Living in a Cocoon

Nations do not always like to recall their weaknesses and flaws even though they must do so to move forward. Americans do not like to discuss slavery or their ancestors’ treatment of Native Americans. The British seek to gloss over their excesses during the colonial era. Turks dispute to this day that genocide was attempted against Armenians in the Ottoman era. But few nations advance a rosy national narrative in an unqualified way as some Pakistanis insist on doing, not only in viewing history but also our current state.

The white man’s atrocities against Native Americans or Black slaves might not be the subject of daily discourse but it still finds its way into articles, books and movies in the United States. British scholars research, teach and publish about colonialism without fear of being branded traitors to king and country. Elsewhere, a different view of one’s own history or a critical analysis of a nation’s performance does not result in abuse of the variety that comes the way of critics in Pakistan.

The Pakistani state has long tried to force a particular narrative of history down the people’s throats and excluded from academia scholars who refuse to conform. It is as if only one set of ‘facts’ and one set of explanations of these facts would help us forge and maintain national identity. The rise of electronic and social media has widely popularised the pathology of describing citation of facts contrary to our particular national narrative as ‘anti-Pakistan.’

This hyper-patriotism is no longer limited to a conformist view of history and historic events. The mere suggestion that we might not be doing as well as we think attracts the label of being ‘negative towards Pakistan.’ It is as if a Pakistani must turn a blind eye to anything that reflects poorly on Pakistan’s image. Celebrate when we win a cricket or hockey match but do not highlight it if an international publication accuses our country of harbouring terrorists; Repeat government officials’ claims about potential economic success but do not cite figures that disprove them.

It is almost as if we want to live in our own cocoon. We will be okay if we think positively. Talk about bad scenarios, cite statistics that point to our decline, quote others on weaknesses of our foreign and security policies and our countrymen react angrily. By their logic, a Pakistani should only work on improving others’ view of Pakistan, not try to alter the substance that leads to a poor image in the first place.

On December 17, 1971, the day after ‘‘all Pakistani armed forces in Bangladesh” surrendered to “Lt General Jagjit Singh Aurora, GOC-in-C of the Indian and Bangladesh forces in the eastern theatre’’ according to the ‘instrument of surrender,’ none of Pakistan’s newspapers reported the surrender. Radio Pakistan had announced four days earlier that ‘‘the question of any surrender is ruled out because our troops are determined to lay down their lives.’’

The official statement on the momentous event comprised a total of 27 words. It read, ‘‘Latest reports indicate that following an arrangement between the local commanders of India and Pakistan, fighting has ceased in East Pakistan and the Indian troops have entered Dhaka.’’

The nation could not avoid facing the loss of more than half the country’s population and almost half its territory forever. But those in charge of the country’s fortunes at the time wanted to break bad news gently. In other matters, where the people might not find the facts out easily, keeping the bad news out of headlines is easier. Maintaining national morale and pride are often deemed more important than facing harsh realities.

The country might be served better by allowing reality to become part of national discourse, as is the case in most countries. Admittedly, nations need to feel good about themselves but those who talk about what went wrong or is likely to go wrong need not be dismissed as negative thinkers or anti-national. They are the much necessary antidote to contrived positivity and they make self-examination and self-correction possible.

Thus, it is important to remember every time we are in a self-congratulatory mood that we are the sixth largest nation in the world by population but only 26th by size of GDP on PPP basis and 42nd in nominal GDP. We have the world’s sixth largest nuclear arsenal and eight largest army. But our ranking in global firepower stands at 17th and Pakistan performs poorly in most non-military indices. Pakistan ranks 146 out of 187 countries in the world on the Human Development Index, which measures health, standard of living, and education.

The World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report ranks Pakistan’s primary education at 136 out of 144 countries. Pakistan’s higher education ranking is 98 out of 144 while in math and science education our ranking is 104 out of 144. DHL’s Global Connectedness Index places Pakistan at 114 out of 140 countries. This shows Pakistan less connected globally than many countries poorer than itself. Should we just feel good or start discussing our failings before figuring out how to rectify them?

Go on, Break the Cycle

The cancellation of scheduled talks between the national security advisors (NSAs) of India and Pakistan reflects the weak fundamentals of the relationship between the two countries. The talks had been scheduled because both wanted to show the rest of the world that they are willing to talk. But neither government had anything substantive to offer the other, beyond well-worn platitudes.

Although Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his Pakistan counterpart Nawaz Sharif had agreed to talks focused on terrorism, Nawaz could not afford to be willing completely to ignore Kashmir. The written statement issued after the meeting on the sidelines of an international summit in Ufa, Russia was not enough to overcome the dictates of domestic politics in either country.

Pakistan’s decision to announce NSA Sartaj Aziz’s plans to meet leaders of the Hurriyat Conference was likely predicated on the knowledge that India would react adversely to that move. The Indians reacted, as expected, prompting Pakistan to call off the talks on grounds of India’s “preconditions”. The talks’ cancellation saved Pakistan from a public discussion of its support for terrorism and gave Islamabad a face-saver. But even if the talks had gone ahead, Aziz would have only returned home to declare that he responded to India’s dossier on terrorism with one of his own about India’s alleged role in ethnic insurgencies in Balochistan and Karachi.

From India’s perspective, the main issue hindering bilateral relations between the two nuclear-armed neighbours is Pakistan’s support for terrorism. Pakistan blandly denies sponsoring Islamist terrorists, though the denial is hardly taken seriously by the international community. As if to create equivalence, Pakistan also blames India for fomenting trouble across their shared border.

The terrorism issue is now almost three decades old and Indians might be justified if they finally conclude that talks might not be the way to bring it to an end. Given that war is not an option, New Delhi may have to think of creative ways to coerce Islamabad, possibly with international reprimand. But Indian efforts to secure condemnation of Pakistan’s support for jihadis at the UN are likely to be blocked by China, which has a veto at the UN Security Council that India does not.

Pakistan continues to insist on the primacy of the Kashmir dispute — the “core issue” — in its ties with India. For the country’s all-powerful military and its religious conservative elements, this is an ideological question, a crucial part of nation-building and the consolidation of a Pakistani identity. But even the most ardent Pakistani hyper-nationalists know that they failed to wrest Kashmir from India in four wars and through the jihadi insurgency that has been waged from Pakistan since 1989.

Thus, India and Pakistan go through the motion of talks periodically, knowing they will get nowhere until the other budges from its position. For years, Pakistan has sought to internationalise the Kashmir dispute, which India does not see any reason to even discuss. Kashmir is an emotive issue in Pakistan because of the failure of its leaders to inform their people that Pakistan no longer enjoys international support on the matter. The average Pakistani is only told that Kashmir should have been part of Pakistan because of its Muslim majority and that India has reneged on its commitment to resolve the dispute through a plebiscite in the disputed territory.

What most Pakistanis do not know is that the last UN resolution on Kashmir was passed in 1957 and Pakistan could not win support for a plebiscite in Kashmir today if it asked for a new vote at the UN. Instead of accepting that it might be better for India and Pakistan to normalise relations by expanding trade and cross-border travel, Pakistani hardliners have stuck to a “Kashmir first” mantra, which they know is unrealistic.

On the other side, hardliners in an increasingly self-confident India play on Indians’ frustration with Pakistani support for jihadis, such as those responsible for the terrorist attacks in Mumbai in November 2008. There is empty talk of “teaching Pakistan a lesson”, without acknowledging that teaching military lessons to nations armed with nuclear weapons is never easy. Indians could learn something from the US’s frustrations with North Korea.

Posturing on Kashmir gets Pakistan nowhere, but its leaders pursue it to maintain support at home. Pakistan has serious internal issues. It is the sixth-largest country in the world by population, but only 26th by GDP on purchasing power parity and 42nd in nominal terms. Forty-two per cent of its schoolgoing-age children are out of school.

Pakistani leaders could open trade, education exchanges and travel with India, which is set to emerge as the third-largest economy in the world within 15 years, instead of insisting on the resolution of a dispute that hasn’t yet been resolved and can wait a bit longer.

India, on the other hand, could choose to engage (or even just disengage) with Pakistan without appearing to be petty and bent on rubbing its neighbour’s nose in the ground. Instead, India should wait patiently for public opinion in Pakistan to realise Pakistan’s increasing internal weakness. At the moment, weak civilian governments seeking to engage with India are not in a position to confront the hyper-nationalist sentiment that totally ignores harsh realities about Pakistan being unable to indefinitely compete with India.

The two countries need to break a familiar cycle: Pakistan tries to seek international attention for Kashmir, sometimes with terrorist attacks in India; both sides fire on each other along the Line of Control in Kashmir; public recrimination and sabre-rattling follows; both sides mobilise troops; both sides stand down under international pressure or through multilateral diplomacy; talks are scheduled; talks result in nothing or are cancelled. The cycle repeats itself.

But things could change if either side simply refuses to play that game. If Pakistan won’t change, perhaps India can.

Pakistani Hate, Indian Disdain

The recent cancellation of scheduled talks between the national security advisers (NSAs) of India and Pakistan is just the latest example of the two countries’ irreconcilable differences. Both sides needed to talk to show the rest of the world that they are ready to talk. Otherwise, many Pakistanis have been convinced by their government that India wants their country to cease to exist. Indians, on the other hand, see Pakistan only as the incubator and exporter of terrorism to their homeland.

The cancelled talks were the result of an agreement between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his Pakistani counterpart Nawaz Sharif on the sidelines of an international summit in Ufa, Russia in early July. The two leaders affirmed in a written statement that terrorism would be the main subject of discussions in Delhi between their NSAs. Talks between the two nuclear-armed neighbors have been erratic and this new round was expected to put the dialogue back on track.

But then, Pakistani NSA, Sartaj Aziz, announced plans to meet leaders of the Hurriyet Conference — an anti-India coalition from the disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir — during his visit to India. The Indians expressed displeasure over this, advising Pakistan to cancel the meeting with “separatists.” Pakistan called off the talks in response to India’s humiliating preconditions.

The United States, which wants India and Pakistan to move beyond their hostile relationship, has expressed disappointment over the cancellation of the talks even though it is likely that no one realistically expected concrete results from the meeting. The international community prefers unfruitful India-Pakistan talks over no talks, given the track record of four wars in 67 years and countless exchanges of fire along their shared border that did not explode into full-scale war.

Pakistan insists that the dispute over the Himalayan region of Kashmir is the core issue in its ties with India. The country’s all powerful military and its religious conservative elements insist that India unlawfully annexed Muslim majority Kashmir, which should have become part of Pakistan under the terms of the 1947 partition of British India. But Pakistan has failed to wrest Kashmir from India in four wars and through a terrorist insurgency that has been waged from Pakistan since 1989.

From India’s perspective, the main issue hindering bilateral relations between the two nuclear armed neighbors is Pakistan’s support for terrorism. Pakistan denies sponsoring Islamist terrorists though the denial is hardly taken seriously by the international community. As if to create equivalence, Pakistan also blames India for secular, ethnic insurgencies in various parts of the country, especially Balochistan, which borders Iran and Afghanistan.

For years Pakistan has sought international support for its position that Kashmir’s future must be resolved through dialogue between India and Pakistan and a plebiscite among the Kashmiri people. India does not even want to discuss the dispute without the end of Pakistan-sponsored terror. Kashmir is an emotive issue in Pakistan because of the failure of its leaders to inform their people that Pakistan no longer enjoys international support on the matter.

The average Pakistani is only told through textbooks and the media that Kashmir should have been part of Pakistan because of its Muslim majority population and that India has reneged on its commitment to resolve the dispute through a plebiscite in the disputed territory. Pakistani textbooks also teach children that India is Pakistan’s existential enemy, which does not accept Pakistan’s existence at heart.

What most Pakistanis do not know is that the last United Nations Security Council resolution on Kashmir was passed in 1957 and Pakistan could not win support for a referendum in Kashmir today if it asked for a new vote at the United Nations. Instead of accepting that it might be better for India and Pakistan to normalize relations by expanding trade and cross-border travel, Pakistani hardliners have stuck to a “Kashmir first” mantra, which they know is unrealistic.

On the other side, hardliners in an increasingly self-confident India play on Indians’ frustration with Pakistani state support for jihadis, such as those responsible for terrorist attacks in Mumbai in 2008. There is empty talk of “teaching Pakistan a lesson” without acknowledging that teaching military lessons to nations armed with nuclear weapons is never easy. Indians could learn from the United States’ frustrations with North Korea.

Posturing on Kashmir gets Pakistan nowhere but its leaders feel they need to do it any way to maintain support from Islamists and the military at home. Pakistan, besieged by jihadis, has serious internal issues. It is the sixth largest country in the world by population but only 26th by GDP on Purchasing Power Parity and 42nd= in nominal terms. Over 25 million children are out of school: 55 percent of whom are girls.

Pakistani leaders could open trade, education exchanges, and travel with India, which is set to emerge as the third largest economy in the world within fifteen years, instead of insisting on resolution of a dispute that hasn’t been resolved for decades and can wait a bit longer.

Indians, on the other hand, could choose to engage with Pakistan without appearing to be bent on rubbing their neighbor’s nose in the ground. So far, there is little sign that rationality will overcome Pakistan’s hate towards India and India’s disdain for Pakistan.