being known to the authorities. Similarly, the arrest of over 400 alleged members of banned militant groups contributes little to public confidence. Most of those arrested in the latest ??crackdown?? were probably amongst the 1,800 militants released after the last crackdown that followed General Musharraf?s January 12 speech promising an end to militancy.

It seems that the government lacks a coherent strategy against terrorism. It is not even sure whether it should blame India or al Qaeda for the latest attack in Karachi.

Some officials have privately blamed the ethnic political party, Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), which has been accused in the past of links with Indian intelligence services. But the MQM blames Pakistan?s security services for waging a dirty war in Karachi. In any case, General Musharraf cannot start pointing fingers at MQM so soon after having sought the party?s support during his referendum campaign.

With over one million troops from both countries facing each other on the border, Pakistan has reasons to be concerned about India?s intentions. New Delhi feels that the Musharraf regime wants to use its new leverage with the US to keep up pressure on India in Kashmir.

The US, too, seems to be worried about the prospect of India-Pakistan confrontation and has sent Assistant Secretary of State Christina Rocca to calm the situation. The US seems inclined towards accepting India?s view that Pakistan has not ended what New Delhi terms ??cross-border terrorism??.

Indian allegations of cross-border terrorism, countered by Pakistani allegations of an Indian hand in the Karachi terrorist bombings, are hardly conducive to an atmosphere of dialogue between the two traditional adversaries. Pakistan will either have to convince the United States (and the rest of the world) of the validity of its accusation against India or withdraw the charge.

Another front that saps the government?s energies and renders its campaign against terrorism ineffective is General Musharraf?s persistent crusade against Pakistan?s politicians. Massive resources have been spent on the so-called accountability of civilian politicians, civil servants and businessmen.

The accountability exercise has provided jobs to several serving and retired military officers but has failed to clean up corruption as extensively as intended. It now serves as a reminder of how trying to set everything right leaves a lot more undone. The Musharraf regime?s political opponents are continually detained on corruption charges for long periods. But the government says it is unable to arrest terrorism suspects indefinitely without due process.

During a recent visit to Washington, Interior Minister Moinuddin Haider demonstrated Islamabad?s muddled thinking by simultaneously seeking aid against terrorism and extradition of politicians and bureaucrats on corruption. The message the Musharraf government seems to be sending is that it is fighting America?s war against terrorism and should be repaid with help against its domestic and regional opponents. General Musharraf needs to realise that the war against terrorism is a battle for Pakistan?s survival. Battles for survival cannot be won if smaller prizes along the way serve as distractions.

Games Dictators Play

Indian Express, Gulf News, May 9, 2002

Following the embarrassment of the referendum, General Pervez Musharraf is now struggling to convince skeptics about his commitment to democracy. Talking to foreign newsmen, who saw and chronicled the farcical nature of the April 30 referendum, he emphasised the importance of parliamentary elections scheduled for October. After these elections, he was quoted as saying the prime Minister will run the country and ??I will relax and play tennis and golf??.

The statement might impress US State Department officials, clutching at straws to justify their refusal to reprimand their favourite military ruler, as well as those who do not remember Pakistan?s history. But knowledgeable Pakistanis find nothing new in General Musharraf?s latest assertion. In March 1985, after he had nominated Mohammed Khan Junejo as Pakistan?s Prime Minister, General Ziaul Haq gave me an interview for the Far Eastern Economic Review. Asked how he saw his new role after the induction of a new parliament, General Zia said, ??I will now spend my time reading books and playing golf??.

Within three years, however, General Zia ran out of books to read and did not find his golf game sufficiently interesting. He sacked Prime Minister Junejo unexpectedly. Zia?s Chief of Staff at the time, the erudite and refined Lt. General Syed Refaqat, and his spokesman, the late Brigadier Siddiq Salik, both confessed that they had been surprised by Prime Minister Junejo?s ouster. Ironically, Junejo could not be accused of amassing wealth and stashing it abroad or of intolerance towards his opponents ? the arguments invoked against the two most recent former prime ministers. He had simply asserted his constitutional authority in an area that General Zia and his colleagues considered their domain.

Given that background, General Musharraf and his minions should not grudge my refusal to believe that tennis and golf will engage his exclusive attention after the October election. Much of what General Musharraf says these days reads like a rehashed version of statements of Pakistan?s previous military rulers. His claims of creating a new political system and establishing a system of checks and balances seem straight out of Field Marshal Ayub Khan?s book Friends, Not Masters. Consider these lines, and compare them with General Musharraf?s recent utterances:

* ?To my knowledge there has never been so much freedom in this country as there is today??.

* ??I feel that if the man at the top commands respect, he does not have to be a dictator. The people will follow him in their own interest, because human nature demands and, indeed, cannot live without leadership??.

* ??All these reforms were devised and oriented to prepare the country and the people for a representative government in the shortest possible time. The object was not to impose any particular system from above, but to cause a system to grow from below in relation to the social, economic, educational, and moral realities of the situation.?

* ??(Before I assumed power) The sense of demoralisation had seeped down to the masses and they started saying openly, ?let someone save this country.? The implication was obvious: it was the army alone that could step into the breach. That was the only disciplined organisation that could give the country the necessary covering fire, in order to enable it to steady itself and extricate itself from the evils which had surrounded it. Things did not look like improving. But I had hoped that someone might rise to the occasion. I would have been the first person to welcome him and to give him all support. I kept hoping and praying.??

Despite his personal charm and mild manner, General Musharraf is not a new political thinker. He represents the continuity in military thinking that began with Ayub Khan. The failings of Pakistan?s current generation of politicians, and there are many, are not the reason for the military leadership?s contempt for democracy and the political process. They are merely its justification.

Field Marshal Ayub spoke about politicians in the same vein as General Musharraf though the politicians he was dealing with were all among Pakistan?s founding fathers. None of the leaders whom he disqualified from politics was accused of having overseas bank accounts, nor were they charged with squandering public money.

In fact, the only surplus budgets in Pakistan?s history were presented by post-independence politicians preceding Ayub Khan. Pakistan?s first military ruler faced opposition from Mohtarma Fatima Jinnah, the Madar-e-Millat (Mother of the Nation), sister of Quaid-e- Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah. But his political idiom was still the same as the one being used by General Musharraf against Benazir Bhutto four decades (and many political faux pas) later.

Since the days of Ayub Khan, Pakistan?s military has been looking for junior civilian partners in a power-sharing arrangement that leaves key areas of decision-making in military hands. Since Pakistan?s first military coup in 1958, the objective of military leaders has only been to create an illusion of institution building while ensuring that the military remains the country?s only viable institution.

Thus pseudo-democratic exercises, such as local government elections and referenda to authenticate a military leader, are meant as legitimising exercises not as serious efforts at political reform. The judiciary and Election Commission have been used as rubber stamps instead of being allowed to grow into independent institutions. The Pakistani military simply does not trust the country?s civilians. This alone can explain General Musharraf?s decision to ignore all sane advice and go ahead with the referendum instead of participating himself in general elections.

After all, if the problem with Pakistan?s democracy is that it does not throw up good leaders and General Musharraf believes that he is the good leader Pakistan really needs, why can?t he gracefully retire from the military and transform himself into a bona fide political leader? General De Gaulle did that for France and his legacy has lived on long after him.

France?s recent election shows how politics can only be changed through politics. The errors of judgement of French politicians during the first round of presidential left only a maverick bigot and a discredited incumbent in the arena. Instead, French politicians accepted second best and threw their weight behind the scandal-tainted President Jacques Chirac. For his part, Chirac also promised to accept the reality of the mandate and address the concerns that led to the unusual situation in French politics. Such reaching out is unknown in Pakistan.

Instead of taking refuge in the fantasy of restructuring Pakistani politics through the machinations of the intelligence-military complex, General Musharraf should talk to Pakistan?s politicians including those he does not like. Only a voluntary consensus on the political rules of engagement, and strict adherence to these rules by all including the military, will break the country?s vicious cycle of military rule followed by impotent civilian regimes.

In Black and White: US Brushes his dirt Under Afghan carpet

Following the embarrassment of the referendum, General Pervez Musharraf is now struggling to convince skeptics about his commitment to democracy. Talking to foreign newsmen, who saw and chronicled the farcical nature of the April 30 referendum, he emphasised the importance of parliamentary elections scheduled for October. After these elections, he was quoted as saying the prime Minister will run the country and ??I will relax and play tennis and golf??.

The statement might impress US State Department officials, clutching at straws to justify their refusal to reprimand their favourite military ruler, as well as those who do not remember Pakistan?s history. But knowledgeable Pakistanis find nothing new in General Musharraf?s latest assertion. In March 1985, after he had nominated Mohammed Khan Junejo as Pakistan?s Prime Minister, General Ziaul Haq gave me an interview for the Far Eastern Economic Review. Asked how he saw his new role after the induction of a new parliament, General Zia said, ??I will now spend my time reading books and playing golf??.

Within three years, however, General Zia ran out of books to read and did not find his golf game sufficiently interesting. He sacked Prime Minister Junejo unexpectedly. Zia?s Chief of Staff at the time, the erudite and refined Lt. General Syed Refaqat, and his spokesman, the late Brigadier Siddiq Salik, both confessed that they had been surprised by Prime Minister Junejo?s ouster. Ironically, Junejo could not be accused of amassing wealth and stashing it abroad or of intolerance towards his opponents ? the arguments invoked against the two most recent former prime ministers. He had simply asserted his constitutional authority in an area that General Zia and his colleagues considered their domain.

Given that background, General Musharraf and his minions should not grudge my refusal to believe that tennis and golf will engage his exclusive attention after the October election. Much of what General Musharraf says these days reads like a rehashed version of statements of Pakistan?s previous military rulers. His claims of creating a new political system and establishing a system of checks and balances seem straight out of Field Marshal Ayub Khan?s book Friends, Not Masters. Consider these lines, and compare them with General Musharraf?s recent utterances:

* ?To my knowledge there has never been so much freedom in this country as there is today??.

* ??I feel that if the man at the top commands respect, he does not have to be a dictator. The people will follow him in their own interest, because human nature demands and, indeed, cannot live without leadership??.

* ??All these reforms were devised and oriented to prepare the country and the people for a representative government in the shortest possible time. The object was not to impose any particular system from above, but to cause a system to grow from below in relation to the social, economic, educational, and moral realities of the situation.?

* ??(Before I assumed power) The sense of demoralisation had seeped down to the masses and they started saying openly, ?let someone save this country.? The implication was obvious: it was the army alone that could step into the breach. That was the only disciplined organisation that could give the country the necessary covering fire, in order to enable it to steady itself and extricate itself from the evils which had surrounded it. Things did not look like improving. But I had hoped that someone might rise to the occasion. I would have been the first person to welcome him and to give him all support. I kept hoping and praying.??

Despite his personal charm and mild manner, General Musharraf is not a new political thinker. He represents the continuity in military thinking that began with Ayub Khan. The failings of Pakistan?s current generation of politicians, and there are many, are not the reason for the military leadership?s contempt for democracy and the political process. They are merely its justification.

Field Marshal Ayub spoke about politicians in the same vein as General Musharraf though the politicians he was dealing with were all among Pakistan?s founding fathers. None of the leaders whom he disqualified from politics was accused of having overseas bank accounts, nor were they charged with squandering public money.

In fact, the only surplus budgets in Pakistan?s history were presented by post-independence politicians preceding Ayub Khan. Pakistan?s first military ruler faced opposition from Mohtarma Fatima Jinnah, the Madar-e-Millat (Mother of the Nation), sister of Quaid-e- Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah. But his political idiom was still the same as the one being used by General Musharraf against Benazir Bhutto four decades (and many political faux pas) later.

Since the days of Ayub Khan, Pakistan?s military has been looking for junior civilian partners in a power-sharing arrangement that leaves key areas of decision-making in military hands. Since Pakistan?s first military coup in 1958, the objective of military leaders has only been to create an illusion of institution building while ensuring that the military remains the country?s only viable institution.

Thus pseudo-democratic exercises, such as local government elections and referenda to authenticate a military leader, are meant as legitimising exercises not as serious efforts at political reform. The judiciary and Election Commission have been used as rubber stamps instead of being allowed to grow into independent institutions. The Pakistani military simply does not trust the country?s civilians. This alone can explain General Musharraf?s decision to ignore all sane advice and go ahead with the referendum instead of participating himself in general elections.

After all, if the problem with Pakistan?s democracy is that it does not throw up good leaders and General Musharraf believes that he is the good leader Pakistan really needs, why can?t he gracefully retire from the military and transform himself into a bona fide political leader? General De Gaulle did that for France and his legacy has lived on long after him.

France?s recent election shows how politics can only be changed through politics. The errors of judgement of French politicians during the first round of presidential left only a maverick bigot and a discredited incumbent in the arena. Instead, French politicians accepted second best and threw their weight behind the scandal-tainted President Jacques Chirac. For his part, Chirac also promised to accept the reality of the mandate and address the concerns that led to the unusual situation in French politics. Such reaching out is unknown in Pakistan.

Instead of taking refuge in the fantasy of restructuring Pakistani politics through the machinations of the intelligence-military complex, General Musharraf should talk to Pakistan?s politicians including those he does not like. Only a voluntary consensus on the political rules of engagement, and strict adherence to these rules by all including the military, will break the country?s vicious cycle of military rule followed by impotent civilian regimes.

Indian Express, May 5, 2002

A Flawed Vote

If official results are to be believed, Pakistan’s military ruler Gen. Pervez Musharraf won a respectable mandate in Tuesday’s stage-managed referendum. But he lost a lot more in the bargain. The results, including figures for voter turnout, are mired in controversy. Instead of conferring legitimacy on him, the referendum has increased instability in a country considered a key ally in the war against terrorism.

Just as Pakistanis got ready to vote (or abstain, as requested by the main political parties) in the referendum, U.S. and Pakistani forces conducted joint raids against al Qaeda along the border with Afghanistan. The referendum was obviously timed so that Gen. Musharraf could use his “indispensability” in the war against al Qaeda to domestic political advantage.

The general wanted to change the label on his regime, redefining it as a democracy without altering its substance. But the U.S. should not allow him to get away with treating democracy with contempt. Doing so could plunge Pakistan into political conflict, undermining the antiterrorist effort. Given Gen. Musharraf’s own mixed record, a blank check from Washington will embolden him to pursue domestic and regional policies that run counter to U.S. interests.

Before the referendum, Gen. Musharraf presented himself as a military leader with a difference. But by seeking a five-year term through the discredited device of an uncontested referendum, he invites comparison with previous military regimes. Each of Pakistan’s military rulers has befriended the U.S. in the hope of maintaining power at home and balancing India’s military superiority. Their repressive domestic policies have been accompanied by a belligerent anti-India posture, often couched in Islamic terms. In his referendum campaign, Gen. Musharraf let it be known that he is not going to be an exception.

The referendum’s success was achieved by politicizing the election commission and compromising the supreme court. One member of the commission resigned to protest the illegality of the referendum. But the supreme court upheld it as valid, maintaining the tradition of a judiciary that has never ruled against a military regime.

The manner in which he conducted the referendum has cost Gen. Musharraf the sympathy of democrats who expected him to help reform the fractured political system. He lost his claim to the moral high ground as state resources were squandered and rules were changed daily to enable a high turnout. Having no competition on the ballot was not enough for the no-nonsense general. He also tried to create the illusion of an election campaign through orchestrated rallies and the forced participation of state employees.

Gen. Musharraf was assumed to have a degree of popular support. But the high-handedness of his team in organizing his rallies has created new pockets of antagonism toward him. The voter turnout (estimated officially to be at 30%, and by independent reporters as way below that) showed the public’s indifference or opposition to the idea of endorsing military rule.

The erosion of institutions such as the supreme court, and lack of faith in the voting process, has led to widespread cynicism about the prospect of a return to democracy. Gen. Musharraf had allowed a free press so far, partly because it is a safety valve for populist sentiment. But the referendum campaign tested the limits of the regime’s patience with the media, which was attacked by the general and his officials.

Gen. Musharraf’s resort to Islamic symbolism and his hard-line statements against India during the referendum campaign makes it clear that he is not averse to using different languages for domestic and international consumption. Until recently, the U.S. looked upon him as the ally who would reverse Pakistan’s involvement with militant Islamic ideology in addition to making peace with India. But he seems unwilling to break from the tradition of Pakistani military leaders to garner support on the basis of Islamic and anti-India sentiment. He also has made it clear that his idea of a modern Pakistan does not include a vision for a self-sustaining democracy.

After Sept. 11, the U.S. cannot afford to strengthen tactical allies who preside over unstable military regimes and pursue local agendas contradictory to U.S. strategic objectives. Washington must serve notice on Gen. Musharraf that he become its strategic partner by putting Pakistan on the path toward democracy and rule of law. Undiluted military rule is a recipe for instability. Gen. Musharraf’s referendum has weakened Pakistan, instead of strengthening its ability to help in the war against terrorism.

Wall Street Journal, May 2, 2002