Monthly Archives: April 2005

Indian Express, April 30, 2005

The much hyped trip by General Pervez Musharraf to India has brought fresh promises of ‘‘confidence building measures’’ between India and Pakistan. But in substantive terms, the India-Pakistan peace process cannot become irreversible just with a joint declaration declaring it so.
The New York Times began its report about the weekend Mush-Man summit began with the words, ‘‘A cricket match brought them together. But it was talk of trade, peace and a gas pipeline that dominated the diplomatic spectacle here.’’ “But the same paper had reported on December 29, 1988 of India and Pakistan’s chance to ‘‘open a new era in relations.’’ The occasion was the summit meeting between Benazir Bhutto and Rajiv Gandhi.

Vajpayee travelled to Lahore by bus in February 1999. ‘‘The journey of an Indian PM to Pakistan is rare and remarkable,’’ editorialised the Los Angeles Times on February 23, 1999. But the expectation of media optimists that Vajpayee’s bus diplomacy will ‘‘reduce the chance of war’’ was proven wrong on the freezing mountain tops of Kargil.

Each time, Pakistan’s leader of the moment was projected as the right man to make peace: ‘‘Benazir and Rajiv are both not poisoned by the bitterness of partition.’’ ‘‘Nawaz Sharif is a Punjabi and therefore can deliver the support of Pakistan’s Punjabis for a deal with India.’’ ‘‘General Musharraf commands the army and he can swing it in favour of peace.’’ But for peace between India and Pakistan to materialise, the domestic influence of the constituencies for hostility in each nation must be kept in check. All previous peace processes faltered because both sides saw their thaw as an opportunity to strengthen their hand over Kashmir. India assumed that it did not need to go beyond friendly gestures because the status quo in Kashmir suits it. The prospect of US economic and military aid raised Pakistani expectations of overcoming their asymmetry in power with India.

Deep down, Pakistan’s generals expect an American role in getting them a territorial settlement in Kashmir. Moreover, the ascendancy of the Pakistani military in internal decision-making militates against early normalisation of relations with India. Musharraf wants to keep the spectre of an Islamist Pakistan alive to secure western assistance. Last week, Pakistani authorities cracked down on the secular Pakistan Peoples Party, resulting in the arrest of several hundred party activists, to prevent a PPP rally even though fundamentalists from the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal have been allowed to hold rallies.

What, then, can India and the international community (especially US) do to engage Pakistan more fruitfully and permanently in the peace process? They should work towards changing Pakistan’s internal power structure, weakening the military-intelligence combine and gradually empowering civil society. Then, Pakistan’s insecurities vis-a-vis its identity and territorial integrity must be comprehensively addressed. India would have to take an interest in Pakistan’s stability and prosperity rather than being seen as Pakistan’s rival or enemy.

That might be a longer-term recipe than periodic high profile summit meetings and declarations of peaceful intentions. But that is the more likely path to durable peace between India and Pakistan.

Gulf News, April 24, 2005

Why did Lieutenant General Safdar Hussain, Commander of the Pakistani forces in the North West Frontier Province, react so strongly to comments by American Lieutenant General David Barno that Pakistan was about to launch an anti-terrorist operation along its border with Afghanistan?

According to media reports, Lt Gen Hussain described his American counterpart’s comments as “highly irresponsible”.

According to Lt Gen Hussain, Lt Gen Barno “should not have made that statement. It was a figment of his imagination. There is no bloody operation going on until we have the right intelligence”.

Since the day Pakistan chose to become an American ally in the war against Al Qaida, it has been assumed that the two sides share intelligence and quite often plan operations together. But Pakistani generals are highly sensitive about what appears in the press even though in practice they are known to concede the right of making important decisions to the more powerful partner in their alliance, the United States.

The spat between Lt Gen Barno and Lt Gen Hussain tells us something about the relationship of generals in the two countries, the United States and Pakistan, to their respective public. Lt Gen Barno commands the troops of a democracy, where officials are answerable to the people and their elected representatives. He deems it necessary to speak to journalists and while he probably spins every now and then, he is expected to reveal at least part of the truth most of the time.

Lt Gen Hussain, on the other hands, has reached the second highest rank in an army that is used to holding civilians accountable but which considers itself answerable to no one. He talks to the press only to tell them what he thinks and if he does not want something to be revealed he can warn reporters that they should not report it “in the national interest”.
Pakistan’s history is replete with instances where the Pakistani people learnt about what was happening in their own country through the foreign media. The surrender of Pakistani forces in erstwhile East Pakistan is one example. The facts of what happened in Kargil are another.

In all likelihood, Lt Gen Barno did not shoot off his mouth. He just made public something Lt Gen Hussain and his superiors did not want the Pakistani people to know. There have been many instances when the Pakistani military has kept its cooperation with the United States hidden from the nation, albeit “in the national interest”.

Secret base

Does anyone remember that Pakistan hosted a secret US base near Peshawar during the 1950s and 1960s for spying missions against the Soviet Union? The Pakistani people only found out about that base after one of the American pilots taking off from there, the now famous Gary Powers, was shown on Russian television after his plane crashed over Soviet territory.

Lt Gen Tommy Franks, the Commander of US Central Command during the Afghan war of 2001, published his memoirs not long ago. In that book titled American Soldier, General Franks writes of his efforts to forge strategic ties with Pakistan’s President General Pervez Musharraf. For Lt Gen Franks, dealing with General Musharraf was a soldier-to-soldier matter. “His military needed help; so did we. Maybe we could make a deal,” Franks believed.

American generals and their Pakistani counterparts both make military to military deals. It is just that the Pakistani generals like to keep their end of the bargain secret whereas the Americans have no such compunction. General Franks tells of basing Combat Search and Rescue missions in Quetta and Dalbandin during the war in Afghanistan and says, “Musharraf had also agreed to a detailed list of 74 basing and staging activities to be conducted in Pakistan, from Combat Search and Rescue, to refuelling and operating communications relay sites, to establishing a medical evacuation point near the Afghan border.

“In return Musharraf requested that the campaign plan not involve the Indian Government or the Indian military, especially in any way that would put Pakistani forces in Pakistani air or sea space. He also asked that the Coalition not ‘advertise’ Indian political involvement, which would inflame sensitivities in Pakistan.”

Franks reveals that Musharraf first mentioned to him the possibility of Osama Bin Laden being in Tora Bora and said that his intelligence officers would know if Bin Laden crossed into Pakistan. But the most important revelation in Franks’ memoirs relates to a purported agreement about hot pursuit.

“And he confirmed our earlier agreement about incursions by Coalition forces over the ill-defined border into Pakistan when ‘in hot pursuit’ of Taliban and Al Qaida. ‘Your troops are very discreet’, he commented, ‘I know they will be discreet’.”

Lt Gen Hussain’s anger with Lt Gen Barno seems to be about not maintaining that discretion. But as an ordinary Pakistani, I am grateful to Lt. Gen Franks and Lt Gen Barno for occasionally informing us hapless 150 million citizens what is transpiring in, or along the borders of, our beloved country. If our rulers insist on keeping secrets from us, let our rulers’ allies tell us the truth.

Gulf News, April 20, 2005

The much hyped trip by General Pervez Musharraf to India has brought fresh promises of “confidence building measures” between India and Pakistan.

A look at previous joint statements by leaders of the two countries, however, reveals a pattern of similar commitments. The India-Pakistan peace process cannot become irreversible just with a joint statement declaring it so.

The colourful spectacle of a Pakistani military ruler at a shrine in India or an Indian prime minister travelling by bus to Pakistan makes a positive picture.

The New York Times began its report about the weekend Mush-Man summit with the words, “A cricket match brought them together. But it was talk of trade, peace and a gas pipeline that dominated the diplomatic spectacle here over the weekend as the Pakistani leader met his Indian counterpart amid signs of reconciliation between the nuclear-armed rivals of South Asia.”

But the same paper had reported on February 22, 1987 that “President Mohammad Zia ul Haq of Pakistan and Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi of India conferred at dinner this evening and expressed satisfaction at the way they had defused a crisis over troop buildups on their border last month.”

Wire service reports on that occasion spoke of “The Indian subcontinent’s passion for cricket” while the Los Angeles Times quoted General Zia ul Haq as “laughing and joking” and saying that “he came to India ‘to see a good game of cricket’.”

Then on December 29, 1988 the New York Times once again spoke of India and Pakistan’s chance to “open a new era in relations”.

The occasion was the summit meeting between Benazir Bhutto, newly elected prime minister of Pakistan and Indian leader Rajiv Gandhi.

“Ms Bhutto’s election victory in November boosted Pakistan’s morale and raised hopes that the two youthful leaders Mr Gandhi is 44 years old and Ms Bhutto is 35 will be able to bury the bitter past and start over.”

Bhutto and Rajiv Gandhi discussed “several confidence-building agreements” and agreed to a process of dialogue.

The process ran aground with the uprising in Indian-controlled Jammu and Kashmir, which India suppressed with force and Pakistan transformed into jihadist terrorism.

Bhutto was ousted from office amid accusations of being soft on India and credibility in Pakistan’s domestic politics came to be defined in terms of adopting a hard line over Jammu and Kashmir.

Proven wrong

That supposedly changed after the South Asian neighbours tested nuclear weapons in 1998 and Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee travelled to Lahore by bus in February 1999.

But the expectation of media optimists that Vajpayee’s bus diplomacy will “reduce the chance of war” was proven wrong on the freezing mountain tops of Kargil. For peace between India and Pakistan to materialise, the domestic influence of the constituencies for hostility in each nation must be kept in check.

As in the past, Pakistan is undertaking the peace process with India under American nudging. For its part, India joined previous attempts at peace because it was unwilling to antagonise the United States.

But deep down, Pakistan’s generals expect an American role in getting them a territorial settlement in Kashmir. US military support leads Islamabad to over-estimate its power potential, which in turn makes it difficult for its military leaders to seek a realistic role for Pakistan in South Asia.

Moreover, the ascendancy of the Pakistani military in internal decision-making militates against early normalisation of relations with India. General Pervez Musharraf’s regime draws its power from the military, which in turn derives legitimacy from being able to defend Pakistan against India.

It is because of this dynamic that Musharraf continues to raise expectations within Pakistan of a solution to the Kashmir issue and keeps alive the hopes of extremist Islamists and covert operations personnel.

Notwithstanding his rhetoric of “enlightened moderation” it is clear that Musharraf’s regime wants to keep the spectre of an Islamist Pakistan alive to secure Western assistance.

Last week, Pakistani authorities cracked down on the secular Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), resulting in the arrest of several hundred party activists, to prevent a PPP rally even though fundamentalists from the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) have been allowed to hold rallies.

While the PPP members were being arrested, the government was releasing MMA activists who had violently broken up a mixed male-female sporting event a few days earlier.

Colourful gestures

The contrived strength of the MMA would allow the Pakistani military and intelligence apparatus to slow down or even derail the India-Pakistan peace process once it sees benefits in confrontation again.

Until then Musharraf will carry on the colourful gestures of peace more or less the same way as several of his predecessors have done over the years.

A more fruitful and permanent peace process would be possible if the international community works towards changing Pakistan’s internal power structure, weakening the military-intelligence combine and gradually empowering Pakistani civil society.

Then, Pakistan’s insecurities vis-à-vis its identity and territorial integrity must be comprehensively addressed. India would have to take an interest in Pakistan’s stability and prosperity rather than being seen as Pakistan’s rival or enemy.

Gulf News , April 6, 2005

General Pervez Musharraf has declared that extremism is the biggest challenge being faced by Pakistan. Pakistan’s “development and dignity in the comity of nations” is threatened by extremism, he told the Balochistan cabinet last week.

If that is the case, one may well ask why is official Pakistan celebrating the US decision to sell F-16 fighter jets as a boon to national security? Should Pakistan not focus on building democracy and reorienting its national discourse to marginalise extremists who have an exaggerated view of Islam and Pakistan’s role in the world? What good would the “offensive punch” that the F-16s are supposed to bring to Pakistan’s air defence do in battling extremism?

It is a good thing that the architect of Kargil now recognises that “war is not a solution to any problem”. There is, however, no connection between General Musharraf’s diagnosis of what ails Pakistan and the prescription he offers.

What is often described by the Musharraf regime now as extremism was, until 9/11, described by the government as jihad for Pakistan’s national survival. The goals that fuelled the jihad settlement of the Kashmir dispute on terms favourable to Pakistan and competition with India may have been deferred or supplemented by new slogans of enlightened moderation. But the Pakistani state’s national objectives have not been replaced by more realistic ones like prosperity for Pakistan’s people and their inclusion in the country’s governance.

The Musharraf regime continues to raise expectations within Pakistan of a solution to the Kashmir issue though there appears little realistic prospect of that happening in the near future.

A few months ago, Musharraf fanned the flames of rhetoric over Kashmir by telling a garrison durbar in Quetta: “We will not give up Kashmir; we have fought wars over it”. Even in his latest speech in the same city he insisted that Kashmir was “the core issue” between India and Pakistan.

There is no doubt that Pakistanis have strong feelings over Jammu and Kashmir, which would have been included in Pakistan in accordance with the logic of partition. But 58 years after partition, and in the absence of any incentive or compulsion on the part of India to revise the status quo, it might be prudent for Pakistanis to give priority to normalisation and stability in South Asia over settlement of the Kashmir dispute.

To make that possible, the rhetoric fed to Pakistanis over Kashmir must end. Musharraf too should try to lower the rhetoric over Kashmir rather than raise his people’s expectations in that regard.

Most disturbing

The most disturbing aspect of Pakistan’s current engagement with the United States, including the F-16 deal, is that it reinforces the traditional pattern of the US-Pakistan-India triangle.

In pursuit of a short-term quid pro quo, the United States believes it is stabilising Pakistan by lending support to its military regime albeit dressed up as transition to democracy.

The Americans also see themselves as encouraging dialogue and facilitating peace between India and Pakistan. But Washington satisfies neither side by its “strategy” of treating them equally. Deep down, Pakistan’s generals expect an American role in getting them a territorial settlement in Kashmir. American military sales encourage Pakistan’s military to believe they can qualitatively keep up with India, thereby postponing India-Pakistan normalisation.

The real reason for the United States selling F-16s to Pakistan (and offering them to India as well) may have been to keep Lockheed Martin’s Fort Worth plant in Texas operational after the US Air Force and Navy stopped ordering F-16s. But Pakistani strategists consider the F-16 sale as a signal of American acknowledgement of Pakistan’s strategic value to the US Central Command.

The prospect of the United States’s partnership and the feeling that Pakistan has a special place in American grand strategy has consistently encouraged Pakistani military planners to think like a Middle Eastern country rather than a South Asian one. Illusory US military support leads Islamabad to overestimate its power potential, which in turn makes it difficult for its military leaders to seek a realistic role for Pakistan in South Asia.

India and Pakistan are going through a choreographed peace process, which is hardly different from a similar course adopted in the past.

India is convinced, with good reason, that it should be a global and not a South Asian player and it is unlikely to spoil its relations with the United States over Pakistan.

But given Pakistan’s internal contradictions, the fragility of its relationship with the United States and the military and economic disparity between India and Pakistan, there is hardly any incentive for India to make significant concessions to Pakistan.

America could help stabilise South Asia in the long term by persuading India to concede something substantial to Pakistan, which at present appears unlikely.

Alternatively, the United States could encourage Pakistan to accept India’s pre-eminence in South Asia.

Neither objective is served by Washington’s decision to sell F-16s to Pakistan and offers of similar or better weapons systems to India.

Gulf News, April 6, 2005

General Pervez Musharraf has declared that extremism is the biggest challenge being faced by Pakistan. Pakistan’s “development and dignity in the comity of nations” is threatened by extremism, he told the Balochistan cabinet last week.

If that is the case, one may well ask why is official Pakistan celebrating the US decision to sell F-16 fighter jets as a boon to national security? Should Pakistan not focus on building democracy and reorienting its national discourse to marginalise extremists who have an exaggerated view of Islam and Pakistan’s role in the world? What good would the “offensive punch” that the F-16s are supposed to bring to Pakistan’s air defence do in battling extremism?

It is a good thing that the architect of Kargil now recognises that “war is not a solution to any problem”. There is, however, no connection between General Musharraf’s diagnosis of what ails Pakistan and the prescription he offers.

What is often described by the Musharraf regime now as extremism was, until 9/11, described by the government as jihad for Pakistan’s national survival. The goals that fuelled the jihad settlement of the Kashmir dispute on terms favourable to Pakistan and competition with India may have been deferred or supplemented by new slogans of enlightened moderation. But the Pakistani state’s national objectives have not been replaced by more realistic ones like prosperity for Pakistan’s people and their inclusion in the country’s governance.

The Musharraf regime continues to raise expectations within Pakistan of a solution to the Kashmir issue though there appears little realistic prospect of that happening in the near future.

A few months ago, Musharraf fanned the flames of rhetoric over Kashmir by telling a garrison durbar in Quetta: “We will not give up Kashmir; we have fought wars over it”. Even in his latest speech in the same city he insisted that Kashmir was “the core issue” between India and Pakistan.

There is no doubt that Pakistanis have strong feelings over Jammu and Kashmir, which would have been included in Pakistan in accordance with the logic of partition. But 58 years after partition, and in the absence of any incentive or compulsion on the part of India to revise the status quo, it might be prudent for Pakistanis to give priority to normalisation and stability in South Asia over settlement of the Kashmir dispute.

To make that possible, the rhetoric fed to Pakistanis over Kashmir must end. Musharraf too should try to lower the rhetoric over Kashmir rather than raise his people’s expectations in that regard.

Most disturbing

The most disturbing aspect of Pakistan’s current engagement with the United States, including the F-16 deal, is that it reinforces the traditional pattern of the US-Pakistan-India triangle.

In pursuit of a short-term quid pro quo, the United States believes it is stabilising Pakistan by lending support to its military regime albeit dressed up as transition to democracy.

The Americans also see themselves as encouraging dialogue and facilitating peace between India and Pakistan. But Washington satisfies neither side by its “strategy” of treating them equally. Deep down, Pakistan’s generals expect an American role in getting them a territorial settlement in Kashmir. American military sales encourage Pakistan’s military to believe they can qualitatively keep up with India, thereby postponing India-Pakistan normalisation.

The real reason for the United States selling F-16s to Pakistan (and offering them to India as well) may have been to keep Lockheed Martin’s Fort Worth plant in Texas operational after the US Air Force and Navy stopped ordering F-16s. But Pakistani strategists consider the F-16 sale as a signal of American acknowledgement of Pakistan’s strategic value to the US Central Command.

The prospect of the United States’s partnership and the feeling that Pakistan has a special place in American grand strategy has consistently encouraged Pakistani military planners to think like a Middle Eastern country rather than a South Asian one.

Illusory US military support leads Islamabad to overestimate its power potential, which in turn makes it difficult for its military leaders to seek a realistic role for Pakistan in South Asia.

India and Pakistan are going through a choreographed peace process, which is hardly different from a similar course adopted in the past.

India is convinced, with good reason, that it should be a global and not a South Asian player and it is unlikely to spoil its relations with the United States over Pakistan.

But given Pakistan’s internal contradictions, the fragility of its relationship with the United States and the military and economic disparity between India and Pakistan, there is hardly any incentive for India to make significant concessions to Pakistan.

America could help stabilise South Asia in the long term by persuading India to concede something substantial to Pakistan, which at present appears unlikely.

Alternatively, the United States could encourage Pakistan to accept India’s pre-eminence in South Asia.

Neither objective is served by Washington’s decision to sell F-16s to Pakistan and offers of similar or better weapons systems to India.