The scary decline of relations between the United States and Pakistan – the world’s most dangerous nuclear-armed country – is illustrated by the perilous plight of one man.
New York Times, May 9, 2009
By MARK LANDLER
WASHINGTON — On May 4, 1999, Husain Haqqani was yanked off a Pakistani street and bundled into a car, a blanket thrown over his head. He managed to keep his cellphone hidden in his pocket, and surreptitiously dialed a friend’s number to let her know he was in trouble.
That may have saved his skin, said Mr. Haqqani, now Pakistan’s ambassador to the United States. The news of his detention made it harder for his captors, Pakistani intelligence agents, to hurt him, Mr. Haqqani said, though he was roughed up and kept in jail for two months until a court ordered his release.
As the Obama administration struggles with another darkening crisis in Pakistan, Mr. Haqqani has become an influential figure in Washington — a silver-tongued interpreter in public of his country’s bewildering politics, but also a relentless, unyielding defender of Pakistan’s image and reputation.
The crisis has given Mr. Haqqani, 52, access to the highest levels of the Obama administration and Congress, the latest twist in a lifetime spent navigating Pakistan’s treacherous political shoals.
He speaks several times a week with Richard C. Holbrooke, the administration’s special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, who calls him “one of the most skilled ambassadors I have ever seen.” He figures he has met with 90 members of Congress. And he is a fixture on CNN, the op-ed pages of newspapers and at research groups around Washington.
But critics say Mr. Haqqani is a quick-change artist who cozies up to whoever is in power. Before he left Pakistan in 2002, after falling out with Gen. Pervez Musharraf, he had worked for both his country’s leading political figures — Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto — switching from one to the other with dispatch, depending on whose fortunes were rising.
As a journalist, Mr. Haqqani cultivated sources in Mr. Musharraf’s circle. But he soon became an outspoken critic of the Musharraf government, making his life in Pakistan difficult. He aligned himself solidly with Ms. Bhutto — and after she was assassinated in 2007, with her husband, Ali Asif Zardari, now the president.
Since moving to the United States, Mr. Haqqani has developed an affinity for American culture. He taught international relations at Boston University from 2004 to 2008, and he roots for the Red Sox. The American experience has only added to suspicions about him back in Pakistan.
“They see him more as a U.S. envoy than a Pakistani envoy,” said Mowahid Hussain Shah, a Pakistani lawyer. “They see him as someone who is competent and bright, but slick.”
Mr. Haqqani readily admits shifting his allegiances over the years. But he denies being an opportunist, saying he underwent a personal journey from being an Islamic activist in his youth to a conservative supporter of Mr. Sharif to an acolyte of the populism of the Bhutto clan.
“Is changing one’s opinion opportunism?” he said. “Opportunism would be if I got commercial or financial gain from changing my opinion, and that charge has never been made of me.”
Mr. Haqqani speaks in lucid, well-rounded sentences that suggest his background as a journalist and commentator. He is catnip for American journalists, offering a mix of high-minded analysis and street-corner gossip. (The New York Times put him on a retainer for several months after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, when he was working as a journalist, to help its correspondents better understand Pakistan.) But he can also be prickly and peremptory, using his new post to hector reporters, editors and policymakers over perceived slights or misinterpretations.
His book “Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military” offered a nuanced analysis of how the armed forces and Islamist groups have used one another in an effort to build influence in the country.
Mr. Haqqani relishes mixing journalism with politics, which got him into trouble in 1999, when he was the spokesman for the opposition to Mr. Sharif, then prime minister. After his abduction, he faced corruption charges, which were later dropped.
His ability to bounce back from adversity may be tested yet again. Mr. Haqqani’s star is now hitched to Mr. Zardari, a billionaire who has himself been dogged by suspicions of corruption and has seen his popularity plummet as Pakistan falls deeper into distress.
Mr. Haqqani does his best to polish his boss’s image.
Mr. Holbrooke, himself no slouch in the media-mastery department, said, “Some ambassadors’ influence is derived logically from the country they represent; Husain Haqqani’s influence is derived from his absolute mastery of the American media.”
Mr. Haqqani’s ties to the Bhutto family run deep. On the day Ms. Bhutto was killed, Mr. Haqqani recalls taping interviews with television stations for 12 hours. At times, he broke down in tears on camera.
Mr. Haqqani’s wife, Farahnaz Ispahani, is a member of the Pakistani Parliament and a spokeswoman for Mr. Zardari.
This week, Mr. Haqqani said he arranged an early morning visit by Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and Mr. Holbrooke to Mr. Zardari at the Willard hotel. The reason was partly personal: Mrs. Clinton said hello to Ms. Bhutto’s 20-year-old son, Bilawal Bhutto Zardari, whom she had last seen a decade earlier.
Mr. Haqqani views himself as a mediator between old friends with a lot of baggage in their relationship.
“I see my role as helping Americans understand that Pakistan is undergoing a transformation,” he said. “Then I have to persuade Americans to help Pakistan with that transformation.”
The solution to Pakistan’s instability, Mr. Haqqani said, is redoubled American support for its democratically elected government. But Mr. Zardari faced deep skepticism when he tried to reassure lawmakers that Pakistan had the political will and military resources to repel a Taliban incursion that has pushed to within an hour’s drive of the capital, Islamabad.
Mr. Haqqani’s belief in Pakistani democracy is hard won and heartfelt, said Teresita C. Schaffer, a former American diplomat who befriended Mr. Haqqani when they both served as ambassadors to Sri Lanka. But as an ambassador, she said, his views were bound to be rosy.
“The part that he has slid over, particularly in his current job, is whether the government is competent enough to make the democratic enterprise work,” Ms. Schaffer said.
Financial Times, 2009
Interview with Husain Haqqani, Pakistan’s US Ambassador
Pakistan wants a real alliance, say Edward Luce and Daniel Dombey
Husain Haqqani, Pakistan’s ubiquitous ambassador in Washington, has a brain teaser for Hillary Clinton.
America’s secretary of state wants to triple civilian aid to Pakistan but impose clear conditions on military assistance to ensure the money goes towards fighting the terrorists rather than building Pakistan’s defences against India.
A big chunk of the mostly unconditional $11 bn in military aid George W Bush gave Pakistan since 2001 went to the latter. “There is no bullet that has been invented that Pakistan can be given to shoot at the terrorists that cannot be used in case there is a war with India.” Mr Haqqani said in an interview. “That said our primary threat right now comes from terrorism and not from our eastern neighbor so our requests for support will be geared to the primary threat we have.”
Yesterday, Mr Haqqani was busy dealing with the latest complication to the US-Pakistan relationship: the release of AQ Khan, the man seen by many Pakistanis as a national hero for his efforts developing the nuclear bomb but regarded by Washington as a dangerous proliferator for his assistance to Iran and North Korea’s nuclear programmes.
“It may cause a short-term perception problem here,” said the ambassador of Mr Khan’s release. “But let’s look at the bright side. Pakistan now has a genuinely independent judiciary and we have dismantled the AQ Khan network.”
As a close confidante of Asif Zardari, Pakistan’s president, Mr. Haqqani is seen by many in Islamabad as the country’s unofficial foreign minister. Many in Washington view him as the representative of the most dangerous potential failed state on the planet.
In the words of one wit, Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan’s former military leader, used to put a gun to his head and tell the Americans: “Help me or I’ll shoot myself.”
Will Pakistan’s young democracy play the same game with the Obama administration? Mr. Haqqani, a former information minister in the 1990s who went into exile during the Musharraf years to teach in the US, insists it is better to give Pakistan the money and trust the facts on the ground. For example, Pakistan did not stop, and is thought tacitly to have authorized, a Central Intelligence Agency Predator strike against targets in Pakistan three days after Barack Obama was inaugurated.
John Kerry, chairman of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, plans to reintroduce a bill that would both authorize the increase in civilian aid to Pakistan to $1.5 bn a year and render the suggested conditions on military assistance into law. Islamabad believes this could make its democratic government look weak to its domestic enemies, notably the Islamists but potentially also within the ranks of the military. “Assistance that is conditional is never good,” Ambassador Haqqani says, “Our advice has been that while we can always discuss what the Americans would prefer … [conditional aid] is not going to serve US or Pakistani interests.”
Mr Haqqani is much more enthusiastic about the recent appointment of Richard Holbrooke as the administration’s special representative to Pakistan and Afghanistan. India was dropped from his designation after protests from New Delhi, which was suspicious he would try to mediate what India sees as a strictly bilateral dispute over Kashmir.
Nevertheless, Mr Holbrooke will visit India as part of his first tour of the region next week. Mr. Haqqani, whose government’s relatively warm overtures to India were shot to pieces by the allegedly Pakistan-facilitated Mumbai terrorist attacks in November, chose his words carefully. “Ambassador Holbrooke’s great strength is that he always approaches issues in their entirety,” he says.
“One understands India’s concerns about not having major powers intercede in the conduct of their foreign policy, but when the Mumbai attacks occurred India’s immediate response was that the international community should put pressure on Pakistan.”
But Mr. Haqqani’s most important brief is to encourage the US to put is relationship with Pakistan on a long-term footing – an elusive Pakistani goal almost since the country was created 62 years ago.
Joe Biden, US vice-president, once spoke for many Pakistanis when he described the relationship as ‘transactional’. America lavishes aid on Pakistan when it needs its help and then switches seamlessly to sanctions after it has got the help it needed. There is barely a think tank in Washington that has not heard Mr Haqqani argue this must change: “We are transforming ourselves from an authoritarian state to a democratic state. We want it to be a real alliance this time round.”
Ex-BU professor facing tough task
By Farah Stockman, Globe Staff | November 10, 2008
WASHINGTON – With Pakistan teetering on the brink of bankruptcy, Husain Haqqani put on a powder blue tie and made his pitch. A quick infusion of US cash, he said, would ensure that Pakistan will be able to afford to keep up its expensive military operations near the Afghan border.
By Paul Richter
October 24, 2008
Reporting from Washington — Only a few months ago, he was a foreign policy commentator in Boston known around the world for blasting the government of his native Pakistan and, sometimes, the Bush administration as well.
Today, Husain Haqqani is Pakistan’s ambassador to the United States, charged with cultivating and promoting the turbulent U.S.-Pakistani relationship.
It may be the toughest diplomatic job in Washington.
The 52-year-old Haqqani represents the new government of a country whose citizens are wary of the United States. At the same time, the Bush administration harbors deep doubts about Pakistani leadership.
In recent weeks, Haqqani has met with officials on both sides after U.S. airstrikes that killed Pakistani civilians, media reports of secret U.S. military raids into Pakistan, and gunfire between U.S. and Pakistani troops near the Afghan border. In a recently released Gallup poll, 45% of Pakistanis said they viewed the U.S. forces in Afghanistan as a menace to their country.
“I haven’t had a moment’s rest through this whole period,” says Haqqani, who regularly receives calls from his country’s president and others for consultations at 2 a.m.
His message has been consistent: Pakistan’s fragile new civilian government is committed to democratic reform and to the battle against extremists and that reports of conflict with the Bush administration are overblown.
Haqqani, who has worked at different times as a journalist, diplomat and political advisor, has lived in the United States since 2002 as a think-tank analyst and head of a foreign policy institute at Boston University.
He has cultivated a taste for American things, including the Boston Red Sox and “Larry King Live” (“when it’s not about Lacy Peterson”).
He is married to Farahnaz Ispahani, a member of parliament and spokeswoman for President Asif Ali Zardari’s Pakistan People’s Party. A former CNN producer, she is the granddaughter of Pakistan’s first ambassador to the United States, M.A.H. Ispahani.
Haqqani regularly draws on his deep U.S. ties, but acknowledges questions back home. “Some people in Pakistan do ask snidely, ‘Is he Pakistan’s ambassador to the United States, or the U.S. ambassador to Pakistan?’ ” he says.
It’s a tough job, but Haqqani has supporters in Washington. “If anybody can carry it off, it’s him,” said Rep. Howard L. Berman (D-Valley Village), chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.
Haqqani has worked for Pakistani politicians of varying stripes, including Prime Ministers Benazir Bhutto, Nawaz Sharif and Ghulam Mustaf Jatoi, as well as Zardari, Bhutto’s widower.
That history has stirred accusations in some quarters that his motive is ambition rather than conviction. He’s been compared to David Gergen, political advisor to Presidents Reagan and Clinton, and, somewhat less flatteringly, to Dick Morris, the former Clinton political advisor known for tough campaign tactics.
Haqqani shrugs off criticisms. He came to his job with his own experience in political Islam. Raised in a conservative religious family from a poorer part of Karachi, he “alternated between being attracted to and repulsed by political Islam,” he wrote in a 1999 op-ed.
As president of the student union at the University of Karachi in 1979, he enjoyed spending time in the U.S. Consulate’s air-conditioned library reading about foreign relations and the United States. When Islamists and other radical students urged him to lead an attack on the facility, he resisted.
Today, he’s proud of all that he has absorbed about the United States. He boasts that he once beat officials at the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad at American history questions in a game of Trivial Pursuit.
When the American ambassador asked at the time how he had managed it, Haqqani answered: “I learned it sitting in your library.”
When Haqqani assumed his latest post in June, the Bush administration’s longtime ally, Pervez Musharraf, was still in the presidency. The White House viewed Musharraf as their best bet for dealing with the militant threat, but Haqqani argued that the new government would do better.
Still, there remained “this huge credibility gap with the Congress and the administration, at least, in the military and intelligence communities,” said Alexander Thier of the U.S. Institute of Peace, a Washington think tank.
As ambassador, Haqqani’s top assignments include helping Pakistani officials understand the United States and communicate with Americans, and guiding them through their U.S. visits.
Other politicians in Pakistan “aren’t able to match his skill in this,” says Arif Rafiq of the New York-based Pakistan policy blog.
For instance, Haqqani is widely assumed to have been responsible for the tenor of a speech late last month by Zardari to the United Nations General Assembly in New York. In the speech, the prime minister declared that the struggle against militants was Pakistan’s own fight, not one being waged on behalf of the United States.
The Zardari speech “struck all the right notes,” said Ashley J. Tellis, a former White House foreign policy aide who was a colleague of Haqqani’s at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
The Zardari address came at a moment when world powers were becoming increasingly convinced that Pakistan was losing its will to confront extremism.
But a U.S. commando raid in South Waziristan on Sept. 3 that killed as many as 20 people had infuriated Pakistanis and was denounced by Zardari and by the nation’s army chief, Gen. Ashfaq Kayani. Haqqani joined in, issuing his own warning to U.S. officials.
“Unilateral action by the American forces does not help the war against terror,” Haqqani said, “because it only enrages public opinion.”
By Nayan Chanda
October 15, 2008
Pakistan’s new democracy tackles complex domestic and foreign policy problems, sharing goals with the US and India
Nayan Chanda: Ambassador Husain Haqqani of Pakistan to the United States, Welcome to Yale. Husain Haqqani has been a very, very well known figure in Pakistan. He has worked for three prime ministers, and he has been at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and at Boston University, and now he’s the ambassador.
Let me ask you first, having served three prime ministers, and with all the experience you have, how do you see the sixth experiment with democracy in Pakistan? How has it started off? How do you see the prospect – is the sixth time lucky?
Husain Haqqani: Well, Nayan, I think that the reason why Pakistan has not been able to build a democracy in the past is because of the invasions of its civil military elites. And I think this time around the international factors, the local factors, and even the perception of the elites in Pakistan is very different. If you go back in history, you will notice that Pakistan’s first military coup was within 10 years of independence, primarily because the civil military elite felt that the complications of working out a democracy were not worth it, that nation-building could be more easily done under an authoritarian regime. That delusion lasted for quite a while, but it ended and we had our first elected civilian government in the 70’s. After that, General [Mohammad] Zia ul-Haq entered the process, and his argument was that Pakistan needed to be an ideological state.
Now both of those arguments, that nation-building is better under authoritarianism, and that Pakistan is better off as an ideological state defined by a small group of theocrats or theocratically inclined elites, have both been proven to be mistakes. The third attempt at military intervention – serious attempt – was under General Musharraf, and he represented the notion that Pakistan can be better run by a technocratic elite. And we have seen that dream in tatters as well now. I see no argument in favor of authoritarianism left in Pakistan. Yes, there are some people who still say that we have to be an ideological state, that we can be much better accomplished under a benevolent dictator, yes, there are a few people who still say that maybe the government should be run by technocrats and not by politicians. But there is great consensus in Pakistan that to forge a Pakistani national identity, all Pakistani provinces, all Pakistani ethnic groups, need to feel that they are part of Pakistan, and the only way they will feel a part of Pakistan is through an elected democratic process. Second, the technocrats also sometimes get purely technocratic decisions right, but they are unable to bring the nation together. And lastly, when it comes to the external factors, when General Zia ul-Haq became Pakistan’s president in a military uniform, many countries in the world had military governments. When Musharraf became Pakistan’s ruler, he was one of two or three.
So now the international momentum is also against military dominated governments. I think all those factors have come together, but most important is the fact that this time the restoration of democracy has come at a very high price. We lost Benazir Bhutto who was much beloved, and in her assassination – it’s very interesting,that Gallup did polling after that and showed that there has never been such unanimity in Pakistan in public opinion on grief. When her father was assassinated, some people didn’t mind it. When General Zia-ul-Haq died, Pakistani society was divided between those who were fond of him and those who hated him. In Benazir Bhutto’s assassination, it was as if a national dream had been killed. And most political leaders in Pakistan are reconciled to the fact that, yes, we will disagree with one another, but we will never help another military coup. So I think this time, there are many factors that will strengthen Pakistan’s evolution as a democracy.
Chanda: Yes, I think the question really is whether the army is reconciled to the loss of its authority that they exercised through Musharraf, and also their plans to sell the land it owns to build its general headquarters. The question is, does the army have the right to sell the state land to build its own headquarters? That is one small example of the army acting as a state within a state.
Haqqani: Look, let us go to the more fundamental question. Pakistan needs a military. But what Pakistan needs is for its military to work under civilian authority, constitutional authority. I think that the new army chief and most of his close commanders all realize that the army’s professionalism suffered immensely with the army being drawn into politics. Will this transition be instantaneous? No, it won’t.But the army has been brought into many things and it will take some time to get out of them. But the important things that have already started happening: The Army Chief General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani has already withdrawn all those serving military officers who were filling up civilian positions in government – a big change. The interservices intelligence has shut down its political wing – a major thing, because that was the instrument of intervention in politics. The army didn’t play any role in trying to influence the outcome of the February 18th elections, or of the political process subsequent to that. Because they didn’t do anything to influence the choice of prime minister, they did nothing to influence the choice of president, and the electoral processes had been taking on their own dynamic. And I think that the things that you’re talking about – about the military’s having welfare schemes with economic dimensions, etc., I think we will be able to rationalize those over time as well.
Chanda: The other question that has been raised is that General Musharraf is gone, but it looks like the current government is pursuing the same policies, whether it’s the question of the war on terror or the question of privatizing state organizations and even raising the price of utilities as has been pressed on by the nation’s financial institutions. In all of these policies, the Asif Ali Zardari government seems to be pursuing Musharraf’s policies. Is there any change?
Haqqani: That [Asif] Ali Zardari government represents what is essentially a national consensus on issues such as privatization. Whether Nawaz Sharif was in power, whether General Musharraf was in power, or the new elected government, even the previous PPP government led by Benazir Bhutto – none of them could do without privatization, for the simple reason that Pakistan has just too many state-owned enterprises that are not sufficiently efficient, and it is much easier for them to be sold off and their value recovered for the benefit of Pakistan’s economy. So privatization falls in that category. Similarly, the question of raising prices of utilities – again, basically, it’s a question of market prices. Oil prices have gone up. The government has to pay for the oil to buy it from the Gulf. And that oil is then sold to the utilities, and after all that has to be recovered… So that is also another category: It is not Musharraf’s policy, it’s the global market’s policy. The only thing that is left is the war on terror, and here, the big difference. Musharraf says we are fighting the war on terror because America told us to do so. This government says that we have to fight terrorism because terrorism is a threat to Pakistan. I think that while the conduct of the war is going on, the fact of the matter is that the war’s aims have changed very seriously. The aim of General Musharraf was to please the United States. The aim of the elected government is to work with the United States and other allies to ensure Pakistan’s own safety and security, and to make sure that Pakistan is not seen as or becomes a safe haven or a base for extremist groups all over the world. So I think that the change of the objective actually makes the policy very different.
Chanda: There is a very significant change in the US approach to Pakistan, with the July signing of President Bush’s secret national security directive in which he authorized the military to intervene in Pakistan without prior notification, and the result of which was the first attack on Pakistani territory on September 3rd. This is a change that follows the departure of Musharraf. The question is, is the new policy designed to put pressure on the civilian government, or is it just because the US elections are approaching and you needed to do something against terrorism in a more demonstrative way? What was the purpose?
Haqqani: First, if the directive was signed, as you said, in July, then Musharraf was still there, so it wasn’t post-Musharraf. And I don’t know if the directive has been signed. If it is a secret directive, the US government, I’m sure, can keep secrets even though they don’t seem to keep them from the New York Times. But, let me just say that the operation that the US forces conducted on September 3 was a mistake. It achieved no war aim, they did not get any terrorists or militants, they did not manage to kill Al Qaeda leaders or the Taliban, and it only served to enrage the Pakistani public. Since then, we have engaged with US officials. We understand political complications, we come from political backgrounds ourselves, President Zardari is a politician, he understands politics. The two parties are engaged in an election campaign – the November elections are coming and people are asking, what happened, did we succeed in getting Osama bin Laden, and if not, why not? So therefore, in the context of the campaign, it makes sense for some people, but there’s another dimension to it also.There are American troops in Afghanistan and they are in harm’s way and they are attacked. And when they are attacked and they ask their Afghan counterparts, why are we under attack, what’s happening, and they are told that some of these Taliban and these Al Qaeda people are coming from Pakistan, then they feel all the more reason to want to do something about it. But all wars require intelligent actions, not just actions. And the intelligent thing to do is to let Pakistan take care of the Pakistani side of the border because if it escalates, if American troops get inducted, they will have another theater of war without necessarily having any war aims being fulfilled. We have spoken to the Americans about this. They now understand that if Pakistan is willing to step up to the plate – which it is, Pakistan wants to step up action on its side of the border. We have paid a dear price, even in the past, even under Musharraf: Hundreds of Pakistanis were killed – Pakistani soldiers were killed. But the problem was that these soldiers were sent in to battle the Taliban without adequate counterinsurgency training. The elected government has asked the United States to help us get that counter-insurgency training. We have asked the US to provide us the equipment that is needed for this kind of warfare, You see, Pakistani soldiers have been trained to fight a different kind of war on a different border. This is different terrain, so we need different types of trained soldiers. The mistake under Musharraf was that the training was not there, the equipment was not there, and the soldiers were sent in large numbers. We sacrificed many lives in the process. Now, we are going to have an intelligent war. Now, I don’t know if you’ve noticed, in the last two to three weeks, in Bajul, Pakistan has conducted a very methodical operation. From the…
Chanda: In the Northwest frontier…
Haqqani: “From the Northwest frontier, bordering Afghanistan, bordering the Kunar province, air power has been deployed. And, because it has been a methodical operation, several hundred militants and Taliban have been killed, and they are feeling the pressure, which is why they are attacking Pakistani cities again. We will have to bear that fear, and we will have to do something about protecting our cities against the suicide bombers as well. But, as President Zardari and Prime Minister [Yousuf Raza] Gilani repeatedly say: “This is Pakistan’s war. We have to save Pakistan from becoming a Taliban home. The Taliban’s vision is not our vision. The Taliban don’t want young women to ever receive an education. The have been blowing up schools in Pakistan. And more Pakistanis have been killed by suicide bombers than Americans have been killed, so we don’t look at this as an American war that we have to fight to please America. We are fighting for our own nation, for our own future, and I think as long as the Americans understand that, and not withstanding any specific directive or not, the American forces will stay on the Afghan side of the border, and Afghanistan, Pakistan, the US and NATO will work cooperatively to make sure that terrorists are denied the opportunity to organize and raise attacks on both sides of the Pakistan-Afghan border.
Chanda: You have mentioned in some other occasions that President Musharraf carried the policy of “running with the hare, hunting with the hound,” in terms of dealing with terrorism. Why was that? Why did he have this two-faced policy on terrorism?
Haqqani: Well, I think it wasn’t a two-faced policy in his perspective, what he was doing was… First of all you must understand that before 9/11 he didn’t see terrorism as a menace in itself which is very different from Benazir Bhutto and Mr. Zardari, who have always seen terrorism as a threat because they don’t intellectually agree with it. General Musharraf thought this is just sub-conventional warfare and it gives some leverage in regional politics. So that was the point of view. And after 9/11, it was very difficult for him to make the major change. He made medium- to short-term changes. He understood that you have to forsake the Taliban, and that you have to curtail the operational militant groups on the other side as well. But having said that, from day one, I don’t know if you can recall, there are many interviews of his, there was a time when he used to argue that the Taliban and Al-Qaeda need to be treated differently. Then he started saying Afghan Taliban and Pakistani Taliban need to be. He just never made the transition from thinking of these people as elements of a regional strategic problem, a regional strategic design, to thinking that they are a problem. And I think that now…
Chanda: So they were pawns that he could play?
Haqqani: He thought that they were pawns that he could play. Even after attempts on his life, he only thought about “okay, the groups that are responsible for trying kill me, we need to go after them. He didn’t understand that what needs to be eliminated is the whole idea that somehow blowing yourself up for a cause is a good thing, because very frankly, irrespective of the objective, terrorism is a nuisance, and a problem, and a threat. It is all of those things, and it’s a menace. Terrorism needs to be eliminated because it is a threat, not because “Terrorist A” is okay, but “Terrorist B” is good. There are no “good” terrorists and “bad” terrorists. And I think the Pakistani military leadership and the Pakistani civilian leadership that have been elected in February of this year understand that.
Chanda: There have been considerable improvements, at least in appearance, in relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan. President [Hamid] Karzai and President Zardari seem to get along well. Now, has there been any progress on the investigation that General Kayani said he was launching on the allegation, by the United States and by India, that ISI was involved in the bombing of the Indian embassy in Kabul?
Haqqani: I think that we are working on finding out the bombing of the Indian Embassy in Kabul. We will have more details at some point in the future, but as of now we do understand that there was no conscious decision on the part of any Pakistani organization to be part of it. This was a terrorist act, and if those terrorists are in any part of Pakistan including the travel areas, the Pakistani government will definitely act against them. The important thing is that President Zardari has articulated a vision. His vision is one of close ties with Afghanistan and friendship with India. While we have disagreements with India, while we have the outstanding disputes of Jammu and Kashmir, we would still want to normalize relations with them because, again, it is more important to move forward and to have less pressures on Pakistan from the external side. And India and Pakistan together can have many economic benefits for each other. Afghanistan and Pakistan together can definitely strengthen each other as nations. And we have historic relations. Let us be honest: India and Pakistan have 5,000 years of common history, and 60 years of partition. Afghanistan and Pakistan have hundreds of years of common history. So there’s no reason why we should be stuck in adversarial mode and not find commonalities on which we can work together. That said, we will occasionally disagree. President Karzai and President Zardari will also disagree. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and President Zardari will disagree. But there has to be a fundamental difference in approaching each other as permanent enemies or looking upon each other as neighbors who can deal with issues on an issue-by-issue basis.
Chanda: On Kashmir. What’s the position of President Zardari and Prime Minister Gilani as to move forward again on Kashmir, which has been …?
Haqqani: Well, I think India and Pakistan both have to find creative solutions to the Kashmir problem. There are strong emotions in Pakistan on the Kashmir issue. I’m sure there are strong views in India on the Kashmir issue. And then the people of Kashmir, they have a position and their point of view needs to be heard. They need to be part of the solution. The important thing is that the bilateral engagement of India and Pakistan should not be stopped because we are not making progress on the issue of Jammu and Kashmir. But the issue of Jammu and Kashmir should not be ignored, so we have to find ways of engaging, and at the same time finding solutions to this dispute that has bedeviled relationships between our two countries. The difference is that there are people in Pakistan who have argued that if we cannot have a solution to Kashmir, we needn’t have forward movement with India. I think that we can continue to engage and, at the same time, look for a solution. I, personally, do not have a solution to offer right now.
Chanda: But, in terms of engaging, what are the areas you think Pakistan and India could engage? And, the impact of their engagement, would it be positive on other issues?
Haqqani: Let me just say that we need to have a very sensible approach to resolving the Siachen Glacier dispute. Both sides lose more people to frostbite in those glaciers than in actual fighting. So it’s in the interest of both sides to try and find a solution to that. The solution is almost there – it’s a question of signing it and moving on. The Sir Creek issue, that’s also something that can be resolved.
Chanda: This is on the border, near Sind?
Haqqani: Basically, it’s a demarcation issue. My point is: Reduce the portfolio of disputes. Third, move forward on bilateral trade. Open up trade more. People-to-people contacts. We need to expand to range of contacts between the two people. Whenever Indians and Pakistanis meet, whether its over a curry or over a cricket match, or over a Masala movie, they always manage to be able to talk to each other in a much more friendly way than they can when they are just dealing with politics. So I think that people-to-people contacts need to be expanded. In terms of trade, we must understand that once the Indian markets open for Pakistani products, Pakistan gets access to a 1 billion strong market. And so there are opportunities for Pakistan. There are synergies between our two countries. Above all, Pakistan is the energy corridor for India. If there is an Iran-India pipeline, it will have to go through Pakistan. If there’s a Turkmenistan-India pipeline it will have to go through Afghanistan and Pakistan. If there’s a pipeline from the Gulf, it will have to go through Pakistan. So, all of those things are the basis from which we can hopefully open up our relationship and have less issues of hostility and more basis for cooperation.
Chanda: Final question, coming back to the United States. The presidential debate was yesterday. A lot of focus on foreign affairs was devoted to your country. How do you think that these two presidential candidates, their vision of Pakistan and how to deal with the problem, how do you see that?
Haqqani: I think that it would not be appropriate of me to insert myself into the American political debate, but let me say one thing: As ambassador, I am personally engaged with both campaigns. The advisors that Senator Obama and Senator McCain have, both of them have listened to our point of view. We have listened to theirs. Pakistan is important for the next president, whoever he may be. Pakistan is important for the United States. While we are not completely happy with the tone of the conversation about Pakistan these days, it’s important that for the first time Pakistan is receiving the attention that it deserves. Now you and I have known each other for many years. Pakistan has always been seen in the context of India-Pakistan relations or due to the Soviet war in the context of the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan or in the context of the war against terrorism. It’s about time that the US paid attention to Pakistan in its own right, a nation of 160 million people with a very strong army and nuclear weapons, with the potential for being a moderate, democratic, tolerant, pluralist state while at the same time having the threat of terrorism and militancy. Senator Joseph Biden is the author of a bill called the Biden-Luger Bill, which expects to triple civilian economic aid to Pakistan to $1.5 billion every year for five years and possibly for 10 years as a long-term engagement with Pakistan so that Pakistanis know that the United States is a friend of Pakistan. I think it’s time for Pakistan and the United States to move away from their short-term, quid pro quo engagements, and develop a strategic partnership for peace in that region and for consolidation of Pakistani democracy and strengthening of Pakistani democracy. And, I think that while there will be disagreements between candidates on how to do that, I think that the important thing is that both presidential candidates in the United States understand the importance of Pakistan and they also understand that for stability in Pakistan, there must be democracy, and that Pakistan’s stability is important to American security.
Chanda: With that, Ambassador Haqqani, thank you very much.
Haqqani: Pleasure talking to you.
Associated Press of Pakistan
October 5, 2008
ISLAMABAD, Oct 5 (APP): Pakistan’s Ambassador to United States Hussain Haqqani is focusing on encouraging continuity and predictability in the bilateral relations of Pakistan and United States. “For too long, our relationship has been one between certain individuals in the U.S. and Pakistan. This has created anti-Americanism,” the ambassador said in an interview to Washington Mutual magazine published in its October issue.
“We are on the verge of a major shift in our worldview – we want to have close relations with Afghanistan, and we want to negotiate all our outstanding disputes with India, including Kashmir, and find an amicable solution to these problems. So my priority is to expand the range of U.S.-Pakistani relations and make it a stable relationship instead of a yoyo relationship.”
According to Haqqani, ending the so-called short-sightedness that has characterized U.S.-Pakistani relations in the past will require an end to the U.S. pattern of heavy aid to Pakistan followed by sanctions.
“That’s how it’s been since 1954,” he complains. “I don’t think it can be done during the tenure of one ambassador, but I want to lay the foundations of a relationship that is multidimensional: political, military, cultural, economic and social.”
“Pakistan has acted very responsibly in relation to its nuclear weapons capability,” he insists. “We acquired these weapons because of a regional threat, not because it wanted to use them internationally. We have always cooperated with the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] and have put the whole Khan affair behind us. His network has been finished off,” he says, referring to A.Q. Khan.
Haqqani notes though that “Pakistan has not been accused of any proliferation-related activity or any irresponsible behaviour in any way.”
He also had nothing negative to say about a recent nuclear agreement between the United States and India. The deal lifts the longstanding U.S. moratorium on nuclear trade with India and provides U.S. assistance to India’s civilian nuclear energy program – even though critics say it reverses half a century of U.S. nonproliferation efforts and undermines attempts to prevent countries such as Iran and North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons.
“The United States has opened the way for non-nuclear proliferation nations like Pakistan, Israel and India to acquire civilian nuclear technology,” he says. “We hope that now, Pakistan will also be considered for a similar arrangement. Pakistan has a burgeoning population and its energy needs are increasing rapidly. It makes sense for us to have nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.”
On Dec. 27, 2007, Hussain Haqqani was at home in Brookline, Mass., when the phone rang. “Someone told me to turn on CNN immediately,” he recalled. TV images were broadcasting horrifying footage of Benazir Bhutto’s assassination as she was addressing a large rally of supporters in Rawalpindi, Pakistan. “I immediately called my wife, who is a member of Parliament and was with her. It was devastating.”
Only two days earlier, Bhutto had completed the manuscript of her 328-page autobiography, “Reconciliation: Islam, Democracy, and the West,” and had emailed it to Haqqani and Mark Siegel, a Washington lobbyist who helped her write the book.
And following an earlier assassination attempt in Karachi that killed 179 people, Bhutto had also sent an e-mail warning that if anything were to happen to her, the country’s then president, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, would be partly to blame.
“By now, two or three local TV crews had arrived at my home in Boston,” Haqqani says. “I rushed to the TV studio at Boston University and spent all day as her spokesman, giving interviews. On my laptop, I wrote an opinion piece that was published the next morning in the Wall Street Journal.”
Not a surprising course of action for a seasoned journalist who came from a conservative Muslim background and started writing when he was 16. After graduating from college, Haqqani moved to Hong Kong, where he covered East Asian and Islamic affairs for the Far Eastern Economic Review. He later returned home to cover Pakistan and Afghanistan for that same magazine.
At the age of 34, Haqqani switched gears and launched his political career, convincing Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to send him to Colombo as Pakistan’s ambassador to Sri Lanka. But he soon returned to campaign for Bhutto, who by 1993 had replaced Sharif as Pakistan’s head of state.
“After that, there was no turning back,” Haqqani mused. “I used to say that I wanted to be a journalist when I grew up, or a professor. And sometimes I’d say that I wanted to be a diplomat or even an ambassador. Now, at the age of 52, thank God, I’ve been all three.”
Given the current tumultuous state of bilateral relations though, being Islamabad’s envoy in Washington isn’t a job many Pakistanis would even want.
Since Haqqani presented his credentials to President Bush at the end of May, U.S.-Pakistani ties have taken a dramatic turn. The resignation of Musharraf, an ally in Bush’s war on terrorism, and the installation of a democratically elected civilian government has shifted the fundamental dynamics of Pakistani-U.S. relations.
“No Pakistani wants foreign troops on Pakistani soil. And the people who understand that region know it is not in America’s advantage to land troops in Pakistan,” he told. “But a lot of this is political noise. People here are asking why Osama bin Laden hasn’t been found in seven years. Why has the U.S. not succeeded in stabilizing Afghanistan in the border areas? So a simplistic answer is that we’re going to do something about Pakistan. I think once the American elections are held, we’ll go back to the Pentagon, the CIA, the State Department and elected political leaders of the United States working with Pakistan’s leadership and make this a collective effort.”
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