Monthly Archives: October 2005

Gulf News, October 26, 2005

Pakistanis have responded in an unprecedented manner to the tragic earthquake that killed tens of thousands of their countrymen and made over 2.5 million homeless.

Thousands of civilians mobilised to lend a helping hand in relief efforts, digging victims out of the rubble with bare hands.
Hundreds of doctors, both inside the country and abroad, left their lucrative practices to volunteer medical care in makeshift hospitals. Contributions worth millions of dollars have flown in from better off Pakistanis around the world.

Children handed in their small savings to help their less fortunate counterparts in the earthquake affected areas. Human chains moved goods and people across mountains.

Islamist and secular NGOs, as well as individuals with divergent religious, political and ethnic backgrounds set aside their differences in extending humanitarian assistance. In terms of national unity and caring for fellow citizens, this may be Pakistan’s finest hour.

Pakistanis have seldom failed to demonstrate national unity in the face of adversity. At the time of the nation’s Caesarian birth in 1947 and again at the time of the 1965 war with India, Pakistan’s civil society rose to show its potential for dealing with misfortunes. In the present tragedy as well as in the case of those two earlier occasions, Pakistan’s professional soldiers also demonstrated their mettle.

One must acknowledge the dedication of army aviation helicopter pilots for running humanitarian sorties notwithstanding exhaustion and bad weather. Hardworking officers and army jawans have also made an immense contribution in digging out the dead and helping the survivors.

Moments of national unity brought about by shared hardship should also serve as occasions to assess a nation’s institutions. If Pakistan’s leaders and thinkers had reflected on the strengths and weaknesses of previous moments of togetherness in the country’s history, the trajectory of Pakistan’s evolution would have been different. The country could have learnt from the events of partition and the pitfall of religious frenzy.

The nation’s willingness in 1965 to sacrifice to defend their frontiers would not have given way to regional rivalries soon thereafter if the people had been told the truth about the war from the beginning.

In 1965, it was Pakistan’s government and the permanent State (which is not the same thing as the Pakistani nation) that let Pakistan down following a moment of unprecedented national unity and unselfishness. To avoid a similar let down, it is important to take stock of the State machinery’s attitude and performance.

It must be stated clearly that no government could be prepared for a natural disaster of this magnitude and, therefore, the government of General Pervez Musharraf and Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz cannot be faulted for lack of preparation. That said, there is also no doubt that for at least four days after the October 8 earthquake, official Pakistan showed little imagination in dealing with the crisis on its hands.

On October 17, Australia’s Sydney Morning Herald quoted “officials linked to Pakistan’s army” as saying that “some [army] units paid more attention to restoring the country’s frontline defences against India after last weekend’s earthquake than to rescuing trapped civilians”.

The report cited a Pakistani military official as saying, “Although the Government knew that India would not attack the country, in the first few days they used every resource to restore its defence line because they never wanted to leave it vulnerable.”

General Sultan’s response, which should be taught in public relations courses as an example of the kind of thing that should never be said, was, “The people are traumatised and this is all a reaction to the trauma.”

The haughtiness of Pakistan’s State functionaries coupled with their traditional political predilections, remained evident even as the nation’s men, women and children rallied to alleviate their compatriots’ suffering. Debate continues to rage over Musharraf’s original decision to turn down India’s offer of helicopters at a time of dire need and when the two countries are ostensibly engaged in a peace process. Stories abound of government officials trying to upstage NGOs, of relief items donated in the US not leaving JFK Airport and of the bureaucracy trying to control the availability of tents for the homeless.

The government also rebuffed the parliamentary opposition by refusing to brief them about relief efforts at the National Assembly. The silly argument that the opposition should come to the GHQ for the briefing exposed the government’s desire to score points, rather than secure every Pakistan’s support in attending to the problem.

Indeed, if Musharraf wanted to seize this moment for national reconciliation, he should have asked Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif to tour the world for fund raising. The two would certainly have obliged and it is unlikely that they would have asked for political favours in return. They would not have endeared themselves to the people if they had asked for political concessions at this juncture.

Gulf News, October 19, 2005

For over two years, Abdul Latif Hakimi regularly telephoned Pakistani and Western reporters and described himself as the spokesman for Afghanistan’s Taliban. He claimed responsibility, on behalf of the Taliban, for several terrorist attacks.

In June, when a MH-47 helicopter was shot down during an anti-guerrilla mission in Afghanistan’s Kunar province bordering Pakistan, killing all 16 American troops on board, Hakimi reported the incident to the media before US or Afghan officials. Hakimi’s claims were often exaggerated and sometimes totally fabricated. But no one doubted that he was based in Pakistan and he spoke on behalf of the Taliban.

Hakimi’s telephone press conferences and interviews, conducted on satellite and mobile phones, offered an embellished version of an emerging ground reality. After being toppled from power in the aftermath of 9/11, the Taliban have reconstituted themselves in part of the Afghan countryside as an insurgent force, especially in several provinces dominated by the Pashtun ethnic group along the Pakistan-Afghan border.

Since the beginning of 2005, casualties in Afghanistan have been rising. Eighty-four American soldiers and 1,400 Afghans have been killed this year, more than any year since the arrival of US forces in 2001. The Taliban insurgency is weak and not yet as threatening as the violent challenge in Iraq. But Afghan insurgents are clearly getting arms, money and training. Through propaganda of the type waged by Hakimi, the Taliban are also recruiting new members.

When Pakistani authorities announced on October 4 that Hakimi had been arrested in the southwestern city of Quetta, near the Taliban’s traditional support base Kandahar, officials in Afghanistan were not impressed. Why had it taken the Pakistanis so long to silence Hakimi when he operated freely in Pakistan for over two years, they asked. What about other Taliban leaders who allegedly roam the streets of Quetta and other Pakistani cities and towns quite openly? Pakistan’s decision to arrest the Taliban spokesman was attributed to relentless US pressure.

American and Afghan officials realise that it would be difficult to bring lasting peace to Afghanistan if the Taliban and other enemies of President Hamid Karzai’s government continue to find sanctuary in Pakistan.

During the war against the Soviets, Pakistan’s military leader General Ziaul Haq had adopted a policy that would bleed the Soviets without goading them into direct confrontation with Pakistan. Pakistani intelligence officers used the metaphor “the water must not get too hot” to describe that policy. It seems that Pakistan is pursuing a similar policy in relation to Afghanistan today.

By allowing the Taliban to regroup and mount insurgent attacks across the border, Pakistan’s hopes to make it clear to Afghan leaders such as Karzai that they cannot stabilise their country without Pakistan’s help. At the same time, Pakistan does not want the situation to reach the point of inviting US reprisals.

Pakistan’s attitude towards Afghanistan was formed largely by historic developments of the nineteenth century when Britain and Russia competed for influence in Central Asia in what came to be known as the “Great Game” of espionage and proxy wars.

Demand for Pashtunistan

Since independence, Pakistan has been concerned about the demand for Pashtunistan, pursued vigorously by Afghanistan for many years and about Indian influence in Afghanistan that could make Pakistan a target of a pincer movement. Pakistan’s concern about the lack of depth in its land defences also led to the Pakistani generals’ strategic belief about the fusion of the defence of Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Pakistan’s complicated role in Afghanistan beginning well before the Soviet invasion of 1979 and through the rise and fall of the Taliban can best be understood in light of this desire for fusion of the two states. Although friendly towards Pakistan, Karzai and other Afghan nationalists remain unwilling to accept Pakistan’s vision of Afghanistan as a sub-ordinate state. Afghanistan maintains close ties with India and expects to pursue an independent foreign policy.

Although Pakistan is engaged in a peace process with India, its generals remain fearful of Indian domination. India’s size coupled with its economic and military might make its ascendancy inevitable but that does not deter Pakistan from pursuing options of low intensity and sub-conventional warfare for greater regional influence a contemporary version of the great game.

Pakistan’s establishment will crack down on the Taliban only when it finds the cost of positioning itself as a major regional power unbearable. The US could help Pakistan realise the dangers of persisting with its traditional policies by refusing to publicly pretend that it is unaware of Pakistan’s regional double-dealing. An American brokered accord between Pakistan and Afghanistan to end the latent dispute over the Durand Line, coupled with international guarantees to end Pakistan’s meddling in Afghanistan might be the minimum requirements for durable peace in the region.

Gulf News, October 12, 2005

The massive 7.6 intensity earthquake that rocked Afghanistan, Pakistan and northern India on Saturday is undoubtedly a great human tragedy.

It is also an occasion for governments in the region to set aside their differences and deal together with the devastation. Shockwaves from the earthquake covered the 625-mile stretch between Kabul, Islamabad and New Delhi.

But the area affected severely by the earthquake comprised mountains covering the Hindukush, Karakoram and Himalayan ranges. In addition to the mountains’ heights, access to the earthquake victims has become more difficult because of shattered bridges, cracked roads and landslides.

Pakistan has been hit hardest by this calamity. The cities of Muzaffarabad in Pakistan controlled Kashmir and Balakot in the Northwest Frontier Province have been reduced to rubble.

Casualties, already estimated to be over 30,000, could rise further as the full extent of the earthquake’s devastation becomes known. Many of the victims are likely to be in small villages, the population of which is not fully recorded and may be difficult to reach.

A much less intense earthquake in December 1974 that hit Pakistan’s northern areas, including some regions damaged again by the latest tremor, caused widespread damage. Almost 100 villages and small towns were flattened. An international rescue effort and worldwide fund-raising ensued.

By the time rescue crews reached remote villages and towns and the casualties were actually counted, 5,200 people were found to have died, thousands injured and a quarter of a million rendered homeless.

This time, too, in addition to burying the dead and locating survivors, massive humanitarian assistance will be needed to rehabilitate those affected by the natural disaster. Rebuilding destroyed towns and villages, reviving their economy and planning for the future would require far more resources than Pakistan can muster on its own.

President Bush’s announcement of US help for the earthquake victims and the generous assistance provided by Britain and the UAE, among others, reflects the international community’s humanitarian concern over the consequences of this natural disaster.

As was seen during the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina that destroyed New Orleans, even the world’s greatest military and economic power was not fully equipped with the unanticipated fury of nature. Countries such as Pakistan, where one-third of the population lives on less than $1 (Dh3.67) a day cannot be expected to deal with the consequences of a large-scale emergency without considerable international assistance.

Pakistan has asked for, and should get, help in the form of transport helicopters, blankets, food supplies and medicines.

Disaster relief

India’s offer of help should help the stalled peace process in South Asia and should be reciprocated by a Pakistani offer of assistance to Indian victims in areas where Pakistanis might have better access.

The US willingness to allow its military personnel, stationed in Afghanistan, to assist with disaster relief in Pakistan should similarly be appreciated. Given the scale of the disaster, humanitarian considerations should rump political ones.

While mobilising manpower and resources to deal with the earthquake’s aftermath, Pakistanis should not overlook the structural shortcomings that have exacerbated the destruction caused by this act of nature.

Wide swathes of Pakistan controlled Kashmir, the Northwest Frontier Province and the Northern Areas had no first aid infrastructure.

Apparently no lessons were learnt from the 1974 earthquake and there was no disaster relief contingency plan in place for an earthquake of greater intensity.

Even in the federal capital, Islamabad, it took soldiers two hours and 45 minutes to reach the collapsed Margalla Towers, notwithstanding the building’s central and accessible location. There was only one crane in all of Islamabad to deal with the massive debris of steel reinforced concrete.

Compare the army’s reaction time in reaching Margalla Towers with its swift execution of the October 1999 coup d’etat that brought General Pervez Musharraf to power and Pakistan’s fundamental problem becomes apparent. Then, army units moved swiftly to take control of Islamabad’s key buildings within 35 minutes of Musharraf’s removal from his position as army chief by the civilian prime minister.

The army claimed that its swift movement was made possible by its preparedness for various contingencies. Quite clearly, the Pakistani establishment prepares for political contingencies but not for natural disasters.

Perhaps it is time to include exercises for dealing with adversities such as last Saturday’s earthquake in the military’s repertoire of contingencies.