The Pakistan North Korea Connection

International Herald Tribune, October 26, 2002

Pakistan’s status as a key ally of the United States in the war against terrorism has not protected it from allegations of secretly supplying North Korea with uranium enrichment equipment and technical expertise in exchange for ballistic missile technology.

Pakistan’s military ruler, General Pervez Musharraf, described the charge as “absolutely baseless.” Secretary of State Colin Powell and National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice said they believed him, although they refused to say in absolute terms that there had never been Pakistani-North Korean cooperation.

So far, no evidence has surfaced to confirm the allegations, but reports on covert weapons programs are often based on intelligence leaks.

U.S. media reports have suggested that there may have been some exchange of technology under one of Pakistan’s shaky civilian regimes that preceded Musharraf.

Most Pakistanis are outraged over the charges that their country periodically faces, ranging from allegations of covert support of terrorists to accusations about Pakistan’s nuclear and missile program.

The Pakistani reaction is understandable, but so is the reason why Pakistan is vulnerable to such allegations.

Pakistan is governed in a secretive manner, with its intelligence services and military running affairs in spheres of international concern. Even when the civilians are in charge of government, security policy remains largely in the military’s hands.

It is inconceivable, for example, for a civilian government in Pakistan to redefine relations with India or review policies relating to nuclear and missile programs.

The United States takes a benign view of the Pakistani military’s covert operations when Pakistan’s strategic cooperation is important to America, as with the anti-Soviet resistance in Afghanistan and the current war against Al Qaeda.

But nuclear proliferation and relations with India become sticking points in the U.S.-Pakistan relationship when Islamabad’s strategic cooperation becomes less significant.

The reports about Pakistan exchanging nuclear know-how for ballistic missiles with North Korea have come at a time when the United States considers Pakistani support crucial for its anti-terrorism operations, which explains the cautious response by U.S. officials to such allegations.

Once the indispensability of Pakistan wanes, the accusations could become the basis for sanctions against a less compliant regime in Islamabad.

The way to break this cycle is to encourage Pakistan to become an open democracy, with a constitutionally defined power structure.

Then it would be easy to pin responsibility for actions such as training militants or buying and selling technology for weapons of mass destruction.

It is ironic that allegations of the North Korean connection have surfaced so soon after Pakistan’s Oct. 10 legislative elections that resulted in a hung Parliament.

Election observers from the European Union rejected the polls as “flawed” and pointed out the many ways in which Musharraf tried to manipulate the election process.

But the United States failed to criticize Musharraf’s conduct, just as it ignored the one-sided presidential referendum in April and arbitrary amendments to Pakistan’s constitution in July.

As a result, Musharraf and the military will continue to wield effective power while an ineffective Parliament and a weak prime minister will be available to share the blame, though not the real responsibility, for critical decisions of war and peace.

The moral imperative for supporting democracy in Pakistan is important.

But equally important is the need to diminish the military’s influence to ensure a more transparent Pakistani foreign policy.

General Musharraf Cannot Lose Voters Cannot Win

Wall Street Journal, October 10, 2002

Parliamentary elections are being held today in Pakistan. But while they will not lead to the restoration of democracy, they could well lead to civil unrest and confrontation between Pakistan’s powerful military and its civilian politicians. Continued military influence is likely to increase hostility between Pakistan and India and undercut efforts to root out Islamic extremists, who have been the armed forces’ political allies in the past.

The elections are meant to meet the deadline for return to civilian rule set by the country’s supreme court after the 1999 coup that brought Gen. Pervez Musharraf to power. But before holding the polls, Gen. Musharraf stripped parliament of its sovereignty through constitutional amendments imposed by decree. He has secured five more years as president, given himself the power to dismiss the government and parliament and authorized himself to amend the constitution further.

The customary 90-day campaign period has been cut to 40, and severe restrictions have been placed on campaigning. State-run radio and television are being used to emphasize the mistakes of previous civilian leaders, without giving their parties a chance to respond.

When Gen. Musharraf secured his position ahead of parliamentary elections through a one-sided referendum in April, many called it fraudulent as well as a farce. This time, the president has a different strategy. In addition to constitutional amendments, the general has decreed arbitrary rules for the elections. Candidates are required to have a college degree (roughly 10% of Pakistan’s population qualifies). And those that do have degrees and political experience are banned too: former Prime Ministers Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, as well as a hundred other experienced politicians belonging to mainstream political parties are barred from standing as candidates.

Gen. Musharraf claims he is trying to change Pakistan’s political culture and bring new leadership to the country. Not a bad goal. But the president is not the first military ruler to make such claims. Pakistan has followed a familiar path since its first military ruler, Field Marshal Ayub Khan, took over in a coup in 1958. No matter how initially promising they seemed, military rulers always ended up multiplying Pakistan’s problems, not solving them.

That’s not likely to change. Gen. Musharraf has created a National Security Council comprised of military and civilian leaders to ensure that military guidelines are followed in policy making. Irrespective of the results of today’s polls, the military, which has ruled Pakistan for more than half its 52-year existence, will remain the most important feature of Pakistani politics.

Repression, war or confrontation with India has characterized each one of Pakistan’s military regimes. Heavy arms spending has caused economic hardship. Even those who earlier supported Gen. Musharraf now agree that strengthening the military’s hand is not the way to avoid the mistakes of civilian politicians.That kind of cynicism from ordinary Pakistanis about the controlled parliamentary election is likely to result in low voter turnout today. When Pakistan’s first national election was held in 1970, more than 63% of registered voters showed up, expecting to change their lives. By the time of the 1997 election only 33% of registered voters bothered to get to the polls on election day.

The Pakistani military justifies its refusal to cede power by projecting India as a constant and imminent threat. But the army’s power to intervene in politics precludes civilian leaders from taking a leading role in helping accommodate the tension with the country’s neighbor. India’s own obsessively anti-Pakistan interest groups (not to mention the bellicose government in New Delhi) only fuel the fire by appearing to validate the more aggressive elements in the Pakistani military.

Pakistan will not become stable, democratic and focused sufficiently on development until the army is persuaded to relinquish its politico-economic dominance. Until now, Gen. Musharraf’s support in the war against terrorism has been considered sufficient reason by the U.S. to back his regime, without insistence on specific steps toward democracy. But if the U.S. refrains from rebuking him over his power grab even after the parliamentary elections, it will devastate the prospects for Pakistan’s long-term stability.

Gen. Musharraf seeks support from the international community in return for his avowed commitment to fighting terrorism. But his desire to perpetuate his own rule, and the domination of the military in Pakistan’s politics, clearly outweighs other considerations.

A Mischevious Blame Game

International Herald Tribune , October 10, 2002

As Pakistan prepares to hold its first general election in five years this Thursday, it has once again conducted tit-for-tat missile tests. Tests last week were carried out by Pakistan and India soon after they blamed each other for recent terrorist attacks. And Pakistan carried out a successful test of a medium-range Shaheen ballistic missile on Tuesday.

Mutual accusations and saber rattling have characterized India-Pakistan relations for most of the last 50 years. But this latest round is fraught with danger because it could provide terrorists in the region with cover to stoke tensions at a time when India and Pakistan are in a military face-off in Kashmir and have nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them.

Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups would like nothing better than to stay under the radar as India and Pakistan blame each other’s security services for terrorist acts. India and Pakistan ought to recognize the peril of global terrorism and help each other to face its consequences.

The opposite is happening. When a recent shootout at a Hindu temple in Gujarat left 30 pilgrims and three terrorists dead, Deputy Prime Minister Lal Kishan Advani accused Pakistan of training and arming the attackers, who had not yet even been identified. Pakistani officials claimed that India was orchestrating terrorism in Pakistan when nine Christian charity workers were killed in Karachi. Interior Minister Moinuddin Haider accused India of complicity in most of the 200 or so acts of terrorism that have taken place in Pakistan in the last three years, although he offered no proof. He absolved Al Qaeda of suspicion when he said that its members had “come to Pakistan as fugitives, not to carry out attacks.”

The relationship between Islamabad and New Delhi has reached a point where both sides consider themselves victims and use each other’s failings to justify their own misconduct. India’s Hindu nationalist government is holding elections in Kashmir that are unlikely to restore stability. Religious rioting in Gujarat, characterized by some Indian writers as a pogrom against Muslims, has also antagonized India’s large Muslim minority.

Unhappy Kashmiris and angry Gujarati Muslims are potential recruits for terrorist groups. Pakistan’s fishing in these troubled waters does not absolve India of responsibility for addressing the flaws in its policy toward Kashmir and its mishandling of religious minorities. Pakistan has allowed its territory to be used by Islamic militants in the past as part of its strategy to confront India by all means available. Its support of the Taliban in Afghanistan was justified on grounds that it needed a friendly regime in Afghanistan to provide “strategic depth” against India.

A year has passed since President Pervez Musharraf abandoned the Taliban, disavowed state sponsorship of Islamic militancy and aligned his government with the United States. But Pakistan remains vulnerable to blowback from its involvement in the anti-Soviet resistance in Afghanistan and from subsequent hospitality offered to the Islamists. The absence of democratic governance and the dominance of decision-making by the military, which built the alliance with Islamists in the first place, do not help.

The United States has drawn India and Pakistan back from the brink of war twice since December. But the Bush administration is now distracted by its plans for disarming Iraq and may not be able to stay engaged in South Asia with the same intensity as before.

Hawks in India and Pakistan are using this distraction to rattle sabers. Hindu nationalists and the military regime in Pakistan want both countries to see each other as enemies.

The United States should not let them play this blame game and permit terrorists to operate with impunity. It can provide independent intelligence on the Islamic extremists in both countries. This would take the thunder away from officials on both sides.

The Bush administration should not hesitate to admonish India for human rights violations and denial of self-determination in Kashmir. But it should also reprimand Musharraf for not fulfilling his promises to curb Islamic militancy and restore democracy.

Pakistan’s Phony Polls

Asian Wall Street Journal, October 9, 2002

Tomorrow’s parliamentary elections in Pakistan will not lead to the restoration of democracy. They could, however, lead to civil unrest and confrontation between Pakistan’s powerful military and its civilian politicians. Continued military influence is likely to increase hostility between Pakistan and India and undercut efforts to root out Islamic extremists, who have been the armed forces’ political allies in the past.

These elections are meant to meet the deadline for return to civilian rule set by the country’s Supreme Court after the 1999 military coup that brought Gen. Pervez Musharraf to power. But before holding the polls, Gen. Musharraf stripped parliament of its sovereignty through constitutional amendments imposed by decree. He has secured himself five more years as president, given himself the power to dismiss the government and parliament and authorized himself to amend the constitution further.

In addition, Gen. Musharraf has created a National Security Council comprising military and civilian leaders to ensure that the military’s guidelines are followed in policy making. The military has ruled Pakistan for more than half its existence as an independent nation and refuses to cede power despite promises of establishing true democracy. Irrespective of the results of Thursday’s polls, the military’s domination will remain the most important feature of Pakistani politics.

Gen. Musharraf secured his position ahead of parliamentary elections through a one-sided referendum in April which was criticized by many as fraudulent as well as farcical. So in order to avoid the embarrassment he faced during the referendum, the president has adopted a different strategy for the parliamentary elections.

In addition to arbitrary constitutional amendments, Gen. Musharraf has also decreed arbitrary rules for the elections. Candidates are required to have a college degree, which excludes over 90% of Pakistanis from running for parliament. Other rules prevent former Prime Ministers Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, as well as a hundred other experienced politicians belonging to mainstream political parties, from standing as candidates.

The customary 90-day campaign period has been cut to 40 days and severe restrictions have been placed on campaigning. State-run radio and television are being used to emphasize the mistakes of previous civilian leaders, without giving their parties a chance to respond.

Gen. Musharraf claims he is trying to change Pakistan’s political culture and bring new leadership to the country. Given the failings of the country’s political class, this seems to be a noble objective. But the president is not the first military ruler to make such claims. Pakistan has followed a familiar path since its first military ruler, Field Marshal Ayub Khan, took over in a military coup in 1958. No matter how initially promising they seemed, military rulers always ended up multiplying Pakistan’s problems instead of solving them.

Repression, war or confrontation with India has characterized each one of Pakistan’s past military regimes. The focus on austerity dictated by aid donors and heavy military spending have caused economic hardship for the poor. Instead of reform, all Pakistan has to show for its years of military intervention are accusations of fixed elections and arbitrary constitutional amendments.

For that reason, initial support for Gen. Musharraf has given way to widespread opposition. Even those who earlier supported him now agree that strengthening the military’s hand is not the way to avoid the mistakes of civilian politicians.

The cynicism of ordinary Pakistanis about the controlled parliamentary election is likely to result in low voter turnout tomorrow. When Pakistan’s first national election was held in 1970, more than 63% of registered voters exercised their franchise. The voters turned out in large numbers because they expected to change their lives by electing their future rulers. By the time of the 1997 election only 33% of registered voters showed up.

A low voter turnout reflects a feeling on the part of the electorate that its vote simply does not matter. In 1970, Gen. Yahya Khan refused to transfer power to the elected representatives, leading to civil war and the secession of Bangladesh. Controversy over the 1977 election provided an excuse for the military coup by Gen. Zia ul-Haq, who ruled for 11 years. Between 1988 and 1999, governments were dismissed with alarming regularity while intelligence operatives manipulated the political process. Once this partially manipulated political process had been completely discredited, Gen. Musharraf assumed power directly on behalf of the military.

Consciously or not, the Pakistani military refuses to cede power and authority to civilians, in part to ensure its large share of national expenditure. The army justifies this role by perceiving and projecting India as an eternal, existential threat. Given the army’s power and disposition to intervene in politics, civilian leaders cannot realistically pursue accommodation with India or reassign national resources to development. India’s own obsessively anti-Pakistan (or, in the context of Indian domestic politics, anti-Muslim) interest groups appear to validate the arguments of the more aggressive elements in the Pakistani military establishment, fueling the unending conflict. Pakistan will not become stable, democratic and focused sufficiently on development until the army is persuaded to relinquish its political-economic dominance. This in turn requires some reassuring inducements from India, perhaps vouchsafed by the U.S.

Until now, Gen. Musharraf’s support in the war against terrorism has been considered sufficient reason by the U.S. to back his regime, without insistence on specific steps toward democracy. If the U.S. refrains from rebuking Gen. Musharraf over his power grab even after the parliamentary elections, it will encourage him to pursue policies inimical to Pakistan’s long-term stability.

Ironically, while Ms. Bhutto, Mr. Sharif and numerous other politicians with pro-Western views were barred from contesting the parliamentary election, the leader of one of several Islamic groups banned by Gen. Musharraf for links to terrorism remain on the ballot. Gen. Musharraf seeks support from the international community in return for his avowed commitment to fighting terrorism. But his desire to perpetuate his own rule, and the domination of the military in Pakistan’s politics, clearly outweighs other considerations. The United States should not allow Pakistan’s military ruler to feel that he can continue flouting democratic norms as long as he hands over some al Qaeda figures escaping from Afghanistan.

America’s New Alliance with Pakistan: Avoiding the Traps of the Past

By Husain Haqqani

Publisher: Carnegie

Policy Brief No. 19, October 2002

Full Text (PDF)

Pakistan has become a strategic U.S. ally in the war against al Qaeda. For now, Washington’s support of General Pervez Musharraf’s military regime is untempered by any insistence on the restoration of democracy. But military rule is likely to increase hostility between Pakistan and India and undercut efforts to root out Islamic extremists, who have been the armed forces’ political allies in the past.

Despite intervals of strained relations, the United States and Pakistan were allies for most of the Cold War. Like past periods of engagement, the present spell of close relations is likely to sour into disillusion unless the United States strongly encourages Pakistan to return to democracy. A democratic regime, however flawed, is more likely to provide long-term stability to Pakistan. Specifically, democratic rule would help contain Islamic militancy and would probably lead to improved India-Pakistan relations.

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About the Author
Husain Haqqani , a leading journalist, diplomat, and former advisor to Pakistan prime ministers, is a visiting scholar in Carnegie’s Russian and Eurasian Program .