US Pak ties replay the past

Gulf News, July 5, 2006

Soon after the 1999 coup d’etat that brought him to power, General Pervez Musharraf telephoned General Anthony Zinni, Commander of the US Central Command (CentCom).

Both Musharraf and Zinni have publicly confirmed their conversation.

In his book Battle Ready, written with Tom Clancy and published in 2004, Zinni says that Musharraf told him “what had led to the coup and why he and the other military leaders had had no choice other than the one they took”.

Zinni also mentions Musharraf’s help, two months later, in arresting some terrorists sought by the US, which led Zinni to tell Washington, “Now do something for Musharraf.”

In the aftermath of a military coup that entailed toppling an elected government, Musharraf found it expedient, possibly necessary, to seek the advice and support from the top American general dealing with the Middle East and Central Asia.

Subsequently, too, Musharraf has been proud of his American connections, citing on more than one occasion US support since 9/11 as somehow conferring legitimacy on his military regime.

Now, however, when US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice publicly expressed support for “democratic, free and fair elections in Pakistan in 2007”, Musharraf’s regime has taken a suddenly nationalistic stance.

A statement by the Pakistani Foreign Office rejected Rice’s comments, saying, “On the democratic processes in Pakistan, we do not require advice from outside.”

Pakistan’s military leaders have followed a familiar pattern since the country’s first military coup in 1958.

They begin by trading on Pakistan’s strategic location and securing US support for military modernisation as well as an economic bonanza for the country’s elites.

During the honeymoon period with the United States, cooperation with the US is cited as crucial for Pakistan’s security and economic well-being.

Friendship with the US, political stability and economic development are the mantras of Pakistan’s military leaders during the first several years of their otherwise unconstitutional regimes.

Then comes what an American friend recently described to me as a “Kabuki situation”, a reference to the Japanese popular drama involving “highly stylised singing and dancing” and slow and cautious movements.

While consolidating their rule as US allies, Pakistani military rulers do not completely conform to the US strategic vision and engage in policies that are considered unsavoury by the Americans but in the Pakistani state’s interest by Pakistani officials.

For example, Field Marshal Ayub Khan’s military regime (1958-69) joined US-led anti-communist alliances and provided Americans with a secret air base and listening posts.

In return, Pakistan received large amounts of aid and World Bank financing that enabled Ayub Khan to claim that he presided over a decade of development.

But Ayub Khan was unwilling to forgo a budding alliance with China and Pakistan’s adversarial relationship with India.

After the 1965 war, fought by Pakistan against US advice and in the mistaken hope of invoking America’s military alliance commitments against India, relations between the US and Pakistan soured.

Ayub Khan summed up his resentment of later US policies towards his regime in the tile of his autobiography Friends, Not Masters, arguing that he wanted Washington as a friend but not as a master.

General Zia-ul-Haq (1977-1988) followed Ayub Khan’s pattern in consolidating his regime with US assistance, this time by offering Pakistan as the staging ground for the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan.

The irritant in the US-Pakistan relationship this time was Pakistan’s nuclear programme.

Looked the other way

The US looked the other way for as long as was necessary but after the Geneva accords and the Soviet withdrawal in 1988, the interests of the Pakistani regime and the United States diverged.

Zia-ul-Haq died in uniform and his military successors bitterly criticised the US for “abandoning” Pakistan yet again.

Musharraf’s military regime might now be gradually entering its own “Friends, Not Masters” phase of relations with the United States.

Musharraf has delivered only partially on the promise of rooting out Islamist terrorists from Pakistan, notwithstanding his government’s high profile support of the US effort against Al Qaida.

Allegations of Pakistan’s covert support for the Taliban are casting a shadow on Islamabad’s ties with Washington.

Above all, the US is unwilling to see Pakistan as an equal of India even though it is prepared to have balanced ties with both countries and describes both as strategic partners.

Musharraf followed the script of Ayub Khan and Zia-ul-Haq in consolidating power with American backing and by buying off Pakistan’s elites with economic prosperity.

By reacting angrily to Rice’s support for democratic processes in Pakistan, Musharraf might inadvertently be copying his military predecessors once again.

Of course, like Ayub Khan and Zia-ul-Haq, the Musharraf paradigm is also unlikely to ensure institutional governance in Pakistan or secure long-term international partnerships.

Pakistan will attain independence, sustainable strength and real development only when the Pakistani people, and not a vice-regal elite, determines its fate.

Lebanon and the Lessons for Pakistan

Indian Express, July 24, 2006

Over the last few days, terrorists have severely disrupted — fatally undermined, some argue — the peace processes in South Asia and the Middle East. Unlike Lebanon, Israel and the Palestinian territories, widespread violence has not yet erupted between India and Pakistan. But given the two countries’ history, their war of words should not be allowed to escalate unattended.

It is unrealistic to expect sustained dialogue between India and Pakistan until Pakistan puts Islamist militants, the Jihadis, truly out of business and India begins to address the insecurities of Pakistan’s elite about Pakistan’s long-term strategic situation.

For the last several years the Jihadis have simply been put on hold, told by Pakistani officials to suspend operations without actually being decommissioned. As India postponed the next round of India-Pakistan talks in the aftermath of the Mumbai terrorist attacks, Pakistan gave no indication that it was willing to move in the direction of shutting down Jihadi groups based in the country.

Pakistan’s official response to India’s allegations about the complicity of Pakistan-based groups in the Mumbai attacks has been technical, not politically substantive. The Foreign Office spokeswoman argued that India had not conveyed “anything in writing or talked of any evidence.” But that is hardly the point of contention at this moment. Pakistan’s argument would have been much stronger if Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) did not operate freely at all within Pakistan despite having been officially banned five years ago.

It may well be true that India has not yet found conclusive evidence of LeT’s involvement in the Mumbai attacks and that the attacks might have been the handiwork of a homegrown Indian terrorist group. But the fact that LeT operates in Pakistan as Jamat-ud-Dawa, and even received acknowledgement from General Pervez Musharraf for aid work in the aftermath of last year’s earthquake in northern Pakistan and Kashmir, is hardly conducive to an India-Pakistan peace process.

No amount of denials from Pakistani officials, or even LeT itself, of non-involvement in the latest attacks inside India washes away the group’s history. Its leader, Hafiz Muhammad Saeed declared in 1999 that, “Our Mujahideen will create three Pakistans in India.” Then, in 2003, he told a Pakistani reporter that he considered suicide bombing the “best form of Jihad.” Hafiz Saeed also rejected the very notion of a peace process between India and Pakistan.

Such rhetoric cannot be disavowed by rhetoric about the need for proof of a specific group’s responsibility for specific attacks against India. By allowing Hafiz Saeed, his group and others like them the freedom to organize and operate in Pakistan, General Pervez Musharraf’s government has undermined its own credibility in the peace process. Just as Lebanon is paying the price of tolerating and co-opting Hezbollah without securing a commitment of renunciation of terrorism from the group, Pakistan risks responsibility for the actions of non-state actors it gives free rein.

General Pervez Musharraf secured international legitimacy in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States by becoming an American ally in the global war against terrorism. But there is a clear reluctance about moving against anti-India groups. That these groups share an ideology and worldview with Al-Qaeda does not seem to alter the Musharraf regime’s perception of these groups.

In his speech, released through Al-Jazeera in April, Osama bin Laden spoke of a ‘‘Crusader-Zionist-Hindu war against Muslims’’. Bin Laden’s decision to add Hindus to his traditional harangues against Zionists and Crusaders indicates that the al-Qaeda chief understands the value of aligning his views with those of Pakistani Jihadi groups.

The Jihadis have only brought violence, instability and defamation for Pakistan. Now their presence has caused the breakdown in South Asia’s peace process, which is crucial for the region’s stability and prosperity. Why then are Musharraf and the Pakistani establishment reluctant to root out the Jihadis with the vigor that Pakistan’s military governments have often shown in vanquishing their political enemies? The answer lies in one of the major fallacies defining the Pakistani establishment’s worldview: the need to “internationalize” the Kashmir dispute.

During the recent controversy over whether Musharraf, as army chief, had cleared the 1999 military operation in Kargil with the then prime minister, Musharraf claimed that Kargil had helped “internationalize” the Kashmir issue. Most thinking people the world over consider Kargil a misadventure and a strategic blunder that brought India and Pakistan to the brink of all-out war and cost Pakistan heavily in lives and international prestige. But for Musharraf the cost was worth it because the conflict “internationalized” the Kashmir dispute and that “internationalization” is somehow the key to resolving the Kashmir problem in Pakistan’s favor.

Just as Kargil was useful in “internationalizing” the Kashmir dispute, the presence of Jihadis is seen by some Pakistani strategic planners as an instrument of focusing international attention on an issue that would otherwise be forgotten. But just as Kargil resulted in little substantive gain for Pakistan, internationalization of the Kashmir dispute through the statements or action of violent groups is also unlikely to be of any long-term utility in an era of global consensus against terrorism.

Blame the jihadis for stalling peace process

Gulf News, July 19, 2006

Over the last few days, terrorists have severely disrupted – some argue, fatally undermined – the peace processes in South Asia and the Middle East.

Unlike Lebanon, Israel and the Palestinian territories, widespread violence has not yet erupted between India and Pakistan.

But given the two countries’ history, their war of words should not be allowed to escalate unattended.

As someone who was sceptical about the outcome when the current India-Pakistan peace process began in January 2004, I take no delight in being proven right two years later.

I had written then, “That India and Pakistan are willing to talk again is a positive development. The nuclear-armed neighbours were on the brink of war less than a year ago. But the thaw in their relations is just that – a thaw, rather than a major breakthrough. We have seen similar developments in the past hailed as breakthroughs, only to end in breakdowns.”

A recurrent theme in my analysis, and one that often annoys many Pakistanis, is the need for Pakistan to put Islamist militants, the jihadis, truly out of business.

Postponed

As India postponed the next round of India-Pakistan talks in the aftermath of the Mumbai terrorist attacks, Pakistan gave no indication that it was willing to move in the direction of shutting down jihadi groups based in the country.

Pakistan’s official response to India’s allegations about the complicity of Pakistan-based groups in the Mumbai attacks has been technical, not politically substantive.

The foreign office spokeswoman argued that India had not conveyed “anything in writing or talked of any evidence”.

That is hardly the point of contention at this moment.

It may well be true that India has not yet found conclusive evidence of Laskhar-e-Taiba’s involvement in the Mumbai attacks and that the attacks might have been the handiwork of a homegrown Indian terrorist group.

Extremist rhetoric cannot be disavowed by rhetoric about need for proof of a specific group’s responsibility for specific attacks against India.

Just as Lebanon is paying the price of tolerating and co-opting Hezbollah without securing a commitment of renunciation of violence from the group, Pakistan risks responsibility for the actions of non-state actors it gives free rein.

The need to deal with terrorist groups is independent of the need to address their causes.
Pakistan’s President General Pervez Musharraf secured international legitimacy in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States by becoming an American ally in the global war against terrorism.

The Musharraf regime has, over the years, taken some steps against Al Qaida operatives seeking refuge in Pakistan.

The Pakistan army has paid a heavy price in fatalities at the hands of terrorist sympathisers in the tribal areas along the Afghan border.

But Pakistan is far from rooting out terrorism from its soil. There is a clear reluctance about moving against anti-India groups.

That these groups share an ideology and worldview with Al Qaida does not seem to alter the Musharraf regime’s perception of these groups.

With such policies, why should anyone be surprised if Pakistan gets blamed for tolerating or supporting terrorists?

Traditional harangues

In his speech, released through Al Jazeera in April, Osama Bin Laden spoke of “a Crusader-Zionist-Hindu war against Muslims”.

Bin Laden’s decision to add Hindus to his traditional harangues against Zionists and Crusaders indicates that the Al Qaida chief understands the value of aligning his views with those of Pakistani jihadi groups.

The recently released video of Shahzad Tanveer, one of the suicide bombers involved in last year’s attacks in London, spoke of his training at an Al Qaida training facility in Pakistan.

Such connections between Pakistani groups and global terrorists should worry Musharraf, who was himself a target of terrorists not long ago.

The jihadis have only brought violence, instability and defamation for Pakistan. Now their presence has caused the breakdown in South Asia’s peace process, which is crucial for the region’s stability and prosperity.

Unquestioning US Support for Musharraf Weakening

Gulf News, July 5, 2006

Soon after the 1999 coup d’etat that brought him to power, General Pervez Musharraf telephoned General Anthony Zinni, Commander of the US Central Command (CentCom).

Both Musharraf and Zinni have publicly confirmed their conversation.

In his book Battle Ready, written with Tom Clancy and published in 2004, Zinni says that Musharraf told him “what had led to the coup and why he and the other military leaders had had no choice other than the one they took”.

Zinni also mentions Musharraf’s help, two months later, in arresting some terrorists sought by the US, which led Zinni to tell Washington, “Now do something for Musharraf.”

In the aftermath of a military coup that entailed toppling an elected government, Musharraf found it expedient, possibly necessary, to seek the advice and support from the top American general dealing with the Middle East and Central Asia.

Subsequently, too, Musharraf has been proud of his American connections, citing on more than one occasion US support since 9/11 as somehow conferring legitimacy on his military regime.

Now, however, when US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice publicly expressed support for “democratic, free and fair elections in Pakistan in 2007”, Musharraf’s regime has taken a suddenly nationalistic stance.

A statement by the Pakistani Foreign Office rejected Rice’s comments, saying, “On the democratic processes in Pakistan, we do not require advice from outside.”

Pakistan’s military leaders have followed a familiar pattern since the country’s first military coup in 1958.

They begin by trading on Pakistan’s strategic location and securing US support for military modernisation as well as an economic bonanza for the country’s elites.

During the honeymoon period with the United States, cooperation with the US is cited as crucial for Pakistan’s security and economic well-being.

Friendship with the US, political stability and economic development are the mantras of Pakistan’s military leaders during the first several years of their otherwise unconstitutional regimes.

Then comes what an American friend recently described to me as a “Kabuki situation”, a reference to the Japanese popular drama involving “highly stylised singing and dancing” and slow and cautious movements.

While consolidating their rule as US allies, Pakistani military rulers do not completely conform to the US strategic vision and engage in policies that are considered unsavoury by the Americans but in the Pakistani state’s interest by Pakistani officials.

For example, Field Marshal Ayub Khan’s military regime (1958-69) joined US-led anti-communist alliances and provided Americans with a secret air base and listening posts.

In return, Pakistan received large amounts of aid and World Bank financing that enabled Ayub Khan to claim that he presided over a decade of development.

But Ayub Khan was unwilling to forgo a budding alliance with China and Pakistan’s adversarial relationship with India.

After the 1965 war, fought by Pakistan against US advice and in the mistaken hope of invoking America’s military alliance commitments against India, relations between the US and Pakistan soured.

Ayub Khan summed up his resentment of later US policies towards his regime in the tile of his autobiography Friends, Not Masters, arguing that he wanted Washington as a friend but not as a master.

General Zia-ul-Haq (1977-1988) followed Ayub Khan’s pattern in consolidating his regime with US assistance, this time by offering Pakistan as the staging ground for the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan.

The irritant in the US-Pakistan relationship this time was Pakistan’s nuclear programme.

Looked the other way

The US looked the other way for as long as was necessary but after the Geneva accords and the Soviet withdrawal in 1988, the interests of the Pakistani regime and the United States diverged.

Zia-ul-Haq died in uniform and his military successors bitterly criticised the US for “abandoning” Pakistan yet again.

Musharraf’s military regime might now be gradually entering its own “Friends, Not Masters” phase of relations with the United States.

Musharraf has delivered only partially on the promise of rooting out Islamist terrorists from Pakistan, notwithstanding his government’s high profile support of the US effort against Al Qaida.

Allegations of Pakistan’s covert support for the Taliban are casting a shadow on Islamabad’s ties with Washington.

Above all, the US is unwilling to see Pakistan as an equal of India even though it is prepared to have balanced ties with both countries and describes both as strategic partners.

Musharraf followed the script of Ayub Khan and Zia-ul-Haq in consolidating power with American backing and by buying off Pakistan’s elites with economic prosperity.

By reacting angrily to Rice’s support for democratic processes in Pakistan, Musharraf might inadvertently be copying his military predecessors once again.

Of course, like Ayub Khan and Zia-ul-Haq, the Musharraf paradigm is also unlikely to ensure institutional governance in Pakistan or secure long-term international partnerships.

Pakistan will attain independence, sustainable strength and real development only when the Pakistani people, and not a vice-regal elite, determines its fate.

Friends Not Masters

Indian Express, July 5, 2006

Soon after the 1999 coup d’etat that brought him to power, General Pervez Musharraf telephoned General Anthony Zinni, Commander of the US Central Command (CentCom). Both Generals Musharraf and Zinni have publicly confirmed their conversation. In his book Battle Ready, written with Tom Clancy and published in 2004, General Zinni says that Musharraf told him ‘‘what had led to the coup and why he and the other military leaders had had no choice other than the one they took.’’ Zinni also mentions Musharraf’s help, two months later, in arresting some terrorists sought by the US, which led Zinni to tell Washington, ‘‘Now do something for Musharraf.’’

In the aftermath of a military coup that entailed toppling an elected government, General Musharraf found it expedient, possibly necessary, to seek the advice and support from the top American general dealing with the Middle East and Central Asia. Subsequently, too, Musharraf has been proud of his American connections, citing on more than one occasion US support since 9/11 as somehow conferring legitimacy on his military regime.

Now, when US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice publicly expressed support for ‘‘democratic, free and fair elections in Pakistan in 2007,’’ General Musharraf’s regime has taken a suddenly nationalistic stance. A statement by the Pakistani Foreign Office said, ‘‘On the democratic processes in Pakistan, we do not require advice from outside.’’

Pakistan’s military leaders have followed a familiar pattern since the country’s first military coup in 1958. They begin by trading on Pakistan’s strategic location and securing US support for military modernisation as well as an economic bonanza for the country’s elites. During the honeymoon period with the United States, cooperation with the US is cited as crucial for Pakistan’s security and economic well being. Friendship with the US, political stability and economic development are the mantras of Pakistan’s military leaders during the first several years of their otherwise unconstitutional regimes. Then comes what an American friend recently described to me as a ‘‘Kabuki situation,’’ a reference to the Japanese popular drama involving ‘‘highly stylised singing and dancing’’ and slow and cautious movements. While consolidating their rule as US allies, Pakistani military rulers do not completely conform to the US strategic vision and engage in policies that are considered unsavory by the Americans but in the Pakistani state’s interest by Pakistani officials.

For example, Field Marshal Ayub Khan’s military regime (1958-69) joined US-led anti-Communist alliances and provided Americans with a secret air base. In return, Pakistan received large amounts of aid and World Bank financing that enabled Ayub Khan to claim that he presided over a decade of development. But Ayub Khan was unwilling to forgo a budding alliance with China and Pakistan’s adversarial relationship with India.

After the 1965 war, fought by Pakistan against US advice and in the mistaken hope of invoking America’s military alliance commitments against India, relations between the US and Pakistan soured. Ayub Khan summed up his resentment of later US policies toward his regime in the tile of his autobiography Friends, Not Masters, arguing that he wanted Washington as a friend but not as a master.

General Ziaul Haq (1977-198) followed Ayub Khan’s pattern in consolidating his regime with US assistance, this time by offering Pakistan as the staging ground for the anti-Soviet Jihad in Afghanistan. The irritant in the US-Pakistan relationship this time was Pakistan’s nuclear program.

The US looked the other way for as long as was necessary but after the Geneva accords and the Soviet withdrawal in 1988, the interests of the Pakistani regime and the United States diverged. Ziaul Haq died in uniform and his military successors bitterly criticised the US for ‘‘abandoning’’ Pakistan yet again. General Musharraf’s military regime might now be gradually entering its own ‘Friends, Not Masters’ phase of relations with the United States…

Allegations of Pakistan’s covert support for the Taliban are casting a shadow on Islamabad’s ties with Washington. Above all, the US is unwilling to see Pakistan as an equal of India even though it is prepared to have balanced ties with both countries.

General Musharraf followed the script of Ayub Khan and Ziaul Haq in consolidating power with American backing and by buying off Pakistan’s elites with economic prosperity. By reacting angrily to Secretary of State Rice’s support for democratic processes in Pakistan, Musharraf might inadvertently be copying his military predecessors once again.

Of course, like Ayub Khan and Ziaul Haq, the Musharraf paradigm is also unlikely to ensure institutional governance in Pakistan or secure long-term international partnerships. Pakistan will attain independence, sustainable strength and real development only when the Pakistani people, and not a vice-regal elite, determines its fate.