Terror v Democracy in Pakistan

Wall Street Journal, October 25 , 2007

After more than a decade in exile, Benazir Bhutto, a former prime minister of Pakistan, returned home to Karachi last week to throngs of cheering supporters. Her triumphal arrival was marred by a terrorist bombing that killed more than 130 people, and underscored this fact: Terrorism is a threat to Pakistan and its people, and not merely a response to the foreign policy of a distant superpower.

For too many Pakistanis, this is a hard fact to accept. Many seem to believe that the war on terrorism is America’s war and that if it did not stand with the U.S., then Pakistan would be safe from attack. This is not true. Pakistan has been a terrorist target since the 1980s, when its security services got involved in proxy wars in Afghanistan and Kashmir.

A compilation of published figures shows the trends. In 2006, 1,471 people were killed in terrorist attacks in Pakistan. Of these, 608 were civilians, 325 were security personnel and 538 were terrorists. That’s an increase over 2005, when the number of fatalities was much lower: 430 civilians, 137 terrorists and 81 security personnel.

This year terrorists stepped up their attacks even before Ms. Bhutto’s return. In the first 10 months of the year, a reported 2,037 people were killed. The number of suicide bombings in Pakistan is also up compared to previous years.

Pakistan clearly has a terrorist problem and needs to fight the organizations that carry out these attacks for the sake of its own people.

The willingness of the United States to provide economic and military aid for fighting terrorism is incidental. Those who punish men for not growing a beard, or who wish to subjugate women, or who behead human beings like animals are not open to persuasion. They will not stop if Pakistan were to distance itself from the U.S.

The attack against Ms. Bhutto reflects a deep-seated anger among global jihadis who shake at the thought of a woman leading the world’s only nuclear-armed, majority-Muslim country. It’s not the first time this anger has been directed at Ms. Bhutto. When she was elected prime minister for the first time in 1988, fatwas were issued by radical clerics condemning her and the decision to elect her. Ramzi Yousef, mastermind of the 1993 attack on New York’s World Trade Center, has also admitted to plotting an attack on Ms. Bhutto in 1989.

Ms. Bhutto is clearly a brave and courageous woman who cannot and will not be deterred easily by either the threats of terrorists, or the machinations of those within Pakistan’s covert security services who have consistently conspired against her. Even after the attacks, Ms. Bhutto did not change her stance against terror, nor did she back away from her demand for restoration of democracy and free and fair elections.

Ms. Bhutto’s suspicion is that certain elements within Pakistan’s ruling establishment might be behind the bid to kill her. These fears should not be disregarded, even though it is difficult for Gen. Pervez Musharraf to accept that some of his close friends and associates may be complicit or tolerant of mass murder. Ms. Bhutto’s fears come from almost two decades of being hounded by jihadis and their allies in Pakistan’s security establishment. It’s crucial for Pakistan to address her concerns.

Mr. Musharraf needs to open his heart to genuine democracy. And that must include listening to the complaints lodged by the people’s representatives against his friends and allies in the establishment. In any case, Mr. Musharraf has wasted six critical years in the war against terrorism by failing to purge the government and intelligence services of hard-liners who supported jihadis in the past, and who have maneuvered behind the scenes to stop true democrats from gaining power.

The massive demonstration of support for Ms. Bhutto and her Pakistan Peoples Party last Thursday confirms that her popularity remains undiminished by the political developments of the past two decades.

Before Ms. Bhutto’s return, the conventional wisdom offered by many pundits and some politicians was this: Ms. Bhutto is seen to be too pro-American and too pro-Musharraf to be popular in Pakistan. But neither of these suggestions, nor the charges of corruption and misrule that have been repeatedly lodged against her over the past 19 years, seemed to carry much weight with the millions of people enthused about Ms. Bhutto’s return.

From America’s point of view, the good news is that the people who were cheering in the streets of Pakistan for Ms. Bhutto will likely cheer against terrorism under a government run by her. Pakistan’s war against terrorism will likely make better progress with the support of the people than it has in recent years under an embattled military dictator.

Bhutto’s Return Shows Two Pakistans

Gulf News October 24, 2007

The tragedy that marred Benazir Bhutto’s trium-phant return to Pakistan brought home several truths that have either been played down or simply ignored over the past several years.

The first is that terrorism is a threat to Pakistan and Pakistanis and not merely a response to the foreign policy of a distant superpower.

Too many Pakistanis have convinced themselves that the war against terrorism is America’s war and any harm faced by Pakistan as its consequence is the result of Pakistan’s decision to join the US in this war.

But Pakistan has faced terrorism, first in the form of sectarian killings and later in the shape of orchestrated bombings ever since its security services got involved in proxy wars in Afghanis-tan and Kashmir since the 1980s.

Pakistan needs to fight terrorism for the sake of its own people and not just because the US is willing to provide large amounts of economic and military aid for fighting terrorists.

Those who punish men for not growing a beard and behead human beings like animals because their understanding of religion does not coincide with that of the extremists will not stop even if Pakistan distances itself from the Washington.

The second lesson of the unfortunate terrorist attacks on the Pakistan Peoples Party’s rally is that Bhutto is a courageous woman who cannot and will not be deterred easily either by threats of terrorists or machinations of those who have consistently conspired against her.

Even after the attacks, Bhutto did neither change her stance against terror nor did she back away from her demand for restoration of democracy and free and fair elections.

It is true that it is difficult for Pakistan President General Pervez Musharraf to believe charges of complicity or tolerance of mass murder against some close friends and associates. But it is equally true that the victim’s concerns must not be ignored.

 

Allaying Bhutto’s fears, resulting from almost two decades of being hounded by the establishment, is crucial if terrorism is to be defeated through a combination of popular support and law enforcement authority.

The third lesson of October 18 is that the popularity of Bhutto and the PPP remain undiminished. Before Bhutto’s return, the conventional wisdom offered by many pundits and some politicians was that “Benazir Bhutto is now seen as pro-American and pro-Musharraf”.

But neither these suggestions nor the charges of corruption and misrule that have been repeated over the past 19 years seemed to carry much weight with the millions enthused about Bhutto’s return.

The US (or for that matter the Pakistani establishment) could not have put the massive crowd that turned up to welcome her in the streets. The spirit of the PPP’s workers, which remained undiminished even after the terrorist attack, is impossible to orchestrate.

Manipulated elections are easy when alternative means of gauging public support do not exist, which explains the desire of the King’s Party (the Pakistan Muslim League-Quaid) to ban public rallies and popular manifestations of political support altogether.

Why did so many members of Pakistan’s intelligentsia fail to predict that Bhutto’s return from exile would generate an enthusiasm similar to the PPP’s shows of popular support in the past?

Explanation

One explanation might lie in the fact that over the years two Pakistans have evolved, with very different understandings and certainly divergent priorities.

One Pakistan consists of the middle and upper classes, estimated by one former World Bank economist to number 30 million or so, who think in the terms that have shaped the Pakistani political discourse of the last few months.

The other Pakistan, estimated to number 130 million, comprises the poor and the dispossessed who still consider the PPP their party.

Well-to-do Pakistan has gone hoarse condemning Bhutto for her failings in and out of power and most recently for negotiating with Musharraf. But the masses seem unaffected by these arguments.

Whose Bomb?

Indian Express , October 23, 2007

The tragedy that marred Benazir Bhutto’s triumphant return home reinforced several truths that have either been played down or simply ignored over the last several years. The first and foremost of these is the fact that terrorism is a threat to Pakistan and Pakistanis, and not merely a response to the foreign policy of a distant superpower.

Too many Pakistanis have convinced themselves that the war against terrorism is America’s war. But Pakistan has faced terrorism, first in the form of sectarian killings and later in the shape of orchestrated bombings, ever since its security services got involved in proxy wars in Afghanistan and Kashmir since the 1980s.

Even before the October 18 carnage in Karachi, 2007 had become the worst year for terrorist activity in Pakistan. More people have died in terrorist violence during the first ten months of this year than in preceding years. So far the number of reported fatalities for the year stands at 2037. The number of suicide bombings in Pakistan has been continually on the rise.

Pakistan needs to fight terrorism for the sake of its own people and not just because the US is willing to provide large amounts of economic and military aid for fighting terrorists, because extremists will not stop even if Pakistan distances itself from the Washington.

The second lesson of the unfortunate terrorist attacks on the PPP rally is that Bhutto is a brave and courageous woman who cannot and will not be deterred easily by either the threats of terrorists or the machinations of those who have consistently conspired against her. Even after the attacks, Bhutto did not change her stance against terror nor did she back away from her demand for restoration of democracy and free and fair elections. Bhutto’s suspicion that certain elements within Pakistan’s ruling establishment might be behind the bid to kill her should not be disregarded.

It is true that it is difficult for General Pervez Musharraf to believe charges of complicity or tolerance of mass murder against some close friends and associates. But it is equally true that the victim’s concerns must not be ignored. Allaying Bhutto’s fears, resulting from almost two decades of being hounded by the establishment, is crucial if terrorism is to be defeated through a combination of popular support and law enforcement authority.

The third lesson of October 18 is that the popularity of Benazir Bhutto and the PPP remain undiminished by the political developments of the last two decades. The US (or for that matter the Pakistani establishment) could not have put the massive crowd that turned up to welcome Bhutto in the streets. The spirit of the PPP’s workers, which remained undiminished even after the terrorist attack, is impossible to orchestrate.

Why did so many members of Pakistan’s intelligentsia fail to predict that Bhutto’s return from exile would generate an enthusiasm similar to the PPP’s shows of popular support in the past? One explanation might lie in the fact that over the years two Pakistans have evolved with very different understandings and certainly divergent priorities.

Well-to-do Pakistan has gone hoarse condemning Bhutto for her failings in and out of power and most recently for negotiating with Musharraf. But the masses seem unaffected by these arguments

A New Old Order

Indian Express, October 17, 2007

Pakistan is a land of many incongruities. The military, and to a lesser extent the civil bureaucracy, wield power but lack foresight and public support. The politicians who enjoy popular backing do not always have power, which limits their experience in governance. Intellectuals and professionals articulate a vision for their country but lack the stamina for politics.

The result is constant experimentation with the system and form of government instead of moving forward on the basis of a clearly defined constitutional pattern. After eight years of military rule that began with promises of “setting things right once and for all,” Pakistan is once again at a crossroads.

Recently, General Pervez Musharraf joined opposition leader Benazir Bhutto in agreeing to an arrangement that could help bridge the traditional divide between the military-dominated establishment and populist politicians. But the B-grade politicians who have benefited from becoming the civilian face of military rule are already screaming at the top of their lungs to preempt a break from past precedent.

Professionals, such as banker Shaukat Aziz, who have ended up in positions that should normally go to elected politicians are also uneasy about a new order that could result in their relinquishing high office.

Then there are the analysts and commentators who insist on drawing the wrong conclusions from the tragedy of Pakistan’s fourth military regime. Some of them are now openly calling for another military intervention to complete what, in their view, could not be completed by generals Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan, Zia ul Haq and Pervez Musharraf.

On the other extreme are commentators cum revolutionaries, who want nothing short of a revolutionary transformation, but without the military and compromising politicians.

Much scorn has been heaped by all categories of critics on the National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO) and the possibility of withdrawal of corruption charges against Bhutto. There is no recognition of the futility of the cases at this stage when none of them has been proven after a lapse of eleven years since their initiation. And some of the pundits even don’t get their facts straight.

An elderly sage devoted a column to the Swiss case against Bhutto and her husband Asif Zardari. He wrote, “Vincent Fournier, one of the three judges, has confirmed his office is about to pass on the case to the prosecutor” and then went on to say, “crystal clear, is it not? The couple stand convicted of corruption.” But there was no explanation of what is it that needs to be sent to the prosecutor if Bhutto and Zardari are convicted of corruption? After all, “approved for prosecution” is not the same thing as “conviction.”

If the case had been as open and shut or “crystal clear” as is claimed, it should not still be in the “is there sufficient basis to prosecute?” stage.
Instead of demanding a return to the drawing board to carve out a new grand plan for Pakistan’s future, let the key actors on Pakistan’s stage recognise their limitations and define their roles. The army must go back to the barracks. The civil servants must execute policy that is framed by elected politicians with inputs from intellectuals and professionals.

And thinking Pakistanis must line up with existing political parties and to try and strengthen Pakistan’s political system.

Let the Best Rule

Gulf News October 17, 2007

Pakistan is a land of many incongruities. In most modern nations, politicians wield power; the military and civil service execute policies and experts help set the nation’s priorities. In

Pakistan, the military, and to a lesser extent the civil bureaucracy, wield power but lack foresight and public support.

The politicians who enjoy popular backing do not always have power, which limits their experience in governance. Intellectuals and professionals, including those who have attained success abroad, articulate a vision for their country but lack the stamina for politics.

The result is constant experimentation with the system and form of government instead of moving forward on the basis of a clearly defined constitutional pattern. After eight years of military rule that began with promises of “setting things right once and for all”, Pakistan is once again at a crossroads.

Pakistan has been at a similar point several times in its short history of 60 years.

One would think that by now the military and civilian bureaucracy would have learnt the lesson that their limited administrative skills are not a substitute for the politicians’ ability to garner popular support.

The politicians, too, should have figured out that compromise and working within established parameters is better than constantly playing a zero-sum game.

The professionals and intellectuals should know that instead of concocting new schemes for a fresh start what Pakistan needs is to tread along a well worn path long enough for everyone to know and obey the rules of that road.

And everyone should have understood by now that if the US is to be Pakistan’s provider and protector of last resort then there should be some acceptance of Americans expressing concerns about Pakistan’s overall direction. But the rhetoric that passes off for discourse in Pakistan is still proceeding as if nothing has been learnt from history.

Recently, President General Pervez Musharraf joined opposition leader Benazir Bhutto in agreeing to an arrangement that could help bridge the traditional divide between the military-dominated establishment and populist politicians. But the B-grade politicians who have benefited from becoming the civilian face of military rule are already screaming at the top of their lungs to preempt a break from past precedent.

Professionals, such as banker Shaukat Aziz, who have ended up in positions that should normally go to elected politicians are also uneasy about a new order that could result in their relinquishing high office.

Wrong conclusions

Then there are the analysts and commentators who insist on drawing the wrong conclusions from the tragedy of Pakistan’s fourth military regime. Some of them are now openly calling for another military intervention to complete what, in their view, could not be completed by generals Ayoub Khan, Yahya Khan, Ziaul Haq and Pervez Musharraf.

On the other extreme are commentators cum revolutionaries who want nothing short of a revolutionary transformation, without the military and without compromised and compromising politicians.

Much scorn has been heaped by all categories of critics on the National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO) and the possibility of withdrawal of corruption charges against Bhutto. There is no recognition of the futility of the cases at this stage when none of them has been proven after a lapse of 11 years since their initiation. And some of the pundits even don’t get their facts straight.

If the Bhutto-Zardari case had been as open and shut or “crystal clear” as is claimed it should not have taken 11 years to still be in the “Is there sufficient basis to prosecute?” stage.

Instead of demanding a return to the drawing board to carve out a new grand plan for Pakistan’s future, let the key actors on Pakistan’s stage recognise their limitations and define their roles. The army must go back to the barracks. The civil servants must execute policy that is framed by elected politicians with inputs from intellectuals and professionals.

Instead of waiting, and calling, for a new military saviour or hoping unrealistically that a new political leadership will be born in time for the forthcoming election, thinking Pakistanis must line up with existing political parties and try to strengthen Pakistan’s political system.

How Musharraf Can Win the Political Battle

Gulf News, October 10, 2007

Unless the Supreme Court of Pakistan rules otherwise, General Pervez Musharraf has been “elected” to a five-year term as Pakistan’s president.

There was nothing normal about the presidential “election” of October 6. Legal challenges, street protests, political deals and international manoeuvres preceded the vote and will most likely continue as Musharraf tries desperately to legitimise his power.

The only hope for normality returning to Pakistan lies in national reconciliation, which Musharraf has promised and some of Pakistan’s major international backers appear to have guaranteed.

But Pakistanis, used as they are to political confrontation and polarisation are having difficulty believing that national reconciliation is possible. Some of Musharraf’s supporters and opponents both suspect that it would be business as usual once the dust of the presidential “election” settles.

Musharraf has the option of acting like Turkish general Kenan Evren, who took power in a 1980 military coup and tried to reshape Turkey’s politics by excluding the major political leaders of the time – Suleyman Demirel, Bulent Ecevit and Necmettin Erbakan – from the political arena.

Evren declared himself president after a referendum in 1982 and ruled as a strongman until he realised that his scheme for controlling politics simply was not working.

After free and fair parliamentary elections, Evren gradually took a back seat and allowed politics to take its course. First Demirel returned to the political centre-stage and then Ecevit and Erbakan followed suit.

Evren completed his presidential term and retired to a Turkish Mediterranean resort town where he took up painting and still lives. If Musharraf truly follows Evren’s model, Pakistan too could have a transition to democracy.

The first step towards that transition had to be reconciliation between Musharraf’s military regime and Benazir Bhutto’s Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP). The stage is now set for Bhutto’s return to Pakistan, and the rejuvenation of the PPP which is already Pakistan’s largest political party.

Musharraf’s arrangement with Bhutto involved the promulgation of the National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO) that ends corruption prosecutions that have not matured into convictions or confessions after pending for many years, in some cases over a decade.

Other elements of the agreement relate to assurances of a free and fair parliamentary election and an end to the ubiquitous role of the military-intelligence machinery in the political arena.

The NRO is being attacked by two principal groups. On the one hand are Musharraf’s supporters and assorted advocates of a clean slate who insist that Bhutto, her husband and other politicians of the 1990s were corrupt and should not be given any quarter.

 

But the loud noises about “We should not let the looters go scot free” belie a major reality. But their accusers have failed so far to obtain a single valid conviction against them at home or abroad.

The other group expressing dissatisfaction with the prospect of national reconciliation comes from Pakistan’s nascent civil society and the media. Their argument is that by opting for a negotiated transition, Bhutto has thwarted a revolutionary transformation to save her skin.

Major flaws

There are two major flaws in this line of reasoning. First, given that the cases against Bhutto and her associates were far from proven it is wrong to claim that these were the PPP leader’s major consideration. Second, there is little evidence that the anti-Musharraf campaign could have brought the regime down.

In situations when the adversary is weak but your side is unable to deliver a decisive blow either, the best strategy is to negotiate and secure a worthwhile settlement. And that is precisely what Bhutto seems to have done.

The outcome remains to be seen and should not be prejudged in extreme terms.

The Stage is Now Set

Indian Express , October 10, 2007

Unless the Supreme Court of Pakistan rules otherwise, General Musharraf has been “elected” to a five-year term as Pakistan’s president. Now, the only hope for normality returning to Pakistan lies in national reconciliation, which Musharraf has promised and some of Pakistan’s major international backers appear to have guaranteed. But Pakistanis, used as they are to political confrontation and polarisation, are having difficulty believing that national reconciliation is possible. Some of Musharraf’s supporters and opponents both suspect that it would be business as usual once the dust of the presidential “election” settles.

Musharraf has the option of acting like Turkish General Kenan Evren, who took power in a 1980 military coup and tried to reshape Turkey’s politics by excluding the major political leaders of the time — Suleyman Demirel, Bulent Ecevit and Necmettin Erbakan — from the political arena. Evren declared himself president after a referendum in 1982 and ruled as a strongman until he realised that his scheme for controlling politics simply was not working. After free and fair parliamentary elections, Evren gradually took a back seat and allowed politics to take its course. First, Demirel returned to the political centre-stage and then Ecevit and Erbakan followed suit. General Evren completed his presidential term and retired to a Turkish Mediterranean resort town where he took up painting and still lives. If Musharraf truly follows Evren’s model, Pakistan too could have a transition to democracy.

The first step towards that transition had to be reconciliation between Musharraf’s military regime and Benazir Bhutto’s Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP). After painstaking negotiations lasting several months, Musharraf and the military-intelligence apparatus that keeps him in power finally appears to have reached an agreement with Bhutto.

In return for the government dropping graft charges that have never been proven, members of the PPP did not join the rest of Musharraf’s opposition in resigning from the federal and provincial legislatures. The stage is now set for Bhutto’s return to Pakistan, and the rejuvenation of the PPP, which is already Pakistan’s largest political party.

Musharraf’s arrangement with Bhutto involved the promulgation of the National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO) that ends corruption prosecutions that have not matured into convictions or confessions after pending for many years, in some cases over a decade. Other elements of the agreement relate to assurances of a free and fair parliamentary election and an end to the ubiquitous role of the military in the political arena.

The NRO is being attacked by two principal groups. On the one hand are Musharraf’s supporters and assorted advocates of a clean slate who insist that Bhutto, her husband and other politicians of the 1990s were corrupt and should not be given any quarter. The other group comes from Pakistan’s nascent civil society and the media. Their argument is that by opting for a negotiated transition, Bhutto has thwarted a revolutionary transformation they believe was under way to save her skin and her allegedly ill-gotten millions.

There are two major flaws in this line of reasoning. First, given that the cases against Bhutto and her associates were far from proven, it is wrong to claim that these were the PPP leader’s major consideration. Second, there is little evidence that the anti-Musharraf campaign that started with the lawyers’ movement over the chief justice issue could have brought the Musharraf regime down. In situations when the adversary is weak but your side is unable to deliver a decisive blow either, the best strategy is to negotiate. And that is precisely what Bhutto did.

The PPP has not bargained away its long struggle for democracy and civilian rule and the party’s negotiations with General Musharraf could still yield an orderly transition to democracy within Pakistan’s constitutional structure. The outcome remains to be seen and should not be prejudged in extreme terms.

Down a Slippery Slope

Indian Express , October 3, 2007

General Musharraf may have won a legal battle when Pakistan’s Supreme Court made it possible for him to run for president without giving up his position as army chief. But ‘legal’ is not the same as ‘legitimate’.

A government headed by a serving general in uniform is, by definition, a military regime. For a government to qualify as civilian and democratic, its head must be elected as a civilian and under the spirit of the constitution.

Since taking power in a military coup in 1999 and especially since 9/11, Musharraf has invoked three principal arguments to justify his continuation in power.

The first of these is his status as a US ally in the war against terrorism. The second relates to Pakistan’s rapid economic growth under military rule, and the third is based on the idea that Musharraf is a benign dictator, not a malevolent one.

Recent developments in Pakistan have contradicted each of these.

Musharraf’s efficacy as a bulwark against terrorism has been exposed as parts of Pakistan have slipped deeper under the influence of Islamist extremists. The recent economic growth under military rule is the result of macroeconomic restructuring, capital inflows and privatisation of state enterprises and banks. It is not based on major expansion in manufacturing or agriculture, the areas that affect the lives of a majority of Pakistanis.

Pakistan has had a succession of flawed civilian and military rulers and several people (especially among the country’s professional middle class) argue that it is more important to have an honest and effective helmsman than a democratically elected one.

Musharraf’s western supporters have also said that he is not as repressive as other military dictators, which coupled with other reasons justifies his continuation in office. But Musharraf has always been selectively repressive, and repression is rising as his power is threatened.

Writing in the Wall Street Journal, James Hookway recently attributed the current violence in Myanmar (Burma) to some core beliefs of the Burmese army. “The country’s military rulers will go to any lengths to crush civil opposition,” he wrote, adding that the two core beliefs of Myanmar’s generals were “that only the army can keep the ethnically diverse country together and that if the generals don’t act decisively, they may be ousted by their own army rivals.” A similar set of beliefs can be found among the higher echelons of Pakistan’s army. Musharraf and his military backers also fear Pakistan’s disintegration or consignment to international irrelevance without the steadying hand of the army. Pakistan is culturally, economically and historically very different from Burma, which explains why cooption of some civilians and selective repression has been enough to maintain military rule.

The army has ruled Burma uninterrupted since 1960 whereas Pakistan’s military has had to cede power to civilians (as was the case after the military defeat of 1971) or to share power in an attempt to retain its institutional credibility (1988-1999). Furthermore, Burma’s military opted for a socialist model resulting in economic stagnation and the absence of modern influences such as a free media, communications technology and integration with the globalised economy. But a military mindset that does not recognise the value of civilian control eventually descends to the depths where Burma finds itself today.

Pakistan Must Avoid Myanmar’s Fate

Gulf News, October 3, 2007

General Pervez Musharraf may have won a legal battle when Pakistan’s Supreme Court made it possible, on a technicality, for him to run for president without giving up his position as army chief. But “legal” is not the same as “legitimate”.

A government headed by a serving general in uniform is, by definition, a military regime. For a government to qualify as civilian and democratic, its head must be elected as a civilian and under the spirit of the constitution.

Since taking power in a military coup in 1999 and especially since 9/11, Musharraf has invoked three principal arguments to secure international backing and to justify his continuation in power.

The first of these is his status as a US ally in the global war against terrorism; the second relates to Pakistan’s rapid economic growth under military rule and the third is based on the idea that Musharraf is a benign dictator, not a malevolent one. Recent developments in Pakistan have contradicted each of these lines of reasoning.

Musharraf’s efficacy as a bulwark against terrorism has been exposed as parts of Pakistan have slipped deeper under the influence of Islamist extremists.

With US intelligence confirming that Al Qaida enjoys a safe haven in remote regions of Pakistan, Musharraf’s claims about saving Pakistan from becoming a terrorist safe haven are ringing hollow.

Musharraf has repeatedly asserted that he is good for Pakistan’s stability mainly because the country’s economy has grown at a rate of 6-8 per cent annually under military rule.

Small group

This rapid economic growth is not based on major expansion in manufacturing or agriculture, the areas that affect the lives of a majority of Pakistanis. As a result, it has benefited only a small group with ties to Pakistan’s military and civilian oligarchy.

Musharraf’s Western supporters have also said that he is not as repressive as other military dictators, which coupled with other reasons justifies his continuation in office.

But Musharraf has always been selectively repressive and repression is rising along with threats to its continuing in power.

Writing in the Wall Street Journal, James Hookway recently attributed the current violence in Burma (Myanmar) to some core beliefs of the Burmese army. “The country’s military rulers will go to any lengths to crush civil opposition,” he wrote, adding that the two core beliefs of Myanmar’s generals were “that only the army can keep the ethnically diverse country together and that if the generals don’t act decisively, they may be ousted by their own army rivals”.

A similar set of beliefs can be found among the higher echelons of Pakistan’s army and is certainly a major factor in Musharraf’s assertion of his indispensability to Pakistan.

Musharraf and his military backers also fear Pakistan’s disintegration or consignment to international irrelevance without the steadying hand of the army. Pakistan is culturally, economically and historically very different from Burma (Myanmar), which explains why cooption of some civilians and selective repression has been enough to maintain military rule.

The army has ruled Burma (Myanmar) uninterrupted since 1960 whereas Pakistan’s military has had to cede power to civilians (as was the case after the military defeat of 1971) or to share power in an attempt to retain its institutional credibility (1988-1999).

Socialist model

Furthermore, Burma’s military opted for a socialist model resulting in economic stagnation.

But a military mindset that does not recognise the value of civilian control eventually descends to the depths where Myanmar finds itself today. Pakistani patriots must prevent putting their country down that slope by working towards an orderly transition from military to civilian rule based on civilian, rather than military, ascendancy.