A Window of Opportunity

Gulf News , January 15, 2005

The Palestinian National Authority (PNA) does not have sovereignty but as of January 9, it has something none of the other Arab states have: a democratically elected President chosen in a contested election.
Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas now has legitimacy in the eyes of the world and a mandate to represent his people in the peace process. Israel has welcomed his election. United States President George W. Bush has invited him for talks in Washington.

If a way can be found to assure terrorism-weary Israelis of their security and to guarantee dignity for Palestinians, we may soon see significant steps in the direction of resolving one of the most difficult conflicts in recent history.

The hopes generated by the presidential election in Palestine, however, could be dashed if Abbas reverts to appeasing Palestinian hardliners instead of controlling and marginalising them.

There would be no viable peace process also if Israeli leaders lapse into complacency, inspired by the belief that Israel does not need to make any concessions in view of its military superiority.

Israelis and Palestinians lead parallel lives. After several decades, it is clear that Israel cannot hope to “get rid” of the Palestinians. It must learn to live them.

The Palestinians, too, appear to be realising the futility of the rhetoric of eliminating Israel. But Israelis and Palestinians have shown pragmatism before only to revert to ideologically driven positions. One can only hope this time things are different.

I was a witness to the PNA’s historic presidential election as a member of the election observer mission organised by the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) and the Carter Centre.

The delegation was led by former US President Jimmy Carter, former Prime Minister of Sweden Carl Bildt and former Republican Governor of New Jersey and Administrator of the US Environmental Protection Agency, Christine Todd Whitman.

It included current and former legislators, former ambassadors, elections and human rights experts, civic leaders and regional specialists from 15 countries in Asia, Europe, Latin America, the Middle East, North Africa and North America.

The delegation visited the Occupied Territories from January 4-10 and deployed 80 observers to the West Bank, Gaza and eastern part of Occupied Jerusalem.

Major accomplishment

According to the preliminary statement by the delegation, “The January 9 Palestinian presidential election was a major accomplishment.

The election was contested vigorously and administered fairly. Election day was orderly and generally peaceful … The successful organisation of this election demonstrates the potential for the start of a new era in Palestinian politics and the development of representative and accountable governance”.

International observers monitoring the election noted six positive developments during the election process: a generally peaceful process, even though there were serious concerns beforehand that violence could disrupt the election; a mostly orderly election administration conducted by dedicated and professional officials; large numbers of Palestinians who came out to cast their votes; the significant presence of political party and candidate agents, as well as non-partisan domestic election observers, adding transparency to the process; the large role played by women in the election process as electoral officials, party and candidate agents, non-partisan observers and voters; and the easing of travel through check points by Israeli authorities to facilitate freedom of movement and election day processes.

The problems with the electoral process that caught the observers’ attention included the large percentage of registered voters whose names did not appear on the appropriate voter list at post offices designated for voting in Occupied Jerusalem; certain last-minute changes by the Central Election Commission (CEC) to conditions and hours for voting were implemented in ways that caused confusion; reliance on two separate voter lists, with separate voting places based on them, caused confusion and opened potential for abuse; and scattered incidents of intimidation and harassment by some Fatah activists.

As some commentators (and rulers in the Muslim world) do not tire of pointing out, democracy is not just about having an election. A free, fair and contested election reflects the will of the people for democracy.

As the NDI and Carter Centre observers pointed out in their post-election statement, “Having successfully conducted this presidential election, there are now opportunities to advance positive developments in a broader context necessary for peace and prosperity … They must quickly move to prepare for the next round of municipal and legislative elections, which are scheduled within the next six months.

Palestinians also should enhance efforts to ensure public order and to curtail violence. It is important that the Palestinian President and his designated Prime Minister establish an effective working relationship.”

The Palestinian election provides a window of opportunity for building an Arab democracy. In the words of international observers, “Palestinians will require continued support from the international community and will need to build upon the Palestinian-Israeli cooperation in election planning that took place in this election period”.

Democracy As Stage Set for Soldiers

Indian Express, January 10, 2005

Professional soldiers are usually proud of their military uniform. Coup-makers, however, cease to be proud soldiers. They are reduced to the status of second-rate politicians using the might and credibility of the military as a substitute for popular support in their quest to maintain power. The military uniform for coup makers is a source of power and no longer a source of soldierly pride. Perhaps that is the reason why General Pervez Musharraf did not wear his General’s uniform while announcing to the Pakistani nation his decision to remain in uniform while remaining Pakistan’s unelected president.
General Musharraf’s decision was a breach of promise on his part. To secure parliament’s approval of his arbitrary constitutional amendments he had promised to give up his military uniform by December 31, 2004. But Pakistan’s military rulers have never fulfilled their promises of turning the reins of power over to civilians and General Musharraf clearly did not want to depart from that tradition. The General’s arguments for breaking his promise were also familiar. He considers himself indispensable for the country. His becoming a ‘‘mere’’ civilian president would somehow weaken the process of normalisation of relations with India and undermine Pakistan’s fight against terrorism and religious extremism.

Before going back on his promise, the General and his civilian apologists tried to mend fences with opposition political parties with gestures such as the release of PPP leader Benazir Bhutto’s husband, Asif Ali Zardari. This process of undoing injustices towards the opposition was officially described as an attempt at national reconciliation. But restoring certain citizens’ rights can hardly be considered a concession to the opposition. The real concessions that General Musharraf needs to make are in the political arena. As long as he holds the somewhat arrogant belief that he is indispensable for the country, General Musharraf is unlikely to make any substantive political concessions.

Given its turbulent political history, Pakistan definitely needs a period of healing national divisions. Polarisation between political forces has already diminished considerably as most politicians have realised the need to approach politics with the ethic of sport rather than the attitude of war. But national reconciliation in Pakistan cannot take place until the country’s military-intelligence establishment also ends its ‘‘war’’ against popular politicians. In any case, there can be no reconciliation until Pakistan’s generals consider it their right to give the nation its marching orders. National reconciliation requires admission of mistakes by the establishment as much as recognition of the errors of politicians. Unless Pakistan’s establishment is prepared to acknowledge the errors of its own self-righteous ways, it should not expect the stability that comes from reconciliation.

When India’s former prime minister Narasimha Rao died recently, he received a ceremonial burial accorded to all deceased elected Indian prime ministers. It did not seem to make a difference that Rao had been indicted on corruption charges and convicted by a lower court, awaiting judgement by the superior judiciary at the time of his demise. The last time a Pakistani prime minister received a ceremonial state funeral was in 1951, following the assassination of Pakistan’s first prime minister Liaquat Ali Khan. Since then Pakistan’s leading politicians have been dismissed from office and jailed or, in the case of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, executed after a dubious trial. The only Pakistani rulers to receive state funerals since 1951 have been army generals. In fact, the army has been generous to accord full honors even to officers who did not acquit themselves honorably. The names of generals involved in the East Pakistan debacle come to mind. There is clearly a case here of institutional conceit. ‘The generals are good even when they do wrong. The civilians, on the other hand, can do no right.’ National reconciliation does not take place when such superciliousness defines the attitude of one party in the process.

To set the process of national reconciliation in motion, the Pakistani state needs to offer apologies to every politician, journalist and citizen it has periodically arrested for political reasons, some times on trumped-up or exaggerated charges. Then the past can be buried with the same ceremonial honors the Pakistani military has conferred on each of its generals, including those whose conduct was far from honourable. Will Pakistan’s military accept responsibility for any of the excesses committed in Balochistan under Field Marshal Ayub Khan, in erstwhile East Pakistan under General Yahya Khan, and in Sindh and against the PPP under General Ziaul Haq? And will General Musharraf concede that combining the offices of army chief and President is a reflection of the Pakistan army’s unfortunate tradition of placing generals on a pedestal above the nation’s civilians?

Sorry seems to be the hardest word

Gulf News, January 5, 2005

Professional soldiers are usually proud of their military uniform. Coup makers, however, cease to be proud soldiers. They are reduced to the status of second rate politicians using the might and credibility of the military as a substitute for popular support in their quest to maintain power. The military uniform for coup makers is a source of power and no longer a source of soldierly pride. Perhaps that is the reason why General Pervez Musharraf did not wear his general’s uniform while announcing to the Pakistani nation his decision to stay in uniform while continuing as Pakistan’s unelected president.
Musharraf’s decision was a breach of promise on his part. To secure parliament’s approval for his arbitrary constitutional amendments, he had promised to give up his military uniform by December 31, 2004.

Pakistan’s military rulers have never fulfilled their promises of turning the reins of power over to civilians and Musharraf clearly did not want to depart from that tradition.

The general’s arguments for breaking his promise were also familiar. He considers himself indispensable for the country. His becoming a “mere” civilian president would somehow weaken the process of normalisation of relations with India and undermine Pakistan’s fight against terrorism and religious extremism.

Before going back on his promise, he and his civilian apologists tried to mend fences with opposition political parties with gestures such as the release of Pakistan People’s Party leader Benazir Bhutto’s husband, Asif Ali Zardari. This process of undoing injustices towards the opposition was officially described as an attempt at national reconciliation.

Restoring certain citizens’ rights can hardly be considered a concession to the opposition. The real concessions that Musharraf needs to make are in the political arena. As long as he holds the somewhat arrogant belief that he is indispensable for the country, Musharraf is unlikely to make any substantive political concessions.

Given its turbulent political history, Pakistan definitely needs a period of healing national divisions. Polarisation between political forces has already diminished considerably as most politicians have realised the need to approach politics with the ethic of sport rather than the attitude of war.

National reconciliation in Pakistan cannot take place until the country’s military-intelligence establishment also ends its “war” against popular politicians. In any case, there can be no reconciliation until Pakistan’s generals consider it their right to give the nation its marching orders.

Admit mistakes

National reconciliation requires admission of mistakes by the establishment as much as recognition of the errors of politicians. Unless Pakistan’s establishment is prepared to acknowledge the errors of its own self-righteous ways, it should not expect the stability that comes from reconciliation.

Several nations with a history of political intervention by permanent institutions of state have adopted the path of national reconciliation in recent years. In each case, the state apparatus the military or the intelligence services admitted to their violations of individual liberties and constitutional arrangements before the nation could march in a new direction.

Consider the example of Chile, where General Augusto Pinochet and the military intervened in 1973 and rewrote the constitution to provide for “democracy” guided by the military.

Chile’s Congress is in the process of implementing a constitutional reform plan that will expand civilian authority and reduce the military’s ability to interfere in governing the country.

Among other items, the package restores the elected president’s power to fire military commanders and eliminates appointive senate seats for former military commanders.

The Chilean constitutional plan is the result of an agreement between the socialist-led coalition now in office and the right-wing opposition, both of whom were bitter enemies in the past.

While the two major political forces reconciled to each other, the Chilean military, too, acknowledged that it had inflicted pain on the nation’s body politic. An official commission was set up to hear the testimonies of 35,000 political detainees from the era of military rule.

The commission concluded that torture was a habitual practice of the armed forces and police throughout the period of military rule.

Current military officers were frustrated by having to face blame for events that happened under a different leadership. But the Chilean armed forces accepted institutional responsibility.

General Juan Emilio Cheyre, the army commander, admitted the army’s responsibility for “morally unacceptable” practices followed by similar statements by the Chilean police and air force. Last October, Zambia apologised to its founding president Kenneth Kaunda for detaining him in 1997 on what were acknowledged to be trumped-up treason charges. Kaunda had been detained for six months in 1997 on charges that he had conspired with 69 army officers and soldiers to topple ex-ruler Frederick Chiluba who ousted Kaunda in Zambia’s 1991 multi-party elections.

Take a leaf from Zambia

Reuters quoted Zambia’s solicitor-general as saying: “The state has conveyed its sincere and unreserved apology to the first president of Zambia, Dr Kaunda, on his arrest and detention by servants or agents of the state on allegations of treason.”

The solicitor-general maintained that Kaunda was subjected to “inhuman treatment without a fair trial”.

The head of Zambia’s human rights commission said the state apology was a “befitting gesture to Kaunda for the injustice he suffered”.

Kaunda reportedly accepted the apology to pave the way for national reconciliation.

To set the process of national reconciliation in motion, the Pakistani state needs to offer apologies to every politician, journalist and citizen it has periodically arrested for political reasons, sometimes on trumped up or exaggerated charges. Then the past can be buried with the same ceremonial honours the Pakistani military has conferred on each of its generals, including those whose conduct was far from honourable.