Who needs the Military to Muddle Through

Indian Express, September 28, 2006

Pakistani supporters of military rule justify the army’s political role by citing its assumed advantages. Pakistan, it is argued, finds greater stability with a general at its helm. This stability, in turn, is said to contribute to economic growth and development. Military rulers supposedly bring corruption under control. Their conduct of foreign relations, too, is considered to confer strength compared to the foreign policy of an administration that must constantly defer to public opinion. Over the past few days, though, it became clear that none of these alleged benefits of military rule are currently flowing to Pakistan.

Last week, a widespread power cut resulted in rumours of a military coup against Musharraf who is on a trip to the US. The rumours were, of course, baseless and were vehemently denied by officials. But a question remained unanswered. How stable can a country be if its citizens are prepared to entertain rumours of a military coup the first time a massive power breakdown occurs since the last coup?

One of the benefits of constitutional governance is the certainty it brings into the affairs of state. In a raucous parliamentary democracy, there is much political noise and a lot of compromise that some people see as instability. But, by and large, everyone knows how governments will ascend to office and how they would be removed from power. Such certainty is almost always missing under personalised military rule.

That military rule ensures reduction in corruption has also been exposed as a myth in Pakistan’s case by the publication of Transparency International’s National Corruption Perception Survey 2006. Transparency International is a Berlin-based anti-corruption watchdog organization that publishes an annual Corruption Perceptions Index based on “the opinions of business people and country analysts”. The latest Pakistan national survey indicates that 67.3 per cent of respondents view the present government, with General Musharraf as President and with the parliament elected in 2002, as the most corrupt government to hold power since 1988.

By way of comparison, it is important to note that 48 per cent of the business community considered the second Benazir Bhutto government (1993-96) as the most corrupt while 34 per cent described the second Nawaz Sharif administration (1996-99) as the most corrupt.

It is important to note that civilian governments have been the target of vicious propaganda by the military-led Pakistani establishment and, therefore, it is not unexpected that the perception of corruption under Sharif’s and Bhutto’s administrations would affect significant numbers of people. The two political leaders did not help their image or that of democratic rule by periodically accusing each other of corruption. But General Musharraf’s regime has not been at the receiving end of endless prosecutions by the military-run National Accountability Bureau (NAB) nor has it been described endlessly as corrupt in the media.

While perceptions of corruption under civilian governments could be the result of media influence, the 67.3 percent that view the Musharraf- Shaukat Aziz regime as most corrupt have more likely formed their opinion on the basis of personal experience.

According to Transparency International, only 8 per cent of those surveyed viewed the first Bhutto government (1988-90) as Pakistan’s most corrupt government even though Ms Bhutto and the PPP were labeled ‘corrupt’ during that period through a massive propaganda drive by the ISI.

If Musharraf’s military regime has failed to bring domestic stability and an end to corruption, has it helped project Pakistan’s strength overseas? Alas, the answer to this question, too, must be in the negative. It is true that Musharraf made the correct choice in allying with the US in the aftermath of 9/11. But his recent disclosure that he made that choice under the American threat of bombing Pakistan into the Stone Age takes away the credit of any wisdom on his part. New York Times columnist Maureen Dowd recently described Musharraf as being part of an ‘Axis of Sketchy Allies’.

The truth is that Musharraf is muddling through, like most of Pakistan’s previous rulers, and offers little better in key areas such as domestic steadiness, reduction of corruption and external strength. If anything his regime’s performance is becoming poorer with each passing day. If muddling through is Pakistan’s best option, it would be better to do so under civilian democratic rule, with a legitimate and representative government. Why persist with dragging the army into politics if the so-called benefits of army rule are just not available?

Musharraf’s rule is no better than others

Gulf News, September 27, 2006

Pakistani supporters of military rule justify the army’s political role by citing its assumed advantages. Pakistan, it is argued, finds greater stability with a general at its helm.
This stability, in turn, is said to contribute to economic growth and development. Military rulers supposedly bring corruption under control.

Their conduct of foreign relations, too, is considered to confer strength compared to the foreign policy of an administration that must constantly defer to public opinion.
But during the last few days, it became clear that none of these alleged benefits of military rule are currently flowing to Pakistan.

Last week, a widespread power cut resulted in rumours of a military coup against General Pervez Musharraf who is on an extended trip to the United States.

Coup rumours

The rumours were, of course, baseless and were vehemently denied by officials. The Federal Information Minister announced that Musharraf underwent a routine medical check-up in Texas with a Pakistani-American doctor while the coup rumours circulated around Pakistan and “he is absolutely all right”. But one question remained unanswered. How stable can a country be if its citizens are prepared to entertain rumours of a military coup the first time a massive power breakdown occurs since the last coup?

One of the benefits of constitutional governance is the certainty it brings into the affairs of state. In a raucous parliamentary democracy, there is much political noise and a lot of compromise that some people see as instability. But, by and large, everyone knows how governments will ascend to office and how they would be removed from power. Such certainty is almost always missing under personalised military rule.

That military rule ensures reduction in corruption has also been exposed as a myth in Pakistan’s case by the publication of Transparency International’s 2006 National Corruption Perception Survey.

Transparency International is a Berlin-based anti-corruption watchdog organisation that publishes an annual Corruption Perceptions Index based on “the opinions of business people and country analysts”. The latest Pakistan national survey indicates that 67.3 per cent of respondents view the present government, with Musharraf as president and with the parliament elected in 2002, as the most corrupt government to hold power since 1988.

By way of comparison, it is important to note that 48 per cent of the business community considered the second Benazir Bhutto government (1993-96) as the most corrupt while 34 per cent described the second Nawaz Sharif administration (1996-99) as the most corrupt.
It is important to note that civilian governments have been the target of vicious propaganda by the military-led Pakistani establishment and, therefore, it is not unexpected that the perception of corruption under Sharif and Bhutto’s administrations would affect significant numbers of people.

Receiving end

The two political leaders did not help their image or that of democratic rule by periodically accusing each other of corruption. But Musharraf’s regime has not been at the receiving end of endless prosecutions by the military-run National Accountability Bureau (NAB) nor has it been described endlessly as corrupt in the media.

While perceptions of corruption under civilian governments could be the result of media influence, the 67.3 per cent that view the Musharraf-Shaukat Aziz regime as most corrupt have more likely formed their opinion on the basis of personal experience.

According to Transparency International, only 8 per cent of those surveyed viewed the first Bhutto government (1988-90) as Pakistan’s most corrupt government even though Bhutto and the PPP were labelled “corrupt” during that period through a massive propaganda drive by Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).

If Musharraf’s military regime has failed to bring domestic stability and an end to corruption, has it helped project Pakistan’s strength overseas? Alas, the answer to this question, too, must be in the negative.

It is true that Musharraf made the correct choice in allying with the United States in the aftermath of 9/11. But his recent disclosure that he made that choice under the American threat of bombing Pakistan into the Stone Age takes away the credit of any wisdom on his part. New York Times columnist Maureen Dowd recently described Musharraf as being part of an “Axis of Sketchy Allies”.

The truth is that Musharraf is muddling through like most of Pakistan’s previous rulers and offers little better in key areas such as domestic steadiness, reduction of corruption and external strength. If anything his regime’s performance is becoming poorer with each passing day.

If muddling through is Pakistan’s best option, it would be better to do so under civilian democratic rule, with a legitimate and representative government. Why persist with dragging the army into politics if the so-called benefits of army rule are just not available?

General Musharraf in the line of fire

Gulf News, September 6, 2006

The people of Pakistan appear to have reacted strongly to the killing of Baloch leader Nawab Akbar Bugti by Pakistan’s security forces. But General Pervez Musharraf has justified the military action by declaring that he would not allow anyone to harm the country, adding that strict action would be taken against “anti-state elements”.

“Whoever wants to harm Pakistan nationally or internationally would have to fight with me first,” Musharraf reportedly said, implying that he knew better than the people what is beneficial or harmful to Pakistan.

Musharraf’s warning that “any elements opposed to the development and prosperity of the country would be dealt with iron hands” is not new. Neither is his claim that “no compromise would be made on [the] country’s stability and interest”. The Pakistani nation has heard such rhetoric several times before.

Soon after starting the military operation against Pakistan’s erstwhile Bengali citizens in March 1971, General Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan told foreign correspondents, “I will be damned if I allow anyone to break up Pakistan.” As it turned out, Yahya Khan presided over Pakistan’s break up and his decision to use an iron hand against alleged “anti-state elements” precipitated that break up.

Musharraf has much in common with General Yahya Khan. He is a soldier’s soldier who takes pride in his military uniform and considers civilians, especially politicians, inferior to himself. Like Generals Yahya Khan and Zia ul Haq, Musharraf has made it clear that he intends to continue running the country, combining the offices of army chief and president in his person.

Musharraf has persistently rejected opposition demands that he take off his uniform, going so far as to say, “At the end of the day I am a soldier and I love to wear uniform. It is part of me, my second skin.”

Within the next few days, Musharraf’s memoirs will be published by American publisher Simon and Schuster under the title In the Line of Fire. The decision to publish a book, outlining his vision of Pakistan and his contribution to a nation he has described as difficult to rule, resembles a similar decision by another Pakistani military ruler.

Self-styled Field Marshal Ayub Khan published Friends Not Masters in 1968. The book was published by the Oxford University Press, reflecting the fact that in those days Pakistan’s Sandhurst-trained generals still had significant affinity with Britain.

Musharraf’s language and decisions are deeply influenced by his predecessor general-presidents. He speaks against anti-state elements with the same vigour that characterised Yahya Khan’s antipathy towards Bengali politicians; His book is likely to echo Ayub Khan’s worldview.

The era of Field Marshal Ayub Khan is often cited as Pakistan’s period of stability and economic growth. But in fact, however, many of Pakistan’s current political and economic problems can be traced back to the Ayub Khan era. Under military rule, Pakistan has consistently pursued lopsided economic development concentrated in a few hands and in specific geographic regions. Alienation of some ethnic groups, impoverishment of the vast majority of people and a total abandonment of politics are the real lasting legacies of Ayub Khan-style governance.

Specific job

Political leaders in most successful countries are pragmatic consensus builders and policy makers. They run their countries, instead of pretending to save them. As for soldiers and generals, they have the specific job of defending their country in the event of war. Generals are not trained for politics and, in Pakistan’s case, have often been responsible for bringing major political disasters upon their country.

Pakistan’s generals from Ayub Khan to Musharraf have always thought that theirs is the only correct way, not taking into account the possibility of there being alternative paths to the nation’s success. These generals have no tolerance with the notion of political process, no acceptance of allowing institutions and individuals to do their own job, no willingness to accept the occasional messiness of democracy and pluralism.

In Friends Not Masters, Ayub Khan spoke disparagingly of Pakistan’s Bengali citizens and laid out the case for why Pakistan was unfit for democracy and needed the steadying hand of the army. Thousands of copies of Ayub Khan’s book, in both English and Urdu, were bought by the Pakistani government and were available by weight to wrap things soon after the Field Marshal lost power to Yahya Khan in 1969.

The cover of Musharraf’s book In The Line of Fire features him in civilian dress, making one wonder why his pride in his uniform is not reflected in the title photograph of his memoir. The decision to feature the general in mufti on the cover of his book indicates the lurking fear of every coup-making general about the legitimacy of his regime.

Musharraf probably wants the rest of the world to see him as a benign pro-western leader, in an Armani suit so that he is not considered as the New York Times recently characterised him, “a garden variety military dictator”.