He Knows Best

The Indian Express, March 22, 2006

Pakistan’s fourth military ruler, General Pervez Musharraf, often makes statements that make eminent sense. He is, however, unwilling or unable to translate these rational sounding pronouncements into policy.
The contradiction between Musharraf’s avowed goals and the reality that he presides over confuses some and frustrates others. How can one reconcile his sensible statement that Pakistanis should not be India-centric in their worldview with his periodic reassertion of the claim that India is a permanent threat to Pakistan’s existence? What explanation can there be for the paradox between Musharraf’s proclamations about “enlightened moderation” and the fact that his government has detained over a thousand people under a counter-terrorism law for flying kites in the province of Punjab?

Musharraf’s assertions about building sustainable democracy are belied by his continuing to rule with the help of the army and the intelligence services. His claim of supporting stability in Afghanistan is compromised by his occasional outbursts against the Afghan government. The general is a linchpin in America’s global war against terrorism but sees nothing wrong with allowing homegrown Pakistani terrorist groups from continuing in business.

General Musharraf’s inconsistencies are not the result of a Machiavellian psyche bent upon confusing the world. On the contrary, they are the product of confusion about ends and means within a mind that has internalised all the prejudices of Pakistan’s cantonment culture. That culture considers the Pakistan army as the centre of the universe and the army chief as having a divine right to set things right for Pakistan.

It is entirely possible that Musharraf even believes his stated vision. But he also believes concurrently in the Pakistan army’s deep-rooted prejudices. That, more than anything else, is the reason why Musharraf’s stated vision does not always translate into action.

Let us examine a few examples of Musharraf’s contradictory positions. He wants peace with India and wants Pakistanis to overcome their India-centric worldview. But he is unwilling to delve into the sources of Pakistan’s India-centrism. Pakistan has spent the bulk of its resources for over half a century on military competition with India. The ascendancy of the Pakistan army in the country’s life depends on the assumption that India presents an existential threat to Pakistan. Musharraf’s view of India has not changed, even after his call upon Pakistanis to stop looking at the world through the prism of India.

On March 18, a few days after coining the term “Indo-centric” to describe Pakistan’s traditional view of India, Musharraf told troops at the Bahawalpur garrison that his government was taking all possible measures to provide state-of-the-art weapons and equipment to the armed forces to maintain a qualitative edge. He also said that the civilian nuclear cooperation pact between the United States and India would upset the “balance of power” in the region. General Musharraf cannot fault ordinary Pakistanis for expecting his government to secure a deal from the Americans similar to that offered to the Indians when he and his officials insist on notional parity between Pakistan and India.

The India-centric view of Pakistanis flows from the centrality of the army in their lives and the continuous projection of the Indian threat in almost all public discourse.
The conflict in vision that is increasingly defining General Musharraf does not end with foreign policy. It is even more evident in domestic matters. Musharraf’s promises of sustainable democracy cannot be fulfilled as long as the ISI’s internal wing controls and manages the political process.

Talking to newspaper editors recently, Musharraf repeated his vow of not allowing Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif back into politics while at the same time saying that he has nothing against Pakistan’s mainstream political parties, the Pakistan Peoples Party and the Pakistan Muslim League. Musharraf repeatedly criticises Pakistan’s political parties for not practicing internal democracy but does not explain how the parties can freely choose a leader if he vetoes the right of specific politicians to participate.

The immediate cause of the 1999 coup was said to be Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s attempt to replace Musharraf from the office of army chief. According to Musharraf’s reasoning, an elected prime minister does not have the right to change an army chief whom the prime minister had appointed but the army chief has the right to decide who is or is not eligible to head political parties of which a serving army officer cannot constitutionally be a member.

Musharraf has been at his contradictory best during recent media interviews. Among other things, he has taken the mantle of a political scientist to redefine democracy. In an interview with CNN’s Wolf Blitzer, Musharraf went so far as to suggest that the Washington Post does not understand democracy though he stopped short of offering training for the Post’s editorial staff at the Pakistan Military Academy.

In an interview with BBC’s Barbara Plett on the eve of President Bush’s South Asia visit, Musharraf said that the vast majority of Pakistanis was with him. “If they were not, first of all I would quit myself,” he exclaimed in what can best be described as an “I know best” proclamation. Musharraf’s glibly stated vision is repeatedly thwarted by his firmly held belief in the divine right of Pakistan’s army chief to rule.

Paradox is the general rule for Musharraf

Gulf News, March 22, 2006

Pakistan’s fourth military ruler, General Pervez Musharraf, often makes statements that make eminent sense. He is, however, unwilling or unable to translate these rational sounding pronouncements into policy.

The contradiction between Musharraf’s avowed goals and the reality that he presides over confuses some and frustrates others. How can one reconcile his sensible statement that Pakistanis should not be India-centric in their worldview with his periodic reassertion of the claim that India is a permanent threat to Pakistan’s existence?

What explanation can there be for the paradox between Musharraf’s proclamations about “enlightened moderation” and the fact that his government has detained over a thousand people under a counter-terrorism law for flying kites in the province of Punjab?

Musharraf’s assertions about building sustainable democracy are belied by his continuing to rule with the help of the army and the intelligence services. His claim of supporting stability in Afghanistan is compromised by his occasional outbursts against the Afghan government.

The general is a linchpin in America’s global war against terrorism but sees nothing wrong with allowing homegrown Pakistani terrorist groups from continuing in business.

Musharraf’s inconsistencies are not the result of a Machiavellian psyche bent upon confusing the world. On the contrary, they are the product of confusion about ends and means within a mind that has internalised all the prejudices of Pakistan’s cantonment culture.

That culture considers the Pakistan army as the centre of the universe and the army chief as having a divine right to set things right for Pakistan.

It is entirely possible that Musharraf even believes his stated vision. But he also believes concurrently in the Pakistan army’s deep-rooted prejudices. That, more than anything else, is the reason why Musharraf’s stated vision does not always translate into action.

Let us examine a few examples of Musharraf’s contradictory positions. He wants peace with India and wants Pakistanis to overcome their India-centric worldview. But he is unwilling to delve into the sources of Pakistan’s India-centrism.

Pakistan has spent the bulk of its resources for over half a century on military competition with India. The ascendancy of the Pakistan army in the country’s life depends on the assumption that India presents an existential threat to Pakistan.

On March 18, a few days after coining the term “Indo-centric” to describe Pakistan’s traditional view of India, Musharraf told troops at the Bahawalpur garrison that the civilian nuclear cooperation pact between the United States and India would upset the “balance of power” in the region.

India-centric view

The India-centric view of Pakistanis flows from the centrality of the army in their lives and the continuous projection of the Indian threat in almost all public discourse. The conflict in vision that is increasingly defining Musharraf does not end with foreign policy. It is even more evident in domestic matters.

Musharraf’s promises of sustainable democracy cannot be fulfilled as long as the ISI’s internal wing controls and manages the political process.

Talking to newspaper editors recently Musharraf repeated his vow of not allowing Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif back into politics while at the same time saying that he has nothing against Pakistan’s mainstream political parties, the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) and the Pakistan Muslim League (PML).

Musharraf repeatedly criticises Pakistan’s political parties for not practising internal democracy but does not explain how the parties can freely choose a leader if he vetoes the right of specific politicians to participate.

The immediate cause of the 1999 coup was said to be prime minister Nawaz Sharif’s attempt to replace Musharraf from the office of army chief.

According to Musharraf’s reasoning, an elected prime minister does not have the right to change an army chief whom the prime minister had appointed but the army chief has the right to decide who is or is not eligible to head political parties of which a serving army officer cannot constitutionally be a member.

Musharraf has been at his contradictory best during recent media interviews. Among other things, he has taken the mantle of a political scientist to redefine democracy.

In an interview with CNN’s Wolf Blitzer, Musharraf went so far as to suggest that the Washington Post does not understand democracy though he stopped short of offering training for the Post’s editorial staff at the Pakistan Military Academy.

In an interview with BBC’s Barbara Plett on the eve of US President George W. Bush’s South Asia visit, Musharraf said that the vast majority of Pakistanis was with him. “If they were not, first of all I would quit myself,” he exclaimed in what can best be described as an “I know best” proclamation.

Musharraf’s glibly stated vision is repeatedly thwarted by his firmly held belief in the divine right of Pakistan’s army chief to rule.

The Wind Blows Another Way at the Durand Line

The Indian Express, March 15, 2006

Pakistan’s relations with Afghanistan are in a downward spiral. First came the war of words between President Hamid Karzai and General Pervez Musharraf over who was to blame for the resurgence of the Taliban along the mountainous Afghan-Pakistan border. Then, the Afghan parliament condemned Musharraf’s use of undiplomatic language about Karzai. Now, the head of Afghanistan’s Senate, Hazrat Sibghatullah Mujaddedi, has accused Musharraf and the ISI of instigating a suicide assassination attempt on Mujaddedi’s life. In between, Afghanistan demanded Pakistan stop naming its missiles after Afghan heroes and Pakistan claimed it was planning a fence along their complex 1,810 km border.

Musharraf and most Pakistani officials blame India for the deterioration in Islamabad’s ties with Kabul. But Karzai, Mujaddedi and the majority of Afghan parliamentarians now criticising Pakistani policy do not have a history of close ties with India. They lived as refugees in Pakistan between ’79 and ’88 when it served, with US help, as the staging ground for the guerrilla war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.

India maintained cordial ties with the pro-Communist Kabul regime during that period. Pakistan’s extensive hospitality for millions of Afghan refugees strained Pakistani society. But the Afghan Jihad was justified by Pakistan’s establishment on grounds that it would create goodwill among Afghans and buy Pakistan influence across its northwestern border for years to come.

How did Pakistan manage to lose the goodwill generated by its support of Afghan refugees and Mujahideen during their anti-Soviet struggle? The answer can be found in the near-obsession of Pakistan’s establishment with extending its influence into Afghanistan. Pakistan should have been content with having friends in power in Kabul after the fall of the pro-communist regime in ’92. Instead, its intelligence community adopted the attitude of British officers of the 19th century.

Afghanistan’s frontier with British India was drawn by a British civil servant, Mortimer Durand, in 1893 and agreed upon by representatives of both governments. After Pakistan’s independence from Britain in 1947, Pakistani leaders assumed that Pakistan would inherit the functions of India’s British government in guiding Afghan policy. But soon after Pakistan’s independence, Afghanistan voted against Pakistan’s admission to the UN, arguing Afghanistan’s treaties with British India relating to Afghan borders were no longer valid since a new country was being created where none existed at the time of these treaties.

Although India publicly did not support the Afghan demand for “Pashtunistan”, Pakistan’s early leaders could not separate the Afghan questioning of Pakistani borders from their perception of an Indian grand design against Pakistan. They wanted to limit Indian influence in Afghanistan to prevent Pakistan from being “crushed by a sort of pincer movement” involving Afghanistan stirring the ethnic cauldron in Pakistan and India stepping in to undo the partition of the subcontinent. Pakistan’s response was a forward policy of encouraging Afghan Islamists that would subordinate ethnic nationalism to Islamic religious sentiment.

Pakistan’s concern about the lack of depth in its land defences led to the Pakistani generals’ strategic belief about the fusion of the defence of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Pakistan’s complicated role in Afghanistan beginning well before the Soviet invasion of 1979 and through the rise and fall of the Taliban can best be understood in light of this desire.

Karzai and other Afghan nationalists remain unwilling to accept Pakistan’s vision of Afghanistan as a subordinate state. Afghanistan maintains lose ties with India and expects to pursue an independent foreign policy. Pakistan has offended Afghans in the past with attempting to dictate their policies and by positioning itself as a major player in a contemporary version of the Great Game. Now, however, it also runs the risk of upsetting the US, which is militarily present in Afghanistan and has significant stakes in ensuring its stability.

Since the beginning of 2005, casualties in Afghanistan have been rising. The Taliban insurgency is weak and not yet as threatening as the challenge in Iraq. But Afghan insurgents are clearly getting arms, money and training. The Taliban are also recruiting new members and undertaking bolder attacks such as the one against Mujaddedi.

Intelligence-led covert operations invariably have unexpected consequences, often described as “blowback”. Pakistan and Afghanistan must defuse current tensions and build an open, diplomatic relationship in place of the Great Game legacy of intrigue and violence. A fence between Afghanistan and Pakistan is unrealistic, as is the complete separation of the two countries’ shared history. An American-brokered accord between Pakistan and Afghanistan to end the latent dispute over the Durand Line, coupled with international guarantees to end Pakistan’s meddling in Afghanistan, might be the basis for durable peace and friendship between the two Muslim states.

Pak-Afghan officials replay the Great Game

Gulf News, March 15, 2006

Pakistan’s relations with Afghanistan are in a downward spiral. First came the war of words between President Hamid Karzai and General Pervez Musharraf over who was to blame for the resurgence of the Taliban along the mountainous Afghan-Pakistan border. Then, the Afghan parliament condemned Musharraf’s use of undiplomatic language about Karzai.

Now, the head of Afghanistan’s Senate, Hazrat Sibghatullah Mujaddedi, has accused Musharraf and Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) of instigating a suicide assassination attempt on Mujaddedi’s life. In between, Afghanistan demanded that Pakistan stop naming its missiles after Afghan heroes and Pakistan claimed that it was planning to build a fence along their complex and long border.

Musharraf and most Pakistani officials blame India for the deterioration in Islamabad’s ties with Kabul. But Karzai, Mujaddedi and the majority of Afghan parliamentarians now criticising Pakistani policy do not have a history of close ties with India.

They lived as refugees in Pakistan between 1979 and 1988 when the country served, with US help, as the staging ground for the guerrilla war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.

India, on the other hand, maintained cordial relations with the pro-communist Kabul regime during that period.

How did Pakistan manage to lose the goodwill generated by its support of Afghan refugees and Mujahideen during their anti-Soviet struggle?

The answer to this question can be found in the near-obsession of Pakistan’s establishment with extending its influence into Afghanistan.

Pakistan should have been content with having friends in power in Kabul after the fall of the pro-communist regime in 1992. Instead, Pakistan’s intelligence community adopted the attitude of British officers of the 19th century when Britain and Russia competed for influence in Central Asia in the “Great Game” of espionage and proxy wars.

Afghanistan’s frontier with British India was drawn by a British civil servant, Sir Mortimer Durand, in 1893 and agreed upon by representatives of both governments. After Pakistan’s independence from Britain in 1947, Pakistani leaders assumed that Pakistan would inherit the functions of India’s British government in guiding Afghan policy.

But soon after Pakistan’s independence, Afghanistan voted against Pakistan’s admission to the United Nations, arguing that Afghanistan’s treaties with British India relating to Afghan borders were no longer valid because a new country was being created where none existed at the time of these treaties.

Although India publicly did not support the Afghan demand for “Pashtunistan”, Pakistan’s early leaders could not separate the Afghan questioning of Pakistani borders from their perception of an Indian grand design against Pakistan.

Forward policy

Pakistan’s response was a forward policy of encouraging Afghan Islamists that would subordinate ethnic nationalism to Islamic religious sentiment.

Pakistan’s concern about the lack of depth in Pakistan’s land defences led to the Pakistani generals’ strategic belief about the fusion of the defence of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Pakistan’s complicated role in Afghanistan beginning well before the Soviet invasion of 1979 and through the rise and fall of the Taliban can best be understood in light of this desire.

Karzai and other Afghan nationalists remain unwilling to accept Pakistan’s vision of Afghanistan as a subordinate state.
Pakistan has offended Afghans in the past with attempting to dictate their policies and by positioning itself as a major player in a contemporary version of the “Great Game”. Now, however, it also runs the risk of upsetting the US, which is militarily present in Afghanistan.

The Taliban insurgency is weak and not yet as threatening as the challenge in Iraq. But Afghan insurgents are clearly getting arms, money and training. The Taliban are also recruiting new members and undertaking bolder attacks such as the one against Mujaddedi.

Intelligence-led covert operations invariably have unexpected consequences, often described as “blowback”.
Pakistan and Afghanistan must defuse current tensions and build an open, diplomatic relationship in place of the “Great Game” legacy of intrigue and violence. A fence between Afghanistan and Pakistan is unrealistic, as is the complete separation of the two countries’ shared history.

An American-brokered accord between Pakistan and Afghanistan to end the latent dispute over the Durand Line, coupled with international guarantees to end Pakistan’s meddling in Afghanistan, might be the basis for durable peace and friendship between the two Muslim states.

Pakistan should make use of Indo-US ties

Gulf News, March 8, 2006

The International Herald Tribune headline said it all: “Bush gives India a hug, Pakistan a friendly pat.” President George W. Bush’s recent South Asian trip officially confirmed India’s status as America’s strategic partner.

India got the much coveted civilian nuclear deal, which assures US cooperation in India’s use of nuclear technology to meet the country’s burgeoning demand for energy.

Pakistan’s claim to a similar deal was firmly turned down and although Bush praised General Pervez Musharraf’s efforts in the war against terrorism, he did not say or do anything else to cheer either Musharraf or the rest of official Pakistan.

Successive military leaders in Pakistan have sought an alliance with the United States as a means of overcoming the power imbalance between India and Pakistan as well as to push for Pakistan’s case over Jammu and Kashmir. Musharraf is no exception.

The Pakistani generals’ formula for befriending the US is simple. Pakistan offers strategic cooperation to the US in addressing its immediate policy concern: containing Soviet communism during the Cold War; providing Afghan Mujahideen a base of operations in the war to bleed the Soviets; and, since 9/11, intelligence sharing and military action against Al Qaida. In return, they invariably seek to advance their own goal of “containing” India.

Had Bush said something more on Kashmir, Musharraf could have used it as a face-saver. The American president decided, however, to stick to his script and avoided saying anything that Musharraf could describe as an offer of American mediation over Kashmir.

As expected, Bush did not press Musharraf very hard on the question of restoring democracy, at least publicly. But he did not leave the issue unaddressed either. In expressing the hope that “democracy is Pakistan’s future”, Bush refuted Musharraf’s assertions that Pakistan is already on the road to democracy.

Bush’s expressed expectation of a free and fair parliamentary election in 2007 was an implicit acknowledgement of the fact that electoral exercises organised under Musharraf so far were not above board.

Realistically speaking, there was little reason for Pakistani officials to expect anything different. But Pakistan’s military rulers have a long history of deluding themselves and building unrealistic hopes.

No indication

The US had given no indication that a civilian nuclear deal would be available to Pakistan. In fact, Pakistan had been told long before the Bush visit not to expect such a deal. The demand for a civilian nuclear agreement was not based on demonstrated energy needs or prior consultation between Pakistan and the US. It was a case of asking to be treated exactly as the US deals with India.

The most memorable statement of Bush’s South Asian visit came at its end when he explained why India and Pakistan could not be treated identically. “Pakistan and India are different countries with different needs and different histories,” Bush said at his joint press conference with Musharraf.

Almost every American leader and official dealing with the two countries has had that thought but the hesitation in stating it has often fed unrealistic expectations among Pakistanis.

The visible disappointment in Pakistan over Bush’s visit is not the result of American unreliability, as several Pakistani commentators are claiming. It is the consequence of the persistence of strategic myopia within the Pakistani establishment.
Bush deserves credit for being straight-forward in his statements throughout his South Asia trip. He carefully and scrupulously avoided feeding false hopes in Pakistan.

But Pakistanis must now come to terms with the fundamental flaw in their strategic paradigm instead of periodically lashing out at others, especially the US.

A nation should not define its interests solely in terms of competing with a much larger neighbour. Pakistan has already suffered enough as a result of its efforts to use periodic alliances with the US to challenge India.

This might be the moment to consider a new strategic vision, one which takes advantage of close Indo-US ties to forge a Pakistani partnership simultaneously with India and the United States.

Instead of acting as the prickliest nation in South Asia, Pakistan could then be the friend of its immediate neighbours as well as of the world’s sole superpower. Pursuit of economic prosperity and political stability under democracy, rather than the “containment” or “cutting down to size” of India would be a better strategic goal for Pakistan.

Musharraf has already indicated that he is not considering any changes in the old Pakistani worldview. The day before Bush’s arrival in Pakistan, Musharraf told an audience of military officers at Islamabad’s National Defence College that he was keeping “Pakistan’s strategic options open” to deal with the new Indo-US partnership.

“My recent trip to China was part of my efforts in that direction,” he was reported as saying.

That could mean several more years of confrontation with India and meddling in Afghanistan.