Monthly Archives: January 2008

Most heads of state paint a positive picture of their nation. During his recent tour of Europe, General (retired) Pervez Musharraf did the exact opposite. According to him, Pakistan’s people are “ill disciplined”, “tribal” and “feudal”, and certainly not ready for modern democracy. Pakistan’s politicians, in his view, are “corrupt”.

Its Supreme Court judges are “politicised”, “inept”, “corrupt” and “nepotistic”. Its most respected media personalities are “undermining our forces and [their] own country”. Pakistan’s religious leaders, we have repeatedly been told, are “extremists”.

The impact of Musharraf’s assertions was reflected in the question posed to me by a European intellectual in the Conference Centre Lounge of the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland. “When he has so much contempt for his own nation why does Musharraf want to lead it?” he wondered.

Before arriving in Davos, Musharraf gave a longish speech in Brussels during which he argued that Pakistan should not be judged by European standards of human rights.

He pleaded with members of the European Parliament to have “more patience” with his unique brand of constitution-suspending “democracy”.

Musharraf’s exact words were, “We are for democracy and I have introduced the essence of democracy, but we cannot be as forward looking as you are [in the West]. Allow us some time to reach that state.”

Describing the West’s concern with democracy in developing countries as an “obsession”, he said, “You have taken centuries to reach where you have come. Allow us time for going for the value that you have reached for yourself.”

The problem with that line of reasoning is that it raises questions about Pakistan’s preparedness for modernity.

Problem

If Pakistan is modern enough to be a nuclear weapons power and an attractive destination for foreign investment, why does it have a problem embracing modern democracy?

If it needs time to be “forward looking” then why should the backwardness apply selectively to human rights and democracy and not to the other characteristics of being a modern power?

Apart from muddying the waters about the prospect of human rights and democracy in Pakistan, Musharraf also confused interviewers and audiences about Pakistan’s priorities in the war against terrorism.

He told his audience at the French Institute for International Relations that it is more important for Pakistani troops to be on the Afghan border to root out the Taliban than search for Al Qaida leaders.

The problem is many Westerners remember that from 2002 onwards Musharraf’s line used to be “We are going after Al Qaida but the Taliban are not such a priority.” His latest U-turn is bound to result in many new research papers and articles in days to come.

Musharraf should not have wasted time touring European capitals to try and convince Western governments of Pakistan’s stability and his own good intentions. He should, instead, have faced the evaporation of support for his authoritarian regime at home.

His trip has helped project Pakistan as a troubled country and his own attitude during that trip has not helped his own battered image.

A simple browsing of all the interviews Musharraf gave during this trip reveals an unwillingness to make adjustments or acknowledge mistakes.

Demonstrations

Similarly, there would have been less embarrassment for the government if handfuls of Musharraf supporters had not been asked to face much larger demonstrations by his critics.

On occasion of Musharraf’s meeting with British Prime Minister Gordon Brown at No. 10 Downing Street, the media reported that 30 pro-Musharraf demonstrators showed up with his portraits to face several hundred opponents.

The one is to ten ratio of supporters to opponents in Londonistan exposed Musharraf’s lack of support in Pakistan even further.

The article was published in Gulf News on January 30, 2008

Most heads of state paint a positive picture of their nation. During his recent tour of Europe, General (retired) Pervez Musharraf did the exact opposite. According to him, Pakistan’s people are “ill disciplined,” “tribal” and “feudal,” and certainly not ready for modern democracy. Pakistan’s politicians, in his view, are “corrupt.”

Its Supreme Court judges are “politicised,” “inept,” “corrupt,” and “nepotistic.” Its most respected media personalities are “undermining our forces and [their] own country.” Pakistan’s religious leaders, we have repeatedly been told, are “extremists.”

The impact of Musharraf’s assertions was reflected in the question posed to me by a European intellectual in the Conference Centre Lounge of the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland. “When he has so much contempt for his own nation why does Musharraf want to lead it?” he wondered.

Before arriving in Davos, Musharraf gave a longish speech in Brussels during which he argued that Pakistan should not be judged by European standards of human rights. He pleaded with members of the European Parliament to have “more patience” with his unique brand of constitution-suspending “democracy.” Musharraf’s exact words were, “We are for democracy and I have introduced the essence of democracy, but we cannot be as forward looking as you are [in the West]. Allow us some time to reach that state.”

Describing the West’s concern with democracy in the third world as an “obsession,” he said, “You have taken centuries to reach where you have come. Allow us time for going for the value that you have reached for yourself.”

The problem with that line of reasoning is that it raises questions about Pakistan’s preparedness for modernity. If Pakistan is modern enough to be a nuclear weapons power and an attractive destination for foreign investment, why does it have a problem embracing modern democracy? If it needs time to be “forward looking” then why should the backwardness apply selectively to human rights and democracy and not to the other characteristics of being a modern power?

Apart from muddying the waters about the prospect of human rights and democracy in Pakistan, Musharraf also confused interviewers and audiences about Pakistan’s priorities in the war against terrorism. He told his audience at the French Institute for International Relations that it is more important for his Pakistani troops on the Afghan border to root out the Taliban than searching for Al-Qaeda leaders.

The problem is many westerners remember that from 2002 onwards, Musharraf’s line used to be “We are going after Al-Qaeda but the Taliban are not such a priority.” His latest U-turn is bound to result in many new research papers and articles in days to come.

Musharraf should not have wasted time touring European capitals to try and convince western governments of Pakistan’s stability and his own good intentions. He should, instead, have faced the evaporation of support for his authoritarian regime at home. His trip has helped project Pakistan as a troubled country and his own attitude during that trip has not helped his own battered image.

A simple browsing of all the interviews Musharraf gave during this trip reveals an unwillingness to make adjustments or acknowledge mistakes.
He told one interviewer that he would leave power when he is convinced that the people of Pakistan want him to quit. But it would only be his “feeling”, not the results of an election or opinion poll that would determine when the people no longer support him. Such reasoning might have impressed Musharraf’s own entourage, it only attracted sighs or giggles from outsiders.

When Nik Gowing of BBC World TV asked him about the statement by 100 retired senior military officers demanding his resignation, Musharraf’s response was that only 10 people had signed the statement. This made him appear like a ruler out of touch with reality. His description of the statement’s signatories as “insignificant personalities” some of whom had “served under me and I kicked them out” showed him to be arrogant. The dignified response from Musharraf to a statement by senior retired military men would have been silence.

On the occasion of Musharraf’s meeting with British Prime Minister Gordon Brown at 10 Downing Street, the media reported that 30 pro-Musharraf demonstrators showed up with his portraits to face several hundred opponents.

The one is to 10 ratio of supporters to opponents in Londonistan exposed Musharraf’s lack of support in Pakistan even further.

The article appeared in Indian Express, on January 30, 2008

The first opinion poll, conducted by Gallup after the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, showed that nearly half of the sample suspected government agencies (23 per cent) and government allied politicians (25 per cent) of killing Bhutto.

Seventeen per cent suspected Al Qaida or the Taliban, while 16 per cent suspected external forces — principally the United States (12 per cent) and India (4 per cent).

The poll raised a fundamental question. If so many people mistrust their own government, how can that government be an effective partner to the US in fighting terrorism and winning hearts and minds against Jihadists?

The suspicions of the Pakistanis about their government can’t be good news for those in the Bush administration who still consider Pervez Musharraf their best bet for keeping Pakistan stable.

For their part, Musharraf and his Western backers offer a simplified thumbnail history lesson that paints Pakistan as a tribal and feudal backwater that can only be held together through military rule.

According to this account of Pakistan’s history and politics, as recounted by retired Colonel Ralph Peters of the US military, “From its founding, Pakistan has been plagued by cults of personality, by personal, feudal loyalties that stymied the development of healthy government institutions (provoking coups by a disgusted military)”.

Thus, Bhutto’s loss is not huge for Pakistan from the point of view of those who think only of managing Pakistan — under military rule and with Western support.

But Pakistan is not a company to be managed. It is a nation that must be united and that is where politicians such as Benazir Bhutto came in.

With Bhutto gone, Pakistan’s faultlines are looking more exposed than ever.

Musharraf, who knows little about winning hearts and minds, and sees politics as an inconvenience in his “sound” administrative approach, is only aggravating Pakistan’s divisions.

He just does not have the healing touch that Pakistan needs. For example, he could end the controversy over who killed Bhutto by accepting an international investigation without any limitations.

His refusal is keeping rumours alive and, as a consequence, the gulf between the government and the people is widening.

Pakistan’s problem has not been the paucity of good civilian leaders. Pakistani politicians are flawed, but so are politicians all over the world.

Pakistan’s problem is the complicated relationship between politicians who cannot be wished away, a military that has a strongly politicised component and successive US governments that seem to prefer military-intelligence control for strategic reasons than to allow the normal functioning of a constitutional democracy.

Created in a hurry under difficult circumstances at the end of the British departure from India, Pakistan inherited a larger army than it resources allowed to maintain.

In the eyes of some, conflict with India necessitated the retention of that army.

Britain and the US were lured to support the military because of strategic concerns during the Cold War. Pakistan became a strategic rentier — a country living off international (mainly American) subsidies.

It remains so under Musharraf though with diminishing internal strength.

The transactional relationship between Pakistan’s military and the United States that Musharraf’s rule has accentuated started soon after Pakistan’s independence — primarily at the initiative of the military leadership.

Pakistan’s military served as an ally in America’s fight du jour (the Cold War, the anti-Soviet Jihad in Afghanistan and now the war against terror) in return for large amounts of aid.

Since 1954, the US has given Pakistan about $21 billion in aid, of which $17.7 billion was given under military rule and only $3.4 billion to elected governments.

In the course of all this, Pakistan also developed its capacity (including nuclear weapons) to compete with India.

But the army could not rule unless it had a fig leaf of domestic legitimacy. For that, it turned to Islam and, at one point, radical Islam.

This is where the Bhutto family comes in. Benazir Bhutto’s father, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, was the first Pakistani leader to call for an end to military rule.

His slogan “Bread, clothing, shelter” resonated with the unwashed masses. His Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) became the country’s largest political movement.

The military could not keep him out of power, especially after Pakistan’s disastrous defeat in the 1971 war with India.
While Bhutto Sr. got power, he did not have full control.

The army, and its intelligence services, continued to conspire against him. He made his share of mistakes, but then, which politician doesn’t?

In 1977, he was removed from power in a military coup and sent to the gallows. Benazir Bhutto, who had never desired a political career, stepped into his shoes.

The struggle against military domination of Pakistan’s politics continued.

Cutout saviours

One third of Pakistan’s 160 million people live below poverty and another one-third are considered vulnerable to poverty.

These people loved Bhutto — both father and daughter — because they symbolised their hope of inclusion in the State of Pakistan instead of being marginalised from it.

The views of Musharraf’s supporters have been shaped by a small clique of international diplomats, parachute journalists and elite Pakistanis.

These people have always liked Pakistan’s generals better than politicians.

Third World dictators have often benefited from “playing” people in the US by painting their own societies as inherently dangerous and themselves as the only people who can save a particular country for the United States.

But now concerns about Musharraf being able to continue his difficult juggling act are making even his supporters somewhat jittery.

Contrary to the view of some in the US, Pakistan’s Islamist problem is a creation of its intelligence service, the ISI.

Like India, Pakistan could also have developed a moderate, democratic state if politicised generals (such as Musharraf) had not wanted to sideline politicians and rally the nation under their command.

The political generals’ refusal to submit to civilian control has resulted in a policy paradigm in which the US is the source of military hardware, India is the eternal enemy and Islam is the national unifier and ideological motivator.

Coup makers’ excuse

Opposite Pakistan’s politicised generals (distinct from professional soldiers who want to defend the country as well as its constitution) are the country’s politicians, often feudal or from the business community.

They would run the country a bit like the US was run in the 19th century or Italy for many years after the Second World War — through compromises among competing factions.

There is corruption under both but in case of the civilians, corruption is invoked as an excuse by coup-makers to thwart the constitutional order.

Politicians are never flawless. To many Pakistanis, and people everywhere, the alleged flaws of popular leaders are just the cost of the business of politics and democracy.

That realisation appears to have dawned on most officers of the Pakistan military.

The new Chief of Army Staff, General Ashfaq Kayani, is responding to the national mood by calling for the military’s withdrawal from politics.

The only remaining question is: at what point does the military withdraw support from Musharraf, who, after all, is now only a widely discredited, faltering politician and not the army chief.

The Bush administration would most likely continue supporting Musharraf a little longer but if, as seems likely, Musharraf’s domestic credibility hits such new lows that he cannot sustain himself in power, Washington’s withdrawal of backing would also follow.

Of course, Musharraf has an honourable way out but he seems disinclined to take it.

He could agree to a transparent international investigation of the Bhutto murder, remove his cronies from top positions as intelligence chiefs and ensure that the February 18 election is totally above board.

Then he could negotiate with Pakistan’s elected leadership and save Pakistan prolonged crisis.

The two leading political figures in post-Bhutto Pakistan — PPP Co-Chairman Asif Zardari and PML-N leader Nawaz Sharif — have both shown remarkable maturity in their words and deeds since Bhutto’s tragic assassination.

If only Musharraf could also rise to the occasion.

Article published in Gulf News on January 17, 2008

Pakistan is a nation in need of healing. The last one year has highlighted the many fissures that have festered below the surface for years. Unity of command, so effective in running a disciplined force like a military unit, has ended up dividing the Pakistani nation.

The first opinion poll, conducted by Gallup, after the assassination of Benazir Bhutto showed that nearly half of the sample suspected government agencies (23 per cent) and government allied politicians (25 per cent) of killing Bhutto.

The response to such widespread mistrust of the government is not dismissive statements by the country’s rulers. A serious effort is now needed to bridge the gap between Pakistan’s state and society.

General (retired) Pervez Musharraf has repeatedly shown that he lacks the ability to heal. He could end the controversy about Bhutto’s death by accepting an international inquiry. But Musharraf thinks like an administrator and insists that since he, as boss, knows there is nothing wrong therefore there is no need for a wider investigation.

At a time when the new army chief, General Ashfaq Kayani, is trying to restore harmony between the army and the people it is imperative that the perception of the military favouring or opposing any political faction or leader is completely erased.

The Citizens Group on Electoral Process (CGEP), in its recent report, has termed the pre-poll electoral process in Pakistan highly unfair, giving it a score of 26 on a scale of 100 in respect of overall fairness of the pre-poll environment spanning over 12 months.

Not free

The judiciary is not free to pronounce on the fairness or otherwise of the election. When Musharraf alone is the decider of what the people want, how will the people ever be able to tell him that they no longer want him?

The thoughtful US politician, Senator Joseph Lieberman, understood the problem with the election process in one visit to Pakistan, something Musharraf is unable to do after running the country for eight years.

Lieberman said, “Opposition parties have little trust the polls will be fair… If there are some bases after the elections for concluding that they were not fair and credible, the consequences, I fear here in Pakistan, will be more division and not the unity that the country needs at this critical moment in its history, facing a serious external threat, now increasing, from Al Qaida.”

A politician would know when some of his staff and officials have become a liability for him. But Musharraf insists on retaining intelligence operatives who are widely despised by the opposition and who are only exacerbating hatred against the government. The political role of intelligence services must end immediately. Pakistan is not a company to be managed. It is a nation that must be brought together.

The need of the hour is a “grand national compromise” that brings to an end the vilification and demonisation of some politicians, restores the military’s prestige and ends its political role, limits the intelligence agencies to external security functions and results in a government that unites the Pakistani nation against terrorism and disintegration.

Musharraf can become part of the Grand National Compromise, salvage some respect, and voluntarily give up on issues relating to a free and fair election. Or he could remain the major wound that must be dealt with before the healing of Pakistan can begin.

The article was published in Gulf Newson January 16, 2008

Pakistan is in need of healing. The last one year has highlighted the many fissures that have festered below the surface for years. Unity of command, so effective in running a disciplined force like a military unit, has ended up dividing the Pakistani nation.

The first opinion poll, conducted by Gallup, after the assassination of Benazir Bhutto showed that nearly half of the sample suspected government agencies (23 per cent) and government allied politicians (25 per cent) of killing her.

The response to such widespread mistrust of the government is not dismissive statements by the country’s rulers. A serious effort is now needed to bridge the gap between Pakistan’s state and society.

Pervez Musharraf has repeatedly shown that he lacks the ability to heal. He could end the controversy about Bhutto’s death by accepting an international inquiry. After all, if the government has nothing to hide why take refuge behind technicalities in clearing up the matter? But Musharraf thinks like an administrator and insists that since he, as boss, knows there is nothing wrong, there is no need for a wider investigation. The government has also limited the scope of the Scotland Yard investigation, which would only keep the controversy and the suspicions stemming from it alive.

Pakistan’s armed forces, once beloved of the people, have suffered a loss of reputation because of their being mired in politics by people like Musharraf. At a time when the new army chief, General Ashfaq Kayani, is trying to restore harmony between the army and the people it is imperative that the perception of the military favouring or opposing any political faction or leader is completely erased.

Musharraf’s lack of healing ability has become obvious in several other self-serving statements. He says he would step down if the people wanted him to quit but he refuses to identify the method whereby the people’s wishes would be determined.

He does not accept opinion polls that show 67 per cent Pakistanis wanting him out. In the civilised world, a free and fair election is the only way to find out what the people want. Musharraf refuses to concede a free election. The Citizens Group on Electoral Process (CGEP), in its recent report, has termed the pre-poll electoral process in Pakistan highly unfair, giving it a score of 26 on a scale of 100 in respect of overall fairness of the pre-poll environment spanning over 12 months.

The judiciary is not free to pronounce on the fairness or otherwise of the election. When Musharraf alone can decide what the people want, how will the people ever be able to tell him that they no longer want him?

The thoughtful US politician, Senator Joseph Lieberman, understood the problem with the election process in one visit to Pakistan, something Musharraf is unable to do after running the country for eight years. Lieberman said, “Opposition parties have little trust the polls will be fair. If there are some bases after the elections for concluding that they were not fair and credible, the consequences, I fear here in Pakistan, will be more division and not the unity that the country needs at this critical moment in its history, facing a serious external threat, now increasing, from Al Qaeda.”

A politician would know when some of his staff and officials have become a liability for him. But Musharraf insists on retaining intelligence operatives who are widely despised by the opposition and who are only exacerbating hatred against the government. Some members of Pakistan’s intelligence services have tortured, blackmailed, pressured or undermined too many civilian politicians, journalists and civil society activists to be credible any more as protectors of the state. The political role of intelligence services must end immediately.

Pakistan is not a company to be managed. It is a nation that must be brought together. Politicians alone can manage popular sentiment as PPP co-chairman Asif Zardari recently demonstrated when his comments about the federation, the military and Punjab calmed down an outraged Sindhi and Baloch population.

The need of the hour is a ‘grand national compromise’ that brings to an end the vilification and demonisation of some politicians, restores the military’s prestige and ends its political role, limits the intelligence agencies to external security functions and results in a government that unites the Pakistani nation against terrorism and disintegration.

Politicians and the permanent state apparatus must become partners, bringing to an end the subordinate relationship that the Musharraf-bred system has created with electable politicians. Pakistan must be run according to its constitution. An independent judiciary and a free media should be the guardians against abuse of power by elected officials.

Musharraf can become part of the grand national compromise, salvage some respect, and voluntarily give in on issues relating to a free and fair election. Or he could remain the major wound that must be dealt with before the healing of Pakistan can begin.

Article was published in Indian Express on January 16, 2008

Pakistan’s embattled President Pervez Musharraf is touring European capitals to try and convince Western governments of the country’s stability, and his own good intentions. He should instead face the evaporation of support for his authoritarian regime at home.

Opinion polls show that 68% of Pakistanis want Mr. Musharraf to step down immediately. While he was in Davos, Switzerland, this week for the World Economic Forum, 100 retired senior military officers signed a statement in Pakistan describing him as an embarrassment to the powerful military that has so far been his power base. Western governments should no longer accept Mr. Musharraf’s sales pitch that he is a valuable ally in the war against terrorism. A ruler widely hated by his own people is unlikely to be effective in defeating the expanding insurgency waged by al Qaeda’s Taliban allies.

Pakistanis are increasingly uniting in their disapproval of Mr. Musharraf, and of the civil-military oligarchy he represents. The first opinion poll after Benazir Bhutto’s murder showed that nearly half of the sample suspected government agencies and government-allied politicians of killing the opposition leader. Mr. Musharraf’s unpopular domestic policies helped al Qaeda get a free pass in an assassination widely mourned throughout the country.

Mr. Musharraf must recognize the widening gulf between state and society, and address its ramifications. If he does not, his Western backers, especially British Prime Minister Gordon Brown (whom he meets on Monday) and President George W. Bush, must make him realize that his policies are undermining the war against terror.

Mr. Musharraf could end the controversy about Ms. Bhutto’s death by accepting an international inquiry under the aegis of the U.N., as demanded by Pakistan’s opposition as well as several U.S. senators from both parties. But he insists that as long as he knows the truth, there is no need for an independent investigation.

Yesterday, Mr. Musharraf told the BBC that he would leave power when he is convinced the people of Pakistan want him to quit. But it would only be based on his “feeling” and personal knowledge, not the results of an election, opinion poll or any other mechanism that would determine when the people no longer support him.

Pakistan’s armed forces have suffered a loss of reputation because Mr. Musharraf mired them in politics. In an attempt to forestall an expected electoral victory by Ms. Bhutto’s Pakistan Peoples Party in polls scheduled for Feb. 18, Mr. Musharraf recently claimed that Ms. Bhutto was very unpopular with the military. The new army chief, Gen. Ashfaq Kayani, says he wants to restore harmony between the army and the people. But Mr. Musharraf is making his task difficult by creating the perception of the military favoring or opposing a specific political faction or leader.

Mr. Musharraf wants the world to simply take his word that the polls would be free and transparent. But in a recent report, the independent Pakistani Citizens Group on Electoral Process has termed the pre-poll electoral process in Pakistan highly unfair, giving it a score of 26 on a scale of 100 for overall fairness of the pre-poll environment spanning the previous 12 months. The U.S. National Democratic Institute and the International Republican Institute, as well as the European International Crisis Group, have also identified several factors they say make honest elections unlikely. Since Mr. Musharraf’s decision to “fire” senior Supreme Court judges, the judiciary is not free to pronounce on the fairness of the election.

Mr. Musharraf rules with the help of intelligence services that have a track record of supporting extremist jihadists. The security apparatus has also tortured, blackmailed, pressured or undermined too many civilian politicians, journalists and civil society activists to be a credible protector of the state. Most Pakistanis now know about the covert machinations of an all-powerful intelligence community, which fixes elections, divides parties and buys off politicians at will.

Pakistan needs a compromise that will stop the demonization of politicians by the military, restore the military’s prestige and end its political role, limit the intelligence agencies to external security functions, and form a government that unites the Pakistani nation against terrorism and disintegration. Only a Pakistan that is run according to its constitution would have non-violent means of resolving its many disputes. An independent judiciary and a free media would then be the guardians against abuse of power by elected officials. A free and fair election, open to international observers and conducted by an independent election commission, could be a remedy for Pakistan’s domestic conflict.

Mr. Musharraf can become part of this compromise, salvage some respect, and agree to a free and fair election. Or he could remain the major wound that must be dealt with before Pakistan’s healing can begin.

Mr. Haqqani, professor of international relations at Boston University, was co-chair of the Hudson Institute’s Project on Islam and Democracy and author of “Pakistan Between Mosque and Military,” (Carnegie Endowment, 2005). He was an adviser to Benazir Bhutto

Article was published in Wall Street Journal on January 25, 2008

Asked by a journalist if he had “blood on his hands,” Pakistan’s President Pervez Musharraf said last week that it was “below my dignity” but his family background, beliefs and values were enough to prove that he was not involved in anyone’s murder. He may well be right.

People should have turned against Al Qaida and the extremist militants after the assassination of Benazir Bhutto. But instead there was a wave of anger and rage against the government. No ruler should ever have to answer the question whether he has blood on his hands.

The very fact that the question was even asked shows the depths to which the credibility of the present government has sunk. Pakistan’s rulers need to focus on mending their relationship with the people of Pakistan.

There is no doubt that there were many lapses in security arrangements for the slain popular opposition leader. The lapses that followed the assassination were even worse.

Scotland Yard sleuths have now been brought in to conduct an investigation but forensic evidence that might have helped crack the mystery was washed out within hours of the incident.

Scotland Yard has had no major successes in resolving the numerous politically significant murder mysteries in Pakistan’s chequered history.

When Bhutto brought in Scotland Yard detectives to help with the Murtaza Bhutto murder in 1996, it was expected that the impartial investigation would bring to an end finger-pointing and suspicion.

But Bhutto’s government was dismissed in November 1996 and the day after the dismissal the Scotland Yard team was sent back to London without completing its inquiry or publishing a report.

What could have been the purpose of shutting down the Scotland Yard probe except to keep alive allegations aimed at the destruction of the reputation of Asif Ali Zardari and splitting the Bhutto family?

This time, too, the forensic evidence is gone before Scotland Yard could investigate. Musharraf says that the decision to hose down the scene of the attack manifested “incompetence” resulting from a desire to keep the place clean.

The US Assistant Secretary of State, Richard Boucher, always eager to harmonise his words with those of Pakistan’s ruling oligarchy, concurred. At a briefing for journalists he was asked if the government was not involved, why it washed away all the evidence.

Boucher said, “I have no idea but based on what I’ve heard from other incidents that seems to be standard practice, unfortunately.”

A little research, however, shows that it is neither standard practice to immediately wash out the site of a terrorist act nor is the “incompetence” of the type seen in Karachi on October 18 (after the first attempt on Bhutto’s life) or in Rawalpindi on December 27 after Bhutto’s murder commonplace.

Secured the area

In fact, in all media reports tracked down by this columnist relating to earlier assassination attempts on high value Pakistani targets it is clearly stated that the police secured the area and collected DNA and other forensic evidence right after the attack.

A few days before the brutal assassination of Bhutto, former Interior Minister Aftab Sherpao was targeted by a suicide bomber during Eid prayers on December 21.

Wire services reported, “The worshippers rushed dozens of injured to a hospital while police sealed off the area and began gathering evidence.” Quite clearly the authorities in Charsadda are more competent than the ones in Karachi and Rawalpindi where Bhutto was the target.

On July 31, 2004, “prime minister” Shaukat Aziz escaped an assassination attempt while on an election campaign. The suicide bomb attack was staged in Fatah Jang, a small town in northern Punjab, where he was contesting a by-election. At least six people, including Aziz’s driver, were killed and 45 injured.

News reports at the time quoted a senior police official as saying that “Aziz was in the car which had just started moving slowly amid a tight security cordon when the car driven by suicide attacker detonated”. One could only wonder where the “tight security cordon” disappeared when Bhutto faced her attacker.

Other important assassination attempts were directed at Musharraf on December 14 and December 25, 2003, both in Rawalpindi. The fact that attackers could twice get so close to the heavily guarded leader raised serious concerns about Musharraf’s security.

“There has been a security lapse,” said Information Minister Shaikh Rashid Ahmad. The attack sites were secured on both occasions.

The purpose of pointing out this historic record is not to further inflame passions that have erupted since Bhutto’s assassination.

It is to point out to Pakistan’s arrogant establishment that its credibility problem is deeply rooted and is of its own making. If they really want to set things right, forget about clever statements and smart TV interviews. Repair the damage by facing and telling the truth.

The article was published in Gulf News on Jan 9, 2008

Asked by a journalist if he had “blood on his hands,” General Pervez Musharraf said last week that it was “below my dignity” to reply, but his family background, beliefs and values were enough to prove that he was not involved in anyone’s murder. He may well be right.

People should have turned against the Al Qaeda and the extremist militants after the assassination of Benazir Bhutto. Instead, there was a wave of anger against the government. No ruler should ever have to answer the question whether or not he has blood on his hands.

The very fact that the question was even asked shows the depths to which the credibility of the present government has sunk. Pakistan’s rulers need to focus on mending their relationship with the people of Pakistan.

There is no doubt that there were many lapses in security arrangements for the slain popular opposition leader. The lapses that followed the assassination were even worse. Scotland Yard sleuths have now been brought in to conduct an investigation but forensic evidence that might have helped crack the mystery was washed out within hours of the incident.

Scotland Yard has had no major successes in resolving the numerous politically significant murder mysteries in Pakistan’s chequered history. When Bhutto brought in Scotland Yard detectives to help with the Murtaza Bhutto murder in 1996, it was expected that the impartial investigation would bring the finger-pointing and suspicion to an end. But Ms Bhutto’s government was dismissed in November 1996 and the day after the dismissal the Scotland Yard team was sent back to London without completing its inquiry or publishing a report.

What could have been the purpose of shutting down the Scotland Yard probe except to keep alive allegations aimed at the destruction of the reputation of Asif Ali Zardari and splitting the Bhutto family?

This time, too, the forensic evidence is gone before Scotland Yard could investigate. General Musharraf says that the decision to hose down the scene of the attack manifested “incompetence,” resulting from a desire to keep the place clean.

The US Assistant Secretary of State, Richard Boucher, always eager to harmonise his words with those of Pakistan’s ruling oligarchy, concurred. At a briefing for journalists he was asked why the government washed away all the evidence if it was not involved. Boucher said, “I have no idea but based on what I’ve heard from other incidents that seems to be standard practice, unfortunately.”

A little research, however, shows that it is neither standard practice to immediately wash out the site of a terrorist act nor is the ‘incompetence’ of the type seen in Karachi on October 18 (after the first attempt on Bhutto’s life) or in Rawalpindi on December 27 after her murder commonplace.

In fact, in all media reports tracked down by this columnist relating to earlier assassination attempts on high value Pakistani targets it is clearly stated that the police secured the area and collected DNA and other forensic evidence right after the attack.

A few days before the brutal assassination of Benazir Bhutto, former Interior Minister Aftab Sherpao was targeted by a suicide bomber during Eid prayers on December 21, 2007. Wire services reported, “The worshippers rushed dozens of injured to a hospital while police sealed off the area and began gathering evidence.” Quite clearly the authorities in Charsadda are more competent than the ones in Karachi and Rawalpindi where Bhutto was the target.

On July 31, 2004, ‘prime minister’ Shaukat Aziz escaped an assassination attempt while on an election campaign. The suicide bomb attack was staged in Fatah Jang, a small town in northern Punjab, where he was contesting a by-election. At least six people, including Aziz’s driver, were killed and 45 injured.

News reports at the time quoted a senior police official as saying that “Aziz was in the car which had just started moving slowly amid a tight security cordon when the car driven by a suicide attacker detonated.” One could only wonder where the “tight security cordon” disappeared to when Benazir Bhutto faced her deadly attacker.

Other important assassination attempts were directed at General Musharraf on December 14 and December 25, 2003, both in Rawalpindi. The fact that attackers could twice get so close to the heavily guarded leader raised serious concerns about Musharraf’s security. “There has been a security lapse,” said Information Minister Sheikh Rashid Ahmed. The attack sites were secured on both occasions. DNA evidence was recovered.

The purpose of pointing out this record is not to further inflame passions that have erupted since Benazir Bhutto’s assassination. It is to point out to Pakistan’s arrogant establishment that its credibility problem is deeply rooted and is of its own making. If it really wants to set things right, forget about clever statements and smart TV interviews. Repair the damage by facing and telling the truth.

The article was published in Indian Express on January 9, 2008

Benazir Bhutto, the outstanding icon of Pakistan’s struggle for democracy, is gone. For those who only saw her as a distant political figure, her human dimension clearly did not matter. That applies to those who vilified her throughout her life, those who failed to protect her and those who actually killed her. But for everyone whose life she touched, her humanity transcended the politics.

I was among those who got to know Benazir Bhutto, the person — a daughter scarred by the assassination of her father, a sister injured by the killing of her brothers, a wife hurt by the disparagement and imprisonment without conviction of her husband, and a mother who was robbed of the opportunity to see her children grow into adulthood. With all the verbal and physical abuse hurled at her, she remained amazingly loving. Her loss is a personal loss to me and millions of others who admired her. Her assassination also creates serious challenges for the integrity and future of Pakistan.

Although many outsiders and most elite Pakistanis may not support the Pakistan Peoples Party’s decision to elect Benazir Bhutto’s son Bilawal Bhutto Zardari and husband Asif Ali Zardari as co-chairs of the party, this decision is absolutely the right one in the context of the PPP’s populist tradition. It will be welcomed by the majority of the party’s supporters — underprivileged Pakistanis who recognise the party as one that has consistently fought for the democratic rights of every Pakistani citizen.

Some view the Bhutto legacy as a thorn in Pakistan’s history. To the family’s supporters, the Bhutto name does not imply a dynasty. It means far more — a wealthy family that has stood up for the poor; that focuses on economic improvements through education and infrastructure rather than on religious dogma; a family that calls for democracy instead of seeking to protect its privileges by aligning itself with military dictatorship. The Bhuttos have not been perfect, as critics remind us on a regular basis but they have stood ready to integrate the largely moderate Pakistan into the world.

This visceral association with the Bhutto family and the PPP of millions of Pakistanis is not easily understood by those who do not take into account the value of sentiments in political choices. Drew Weston’s book, The Political Brain: The Role of Emotion in deciding the fate of the Nation demonstrates that Pakistan is not the only country where feelings influence political choices.

What Pakistan needs most right now is stability and a bringing together of a fractured nation. As the largest party in Pakistan, the PPP will play a critical role in stabilising Pakistan’s currently chaotic situation. While it may sound absurd to a western ear, the 19-year-old Bilawal and his father can bring this stability.

The PPP already has more support in Pakistan than any other faction. Benazir Bhutto’s tragic assassination has enhanced the aura of martyrdom that initially came with the execution of the PPP’s founder, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, at the hands of Islamist military dictator General Zia-ul-Haq. For the party to continue its success for the people of Pakistan, it is imperative that it win a majority of the votes in the upcoming election. Given the party’s legacy, party unity can best be maintained and votes garnered under the leadership of the Bhutto/Zardari family. Any other leader could have been a brilliant administrator or politician but none commands the same popularity and recognition as the family members of a martyr.

Although Bilawal has four years to go before graduating from Oxford University, Pakistan will benefit from young political leadership. Today’s younger generation has been disillusioned by politics. Bilawal can help spark a renewed faith in Pakistani politics in today’s younger generation — just the way Robert F. Kennedy did in the US, or Rahul Gandhi and Jyotiraditya Scindia are doing in India.

Now that the PPP and PML-N have agreed to participate in the polls, parliamentary elections scheduled for January 8 should not be delayed. The plans for poll rigging already in place for the benefit of the King’s Party, PML-Q, should be shelved to ensure that a rigged poll does not become the instigator of a new round of street violence. Musharraf has ruled alone for long enough. He should not put the country’s stability and prosperity in jeopardy by continuing with the political juggling that has kept him strong so far while making Pakistan weak.

There is no way the PPP will now lose the election, given the strong sympathy wave resulting from Mohtarma’s assassination. It led in the opinion polls, followed by Sharif’s PML-N even before the tragic episode. Cooperation between PML-N and the PPP, as well as other opposition parties, offers an opportunity to turn national sorrow into national unity. The establishment could hold on to power by use of force but that would only harm an already brittle nation further.

Indian Express , January 2, 2008