Meddling neighbors in a war of words

Gulf News, December 21, 2006

Amidst spiralling violence in Kabul and the Afghan countryside, Afghan President Hamid Karzai has stepped up his criticism of Pakistan’s role in supporting the resurgent Taliban.

“Pakistan hopes to make slaves out of us, but we will not surrender,” Karzai told schoolboys last week. Three days earlier, a tearful Karzai had grieved over Afghan children being killed by Nato and US bombs and by “terrorists” from Pakistan.

In frequent media interviews, General Pervez Musharraf recounts the ways he has assisted the United States in the war against terrorism and insists that the Afghans should “avoid the blame game” and work with Pakistan in dealing with a shared problem.

Pakistani officials list Karzai’s weaknesses, which they say are the real cause of Afghanistan’s current security problems.

It is true that Pakistan cannot fully control its complex 1,125 mile (1,810 kilometres) border with Afghanistan, where the international community and the national government have both made a series of mistakes.

Karzai’s patronage politics has kept Afghan warlords in business and his reliance on secular westernised Pashtuns has antagonised the more religiously oriented Afghans.

Afghanistan’s current political structure is far from fully inclusive and the country is plagued with corruption and governance problems. But it is also a fact that there is no insurgency in Afghanistan’s Northern provinces, which face the same problems of governance that affect the eastern and southern provinces adjoining Pakistan.

Despite the weakness of their state, the Afghans have a strong sense of nationalism and under normal circumstances they would have resolved their grievances against Kabul without suicide bombings and terrorist attacks.

The international and Pakistani media has run credible reports of Pakistani authorities’ tolerance and in some cases active support for its former Taliban protégés.

Pakistan’s powerful security services, notably the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), never liked the idea of removing the Taliban from power in the first place. Instead of ensuring a friendly government in Kabul by working with whoever is in power there, the ISI has long been wedded to the idea of installing its clients and allies as Afghanistan’s rulers.

Unfortunately, the Pakistani security establishment has repeatedly chosen extremists unacceptable to the international community for that role, including Gulbeddin Hekmatyar and the Taliban.

In the aftermath of 9/11, Pakistan became a reluctant US ally and the ISI has taken some action against Al Qaida. But notwithstanding recent official protestations to the contrary, Pakistan has done little to fight the Afghan Taliban.

Rooted in history

Pakistan’s interest in Afghanistan is rooted in history. The Pakistan-Afghanistan border was demarcated in 1893 as the frontier of the British Raj in India. After independence in 1947, Pakistani leaders had assumed that Pakistan would inherit the functions of India’s British government in guiding Afghanistan’s foreign policy.

But Afghanistan responded to the emergence of Pakistan by voting against Pakistan’s admission to the United Nations. It argued that the treaty that demarcated Afghanistan’s current border with Pakistan was no longer valid because a new country had been created where none existed at the time the treaty was signed under British coercion.

Since then, Pakistan’s establishment says it is fearful of Afghan officials collaborating with India in squeezing Pakistan through a pincer movement.

A lot has changed in Afghanistan’s attitude towards Pakistan and none of Afghanistan’s current leaders espouse anti-Pakistan views of the Kabul regimes of the 1950s, 60s and 70s. It is now Pakistan’s turn to review its security concerns and change the prism through which it views Afghanistan.

The establishment’s near obsession with extending Pakistan’s influence into Afghanistan has already lost Pakistan the good will generated by support of Afghan refugees and Mujahideen during their anti-Soviet struggle.

Since the fall of the pro-communist Kabul regime in 1992, Pakistan’s intelligence community has adopted the attitude of British officers of the 19th century when Britain and Russia competed for influence in Central Asia in the “Great Game” of espionage and proxy wars.
Karzai was obviously referring to this attitude in his remarks about Pakistan’s desire to enslave Afghanistan though he could have used more temperate language.

Many in Pakistan’s security establishment do not consider the Taliban as enemies and US officials are simply bluffing themselves by failing to see that reality.

The result is the creeping Talibanisation in NWFP and the tribal areas, which does not augur well for Pakistan. It is further evidence that intervention in Afghanistan is more likely to weaken Pakistan instead of strengthening its security.

It is time for the Pakistani establishment to give up ideas evolved during the British Raj and the Cold War. Pakistan should befriend Karzai to secure its northwest flank instead of yet another risky adventure involving militancy and terrorism.

The international community, too, must persuade Musharraf ensure the stability of both Pakistan and Afghanistan by disengaging from the folly of seeking “strategic depth” through dangerous proxies such as the Taliban.

Generally Talkative

Indian Express, December 16, 2006

PAKISTAN government spokespersons have made it clear that General Pervez Musharraf was not making a unilateral offer when he told NDTV that Pakistan would give up its claim on Kashmir if India, too, agreed to self-governance in the region.

An interview to an Indian TV channel would have been the wrong venue for announcing the most significant shift in Pakistani foreign policy in 58 years. Moreover, Pakistan does not have “a claim” on Jammu & Kashmir that can be unilaterally given up by a Pakistani ruler.

Since 2001, Musharraf has “misspoken” far too many times. He has given divergent and confusing statements about where Osama bin Laden might be after becoming the toast of the international circuit as the man who might deliver Osama bin Laden to the US after September 11, 2001. A book can be compiled on Musharraf’s contradictory statements on domestic issues.

On more than one occasion, Musharraf has described Kashmir as the most important issue for Pakistan. Considering he attaches greater importance to Kashmir than to democracy or human development, one expects Musharraf to at least know Pakistan’s position on Kashmir well.

By saying what he said to NDTV, Musharraf seems to be suggesting that the Kashmir dispute is now a matter to be resolved between India and Pakistan, and for his part Musharraf is willing to “give up” the Pakistani “claim”. The international community has no role in resolving the Kashmir issue, if it is a bilateral matter between India and Pakistan, and as far as the Kashmiri people are concerned, they can negotiate with India. That is what India has argued for years.

That runs contrary to Pakistan’s official position on Kashmir that it is the unfinished business of Partition. Pakistan’s entire stand has been based on the argument that the Kashmiri people have not yet exercised their right of self-determination in accordance with UN resolutions. Pakistan has consistently questioned the accession of J&K to India as unlawful.

If the issue is the Kashmiris’ right of self-determination, Pakistan has no claim to give up. If, on the other hand, the UN resolutions are no longer relevant, then India can negotiate self-determination with the Kashmiri people in territories under its control and Pakistan ought to do the same. There is no locus standi left for Pakistan in the matter in relation to Indian-controlled parts of Jammu and Kashmir.

The latest Musharraf comments, which outright reject Kashmiri independence, are close to accepting the de facto division of Kashmir but fall short of accepting the Line of Control as the border between Pakistan and India.

The problem is, Musharraf lacks the authority to solve the Kashmir question but insists on continuously talking about Kashmir, as if to justify his status as army chief and absolute ruler.

Musharraf has misspoken again

Gulf News, December 13, 2006

Pakistan government spokesmen have made it clear that General Pervez Musharraf was not making a unilateral offer when he told NDTV that Pakistan would give up its claim on Kashmir if India also agreed to self-governance.

“The president at no point said that Pakistan is unilaterally ready to give up its stance on Kashmir,” Major-General Shaukat Sultan said.

An interview to an Indian television channel would have been the wrong venue for announcing the most significant shift in Pakistani foreign policy in 58 years. More significant, Pakistan does not have “a claim” on Jammu and Kashmir that can be unilaterally given up by a Pakistani ruler.

In its recent review of Musharraf’s book In the Line of Fire, the Wall Street Journal described him as a person “accountable to no one, elected by no one and trusted by no one”.

Musharraf’s many interviews with the media that generate controversy ranging from comments that “a lot of people say that if you want to go abroad and get a visa from Canada or citizenship and be a millionaire, get yourself raped” to his latest remarks on being willing to give up the claim on Kashmir confirm that Pakistan’s all powerful ruler sometimes tends to talk without thinking through the consequences of his words.

Musharraf also justified the killing of Baloch leader Nawab Akbar Bugti in his NDTV interview, implicitly acknowledging that Bugti was deliberately targeted a position at variance with the previous official version that the Baloch Nawab was killed unintentionally.
He also compared his action against Bugti with India’s actions against militants in Kashmir and elsewhere. He appears to have forgotten that Pakistan has consistently maintained that India’s actions in Jammu and Kashmir constitute “massive human rights violations”.

Since 2001, Musharraf has “misspoken” far too many times. He has given divergent and confusing statements about where Osama Bin Laden might be after becoming the toast of the international circuit as the man who might deliver Bin Laden for the US in the aftermath of 9/11.

Lack of legitimacy

An entire book can be compiled on the basis of Musharraf’s contradictory statements on domestic issues.

Like his predecessor as Pakistan’s military ruler, General Zia ul Haq, Musharraf seems to think that charming foreign journalists with frequently given interviews might somehow make up for the lack of legitimacy that haunts a coupmaker, notwithstanding how long they manage to hold on to power.

On more than one occasion, Musharraf has described Kashmir as the most important issue for Pakistan. Considering that he attaches greater importance to Kashmir than to internal consolidation, democracy or human development, one expects Musharraf to at least know Pakistan’s position on Kashmir well.

By saying what he said to NDTV, Musharraf seems to be suggesting that the Kashmir dispute is now a matter to be resolved between India and Pakistan, and for his part Musharraf is willing to “give up” the Pakistani “claim”.

The international community has no role in resolving the Kashmir issue, if it is a bilateral matter between India and Pakistan, and as far as the Kashmiri people are concerned, they can negotiate their future with India. That is what India has argued for years.

That runs contrary to Pakistan’s official position on Kashmir that it is the unfinished business of partition. Pakistan’s entire stand has been based on the argument that the Kashmiri people have not yet exercised their right of self determination in accordance with United Nations resolutions.

Pakistan has consistently questioned the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India “unlawful”.

If the issue is the Kashmiris’ right of self-determination, Pakistan has no claim to give up. If, on the other hand, the UN resolutions are no longer relevant then India can negotiate self-determination with the Kashmiri people in territories under its control and Pakistan ought to do the same.

There is no locus standi left for Pakistan in the matter in relation to Indian controlled parts of Jammu and Kashmir, which are the State of Jammu and Kashmir for the Indians under India’s constitution.

India has hinted at solving the Jammu and Kashmir dispute by accepting the Line of Control as the international boundary since the 1960s but Musharraf has also said repeatedly that this is not the solution he has in mind.

The latest Musharraf comments, which outright reject Kashmiri independence, are close to accepting the de facto division of Kashmir but falls short of accepting the LoC as the border between Pakistan and India.

The problem is, Musharraf lacks the authority to solve the Kashmir question but insists on continuously talking about Kashmir, as if to justify his status as army chief and absolute ruler.

Kashmir is too important an issue to be left to verbal sophistry of a man untrained in the craft of a wordsmith but insisting on acting like one.