Monthly Archives: April 2007

Indian Express, April 26, 2007

It is hardly surprising that Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert politely turned down General Pervez Musharraf’s offer of mediation in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Given Musharraf’s current problems at home, it was his offer of mediation and the expression of willingness to visit Israel “to help bring peace to the Middle East” that was unusual.

Musharraf’s mediation offer reflects a longstanding belief of Pakistan’s civil-military establishment that the road to the country’s survival and prosperity lies overseas.

The belief is, of course, erroneous. It has been proven wrong again and again, most notably in 1971 when General Yahya Khan thought his help in bringing China and the US closer would save erstwhile East Pakistan from becoming Bangladesh.

But, as is often the case with folly, successive Pakistani rulers persist in thinking that they can extricate the nation from its troubles merely by playing a major role on the world stage. After making his mediation offer in an interview with an Arab television channel, Musharraf took off for a week-long four-nation tour that will take him to Poland, Bosnia, Spain and Turkey.

Meanwhile, the judicial crisis at home continues to brew. Demonstrations against Musharraf grow larger with each passing day, and there is no sign of stability returning. The situation in the tribal areas along Afghanistan’s border has not improved, notwithstanding the government’s effort to spin a conflict between some foreign fighters and Pashtun Taliban in South Waziristan as a tribal uprising against al-Qaeda. The leader of the Pakistani tribesmen in the area has publicly declared that he would extend hospitality to Osama Bin Laden if he lands in his territory.

The standoff with Pakistani Taliban in Islamabad, too, has not ended, notwithstanding Pakistani civil society’s courageous demonstrations against the country’s Talibanisation. Musharraf’s decision to travel abroad in the middle of a major domestic crisis has several precedents in Pakistan’s history. Most significantly, late Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto went off on an unexplained trip in June 1977 to six Muslim countries, including Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Afghanistan, in the middle of his negotiations with the opposition Pakistan National Alliance (PNA).

By then, the country had witnessed violent demonstrations against Bhutto for almost three months over alleged rigging of parliamentary elections. Several rounds of talks between the government and the opposition had led to a basic compromise, the details of which were left unsettled before Bhutto’s overseas tour. By the time the prime minister returned from his travels, the opposition’s stance had hardened and he was toppled in a military coup on July 5, 1977.

Foreign relations are indeed important in the life of a nation but more important than external affairs are the internal dynamics of a country. Pakistan has had a tendency since its earliest days to focus on a role on the world stage at the expense of resolution of issues at home. Soon after Pakistan’s independence in 1947, veteran Life magazine photo-journalist Margaret Bourke-White noticed a tendency among Pakistani officials to look for “opportunities for profiting from the disputes of others.” Pakistan’s establishment has developed a mindset that considers foreign policy a substitute for evolving national cohesion and improving the life of citizens.

The domestic cost of constantly looking overseas has been significant. Soon after independence, 16.4 per cent of Pakistan’s population was literate, compared with 18.3 per cent of India’s significantly larger population. By 2003, while India had managed to attain a literacy rate of 65.3 per cent, Pakistan’s stood at no more than 35 to 50 per cent, depending on whose figures one believes.

Pakistan ranks close to the bottom among 87 developing countries in the amount allotted to primary schools. Its low literacy rate and inadequate investment in education has led to a decline in Pakistan’s technological base, which in turn hampers the country’s economic modernisation. Pakistan is also far from developing a consistent system of government, with persisting political polarisation along three major, intersecting fault lines: between civilians and the military, among different ethnic and provincial groups, and between Islamists and secularists.

Instead of seeking international standing while ignoring the situation at home, it is time for Pakistan’s establishment to turn inward. Ending polarisation, building critical institutions of state, restoring democracy and reviving people’s trust in their future as a nation should take priority over gimmickry in international relations.

Gulf News, April 25, 2007

It is hardly surprising that Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert politely turned down Pakistan’s President General Pervez Musharraf’s offer of mediation in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

Given Mush-arraf’s current problems at home, it was his offer of mediation and the expression of willingness to visit Israel “to help bring peace to the Middle East” that was unusual.

“We don’t need someone to come from afar in order for me and Abu Mazen to meet,” Olmert said, referring to Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas. An official in the Israeli Prime Minister’s Office went a little farther, describing Musharraf’s offer as “a little ridiculous”, according to a report in the Jerusalem Post.

“We have an Arab initiative. Why would we need a Pakistani initiative?” the official asked.

Musharraf’s mediation offer reflects a longstanding belief of Pakistan’s civil-military establishment that the road to the country’s survival and prosperity lies overseas.

The belief is, of course, erroneous. It has been proven wrong again and again, most notably in 1971 when General Yahya Khan thought his help in bringing China and the US closer would save erstwhile East Pakistan from becoming Bangladesh.
But, as is often the case with folly, successive Pakistani rulers persist in thinking that they can extricate the nation from its troubles merely by playing a major role on the world stage.

After making his mediation offer in an interview with an Arab television channel, Musharraf took off for a week-long four-nation tour that will take him to Poland, Bosnia, Spain and Turkey.

In the meantime, the judicial crisis at home continues to brew. Demonstrations against Musharraf grow larger with each passing day, and there is no sign of stability returning any time soon.

The situation in the tribal areas along Afghanis-tan’s border has not improved. The standoff with Pakistani Taliban in Islamabad, too, has not ended notwithstanding Pakistani civil society’s courageous demonstrations against the country’s Talibanisation.

Musharraf’s decision to travel abroad in the middle of a major domestic crisis has several precedents in Pakistan’s history.
Most significantly, the late prime minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto went off on an unexplained trip in June 1977 to six Muslim countries, including Saudi Arabia, Iran and Afghanistan, in the middle of his negotiations with the opposition Pakistan National Alliance (PNA).

By then, the country had witnessed violent demonstrations against Bhutto for almost three months over alleged rigging of parliamentary elections.

By the time he returned from his travels, the opposition’s stance had hardened and he was toppled in a military coup on July 5, 1977.

Foreign relations are indeed important in the life of a nation but more important than external affairs are the internal dynamics of a country. Pakistan has had a tendency since its earliest days to focus on a role on the world stage at the expense of resolution of issues at home.

Soon after Pakistan’s independence in 1947, veteran Life magazine photo-journalist Margaret Bourke-White noticed a tendency among Pakistani officials to look for “opportunities for profiting from the disputes of others”.

Mindset

In the process, Pakistan’s establishment has developed a mindset that considers foreign policy a substitute for evolving national cohesion and improving the life of the nation’s citizens.

The domestic cost of constantly looking overseas has been significant. Soon after independence, 16.4 per cent of Pakistan’s population was literate, compared with 18.3 per cent of India’s significantly larger population.

By 2003, while India had managed to attain a literacy rate of 65.3 per cent, Pakistan’s stood at no more than 35 to 50 per cent, depending on whose figures one believes.

Pakistan ranks close to the bottom among 87 developing countries in the amount allotted to primary schools. Its low literacy rate and inadequate investment in education has led to a decline in Pakistan’s technological base, which in turn hampers the country’s economic modernisation.

Pakistan is also far from developing a consistent system of government, with persisting political polarisation along three major, intersecting fault lines: between civilians and the military, among different ethnic and provincial groups, and between Islamists and secularists.

Instead of continuing along the path of seeking international standing while ignoring the situation at home, it is time for Pakistan’s establishment to turn inward.

Ending polarisation, building critical institutions of state, restoring democracy and reviving people’s trust in their future as a nation should take priority over gimmickry in international relations.

Indian Express, April 4, 2007

The Pakistani media is clearly concerned about the expanding influence of the Taliban within the country. Hard-line religious leaders and hundreds of male and female activists from Islamabad’s madrasas have challenged the writ of the state by forcing their brand of ‘Islamic justice’ in the federal capital. The Pakistani state, which is extremely competent at jailing elected leaders and putting Supreme Court chief justices under house arrest, has so far done little to check the vigilantism of the religious extremists.

Everyone knows that the Taliban are active in the tribal areas bordering Afghanistan where they behead alleged American spies and mete harsh punishments for ‘crimes’ such as listening to music, watching television or shaving one’s beard while being an adult male. But the influence of Taliban beyond the tribal areas was less known until recently. Now the Taliban control significant parts of the settled areas of Northwest Frontier Province. They have enforced their rules in parts of Bannu, Hangu and Tank. Their recent actions in Islamabad should worry anyone concerned about Pakistan’s future as a viable and functional state.

In Islamabad, where hardly a leaf flutters without the knowledge of Pakistan’s ubiquitous intelligence services, Pakistani Taliban took hostage three women from a house allegedly for running a brothel. The students of Jamia Hafsa madrasa, encouraged by the radical Imam of Islamabad’s government-operated Lal Masjid, occupied a children’s library almost sixty days ago, which still remains under their control.

For the last six years, General Pervez Musharraf’s military regime has described the elimination of extremism as its raison d’etre. After large infusions of US and other economic and military assistance expressly for the purpose of promoting ‘enlightened moderation,’ extremism is still rising in Pakistan and becoming far more threatening than before.

There are four possible explanations for the deteriorating situation in Pakistan. The first, given by Pakistani officials, is that religious extremism has deep roots in Pakistan and would take many years and a lot more US dollars to root out.

The second, offered by American officials (notably outgoing US ambassador Ryan Crocker) claims that the Pakistani government does not have the capacity to control the Taliban and their sympathisers in all parts of the country. The third, somewhat harsh, view is that Pakistan’s military-intelligence-bureaucratic complex is deliberately encouraging extremism in an effort to extort more international support, manage domestic crises and to persist with their decades-old dreams of expanding influence in Afghanistan and Kashmir. The free rein for Jamia Hafsa’s vigilantes, for example, serves the regime’s purpose by taking attention away from the crisis generated by Musharraf’s suspension of the Supreme Court chief justice.

The fourth explanation is a hybrid of the second and the third. Pakistan’s rulers, it suggests, give priority to regime survival above long-term national strength. As long as Pakistan’s ruling elite presents itself as being between a rock and a hard place, the world will continue to bail it out. After all, no one wants a nuclear-armed state to fall under the control of the Taliban.

The official Pakistani explanation does not hold much water. If the aim of Musharraf’s policies is to weaken deep-rooted Islamist extremist groups then why are these groups gaining in strength instead of losing ground?

In principle it seems reasonable that the Pakistani state should avoid using extreme force against its own citizens. But such qualms have never held back the Pakistani state from killing Bengalis in erstwhile East Pakistan or Baloch and Sindhi dissidents.

As for the American account of ‘limited capacity’ of the Pakistani state, that is only partly true. Had Benazir Bhutto or Asif Ali Zardari been the ones hiding in Waziristan, instead of Afghan Taliban and al-Qaeda figures, I am quite certain that the Pakistani state would have found the means to deal with any armed supporters they might have had.

That leaves us with the harsh view that the generals like the chaos generated by Islamists and the explanation based on the Musharraf regime’s wrong priorities. There is enough evidence to demonstrate past collaboration between Pakistan military-intelligence apparatus and extremist Islamists to make the cynics seem plausible. On the other hand, if instead of being used as personal security guards for an unpopular ruler or rent-a-crowd tools at Musharraf’s rallies, Pakistan’s security forces were properly deployed they could, at least, protect Pakistan’s federal capital from Talibanisation.

The survival of Pakistan depends upon eliminating extremists. But the Pakistani establishment’s erroneous view that its survival in power is synonymous with Pakistan’s survival is pushing the country further to the brink. Regime survival requires manipulation or calibration of the extremists. Pakistan’s survival necessitates their containment or elimination.

Gulf News, April 11, 2007

Each time General Pervez Musharraf comes under pressure at home or abroad, his minions float rumours of an impending deal with opposition leader Benazir Bhutto. Musharraf’s emissaries fly to Dubai, meet Bhutto and then both sides deny that a deal is in the making.

Bhutto’s willingness to keep channels of communication open with all political forces in Pakistan is abused by the Musharraf regime to create the illusion of a deal without actually pursuing one.

Over the past few weeks, Musharraf emerged as an increasingly ineffective military ruler facing wide-spread resentment at home and growing international ridicule.

There is only one thing worse than a military strong running a country and that is a strongman who is clearly weak. Even Musharraf’s American armour has started to show some chinks.

As if to defuse the pressure, the rumour of a deal with Bhutto was spread. To make the rumours plausible, the government abolished the cell that was supposedly investigating the foreign assets and offshore bank accounts of some politicians, including Bhutto.

The impression was given that this was part of “confidence-building measures” preceding a Musharraf-Bhutto deal.
But the substantive issues such as guarantees for a free and fair election and the restoration of civilian rule were not addressed as they have remained unaddressed before.

A deal between Bhutto and Musharraf would suit the US and is supported by the liberal segment of Pakistan’s oligarchy. Bhutto would bring popular support for a power-sharing arrangement and could provide Pakistan’s army with an exit strategy.

Through a deal, Musharraf could phase himself out of power in a predictable and planned manner, avoiding uncertainties that have followed past military rulers in Pakistan’s history. What, then, prevents a deal?

Whether it is the handling of India and Afghan-istan or relations with the political opposition, Mush-arraf negotiates not for a deal but to buy time. Once the immediate crisis is over, he feels no need for a deal and the negotiation process falls by the wayside until the next major crisis.

Furthermore, Musharraf is willing to give immediate payoffs but is unwilling to bargain over the near-divine right of army chiefs to rule.

In case of negotiations with Bhutto, the two sides are far apart on fundamentals. Musharraf considers changes in his (and Pakistani intelligence machinery’s) relentless pursuit of Bhutto and her family as major concessions for which Bhutto should be grateful.

Negotiations

From Bhutto’s point of view, the cases against her constitute persecution and an end to persecution is the precondition for talks, not the desirable outcome. She wants negotiations to focus on political and constitutional matters, such as Musharraf’s uniform and guarantees for a free and fair poll.

The cases against Bhutto and her husband have lost their significance and, though still an inconvenience, do not have the same leverage they might have had a few years earlier. Fewer people believe in the validity of the charges, which have largely remained unproven after almost 11 years.

Former Philippines president Ferdinand Marcos was removed from office in 1986. The graft cases against him and his wife, Imelda, were wrapped up by 1993 – a total duration of seven years. The cases against the Marcoses still took no more than seven years to conclude.

In case of Bhutto and her husband, Asif Zardari, 11 years have passed since Bhutto’s removal from power in 1996 and not a single case has been finalised. Just as Musharraf and his military-intelligence machine use the rumours of a deal for advantage, the corruption cases too are proving to be illusory.

Why, under such circumstances, does Bhutto not agree to a grand alliance between Pakistan’s mainstream political parties, including the Islamist Mutahhida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) and use violent protests to oust Musharraf?

Bhutto has clearly been weighing the pros and cons of joining an agitation which runs the risk of being hijacked by the Islamists and their structured organisation. She has to take into consideration the network of Islamists within Pakistan’s military and intelligence services.

After all, liberal politicians (notably Air Marshal Asghar Khan) contributed strongly to the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) campaign of 1977 only to find General Zia ul Haq ready to take over and rule for 11 years with the help of the Islamists within the PNA.

Bhutto is ready to return to Pakistan and to lead the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) in a free and fair election. She is also clear that she wants to pave the way for the army’s withdrawal to the barracks and the emergence of a functioning democracy. She will not take hasty steps that might perpetuate Khaki shadows over Pakistan.

Indian Express, April 11, 2007

Each time General Pervez Musharraf comes under pressure at home or abroad, his minions float rumours of an impending deal with opposition leader Benazir Bhutto. Musharraf’s emissaries fly to Dubai, meet Bhutto, and then both sides deny that a deal is in the making.

Bhutto’s willingness to keep open channels of communication with all political forces in Pakistan is abused by the Musharraf regime to create the illusion of a deal without actually pursuing one.

Over the last few weeks, General Musharraf emerged as an increasingly ineffective military ruler facing widespread resentment at home and growing international ridicule. There is only one thing worse than a military strongman running a country and that is a strongman who is clearly weak. Even Musharraf’s American armour has started to show some chinks.

As if to defuse the pressure, the rumour of a deal with Bhutto was spread. To make the rumours plausible, the government abolished the cell that was supposedly investigating the foreign assets and offshore bank accounts of some politicians, including Bhutto. The impression was given that this was part of “confidence-building measures” preceding a Musharraf-Bhutto deal.

But the substantive issues such as guarantees for a free and fair election and the restoration of civilian rule were not addressed, as they have remained unaddressed before.

A deal between Bhutto and General Musharraf would suit the United States, and is supported by the liberal segment of Pakistan’s oligarchy. Bhutto would bring popular support for a power-sharing arrangement and could provide Pakistan’s army with an exit strategy. Through a deal, Musharraf could phase himself out of power in a predictable and planned manner, avoiding uncertainties that have followed past military rulers in Pakistan’s history. What, then, prevents a deal?

Whether it is the handling of India and Afghanistan or relations with the political opposition, Musharraf negotiates not for a deal but to buy time. Once the immediate crisis is over, he feels no need for a deal and the negotiation process falls by the wayside until the next major crisis. Furthermore, Musharraf is willing to give immediate payoffs but is unwilling to bargain over the near-divine right of army chiefs to rule.

In case of negotiations with Bhutto, the two sides are far apart on fundamentals. Musharraf considers changes in his (and the Pakistani intelligence machinery’s) relentless pursuit of Bhutto and her family as major concessions for which Bhutto should be grateful.

From Bhutto’s point of view, the cases against her constitute persecution and an end to persecution is the precondition for talks, not the desirable outcome. She wants negotiations to focus on political and constitutional matters, such as Musharraf’s uniform and guarantees for a free and fair poll. The cases against Bhutto and her husband have lost their significance and, though still an inconvenience, do not have the same leverage they might have had a few years earlier. Fewer people around the world believe in the validity of the charges, which have largely remained unproven after almost eleven years. Just as Musharraf and his military-intelligence machine use the rumours of a deal for advantage, the corruption cases too are proving to be illusory.

Why, under such circumstances, does Bhutto not agree to a grand alliance between Pakistan’s mainstream political parties, including the Islamist Mutahhida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) and use violent protests to oust Musharraf?

Bhutto has clearly been weighing the pros and cons of joining an agitation, which runs the risk of being hijacked by the Islamists and their structured organisation. She has to take into consideration the network of Islamists within Pakistan’s military and intelligence services.

After all, liberal politicians, notably Air Marshal Asghar Khan, contributed strongly to the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) campaign of 1977 only to find General Zia-ul Haq ready to take over and rule for eleven years with the help of the Islamists within the PNA.

Bhutto is ready to return to Pakistan and to lead the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) in a free and fair election. She is also clear that she wants to pave the way for the army’s withdrawal to the barracks and the emergence of a functioning democracy. She will not take hasty steps that might perpetuate khaki shadows over Pakistan.

Gulf News, April 4, 2007

The Pakistani media is clearly concerned about the expanding influence of the Taliban within the country. Hardline religious leaders and hundreds of male and female activists from Islamabad’s mad-rasas (religious schools) have challenged the writ of the state by forcing their brand of “Islamic justice” in the federal capital.

The Pakistani state, which is extremely competent at jailing elected leaders and putting supreme court chief justices under house arrest, has so far done little to check the vigilantism of the religious extremists.

Everyone knows that the Taliban are active in the tribal areas bordering Afghanistan where they behead alleged American spies and mete harsh punishments for “crimes” such as listening to music, watching television or shaving one’s beard while being an adult male. But the influence of the Taliban beyond the tribal areas was less known until recently.

Now the Taliban control significant parts of the settled areas of Northwest Frontier Province. They have enforced their rules in parts of Bannu, Hangu and Tank. Their recent actions in Islamabad should worry anyone concerned about Pakistan’s future as a viable and functional state.

In Islamabad, where hardly a leaf flutters without the knowledge of Pakistan’s ubiquitous intelligence services, Pakistani Taliban took hostage three women from a house allegedly for running a brothel. The students of Jamia Hafsa madrasa, encouraged by the radical Imam of Islamabad’s government-operated Lal Masjid, occupied a children’s library almost 60 days ago, which still remains under their control.

For the last six years, Pakistan’s President General Pervez Musharraf’s military regime has described the elimination of extremism as its raison d’etre. After large infusions of US and other economic and military assistance expressly for the purpose of promoting “enlightened moderation”, extremism is still rising in Pakistan and becoming far more threatening than before.

Deep roots

There are four possible explanations for the deteriorating situation in Pakistan. The first, given by Pakistani officials, is that religious extremism has deep roots in Pakistan and would take many years and a lot more US dollars to root out.

The second, offered by American officials (notably outgoing US ambassador Ryan Crocker) claims that the Pakistani government does not have the capacity to control the Taliban and their sympathisers in all parts of the country

The third, somewhat harsh, view is that Pakistan’s military-intelligence-bureaucratic complex is deliberately encouraging extremism in an effort to extort more international support, manage domestic crises and to persist with their decades old dreams of expanding influence in Afghanistan and Kashmir.

The free rein for Jamia Hafsa’s vigilantes, for example, serves the regime’s purpose by taking attention away from the crisis generated by Musharraf’s suspension of the Sup-reme Court Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Choudhary.

The fourth explanation is a hybrid of the second and the third. Pakistan’s rulers, it suggests, give priority to regime survival above long-term national strength. As long as Pakistan’s ruling elite presents itself as being between a rock and a hard place, the world will continue to bail it out. After all, no one wants a nuclear-armed state to fall under the control of the Taliban.

The official Pakistani explanation does not hold much water. If the aim of Musharraf’s policies is to weaken deep-rooted Islamist extremist groups then why are these groups gaining in strength instead of losing ground?

In principle it seems reasonable that the Pakistani state should avoid using extreme force against its own citizens. But such qualms have never held back the Pakistani state from killing Bengalis in erstwhile East Pakistan or Baloch and Sindhi dissidents.

As for the American account of “limited capacity” of the Pakistani state, that is only partly true. Had Benazir Bhutto or Asif Ali Zardari been the ones hiding in Waziristan, instead of Afghan Taliban and Al Qaida figures, I am quite certain that the Pakistani state would have found the means to deal with any armed supporters they might have had.

That leaves us with the harsh view that the generals like the chaos generated by Islamists and the explanation based on the Musharraf regime’s wrong priorities.

There is enough evidence to demonstrate past collaboration between the Pakistan military-intelligence apparatus and extremist Islamists to make the cynics seem plausible. On the other hand, if instead of being used as personal security guards for an unpopular ruler or rent-a-crowd tools at Musharraf’s rallies, Pakistan’s security forces were properly deployed they could, at least, protect Pakistan’s federal capital from Talibanisation.

The survival of Pakistan depends upon eliminating extremists. But the Pakistani establishment’s erroneous view that its survival in power is synonymous with Pakistan’s survival is pushing the country further to the brink. Regime survival requires manipulation or calibration of the extremists. Pakistan’s survival necessitates their containment or elimination.