The Problem is Beyond Musharraf

International Herald Tribune, May 25, 2007

With nuclear weapons, the seventh largest standing army in the world and impressive economic growth rates, Pakistan projects a powerful image. But the country lacks the strength of an effective state at home.

Attacks by armed supporters of the government against opposition activists in Karachi and frequent terrorist bombings raise fears about Pakistan’s future. The country faces increasing demands from religious extremists, and doubts are growing among Pakistan’s Western allies about the regime’s ability to handle these pressures.

Paradoxically, Pakistan has turned out to be a hot destination for investors from the Gulf, encouraged by business-friendly government policies and annual GDP growth rates of 7 percent over the last four years. Pakistan’s privatization program is regarded as a regional success.

Pakistan’s elite now drive around in Porsches, more of which have sold in Lahore alone than the car’s manufacturer had envisaged for the entire country. The pace of construction for new country clubs and luxury hotels also reflects growing prosperity of a select few.

Internationally, Pakistan is viewed as a critical Western ally in the global war against terrorism. Relations with arch-rival India have improved markedly over the past four years.

The temptation to let optimism prevail is great. But, in essence, Pakistan has become a dysfunctional state, a tinderbox that may not light up for years, but could also go up in flames in an instant. The military’s ability to keep a lid on dissent has diminished with the emergence of well-armed militias, both Islamist and secular, in various parts of Pakistan.

At least 1,471 people were reported killed in terrorist incidents in Pakistan during 2006, up from 648 terrorism-related fatalities during the preceding year.

Vast parts of Baluchistan, the sparsely populated southwestern province bordering Afghanistan and Iran, are virtually ungoverned. A secular, tribal insurgency in Baluchistan has been overshadowed by the resurgence of the Taliban in the province’s north.

A recently released video of the Taliban using a boy of about 12 to behead a man took place in Baluchistan. It involved the ethnic Pashtun Taliban punishing an ethnic Baluch for allegedly spying on behalf of the Americans and their allies. The Taliban also control tribal areas in the Northwest Frontier province and are gradually expanding their influence into the adjoining non-tribal districts.

In addition, at least 200 people died in sectarian violence between Shiite and Sunni militant groups across the country during the last year.

General Pervez Musharraf, who came to power in a coup in October 1999 and remains a clear favorite of the Bush administration, has made no effort to encourage democratic institutions. Musharraf’s decision to marginalize Pakistan’s secular political parties to avoid sharing power has further strengthened Islamist groups.

Lately, Pakistani civil society has been stirred to action by the removal of the chief justice from office. For the past two months, lawyers have joined opposition activists in demonstrations.

But the military has held the reins of power for most of the country’s existence and continues to see itself as the final arbiter of Pakistan’s national direction.

In the midst of widespread disorders, Pakistan successfully tested the latest version of its long-range nuclear-capable missile in February. According to Pakistan’s military, the Hatf VI (Shaheen II) ballistic missile, launched from an undisclosed location, has a range of 2,000 kilometers and the ability to hit major cities in India.

In the process of building up such capabilities, Pakistan’s rulers have allowed essential internal attributes of statehood to deteriorate, as reflected by the proliferation of religious vigilantes, insurgents, militias and organized crime.

The country’s institutions – ranging from schools and universities to political parties and the judiciary – are in a state of general decline.

Many Pakistanis, moreover, view the United States as the Pakistani Army’s principal benefactor and hold it partly responsible for weakening civil institutions. The three periods of significant flow of U.S. aid to Pakistan have all coincided with military rule in Pakistan.

Much of the Western analysis of Pakistan since 9/11 has focused on Musharraf’s ability to remain in power and maintain the juggling act between the United States and various domestic forces, including the military and the Islamists.

Pakistan’s problems, however, run far deeper. It is time to set aside the with Musharraf’s future and examine the fundamental conditions of the Pakistani state.

This article was earlier printed on Yale Global Online Reprinted with permission from YaleGlobal Online.

US Volt-face on Democracy

Gulf News, May 23, 2007

The US government appears to have changed its course away from where it stood in November 2003. Then, in a speech at the National Endowment for Democracy in Washington, DC, President George W. Bush promised an American “forward strategy” to promote democracy in the greater Middle East.

Now, the Iraq war seems to have sapped the Bush administration’s energies. Democracy has advanced very little in most Muslim countries over the last three years.

And some US officials are choosing to shamefully redefine the authoritarian status quo as democracy and freedom.

The world is not perfect. Most of us understand the difficulties and limitations faced by the US as the world’s sole superpower. Notwithstanding perceptions to the contrary, the US does not control the world.

American leaders and officials must deal with constant divergence between their ideals and the strategic compulsions of the moment.

Even then, US officials do not need to lie publicly in an effort to curry favour with authoritarian rulers useful for current American strategic objectives.

Consider recent comments by the American ambassador in Egypt, Francis Ricciardone, and Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs, Richard Boucher.

Ricciardone recently told Egyptian television, “Here in Egypt as in the US, there is freedom of speech.” Boucher told Voice of America, “I think the Pakistani government is moving forward; they’re moving toward elections.”

Ricciardone’s comments were not a slip of the tongue and the transcript of his television interview was posted on the website of the American embassy in Cairo.

When asked by CNN International recently to comment on the torture and continued detention of Egyptian dissident Ayman Nour, an embassy spokesman refused to be drawn into criticism of President Hosni Mubarak’s government. Instead, the spokesman insisted that the US believed Egypt was “making prog-ress” towards democracy.

The ambassador’s proc-lamation and his spokes-man’s description of a regime that arrests and tortures dissidents as reflecting progress is far from reality.

Even the State Department’s annual human rights report, prepared by its Democracy and Human Rights Bureau and released in March 2007, pointed out that the Egyptian government’s “respect for human rights remained poor, and serious abuses continued in many areas”.

Boucher’s characterisation of Pakistan under General Pervez Musharraf is even worse. To say that the “Pakistani government is moving forward” so soon after the government-orchestrated massacre of opposition supporters in Karachi is nothing short of an insult to Pakistanis marching in the streets of the country’s cities for rule of law and restoration of democracy.

Boucher tried to cover his tracks by saying, “I recognise that tensions do exist” in Pakistan but his bottom line was an unequivocal endorsement of a military regime that is clearly undoing whatever little good it might have done in the past seven years.

 

Important question

An important question is why does Boucher feel compelled to praise a client regime at a time when its actions merit criticism, whether public or private?

If the purpose is to reassure Musharraf that the US is still with him even if the people of Pakistan are not, then that purpose is better served during private meetings.

Why must Boucher risk his credibility, and that of the US government, by saying on radio or television what is already being communicated to Musharraf with large sums of money?

The Bush administration has already provided and budgeted $5.174 billion in aid for Musharraf’s regime for the period 2001-2008. Some of this amount has admittedly gone towards projects benefiting the people. But an additional $80 to $100 million is given each month as Coalition Support Funds and the total under that head until August 2006 was over $4 billion.

That amount goes almost exclusively towards Pakistan’s security services. There are no publicly available estimates for covert transfers of funds to Pakistan’s army and intelligence services but it can safely said that total US aid for the Musharraf regime over the last five years is $10 to $15 billion.

If after such largesse, Musharraf’s regime cannot maintain security and create even the illusion of stability in Pakistan, Ambassador Boucher’s false praise for the teetering Pakistani government is unlikely to strengthen it.

During the cold war, the words of US officials served to encourage Soviet bloc dissidents suffering imprisonment and torture.

Now, US diplomats don’t even have words of comfort to offer prisoners of conscience such as Egypt’s Ayman Nour or supporters of the democratic opposition in Karachi who were killed by pro-government gunmen.

Can’t Ricciardone and Boucher at least keep quiet if strategic compulsions of the moment prevent them from speaking out in favour of tortured advocates of democracy?

Pakistan: Nuclear Power with Feet of Clay

Pakistan’s focus on military muscle weakens social cohesion and makes the state increasingly ungovernable
BOSTON: Backed by nuclear weapons and the seventh largest standing army in the world, Pakistan has the ability to project its power externally, but lacks the strength of an effective state at home.

 

The recently released video of the Taliban using a young boy, believed to be 12 years old, to behead a man amid cries of “Allahu Akbar” is only one of several troubling images emanating from Pakistan. Attacks by armed supporters of a pro-government militia on opposition activists in the port city of Karachi and frequent terrorist bombings revive fears about Pakistan’s future.

 

The country faces increasing demands from religious extremists, and doubts are growing among Pakistan’s Western allies about the military regime’s ability to handle these pressures.

Paradoxically, Pakistan has turned out to be a hot destination for investors from the Gulf, encouraged by business friendly government policies and annual GDP growth rates of 7 percent over the last four years. Pakistan’s privatization program is considered a regional success. Government economists cite increasing mobile phone use and expanding sales of motorcycles and cars as signs of progress.

 

Pakistan’s elite now drive around in Porsches, more of which have sold in the city of Lahore alone than the car’s manufacturer had envisaged for the entire country. The pace of construction for new country clubs, golf clubs and luxury hotels also reflects growing prosperity of a select few.

 

That this strife-ridden country with a booming economy seems precariously balanced between chaos and growth should not, however, be a source of comfort. Given widespread anti-Americanism and signs of rising support for Islamist sentiment in the military, Washington cannot count on the military to keep the balance. If Pakistan falls from its shaky perch, the consequences for the region and the US could be dire.

Pakistan is viewed as a critical Western ally in the global war against terrorism. Relations with arch-rival India have improved markedly since four years ago, when the armies of the two nuclear-armed neighbors stood eyeball-to-eyeball. Pakistan reveals multiple realities, and the temptation to let optimism prevail is great. But, in essence,

Pakistan has become a dysfunctional state, a tinderbox that may not light up for years, but could also go up in flames in an instant.

 

At least 1,471 people were reported killed in terrorist incidents in Pakistan during 2006, up from 648 terrorism-related fatalities during the preceding year. Of these, 608 were civilians, 325 security personnel and 538 accused terrorists. The rising fatalities of security forces indicate the growing strength of armed non-state actors, especially extremists.

 

An army, largely recruited from one of the country’s four ethnically diverse provinces, has traditionally maintained order in Pakistan. The military’s ability to keep a lid on dissent has diminished with the emergence of well-armed militias, both Islamist and secular, in various parts of Pakistan.

 

Vast parts of Balochistan, the sparsely populated southwestern province bordering Afghanistan and Iran, are virtually ungoverned. A secular, tribal insurgency in Balochistan has been overshadowed by the resurgence of the Taliban in the province’s north.

 

The brutal beheading involving the 12-year old took place in Balochistan and involved the ethnic Pashtun Taliban punishing an ethnic Baloch for allegedly spying on behalf of the Americans and their allies. The Taliban also control the generally uncontrolled tribal areas in the Northwest Frontier province (NWFP) and gradually expand their influence into the adjoining non-tribal settled districts.

Balochistan accounts for 42 percent of Pakistan’s territory, and the Pashtun tribal areas represent 3 percent of the land area. Even if one ignores the rising violence and lawlessness in urban Pakistan, almost half the country now constitutes an anarchistic or inadequately governed space.

 

In addition to problems in Balochistan and NWFP, at least 200 people have died in sectarian violence between Shia and Sunni militant groups across the country during the last year.

 

General Pervez Musharraf, who came to power in a coup d’état in October 1999 and remains a clear favorite of the Bush administration, has made no effort to encourage democratic institutions. Musharraf’s decision to marginalize Pakistan’s secular political parties to avoid sharing power has strengthened radical Islamist groups.

 

Lately, Pakistani civil society has stirred in reaction to the domination of the country’s life by the military and assorted Islamist militants. For the past two months, lawyers in suits join activists from opposition political parties in demonstrations protesting the removal from office of the country’s chief justice.

 

Amid widespread disorder and the emboldening of insurgents and terrorist groups, Pakistan successfully tested the latest version of its long-range nuclear-capable missile, in February. The Hatf VI (Shaheen II) ballistic missile, launched from an undisclosed location, is said to have a range of 2,000 kilometers and has the capability to hit major cities in India, according to Pakistan’s military.

 

In the process of building extensive military capabilities, Pakistan’s successive rulers have stood by as essential internal attributes of statehood degrade. A major attribute of a state is its ability to maintain monopoly, or at least the preponderance, of public coercion.

 

The proliferation of insurgents, militias and Mafiosi reflect the state’s weakness in this key area. There are too many non-state actors in Pakistan –ranging from religious vigilantes to criminals – who possess coercive power in varying degrees. In some instances the threat of non-state coercion in the form of suicide bombings weakens the state machinery’s ability to confront challenges to its authority.

 

Since its emergence from the partition of British India in 1947, Pakistan has defined itself as an Islamic ideological state. The country’s praetorian military has held the reins of power for most of the country’s existence and seen itself as the final arbiter of Pakistan’s national direction.

The emphasis on ideology has empowered Pakistan’s Islamist minority. The overwhelming influence of the army has accentuated militarism at the expense of civilian institutions. Many Pakistanis view the US as the army’s principal benefactor and by extension partly responsible for weakening civil institutions. The three periods of significant flow of US aid to Pakistan have all coincided with military rule in Pakistan.

 

The disproportionate focus of the Pakistani state on ideology, military capability and external alliances since Pakistan’s independence in 1947 has weakened the nation internally. Pakistan spends a greater proportion of its GDP on defense and still cannot match the conventional forces of India, which outspends Pakistan 3 to 1 while allocating a smaller percentage of its burgeoning GDP to military spending. The country’s institutions – ranging from schools and universities to political parties and the judiciary – are in a state of general decline.

 

Much of the analysis on Pakistan in the West since 9/11 has focused on Musharraf’s ability to remain in power and keep up the juggling act between alliance with the US and controlling various domestic constituencies, including the Pakistani military and Islamist militants. Pakistan’s problems, however, run deeper. It is time the world set aside its immediate preoccupation with Musharraf’s future to examine the fundamental conditions of the Pakistani state.

Originally appeared in Yale Global , May 22, 2007

When The Future Calls

Indian Express , May 16, 2007

Recent events indicate that General Pervez Musharraf has no intention of becoming the first ruler in Pakistani history to relinquish power without first trying to hold on to it by all means, fair or foul.

Instead of allowing politics to take its course, Musharraf is once again insisting on his indispensability. It appears that he hopes to do so with threats of violence ignited with the help of allies in Karachi, some of whom have now taken to shouting the slogan, “Pakistan without Musharraf is unacceptable.”

By most accounts, backed up with video footage, the violence in Karachi was initiated by the pro-government Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) which claimed that it ‘controls’ Pakistan’s financial capital and largest city. The MQM said it would not allow the opposition to hold a rally in support of Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry, a blatantly anti-democratic stance. Even if, as the MQM asserts, the majority of the people of Karachi are not with the opposition parties, surely they have the democratic right to march in the streets peacefully and voice their opinions.

General Musharraf’s refusal to go with the flow of politics was also reflected in the government-sponsored, lacklustre rally organised for him in Islamabad. Speaking from behind a bullet-proof glass wall, Musharraf repeated his call that the chief justice issue should not be politicised.

Musharraf repeated his assertion that Pakistan had progressed economically under his rule. He then claimed that he would be elected for a second term as president. Considering that he was not elected under the Constitution for a first term, and given his refusal to take off his uniform and contest a free and fair election on a level playing field with the opposition, both claims rang hollow.

Pakistan’s military men as an institution, and their assorted supporters, have almost never accepted the value of the political process. They seem to have embraced the view of the country as a corporation.

Under this view, military rulers are measured by their ability to improve GDP growth rates and civilians are condemned for lower productivity or corruption. In Pakistan’s chequered history, rulers have insisted on applying the accountant’s criteria to measure national leadership. This has proven to be a major stumbling block to understanding the dynamic of politics and history that shapes nations.

A careful study of Pakistan’s history would reveal that methods such as muzzling the press, arresting and harassing political opponents, using government machinery to frame, intimidate and humiliate opponents were widely practiced and many even originated under General Ayub Khan without much complaints from the military-bureaucrat-technocrat class.

Ayub Khan’s governor, the Nawab of Kalabagh, did not hesitate to threaten the president’s opponents and used Intelligence Bureau (IB) personnel to plot assassinations and blackmail. The institutional role of the army and the permanent state structure in undermining normal democratic politics in Pakistan is only now being fully debated.

Pakistan’s greatest problem is its institutional imbalance, the pattern of military intervention and the recurrent political problems of Pakistan. The refusal of the Pakistani elite to accept the principle of elected civilian leadership keeps drawing the country into crisis after crisis.

It is time for Pakistan’s military officers, professionals and business classes to withdraw support from the past pattern of military rule and accept the principle of institutionalised political process.

Mobilising street thugs to combat a people’s movement for democracy may be part of Pakistan’s unfortunate history. It does not augur well for the country’s future.

Pakistan has a Basic Flaw

Gulf News, May 16, 2007

Recent events indicate that General Pervez Musharraf has no intention of becoming the first ruler in Pakistani history to relinquish power without first trying to hold on to it by all means, fair or foul.

Instead of allowing politics to take its course, Musharraf is once again insisting on his indispensability. It appears that he hopes to do so with threats of violence ignited with the help of allies in Karachi, some of whom have now taken to shouting the slogan “Pakistan without Musharraf is unacceptable.”

By most accounts, backed up with video footage, the violence in Karachi was initiated by the pro-government Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) which claimed that it “controls” Pakistan’s financial capital and largest city.

The MQM said it would not allow the opposition to hold a rally in support of Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry, a blatantly anti-democratic stance. Even if, as the MQM asserts, the majority of the people of Karachi are not with the opposition parties, surely they have the democratic right to march in the streets peacefully and voice their opinions.

Musharraf’s refusal to go with the flow of politics was also reflected in the government-sponsored, lackluster rally organised for him in Islamabad. Speaking from behind a bullet-proof glass wall, Musharraf repeated his call that the chief justice issue should not be politicised.

Musharraf repeated his assertion that Pakistan had progressed econ-omically under his rule. He then claimed he had the support of the people and insisted that he would be elected for a second term as president.

Considering that he was not elected under the constitution for a first term, and given his refusal to take off his uniform and contest a free and fair election on a level playing field with the opposition, both claims rang hollow.

The arbitrary dismissal of the chief justice by a president in a general’s uniform is clearly a political issue. The reason Musharraf and his allies are unwilling to see it as such lies in the deep-rooted antipathy towards politics cultivated by Pakistan’s ruling oligarchy.

The generals, technocrats, senior civil servants, international bankers and global businessmen who have virtually controlled the fate of Pakistan under long periods of military rule have also worked hard to depoliticise discourse about governance in Pakistan.

Occasional outbreaks of violence, often orchestrated by groups nurtured by Pakistan’s ubiquitous security services, are meant to prove that politics is “dirty” and that only non-political leaders such as a coup-making general have the country’s best interest at heart.

Before the military’s direct intervention in government under Field Marshal Ayub Khan, in 1958 Pakistan’s politics were by and large non-violent.

Patronage, protest and policy differences were all factors in the political process, as they are in any non-authoritarian system. But Ayub Khan began a process of demonising politics and politicians that continues to this day.

Pakistan’s military men (as an institution) and their assorted supporters have almost never accepted the value of the political process. They seem to have embraced the view of the country as a corporation.

Under this view, military rulers are measured by their ability to improve GDP growth rates and civilians are condemned for lower productivity or corruption.

In Pakistan’s chequered history, rulers have insisted on applying the accountant’s criteria to measure national leadership. This has proven to be a major stumbling block to understanding the dynamic of politics and history that shapes nations.

Institutional role

The institutional role of the army and the permanent state structure in undermining normal democratic politics in Pakistan is only now being fully debated.

Pakistan’s greatest problem is its institutional imbalance, the pattern of military intervention and the recurrent political problems of Pakistan. The refusal of the Pakistani elite to accept the principle of elected civilian leadership keeps drawing the country into crisis after crisis.

It is time for Pakistan’s military officers, professionals and business classes to withdraw support from the past pattern of military rule and accept the principle of institutionalised political process.

Mobilising street thugs to combat a people’s movement for democracy may be part of Pakistan’s unfortunate history. It does not augur well for the country’s future.

Can They Hear The Pakistani People

Indian Express, May 9, 2007

The tumultuous rallies across Pakistan supporting Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry and calling for the resignation of General Pervez Musharraf reflect a new phase in the country’s politics. Those marching in the streets to honour a chief justice they barely knew much about until a few days ago are calling for the rule of law. For most of its history, Pakistan has been subject to the law of rulers.

The fundamental division in Pakistan now appears to be between the people and ‘the establishment’ comprising top generals, the intelligence services, and collaborating civilians. The best thing for Pakistan right now would be for the establishment to step back and recognise that a free and democratic political system would be in Pakistan’s long-term interest. Judging by history and recent statements by those in power, such voluntary stepping back is not expected.

The biggest losers in a return to a constitutional democratic arrangement would be unrepresentative civilians such as Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz and leaders of the king’s party, the Pakistan Muslim League Q (PML-Q).

Aziz is already hinting at the possibility of imposing emergency rule while the president of PML-Q, Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain has gone to the extent of publicly declaring that “those criticising the army should be gunned down” — a reference to slogans shouted at public rallies against the military’s domination of Pakistani life.

The truth is, General Musharraf’s 1999 military coup already represented an emergency measure and Aziz’s talk of emergency rule is nothing but a threat to violently clamp down against mass protests. As for Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain’s comments, hardly anyone in Pakistan opposes the country’s army. Pakistan, like all nations, needs a professional army to defend its frontiers. What Hussain is falsely describing as criticism of the army is only criticism of army rule, which many proud Pakistani soldiers from the past have valiantly joined.

The army as an institution needs to revisit the fundamental assumptions that have repeatedly dragged it into Pakistan’s politics. On March 24 1969, Pakistan’s first military ruler, Field Marshal Ayub Khan wrote a letter to the then chief of the army, General Yahya Khan, formally seeking martial law. Pakistan had a weak political system before Ayub Khan that might have evolved into something better over time if it had been allowed to continue. At the end of Ayub Khan’s regime, there was no political system left.

In his letter to Yahya Khan, Ayub Khan spoke of the military’s “legal and constitutional responsibility to defend the country, not only against external aggression, but also to save it from internal disorder and chaos.” He had carefully omitted to mention that in war as well as in peace the army is duty-bound to act under civilian authority.

This time, the popular campaign against the Musharraf regime should not result in the prevalence of a similar attitude.

Pakistan has suffered immense harm from the “Good Soldier saves Nation” thesis that has crept into Pakistan’s body politic since the day Iskander Mirza and Ayub Khan plotted Pakistan’s first military coup in 1958.

The running of the country is a job for politicians enjoying the people’s support. Most politicians are flawed but, as we have learnt over the last five decades, so are generals. The military does not have the right to intervene politically under any circumstances. The way to get rid of bad politicians is to give the people a chance to vote them out or to have them convicted by an independent judiciary for crimes they might have committed.

Austrian-born British philosopher Sir Karl Popper explained in his book The Open Society and Its Enemies that modern democracy is not about ‘who’ rules but it is about ‘how’ a state must govern. A constitutional mechanism of checks and balances separates a modern democracy from a dictatorship. “No system is capable of doing everything right, so no system should have too much power,” is how one scholar summarised the philosopher’s views.

If Pakistan’s tragic political history of military interventions and the obsession of the drawing room class with finding “a clean government of technocrats and patriotic generals” are to be avoided, we must turn to the idea of constitutional checks and balances.

The current people’s movement should not result in a re-run of the Ayub-Yahya dynamic, with one general being replaced with another openly or covertly. This time the question of “how Pakistan is to be governed” must be firmly and finally decided and the army should go back to doing what it has been constituted to do — defend the country in case of external aggression.

Politics and Army Dont Mix

Gulf News, May 9, 2007

The tumultuous rallies across Pakistan supporting Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry and calling for the resignation of General Pervez Musharraf reflect a new phase in the country’s politics.

Those marching in the streets to honour a chief justice they barely knew much about until a few days ago are calling for rule of law. For most of its history, Pakistan has been subject to the law of rulers.

The fundamental division in Pakistan now appears to be between the people and “the establishment” comprising top generals, the intelligence services, and collaborating civilians.

The best thing for Pakistan right now would be for the establishment to step back and recognise that a free and democratic political system would be in Pakistan’s long-term interest. Judging by history and recent statements by those in power, such voluntary stepping back is not what is to be expected.

Biggest losers

The biggest losers in a return to constitutional democratic arrangement would be unrepresentative civilians such as Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz and leaders of the King’s Party, the Pakistan Muslim League Q (PML-Q).

Aziz is already hinting at the possibility of imposing emergency rule while the president of PML-Q, Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain has gone to the extent of publicly declaring that “those criticising the army should be gunned down” – a reference to slogans shouted at public rallies against the military’s domination of Pakistani life.

The truth is, Musharraf’s 1999 military coup already represented an emergency measure and Aziz’s talk of emergency rule is nothing but a threat to violently clamp down against mass protests.

As for Hussain’s comments, hardly any one in Pakistan opposes the country’s army. Pakistan, like all nations, needs a professional army to defend its frontiers.

What Hussain is falsely describing as criticism of the army is only criticism of army rule, which many proud Pakistani soldiers from the past have valiantly joined.

The army as an institution needs to revisit the fundamental assumptions that have repeatedly dragged it into Pakistan’s politics.

On March 24, 1969 Pakistan’s first military ruler, Field Marshal Ayub Khan wrote a letter to the then chief of the army, General Yahya Khan formally seeking martial law.

Pakistan had a weak political system before Ayub Khan that might have evolved into something better over time if it had been allowed to continue. At the end of Ayub Khan’s regime, there was no political system left.

In his letter to Yahya Khan, Ayub Khan spoke of the military’s “legal and constitutional responsibility to defend the country not only against external aggression but also to save it from internal disorder and chaos.”

He had carefully omitted to mention that in war as well as in peace the army is duty-bound to act under civilian authority.

This time, the popular campaign against the Musharraf regime should not result in the prevalence of a similar attitude.

Pakistan has suffered immense harm from the “Good Soldier saves Nation” thesis that has crept into Pakistan’s body politic since the day Iskander Mirza and Ayub Khan plotted Pakistan’s first military coup in 1958.

The running of the country is a job for politicians enjoying the people’s support. Most politicians are flawed but, as we have learnt over the last five decades so are generals. The military does not have the right to intervene politically under any circumstances.

Checks and balances

The way to get rid of bad politicians is to give the people a chance to vote them out or to have them convicted by an independent judiciary for crimes they might have committed.

Austrian-born British philosopher Sir Karl Popper explained in his book The Open Society and Its Enemies that modern democracy is not about “who” rules but it is about “how” a state must govern. A constitutional mechanism of checks and balances separates a modern democracy from a dictatorship.

“No system is capable of doing everything right, so no system should have too much power,” is how one scholar summarised the philosopher’s views.

If Pakistan’s tragic political history of military interventions and the obsession of the drawing room class with finding “a clean government of technocrats and patriotic generals” are to be avoided, we must turn to the idea of constitutional checks and balances.

The current people’s movement should not result in a rerun of the Ayub-Yahya dynamic, with one general being replaced with another openly or covertly.

This time the question of “how Pakistan is to be governed” must be firmly and finally decided and the army should go back to doing what it has been constituted to do – defend the country in case of external aggression.

American Waffle

Indian Express , May 23, 2007

The US government appears to have changed its course away from where it stood in November 2003. Then, in a speech at the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) in Washington DC, President George W. Bush promised an American “forward strategy” of promoting democracy in the greater Middle East.

Now, the Iraq war seems to have sapped the Bush administration’s energies. Democracy has advanced very little in most Muslim countries over the last three years. And some US officials are choosing to shamefully redefine the authoritarian status quo as democracy and freedom.

The world is not perfect. Most of us understand the difficulties and limitations faced by the US as the world’s sole superpower. Notwithstanding perceptions to the contrary, the US does not control the world.

American leaders and officials must deal with constant divergence between their ideals and the strategic compulsions of the moment. Even then, US officials do not need to state falsehoods publicly in an effort to curry favour with authoritarian rulers useful for current American strategic objectives.

Consider recent comments by Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs, Richard Boucher, who told Voice of America, “I think the Pakistani government is moving forward; they’re moving toward elections.”

Ambassador Boucher’s characterisation of Pakistan under General Pervez Musharraf is terrible. To say that the “Pakistani government is moving forward” so soon after the government-orchestrated massacre of opposition supporters in Karachi is nothing short of an insult to the Pakistanis marching in the streets of the country’s cities for rule of law and restoration of democracy.

Boucher tried to cover his tracks by saying, “I recognise that tensions do exist” in Pakistan but his bottom line was an unequivocal endorsement of a military regime that is clearly undoing whatever little good it might have done in the past seven years.

An important question is, why does Boucher feel compelled to praise a client regime at a time when its actions merit criticism, whether public or private?

If the purpose is to reassure General Musharraf that the US is still with him even if the people of Pakistan are not, then that purpose is better served during private meetings. Why must Ambassador Boucher risk his credibility, and that of the US government, by saying on radio or television what is already being communicated to General Musharraf with large sums of money?

The Bush administration has already provided and budgeted $5.174 billion in aid for General Musharraf’s regime for the period 2001-2008. Some of this amount has admittedly gone towards projects benefiting the people. But an additional $80 to 100 million is given each month as Coalition Support Funds and the total under that head until August 2006 was over $4 billion.

That amount goes almost exclusively towards Pakistan’s security services. There are no publicly available estimates for covert transfers of funds to Pakistan’s army and intelligence services but it can be safely said that the total US aid for the Musharraf regime over the last five years is between $10 to 15 billion.

If after such largesse General Musharraf’s regime cannot maintain security and create even the illusion of stability in Pakistan, Ambassador Bouc-her’s false praise for the teetering Pakistani government is unlikely to strengthen it.

During the Cold War, the words of US officials served to encourage Soviet bloc dissidents suffering imprisonment and torture. Now, US diplomats don’t even have words of comfort to offer supporters of the democratic opposition in Karachi who were killed by pro-government gunmen.

Reasons for Decline of the Muslim World

Gulf News, May 2, 2007

The Muslim world seems to be in the grip of all kinds of rumours. The willingness of large numbers of Muslims to believe some outrageous assertions reflects pervasive insecurity coupled with widespread ignorance.

The contemporary Muslim fascination for conspiracy theories limits the capacity for rational discussion of international affairs. For example, a recent poll indicates that only 3 per cent of Pakistanis believe that Al Qaida was responsible for the 9/11 attacks in the US, notwithstanding Osama Bin Laden and his deputies have taken credit for the attacks on more than one occasion.

The acceptance of rumours and the readiness to embrace the notion of a conspiracy does not apply exclusively to the realm of politics. Villagers in rural Nigeria are refusing to administer the polio vaccine to their infant children out of fear that the vaccine will make their offspring sterile.

Some religious leaders in Pakistan’s Pashtun tribal areas bordering Afghanis-tan have also voiced concerns about a “Western-Zionist conspiracy” to sterilise the next generation of Muslims as part of what they allege is an “ongoing war against Islam”.

Mobile phones and the internet, the pervasiveness of which is often cited as a measure of a society’s progress and modernity, have become a means of spreading fear in the Muslim world. Text messages, originating from the Pakistani city of Sialkot, recently warned people of a virus if people answered phone calls from certain numbers. The virus would not hurt the phone, the messages said, but would rather kill the recipient.

The panic caused by the rumours forced the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority to issue a denial. Phone companies sent out text messages urging people to be calm. A newspaper rejected the rumour but featured the headline, Killer Mobile Virus.

Text message

A text message widely circulated in an Arab country claimed that trucks carrying a million melons had been smuggled across the country’s northern border and the melons were contaminated with the HIV virus, which causes Aids. No one paid any attention to the fact that the HIV virus cannot be transmitted by eating melons.

The Muslim world has a high rate of illiteracy but ignorance reflected by the readiness to believe unverified (and sometimes totally outrageous) claims is not just a function of illiteracy. It is a function of bigotry and fear. Literate Muslims, such as those involved in the text message rumour-mongering, are as vulnerable to ignorant behaviour as illiterate ones.

Conspiracy theories have been popular among Muslims since the twilight years of the Ottoman Empire as a way of explaining the powerlessness of a community that was at one time the world’s economic, scientific, political and military leader.

The erosion of the leadership position of Muslims coincided with the West’s gradual technological ascendancy.

The Persian, Mughal and Ottoman empires controlled vast lands and resources but many important scientific discoveries and inventions since the 15th century came about in Europe and not in the Muslim lands.

Ignorance is an attitude and the world’s Muslims have to analyse, debate and face it before they can deal with it.

The 57-member countries of the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) have around 500 universities compared with more than 5,000 universities in the US and more than 8,000 in India. In 2004, Shanghai Jiao Tong University compiled an “Academic Ranking of World Universities”, and none of the universities from Muslim-majority states was included in the top 500.

The Muslim world spends 0.2 per cent of its GDP on research and development, while the Western nations spend around five per cent of GDP on producing knowledge.

The tendency of Muslim masses to accept rumours as fact and the readiness to believe anything that suggests a non-Muslim conspiracy to weaken or undermine the Muslims is the result of the overall feeling of helplessness and decline that permeates the Muslim world.

Most Muslim scholars and leaders try to explain Muslim decline through the prism of the injustices of colonialism and the subsequent ebb and flow of global distribution of power.

But Muslims are not weak only because they were colonised. They were colonised because they had become weak.
Conspiracy theories paper over the knowledge deficit and the general attitude of ignorance in the Muslim world. It is time for a discussion of the Ummah’s decline in the context of failure to produce and consume knowledge and absorb verifiable facts.