Al Qaeda’s New Enemy

Indian Express, The Nation(Pakistan) and Gulf News, June 26, 2002

General Pervez Musharraf has unveiled his plan for what he describes as Pakistan’s return to democracy. He will hold parliamentary elections in October to meet the deadline for polls set by the Supreme Court while conditionally endorsing his October 1999 coup d’etat. But he will retain the power to dismiss the Prime Minister, his cabinet and the national assembly. ‘‘Unless there is unity of command, unless there is one man in charge on top, it will never function,’’ he said recently, outlining his view of government. ‘‘Too many cooks spoil the broth.’’

What General Musharraf describes as ‘‘unity of command’’ is known in political science as dictatorship. Pakistan’s mainstream political parties, bar associations and leading civil society organisations are already questioning General Musharraf’s right to arbitrarily alter the constitution. Pressure from the mainstream will make him vulnerable to the covert moves of militant Islamists.

As a key ally of the United States after September 11, General Musharraf is hoping that his plan to rule Pakistan with a veneer of elected, albeit powerless, institutions will be enough to confer legitimacy on his military regime. The US depends upon other undemocratic regimes in the Middle East and Central Asia in its war against terrorism. Why should Pakistan be different?

Unlike most Arab and Central Asian states, which have never seen democracy, Pakistan has aspired for democratic rule since its inception. Power has alternated between civilian-democratic dispensations and military rulers claiming to control institutional decline and chaos and economic disarray. When General Musharraf took power he promised to restore democracy within three years, after creating institutional checks and balances and introducing reforms that would forever end the alteration of power between authoritarian military rulers and ineffective elected civilians.

Even before he achieved the status of a US ally, General Musharraf had started espousing political ideas that rested on his continuation in office rather than on the effectiveness of institutions such as an independent judiciary or a government truly accountable to parliament. Now, with international sanctions usually applied to military regimes having been lifted in return for his support in the anti-terrorism effort, his desire to perpetuate his power without real reform has become all too obvious.

General Musharraf’s plans for controlled democracy will not solve Pakistan’s problems. Civilians will continue to snipe at a regime lacking legitimacy.

To the rescue, alas

Pakistan has been down this road before. Field Marshal Muhammad Ayub Khan ruled for a decade from 1958-1969, backed by the west for his participation in anti-communist regional treaties. General Ziaul Haq presided over the country from 1979 to his death in 1988, benefiting from Pakistan’s role as the frontline state in the anti-Soviet resistance in Afghanistan. Ayub wrote his own constitution while Zia revised the existing constitution to suit himself. Like Musharraf, they established ‘‘unity of command’’, which led to social unrest, corruption and eventual economic stagnation.

All of Pakistan’s military rulers have thought of themselves as saviours of the nation. Their scheme of power has depended on their own central role and the exclusion from the political arena of politicians they took over from. General Musharraf, too, has declared that he will not allow Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto to participate in the October elections. Instead of changing the constitution or excluding leaders from the race, he should try to change the way politics is practised in the country.

Pakistani politicians look upon politics as an arrangement for the distribution of patronage rather than a process of formulating policy. To be able to rob the exchequer themselves, they invite others to share the spoils. Political loyalties are bought by doling out favours. They try and accumulate more and more power instead of exercising the authority vested in them by law. They victimise their opponents with the intention of eliminating them from politics.

Once in power, Pakistani politicians start planning to perpetuate their rule. They tinker with institutions without thinking of the day when they themselves might need the protection from those very institutions. Instead of allowing civil servants, soldiers and judges to do their job, most powerful civilians seek the promotion and appointment of family retainers and personal loyalists.

Pakistan’s political parties behave like warring tribes. Differences in opinion are described as betrayal. Refusal to toe the line is treated as a declaration of war. Disagreement with mutual respect is an important ingredient of democracy. But it is a trait uncommon to those who have entered the political fray in Pakistan. What Pakistan needs to change this is not a general acting, in General Musharraf’s words, as ‘‘over-watch’’. It requires a compact among the major politicians that ensures their adherence to democratic ethics.

Losing office while respecting dissent and accepting the role of national institutions is not so bad as risking everything. Instead of trying to impose reform from above, and creating new polarisation, General Musharraf should sit down with major political leaders, including Sharif and Bhutto, and secure an agreement that they will not pursue vendettas against each other. There should also be consensus on non-interference with judicial appointments or independence of the judiciary as well as on amendments in Pakistan’s constitution.

In the past, a party with two-thirds majority in parliament managed to push through self-serving constitutional amendments without debate. During Sharif’s last tenure, two constitutional amendments were rushed through parliament in a record 12 minutes. If General Musharraf wants Pakistan’s future politicians to behave differently from the politicians of the past, he should himself act differently from previous military rulers. Pakistan’s problem is not that it does not have a good constitution or a good set of laws. The country’s greatest weakness lies in the fact that the constitution and law are subject to the whims of rulers, who change the rules when these do not suit them.

At Transit Point Time to Pay Toll

Indian Express, June 20, 2002

The terrorist attack on the US consulate in Karachi leaves no doubt that Pakistan is now a major target of groups linked to al Qaeda. Officials may well say that the current wave of terrorism is the price Pakistan is having to pay for supporting the United States since September 11 last year. But in fact, the price Pakistan is paying may be for allowing militants from all over the Muslim world to transit to and from Afghanistan since 1979.

Officials have mentioned the possibility of Indian complicity in the bombing. But playing the traditional South Asian blame game without substantive evidence serves no purpose except to divert attention from the Al Qaeda linked groups. It is time to prepare Pakistani public opinion for the hard truth about terrorism, whether home-grown (sectarian groups) or imported from the Middle East. Instead of facing the challenge squarely, officials have shied away from admitting the presence of al Qaeda in Pakistan. During the anti-Soviet resistance, militants from all over the Muslim world transited through Pakistan to participate in the jihad.

Some of them created covert networks within Pakistan, taking advantage of poor law enforcement and the state’s ambiguity towards pan-Islamic militancy. Now that the al Qaeda and Taliban’s base in Afghanistan have been disrupted, they are using their former transit station as a temporary staging ground.

If General Pervez Musharraf’s commitment to opposing terrorist groups is irreversible (as it appears to be), there is no reason for government spokesmen to deny the existence of terrorist groups within the country. Terrorist attacks in Pakistan have not started merely because of Musharraf’s policies, though the post-September 11 shift in the country’s stance has increased their frequency and intensity. Al Qaeda’s ally, Egyptian Jihad, bombed and destroyed the Egyptian embassy in Islamabad on November 19, 1995. A few months earlier, on March 8, 1995, two employees of the US Consulate in Karachi, Gary Durell and Jacqueline Van Landingham were killed in a terrorist attack on a consulate van.

On April 22, 1996 explosive devices were hurled on the US Information Service building in Lahore. Four Americans and two Pakistanis working with the Union Texas oil Company were killed on November 12, 1997, again in Karachi. On November 12, 1999 rocket attacks targeted offices of the United States government as well as the United Nations in Islamabad.

It is obvious terrorism has been at work in Pakistan before and is now menacing the country with a vengeance. Musharraf’s decision to fight a multi-pronged battle—against domestic political rivals, India and terrorism—could give the terrorists an advantage. They have nothing to protect, only targets to destroy.

 

The diminishing of the recent stand-off with India has given General Musharraf some breathing space. But despite lessening of tensions, India appears unwilling to withdraw its troops from the border. The recent reduction in India-Pakistan tension is based on US verification of an end to Pakistani support for Kashmiri militancy. Indigenous Kashmiri groups will most probably keep up their fight, as will those al Qaeda types who are already inside India or in Jammu and Kashmir. But helped by US intelligence, India is expected to know the extent and nature of Pakistani support for the militants.

Pakistan could soon find that it is having to clamp down on the militants without necessarily securing a discussion over the future of Jammu and Kashmir. Musharraf has a tough act on his hands, one that requires political skills that he is not known to possess. He will have to roll back the jihadi movement without seeming to do so on American or Indian orders and without getting an immediate quid pro quo over Kashmir. He will probably face defiance from militants and religious parties, as well as from ideologues within the establishment.

He could pull through if he reached out to mainstream political parties and if India eased pressure on him. The problem is that General Musharraf hates Pakistan’s politicians almost as much as he dislikes India. Believing as he does in his good luck he could be tempted to take on the militants and Islamist ideologues without cutting a deal with mainstream politicians at home. He could also try to keep up his anti-India rhetoric at least in public which may not go down too well with hardliners on the other side of the border. The breathing space provided by the Armitage and Rumsfeld missions could evaporate in a very short time.

 

The world continues to see Kashmir in terms of militancy and terrorism instead of as an issue of self-determination. The legal, moral and political merit of Pakistan’s position continues to be ignored despite considerable focus—call it internationalisation—on the question of Kashmir’s future. The reason for this lies in factors that General Musharraf, as a military man, may not be able to comprehend or accept. Pakistan has consistently neglected non-military aspects of national power, such as economic growth and diplomatic potential. It has an effective military but is ineffective in most other realms. The greatest tool in statecraft, political skills, cannot evolve in a country where politics remain suspended for long periods.

General Muhammad Moosa, Chief of Pakistan’s Army during the 1965 war went on to become Governor of then West Pakistan. After his retirement he was asked why he failed so miserably as governor after such an illustrious career as a soldier. Musharraf would do well to pay attention to General Moosa’s reply: ‘‘In the army,’’ he said, ‘‘I was trained to locate the enemy and liquidate the enemy. In politics I discovered that things are more complex. It is not always easy to locate who the enemy is and sometimes you discover that you can’t liquidate him even if you locate him’’.

Withdraw the Indian Threat of War

International Herald Tribune, June 11, 2002

ISLAMABAD, Pakistan – India and Pakistan have toned down their rhetoric of nuclear war in recent days, but the threat of conflict remains. When they each tested nuclear weapons in 1998, it was hoped that there would be no further wars between them. But since then deterrence has already failed once.

The two armies clashed in the high mountain region of Kargil in Kashmir in 1999. After a terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament in December, a million troops have massed on either side of the 3,200-kilometer border between Pakistan and India. Such confrontations have never occurred with this frequency between the world’s other nuclear powers. Can deterrence be sustained between India and Pakistan in the way it worked between the United States and the Soviet Union in the Cold War? India and Pakistan have nuclear weapons but do not have in place any of the other elements of deterrence. They do not have clearly identified “red lines,” the crossing of which would result in a nuclear strike. There are no arms control talks, no detailed nuclear doctrines and no telephone hot lines to guard against triggering misperceived or accidental nuclear clashes.

Hawks in India think that they can manage a limited war with Pakistan without either side resorting to nuclear arms. Pakistani hard-liners believe that demonstrating the will to use nuclear weapons is important in containing an Indian threat. If the hawks on both sides carry out their threats, India could start a conventional war and Pakistan could take it to the nuclear stage.

India and Pakistan are home to more than a billion people, accounting for one-fifth of the world’s population. They have fought three wars in 54 years. Kashmir, the former princely state in the Himalayas with a Muslim majority that is at the heart of their dispute, has been the center of an insurrection since 1989. India accuses Pakistan of supporting the insurgency in Indian-controlled parts of Kashmir with the induction of Islamic militants, at least some of whom share beliefs with Al Qaeda and the Taliban.

U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld is following Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage to South Asia this week to try to minimize the threat of war. The situation in the region has received less attention in Washington than it deserves. But the latest twist in the long and bitter feud between India and Pakistan is directly linked with America’s war against terrorism.

In the last few months the terrorists have intensified attacks in Kashmir and India. There have also been attacks in Pakistan, to protest its recent support for the United States. Both New Delhi and Islamabad seem to be ignoring the possibility that the militants’ latest attacks are meant to provoke them into war.

Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee refuses to talk directly to President Pervez Musharraf until the end of “all cross-border terrorism.” The presence of some militant groups over which Pakistan’s government has no influence makes that condition impossible to meet. Pakistan is believed to be acting against the militants it can control, albeit slowly.

But the presence of large numbers of Indian troops on the border discourages Musharraf from moving too fast. Supporters of the militants argue that they would serve as an important fifth column for Pakistani soldiers, in sabotage actions against much larger and better equipped Indian forces, in case of war. Withdrawal of the Indian threat of war would help Musharraf fulfill his promises of ending militant infiltration from Pakistan. The United States could provide the mechanism for verifying Pakistan’s compliance with its commitments. But defusing the current crisis is only half the battle. If fears of a nuclear clash are to be banished, the root causes of violence between India and Pakistan must be addressed. In addition to using its influence with Pakistan to get action against all Islamic extremists, the United States should persuade India to get serious about resolving the dispute over Kashmir.

India and Pakistan should remember that mere possession of nuclear weapons does not create deterrence. Negotiations are also necessary.

Deterrence Did Someone Say

Indian Express, June 10, 2002

India and Pakistan have toned down the rhetoric of nuclear war in the last few days but the threat of conflict between these traditional rivals continues to loom. Deterrence ? the notion that the prospect of nuclear annihilation creates a ??balance of terror?? that in turn forces protagonists to talk instead of fighting ? has already failed in part between India and Pakistan since their nuclear tests. The 1999 clash in Kargil is evidence that war remains possible. Since December last year, almost one million troops from both sides are massed along the border. Such shooting wars or eyeball-to-eyeball confrontations have never occurred with such frequency between the world?s other nuclear powers since the 1962 Cuban missile crisis.

It is time to ask whether deterrence can be sustained between India and Pakistan in the same way it worked between the United States and the Soviet Union during the cold war. India and Pakistan possess nuclear weapons but do not have in place any of the other elements of deterrence. They do not have clearly identified ??red lines??, the crossing of which would result in a nuclear strike. There are no arms control talks, no detailed nuclear doctrines and no hotlines to guard against triggering misperceived or accidental nuclear clashes.

Hawks in India think they can manage a limited war with Pakistan without either side resorting to nuclear arms. Pakistani hardliners believe that demonstrating the will to use nuclear weapons is important in containing an Indian threat. If the hawks on both sides carry out their threats, India could start a limited conventional war and Pakistan could take it to the nuclear stage.

Historically, nuclear-armed nations have always maintained communications with each other, to avoid escalation of conflict that can result from lack of communication. The total absence of dialogue between India and Pakistan creates a situation potentially more dangerous than that between the US and the Soviet Union during the Cuban missile crisis. There appears to be considerable ignorance in South Asia about the implications of nuclear weapons. Indians and Pakistanis, including several decision-makers, seem to think of nukes as just bigger and more powerful bombs. There is little awareness of factors such as radiation and fallout. Is it not strange that neither country has ever considered building nuclear fallout shelters for its citizens while rushing to develop, and test, nuclear weapons?

Some Indians are frustrated that they can?t ??teach Pakistan a lesson?? as a result of ??nuclear blackmail??. But US diplomatic warnings, rather than Indian threats of war, are the better means of ensuring that Pakistan clamps down effectively against militant Islamists responsible for terrorist attacks in Kashmir. US diplomacy in the form of a shuttle mission by Secretary of State Colin Powell helped avert an India-Pakistan war in December.

With each new attack and subsequent warning of a ??decisive battle??, India?s rhetoric loses credibility. General Musharraf?s balancing act of promising to stop infiltration across the LoC while refusing to condemn Kashmiri militancy is already finding few takers around the world. Soon, India may be constrained to go beyond rhetoric to restore the credibility of its threats. General Musharraf?s hand could also be forced by circumstances, especially if he feels that alliance with the United States is bringing more pressure than benefits.

The situation in South Asia has received less attention in Washington than it deserves, partly because the Bush administration considers the war against the Al Qaeda its top priority. But the latest twist in the 54-year old rivalry between India and Pakistan is directly linked with America?s war against terrorism. In the last few months, the terrorists have intensified their attacks in Kashmir and India. There have also been attacks in Pakistan, to protest its recent support for the United States. Both India and Pakistan seem to be ignoring the possibility that the militants? latest attacks are planned to provoke them into war.

Prime Minister Vajpayee refuses to talk directly to General Musharraf until the end of ??all cross-border terrorism??. But the outlook of militant Islamists has changed considerably since September 11. The presence of militant groups over which Pakistan has no influence makes India?s condition impossible to meet.

Pakistan is now believed to be acting against the militants, albeit slowly. But the presence of large numbers of Indian troops on the border also discourages Musharraf from moving faster. The militants? supporters argue that they would serve as an important fifth column for Pakistani soldiers, sabotaging the much larger and better-equipped Indian army, in case of war. Withdrawal of the Indian threat of war would help Musharraf fulfil his promises of clamping down on militants operating from Pakistan.

To overcome Indian mistrust, the U.S. could provide the mechanism for verifying Pakistan?s compliance with its commitments. Proposals for multinational or joint India-Pakistan monitoring of the Line of Control to stop infiltration of militants ostensibly acting on their own, must also be seriously considered.

A war between India and Pakistan will only result in the realization of the extremist Jihadi groups? vision of extensive violence, leading to fulfillment of their version of apocalypse. Pakistan?s status as a country under military rule makes its position precarious. While supporting General Musharraf in his efforts against Islamic extremists, the US also needs to ensure that Pakistan moves towards democratic rule. Musharraf should be encouraged to initiate a dialogue with Pakistan?s major politicians, currently living in exile.

In the past, India and Pakistan have managed to avoid military confrontation whenever civilians were in power in Islamabad, and a civilian democratic government in Pakistan would be less dependent on the military and the Islamic militants for support. Washington?s visible support for democracy will strengthen support in Pakistan for its efforts against terrorism. It will also ensure that Pakistani support against Al Qaeda continues even after a change of regime.

Defusing the current crisis is only half the battle. If the world is to stop living in fear of a nuclear clash, the root causes of violence between India and Pakistan must also be addressed. In addition to using its influence with Pakistan to force action against Islamic extremists, America should also persuade India to get serious about resolving the Kashmir dispute.

Withdraw the Indian Threat of War

San Diego Union-Tribune, June 9, 2002

‘A situation far more dangerous than the Cuban missile crisis’

India and Pakistan have toned down the rhetoric of nuclear war in the last few days, but the threat of conflict between these traditional rivals continues to loom. U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage are visiting the region to deliver a terse message from Washington. The United States wants Pakistan to clamp down effectively against militant Islamists responsible for terrorist attacks in the disputed Himalayan territory of Kashmir. India, on the other hand, will be asked to back off from its belligerent posture so that Pakistan can continue to assist the United States in its military operations against al-Qaeda and Taliban remnants in Afghanistan.

But the United States must go beyond telling India and Pakistan, “Don’t start your own war because we need to finish ours.” It must engage in South Asia to eliminate terrorism, promote democracy and prevent conflict involving nuclear weapons.

India and Pakistan are home to more than a billion people, accounting for one-fifth of the world’s population. They share a legacy of mutual mistrust, dating to the partition in 1947 of British-ruled India. That partition resulted in the creation of two states, Muslim-majority Pakistan and Hindu-majority India. Like partners in a bitter divorce, both states accuse each other of undermining their interests. And they have a custody battle to resolve: the question of who will control Kashmir, a beautiful region in the Himalayas bordering both India and Pakistan.

The majority of Kashmir’s population is Muslim, but its Hindu ruler at the time of independence announced its accession to India. Pakistan contests that accession, backed by United Nations resolutions calling for a plebiscite to determine the wishes of Kashmiri people.

India and Pakistan have fought three wars in 54 years and Kashmir has been the center of an insurrection since 1989. India accuses Pakistan of supporting the insurgency in Indian-controlled parts of Kashmir with the induction of Islamic militants, at least some of whom share beliefs similar to those of al-Qaeda and the Taliban.

When India and Pakistan tested their nuclear weapons in 1998, some experts expressed the hope that there would be no further wars between them. Nuclear weapons served as a deterrent to war between the United States and the Soviet Union, and it is a widely held view that the prospect of nuclear annihilation creates a “balance of terror” that in turn forces protagonists to talk to each other.

India and Pakistan possess nuclear weapons, but do not have in place any of the other elements of deterrence. They do nothave clearly identified “red lines,” the crossing of which would result in a nuclear strike. There are no arms control talks, no detailed nuclear doctrines and no hotlines to guard against triggering accidental nuclear clashes. Given the geographic proximity of the two states, their reaction time in case of a missile attack is barely a few minutes. And neither side can nuke the other without having to bear some of the fallout.

Deterrence already has failed in part between India and Pakistan since their nuclear tests. Their armies clashed in Kargil, a glaciated part of Kashmir in 1999. Since last December, following a terrorist attack on the Indian parliament, 1 million troops from both sides have massed along their 2,000 mile border. Such confrontations have never occurred with such frequency between the world’s other nuclear powers.

U.S. diplomacy in the shape of a shuttle mission by Secretary of State Colin Powell helped avert an India-Pakistan war in December. Another terrorist attack last month, this time on an Indian military camp, led to the current stand-off, which the United States is now working to resolve.

The situation in South Asia has received less attention in Washington than it deserves, partly because the Bush administration considers the war against al-Qaeda its top priority. But the latest twist in the 54-year old rivalry between India and Pakistan is directly linked with America’s war against terrorism.

For the last 13 years, India has accused Pakistan of sponsoring the Kashmiri militants and Pakistan’s vehement denials of that charge are not believed in the world’s capitals. Pakistan promised a change in policy toward Islamic extremists after Sept. 11, but its crackdown on the militants is thought to be insufficient.

In the last few months, the terrorists have intensified their attacks in Kashmir and India. There also have been attacks in Pakistan, to protest its recent support for the United States.

Searching for a battlefield

Both India and Pakistan have ignored the view that the militants’ latest attacks are planned to provoke these traditional adversaries into war. According to this view, the exponents of global jihad seek a battlefield that stretches from Kabul in Afghanistan to Kolkata in India. And Pakistan falls right in the middle of that battlefield.

Extremists looking towards Osama bin Laden for inspiration do not recognize national boundaries. They want to polarize the world between Muslim and non-Muslim. Jihadi publications and websites talk of the final conflict between iman (belief) and kufr (disbelief). And that final conflict, according to Jihadi folklore will start in the region known in much of Islamic history as Khurasaan (present day Afghanistan). Jihad in Hind (modern India) is described as having been mentioned in the attributed sayings of Prophet Muhammad, although this is not considered an element of the religious beliefs of the vast majority of the world’s 1 billion Muslims.

India and Pakistan inadvertently have become hostages to the agenda of the Islamic militants. The United States should pressure the leaders of both countries to join hands against the terrorists. A war between India and Pakistan will result only in the realization of the Jihadi groups’ vision of extensive violence, leading to fulfillment of their version of apocalypse.

India and Pakistan so far have responded only partially to U.S. appeals for restraint. Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee refuses to talk directly to Pakistan’s Gen. Pervez Musharraf until the end of “all cross-border terrorism.” India withdrew its ambassador from Pakistan’s capital of Islamabad last December and recently expelled the Pakistani Ambassador from its capital. Historically, nuclear-armed nations always have maintained communications with each other, to avoid escalation of conflict that can result from lack of communication.

The total absence of dialogue between India and Pakistan, coupled with the general ignorance of their impoverished peoples about the implications of nuclear weapons, creates a situation far more dangerous than that between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cuban missile crisis.

Direct dialogue needed

New Delhi and Islamabad cannot afford to depend exclusively on the United States to defuse tensions. They will have to resume direct dialogue that may, at best, be facilitated by the United States. Pakistan will have to act decisively against Islamic militants allegedly involved in attacks in India and Kashmir.

Indications are that Musharraf’s government may be doing that, albeit slowly. The presence of large numbers of Indian troops on the border discourages Musharraf from moving too fast against the militants. Supporters of the insurgents argue that they would serve as an important fifth column for Pakistani soldiers, sabotaging the much larger and better-equipped Indian army, in case of war.

Withdrawal of the Indian threat of war would help Musharraf fulfil his promises of ending militant infiltration from Pakistan. The United States could provide the mechanism for verifying Pakistan’s compliance with its commitments. And proposals for multinational or joint India-Pakistan monitoring of the Line of Control in Kashmir and to stop infiltration of militants ostensibly acting on their own also must be seriously considered.

Anti-Pakistan extremists in India’s ruling coalition are insisting on rubbing Pakistan’s nose in the ground. But it simply is not possible to “eliminate” or “liquidate” a neighbor with nuclear weapons without risking enormous destruction.

Keeping up military pressure is impairing Pakistan’s ability to cooperate in the war against terrorism. It could even give a boost to Islamic militants in Pakistan, thereby strengthening the cause of the terrorists. Conflicts with India tend to unite Pakistanis. If Musharraf’s regime is seen to be buckling under Indian pressure, support for the militant Islamists opposing him could increase.

Pakistan’s status as a country under military rule makes its position precarious. While supporting Musharraf in his efforts against Islamic extremists, the United States also needs to ensure that Pakistan moves towards democratic rule. Musharraf should be encouraged to initiate dialog with Pakistan’s major politicians, most of whom are currently living in exile.

In the past, India and Pakistan have managed to avoid military confrontation whenever civilians were in power in Islamabad, and a civilian democratic government in Pakistan would be less dependent on the military and the Islamic militants for support. Washington’s visible support for democracy will strengthen support in Pakistan for its efforts against terrorism. It also will ensure that Pakistani support against al-Qaeda continues even after a change of regime.

Defusing the current crisis is only half the battle. If the world is to stop living in fear of a nuclear clash in South Asia, the root causes of violence between India and Pakistan also must be addressed. America already is using its influence with Pakistan to force action against Islamic extremists. It also should persuade India to get serious about resolving the dispute over Kashmir. Pakistan needs to root out Islamic extremism for its own sake, not just to fulfil Indian and U.S. demands.

But India also must wake up to the fact that it will continue to have a Kashmir problem even after the current militancy there is brought under control. Instead of using elimination of terrorism as a pretext for ending all discussion of Kashmir’s future, India should seek a comprehensive settlement of its security problems with Pakistan.