A question of democracy

Gulf News, May 23, 2006

Recent developments in Nepal and Nigeria serve as examples for how nations can overcome entrenched authoritarian structures through popular mobilisation and thoughtful political action.

Nepal’s parliament, restored by King Gyanendra after massive street protests, has voted to strip the king of all substantive powers. That paves the way for the country’s transition, hopefully on a more stable basis, towards constitutional democracy under a titular monarch.

King Gyanendra’s effort to use his nation’s difficulties, including the brutal Maoist insurgency that plagues the countryside, to concentrate power in his own hands appears to have been thwarted.

It took a combination of international pressure, manifestation of the people’s opposition to the king in the streets of Katmandu and cooperation among Nepal’s various political parties to ensure the diminution of the king’s authority. Nepal still has a long way to go in its transition to democracy but its political leaders have clearly agreed on a roadmap for that transition.

In Nigeria, the Senate threw out a proposed constitutional amendment that would have allowed retired General Olusegun Obasanjo to seek a third term as the country’s president. Like Pakistan, Nigeria has also had a chequered history of intermittent civilian and military rule.

General Obasanjo had been Nigeria’s military ruler from 1976 to 1979. Then, he handed over power to an elected civilian government that was subsequently overthrown by the military. Obasanjo entered politics and was elected president in 1999 as a popular civilian politician after a round of disastrous military dictators.

Nigeria’s constitution limits elected presidents to two terms of office. But Obasanjo’s colleagues campaigned hard to change the constitution to enable their leader to secure the presidency again. The decision of the Nigerian parliament to reject the proposition is likely to strengthen democracy in Africa’s most populous country.

Educated Pakistanis who are equally disillusioned with the country’s military and political leaderships must look at the experiences of Nepal and Nigeria to identify prospects for change within their own country.

King Gyanendra had justified his own power grab on grounds of the ineffectiveness and ineptitude of Nepal’s civilian politicians. But the politicians turned to the masses and were eventually able to demonstrate greater popular support for their messy democracy than for King Gyanendra’s “efficient autocracy”. Pakistan’s politicians, too, would have to do the same.

Waning support

Once Nepal’s people took to the streets, Gyanendra’s international support vapourised. The international community backed the demand for restoration of parliamentary government and it is unlikely that the cantankerous nature of Nepal’s politics will change the world’s commitment to constitutional democratic rule in Nepal.

The “Charter for Democracy” recently signed by Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif offers hope that the still popular exiled politicians might return to Pakistan in time for the 2007 parliamentary elections.

People power is more easily manifested in countries where the commercial centre, political and cultural hub and state capital are all in one city or close to each other.

In Pakistan’s case, the federal capital (Islamabad) is a city mostly of diplomats and civil servants while centres of commercial and political activity are widely dispersed. Unless an agitation campaign is organised in several Pakistani cities simultaneously, it is unlikely to be effective.

The last such campaign, in 1977, succeeded because it was encouraged by the refusal of the military-intelligence complex to put it down with force. Since then, Pakistan’s military and intelligence services have ensured through manipulation that each of Pakistan’s major cities is controlled by a different political faction.

Since the 1999 coup d’etat, General Pervez Musharraf has benefited from disagreements within opposition ranks and the lack of sufficient organisation of Pakistan’s mainstream political parties.

The military regime has, through the political wings of the intelligence services, exacerbated dissension among opposition ranks and aggravated the relatively weak organisation of Benazir Bhutto’s PPP and Nawaz Sharif’s PML(N). It is difficult to be fully organised as a political party while being hounded by the state apparatus.

The “Charter for Democracy” marks the end of acrimony between the major parties, which was accentuated by the military-intelligence combine between 1988 and 1999 and then cited as justification for the military’s continuous meddling in politics.

The supporters of the two mainstream parties would be encouraged to mobilise by the return to the country of their leaders. That would make it difficult for the Musharraf regime to stage-manage the results of the 2007 election.

If Pakistan’s parliament acts like the Nigerian Senate and turns down any attempt by Musharraf to change the rules of the game, Pakistan might also get another chance at becoming a democracy.

A question of democracy

Gulf News, May 23, 2006

Recent developments in Nepal and Nigeria serve as examples for how nations can overcome entrenched authoritarian structures through popular mobilisation and thoughtful political action.

Nepal’s parliament, restored by King Gyanendra after massive street protests, has voted to strip the king of all substantive powers. That paves the way for the country’s transition, hopefully on a more stable basis, towards constitutional democracy under a titular monarch.
King Gyanendra’s effort to use his nation’s difficulties, including the brutal Maoist insurgency that plagues the countryside, to concentrate power in his own hands appears to have been thwarted.

It took a combination of international pressure, manifestation of the people’s opposition to the king in the streets of Katmandu and cooperation among Nepal’s various political parties to ensure the diminution of the king’s authority. Nepal still has a long way to go in its transition to democracy but its political leaders have clearly agreed on a roadmap for that transition.

In Nigeria, the Senate threw out a proposed constitutional amendment that would have allowed retired General Olusegun Obasanjo to seek a third term as the country’s president. Like Pakistan, Nigeria has also had a chequered history of intermittent civilian and military rule.

General Obasanjo had been Nigeria’s military ruler from 1976 to 1979. Then, he handed over power to an elected civilian government that was subsequently overthrown by the military. Obasanjo entered politics and was elected president in 1999 as a popular civilian politician after a round of disastrous military dictators.

Nigeria’s constitution limits elected presidents to two terms of office. But Obasanjo’s colleagues campaigned hard to change the constitution to enable their leader to secure the presidency again. The decision of the Nigerian parliament to reject the proposition is likely to strengthen democracy in Africa’s most populous country.

Educated Pakistanis who are equally disillusioned with the country’s military and political leaderships must look at the experiences of Nepal and Nigeria to identify prospects for change within their own country.

King Gyanendra had justified his own power grab on grounds of the ineffectiveness and ineptitude of Nepal’s civilian politicians. But the politicians turned to the masses and were eventually able to demonstrate greater popular support for their messy democracy than for King Gyanendra’s “efficient autocracy”. Pakistan’s politicians, too, would have to do the same.

Waning support

Once Nepal’s people took to the streets, Gyanendra’s international support vapourised. The international community backed the demand for restoration of parliamentary government and it is unlikely that the cantankerous nature of Nepal’s politics will change the world’s commitment to constitutional democratic rule in Nepal.

The “Charter for Democracy” recently signed by Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif offers hope that the still popular exiled politicians might return to Pakistan in time for the 2007 parliamentary elections.

People power is more easily manifested in countries where the commercial centre, political and cultural hub and state capital are all in one city or close to each other.
In Pakistan’s case, the federal capital (Islamabad) is a city mostly of diplomats and civil servants while centres of commercial and political activity are widely dispersed. Unless an agitation campaign is organised in several Pakistani cities simultaneously, it is unlikely to be effective.

The last such campaign, in 1977, succeeded because it was encouraged by the refusal of the military-intelligence complex to put it down with force. Since then, Pakistan’s military and intelligence services have ensured through manipulation that each of Pakistan’s major cities is controlled by a different political faction.

Since the 1999 coup d’etat, General Pervez Musharraf has benefited from disagreements within opposition ranks and the lack of sufficient organisation of Pakistan’s mainstream political parties.

The military regime has, through the political wings of the intelligence services, exacerbated dissension among opposition ranks and aggravated the relatively weak organisation of Benazir Bhutto’s PPP and Nawaz Sharif’s PML(N). It is difficult to be fully organised as a political party while being hounded by the state apparatus.

The “Charter for Democracy” marks the end of acrimony between the major parties, which was accentuated by the military-intelligence combine between 1988 and 1999 and then cited as justification for the military’s continuous meddling in politics.

The supporters of the two mainstream parties would be encouraged to mobilise by the return to the country of their leaders. That would make it difficult for the Musharraf regime to stage-manage the results of the 2007 election.

If Pakistan’s parliament acts like the Nigerian Senate and turns down any attempt by Musharraf to change the rules of the game, Pakistan might also get another chance at becoming a democracy.

A Failed State of Understanding

Indian Express, May 12, 2006

Official Pakistan has reacted angrily, as it always does, to two recent suggestions that the situation in the country might not be as rosy as painted by General Musharraf and his cohorts. Pakistan was rated as ninth on the 2006 Failed States Index developed by the U.S. Non-governmental Fund for Peace and Foreign Policy magazine. Instead of understanding the index, and why Pakistan’s rating on it was high, several Pakistanis in government responded with patriotic indignation.

The Failed States Index was pooh-poohed as yet another attempt to denigrate Pakistan, a project attributed to the nation’s real and imaginary enemies around the world. More recently, comments in Kabul by the US State Department Coordinator for counter-terrorism Henry Crumpton, suggesting that Pakistan was not doing enough in the search for Osama bin Laden, have invited the ire of those who see criticism as a part of sinister conspiracies.

The Failed States Index (FSI) is an academic exercise that started last year and will probably go on to become an annual feature. Like many other similar academic exercises in the United States, it is not Pakistan-specific and is designed as an analytical tool rather than as simplistic political commentary.

It is not the case that someone set out to insult Pakistan by describing it as a potentially failing state. An academic, in this case Dr. Pauline H. Baker, devised a general criteria for what causes a state to fail and — after applying it to 148 countries — listed those that scored higher than others on the basis of the criteria.

One possible analogy is a medical doctor’s list of risk factors for an individual’s health. Based on objective criteria, a doctor might say that someone who overeats, drinks heavily and smokes regularly is most likely to get a heart attack. There are always some people who survive the risk factors better or longer than others. But the doctors would not be wrong in listing threats to a person’s health and saying that someone more exposed to the risk factors is in danger.

According to the Fund for Peace website, the FSI is based on the Conflict Assessment System Tool (CAST) — “a comprehensive methodology for early warning and assessment of internal conflicts.” The purpose of CAST and FSI is to rate “indicators of state failure that drive conflict.” Using social, economic and political indicators, CAST provides “a rating system for trend analysis that can track a conflict over time.”

The Index’s political indicators are where Pakistan’s score rose enough to merit a higher rating as a potentially failed state. These indicators include Criminalization and/or Delegitimization of the State; Progressive Deterioration of Public Services; Suspension or Arbitrary Application of the Rule of Law and Widespread Violation of Human Rights; Security Apparatus Operates as a “State Within a State”; Rise of Factionalized Elites and Intervention of Other States or External Political Actors.

Instead of rejecting the Failed States Index as an attack on Pakistan, government officials and Pakistani analysts alike should pay attention to its message. Threats to the country’s long-term health should not be dismissed out of a desire for feeling good that all is well.

Outside observers and researchers have warned of Pakistan’s multiple crises in the past and the country has survived many predictions of doom. In that sense, the country is like the lucky person who has managed to avoid cancer or heart disease despite smoking heavily. But good luck is not a substitute for good policy.

Official Pakistan is used to rejecting out of hand scholarly research such as the Failed States Index. It is remarks such as those by Crumpton that particularly irk Islamabad. Since 9/11, General Musharraf’s unrepresentative military regime has sought legitimacy in the eyes of international public opinion on grounds of its usefulness in the U.S.-led war against terrorism.

When an American official deviates from the script that praises Pakistan as a critical U.S. ally, the regime feels particularly embarrassed. It feels its source of international legitimacy is under attack.

But General Musharraf and his associates, or their successors, will some day have to deal with the substantive threats to Pakistan, the kind that bother formulators of the Failed States Index. Living in denial and emphasizing only one part of Pakistan’s complex reality will not help deal with major faultlines and long-term dangers.

Taking the smoking and health risk analogy one step further, one can dismissive smoker’s cough as insignificant but the greater health risks remain, whether or not someone talks about them.

Dont ignore the doctors advice

Gulf News, May 10, 2006

Official Pakistan has reacted angrily, as it always does, to two recent suggestions that the situation in the country might not be as rosy as painted by General Pervez Musharraf and his cohorts.

Pakistan was rated as ninth on the 2006 Failed States Index developed by the US Non-governmental Fund for Peace and Foreign Policy magazine. Instead of understanding the index, and why Pakistan’s rating on it was high, several Pakistanis in government responded with patriotic indignation.

The Failed States Index was pooh-poohed as yet another attempt to denigrate Pakistan, a project attributed to the nation’s real and imaginary enemies around the world. More recently, comments in Kabul by Henry Crumpton, US State Department Coordinator for counter-terrorism, suggesting that Pakistan was not doing enough in the search for Osama Bin Laden have invited the ire of those who see criticism as a part of sinister conspiracies.

The Failed States Index (FIS) is an academic exercise that started last year and will probably go on to become an annual feature. Like many other similar academic exercises in the United States, it is not Pakistan-specific and is designed as an analytical tool rather than a simplistic political commentary. It is not the case that someone set out to insult Pakistan by describing it as a potentially failing state.

An academic, in this case Dr Pauline H. Baker, devised a general criteria for what causes a state to fail and after applying it to 148 countries listed those that scored higher than others on the basis of the criteria.

One possible analogy is a medical doctor’s list of risk factors for an individual’s health. Based on objective criteria, a doctor might say that someone who overeats, drinks heavily and smokes regularly is most likely to get a heart attack. There are always some people who survive the risk factors better or longer than others. But the doctors would not be wrong in listing threats to a person’s health and saying that someone more exposed to the risk factors is in danger.

According to the Fund for Peace website, the FIS is based on the Conflict Assessment System Tool (CAST) “a comprehensive methodology for early warning and assessment of internal conflicts”. The purpose of CAST and FIS is to rate “indicators of state failure that drive conflict”. Using social, economic and political indicators, CAST provides “a rating system for trend analysis that can track a conflict over time”.

The social indicators that determine the Failed States Index are Mounting Demographic Pressures; Massive Movement of Refugees or Internally Displaced Persons creating Complex Humanitarian Emergencies; Legacy of Vengeance-Seeking Group Grievance or Group Paranoia and Chronic and Sustained Human Flight. The economic indicators are Uneven Economic Development along Group Lines and Sharp and/or Severe Economic Decline.

Indicators

The Index’s political indicators are where Pakistan’s score rose enough to merit a higher rating as a potentially failed state. These indicators include Criminalisation and/or Delegitimisation of the State; Progressive Deterioration of Public Services; Suspension or Arbitrary Application of the Rule of Law and Widespread Violation of Human Rights; Security Apparatus Operates as a “State Within a State”; Rise of Factionalised Elites and Intervention of Other States or External Political Actors.

Instead of rejecting the Failed States Index as an attack on Pakistan, government officials and Pakistani analysts alike should pay attention to its message. Threats to the country’s long-term health should not be dismissed out of a desire for feeling good that all is well.

Outside observers and researchers have warned of Pakistan’s multiple crises in the past and the country has survived many predictions of doom. In that sense, the country is like the lucky person who has managed to avoid cancer or heart disease despite smoking heavily. But good luck is not a substitute for good policy.

Official Pakistan is used to rejecting out of hand scholarly research such as the Failed States Index. It is remarks such as those by Henry Crumpton that particularly irk Islamabad.

Since 9/11, Musharraf’s unrepresentative military regime has sought legitimacy in the eyes of international public opinion on grounds of its usefulness in the US-led war against terrorism. When an American official deviates from the script, the regime feels particularly embarrassed. It feels its source of international legitimacy is under attack.

But General Musharraf and his associates, or their successors, will some day have to deal with the substantive threats to Pakistan.

Taking the smoking and health risk analogy one step further, one can be dismissive of smoker’s cough but the health risks remain, whether or not someone talks about them.