Casting the Wrong Blame

Wall Street Journal, July 22, 2005

The July 7 terrorist attacks in London should have focused Europe’s attention on the small band of extremist jihadists committed to the elimination of western civilization by all possible means. Instead, some people in Britain and elsewhere are blaming U.S. policy — and Britain’s support for the U.S. — for the attack.

It is not necessary for everyone in Europe or the Muslim world to agree with all aspects of U.S. policy. Disagreements over security issues must not, however, shift responsibility for Islamist terrorism from its ideology of hate to specific U.S. policy decisions, past or present. Those who consider Islamist terrorism as a response to the “occupation of Iraq, Afghanistan and Palestine,” as British activist Tariq Ali claimed recently, must explain how terrorists attacking a night club in Bali, Indonesia can be described as fighting occupation.

A booklet by the Pakistani jihadist group Lashkar-e-Taiba (Army of the Pure), believed to be linked to the recent London bombings, declares the U.S., Israel and India as existential enemies of Islam and lists eight reasons for global jihad. These include the restoration of Islamic sovereignty to all lands where Muslims were once ascendant, including Spain, “Bulgaria, Hungary, Cyprus, Sicily, Ethiopia, Russian Turkistan and Chinese Turkistan. . . Even parts of France reaching 90 kilometers outside Paris.” Blaming the U.S. for the delusions of these admittedly small groups confers a degree of legitimacy on Islamist extremists and undermines moderate Muslim struggling for the soul of their faith.

Some of the post-July 7 rhetoric against the U.S. is based on factually incorrect assertions, such as claims that the current global jihadist movement was somehow created by the U.S. or that America created radical religious seminaries (madrassas) in the Muslim world. These arguments would only encourage the terrorist minority within the Muslim world, which does not want America or Europe to understand its nihilistic beliefs.

The deliberate ignorance of blame-the-U.S. commentators is pervasive. Left-wing activist Mr. Ali wrote in the Guardian the day after the London bombings that “the principal cause of this violence is the violence inflicted on the people of the Muslim world.” He suggested, and other critics of the U.S. agree, that “it is safe to assume that the cause of these bombs is the unstinting support given by New Labor and its prime minister to the U.S. wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.”

Reporting on the links of three of the four London bombers to a madrassa, a BBC reporter said: “Madrassas mushroomed in the 1980s funded by religious radicals in Saudi Arabia and the United States as training and arming centers for thousands of mujahedeen fighting soviet forces in Afghanistan.”

The truth is that some Muslims have interpreted Islamic teachings to include hatred of nonbelievers and, especially since the decline of Muslim power, advocated unconventional warfare against the disproportionately more powerful West. In the 19th century, the first antimodernity jihadist group called Tehrik-e-Mujahedeen (Movement of Holy warriors) emerged in India and operated in the country’s northwest frontier, including parts of present-day Pakistan and Afghanistan. This puritanical militant movement first fought the region’s Sikh rulers and later targeted the British.

The movement’s founder, Sayyid Ahmed of Bareili, who died in 1831, organized cells throughout India to supply the frontier movement with men and money. Calling themselves mujahedeen, the movement’s followers interpreted the Islamic concept of jihad in its literal sense of “holy war.” India’s jihadists killed British officials and civilians with swords and knives and their campaign of terror lasted for several decades. That 19th century movement spawned the contemporary ideology of jihad and serves as the prototype for subsequent the subsequent jihad network of al Qaeda and its associated groups in the region.

Sayyid Ahmed of Bareili himself was influenced by the ideas of Muhammad ibn-Abdul Wahab, founder of the Wahabi movement in present-day Saudi Arabia. Islamic revivalist movements calling for a return to early Islamic purity and the re-establishment of Muslim political power were active through much of the Muslim world long before America’s engagement with the greater Middle East. If the Islamists’ ideology precedes U.S. involvement in the region by more than a century, how can Britain’s support for U.S. security policy alone be the instigator of Islamist violence in London?

Similarly, U.S. support for the guerilla campaign against Soviet occupation of Afghanistan cannot be described as American endorsement of jihadist ideology. The Soviet Union occupied Afghanistan in an effort to bolster a weak client regime, which was fighting a mass resistance supported initially by Pakistan.

From the U.S. point of view, it made strategic sense to bleed the Soviets and force them out of Afghanistan. The U.S. channeled its support for the Afghan resistance through its ally, Pakistan, and encouraged another ally, Saudi Arabia, to support the Afghans as well. The Afghan resistance included secular nationalists as well as Islamist jihadists. It was the Saudis and Pakistan’s military ruler General Ziaul Haq who decided to allow Islamists from all over the world to congregate in Pakistan to train for war across the border.

The decision to radicalize madrassas that had previously shunned Western values without fighting against them was also taken by the Saudis and Pakistan’s rulers. Saudi Arabia sought to assert itself as the leader of the Sunni Islamic world in competition with Shia revolutionary Iran. Pakistan planned on using the jihadists as a tool for establishing a client regime in Afghanistan and to wrest disputed Kashmir from India.

Although Pakistani madrassas have been blamed for producing the bulk of global jihad foot soldiers, several recent studies point out that terrorists involved in attacks against Western targets are as likely to have been educated in ordinary schools as in madrassas. The ideology of hate in Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and other Muslim countries is not limited to religious seminaries, though the madrassas have been making their own negative contribution.

The U.S. did not train, fund or equip the global jihadists during the Afghan war, nor did it directly fund the establishment of even a single madrassa. Approximately $2 billion in covert assistance was channeled to the mujahedeen through Pakistan’s intelligence service. The U.S. erred in trusting its allies, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, during the anti-Soviet Afghan war and failed to recognize their ideological or strategic agendas.

America’s intelligence apparatus and intellectual community, focused on fighting communism, did not identify the potential of radical Islamists to emerge as a major global security threat. That error is now being rectified. To minimize the significance of the radical Islamists’ ideology, and blame America for attacks against the west, is as likely to swell the ranks of terrorists as are real or perceived grievances within the Muslim world.

Why Extremism can Breed

Gulf News, July 20, 2005

The July 7 terrorist bombings in London have led to greater scrutiny of Pakistan’s role in fomenting global jihad (holy war). The London bombers were Britons of Pakistani origin and at least three out of the four visited Pakistan recently. It is natural for the international community to wonder why so many elements of Islamist extremism have a Pakistani connection.

Pakistan’s President General Pervez Musharraf has responded to the London attacks by ordering a crackdown on extremist groups. There is no doubt that Musharraf has selectively cooperated with the United States and other Western governments since 9/11 and Pakistan has made some high profile Al Qaida arrests. But Pakistan has yet to acknowledge, let alone deal with, the ideology of hatred and militancy that has been cultivated as state policy for over four decades.

The threat of terrorism to the West does not come exclusively from Arabs formally affiliated with Osama Bin Laden’s Al Qaida. Other groups organised to “avenge” real and perceived humiliation of Muslims are an equally significant menace, operating as “baby Al Qaidas”. Afghan, Kashmiri and Pakistani Islamist groups share Al Qaida’s ideology even when they have no direct links to Bin Laden’s network.

Some of Pakistan’s madrassas are no longer just bastions of medieval theology, which they were for centuries without fomenting terrorism. They have evolved into training centres for radical anti-Western militancy. Pakistan’s school curriculum cultivates the sentiment of Muslim victimhood and inculcates in young minds the hatred of Jews and Hindus, in particular, and non-Muslims in general. These pervasive attitudes are hardly conducive to Pakistan’s emergence as a modern and progressive Muslim state.

When it emerged as an independent state in 1947, Pakistan was considered a moderate Muslim nation that could serve as a model for other emerging independent Muslim states. Pakistan’s founder, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, was a Shiite Muslim. Its first law minister was a Hindu. Its foreign minister belonged to the Ahmadiyya sect, which opposes jihad.

Although Pakistan’s birth was accompanied by religious riots and communal violence, the country’s founders clearly intended to create a non-sectarian state.

Over the years, however, Pakistan has become a major centre of Islamist extremism. The disproportionate influence wielded by fundamentalist groups in Pakistan is the result of state sponsorship of such groups.

Pakistan’s rulers have played upon religious sentiment as an instrument of strengthening Pakistan’s identity since soon after the country’s inception. Islamist militants were cultivated, armed and trained during the 1980s and 1990s in the Pakistan military’s efforts to seek strategic depth in Afghanistan and to put pressure on India for negotiations over the future of Kashmir.

Although Musharraf has restrained some of these home-grown groups since 9/11, he has refused to work towards eliminating them completely.

In an effort to justify the ascendancy of Pakistan’s military in the country’s affairs, a national ethos of militarism was created. An environment dominated by Islamist and militarist ideologies is the ideal breeding ground for radicals such as the July 7 suicide bombers. In their search for identity, British-born Pakistanis have been drawn into the whirlpool of their parents’ homeland.

The London attacks point out the deep-rooted problems in Pakistan that cannot be handled merely with rhetoric of “enlightened moderation”.

The major Kashmiri jihadi groups retain their infrastructure because the Pakistani military has not decided to give up the option of battling India at a future date. Afghanistan’s Taliban also continue to find safe haven in parts of Pakistan as recently as the spring of 2005.

Western policy makers would rather see Pakistan’s glass as half full rather than half empty and Pakistan’s ruling oligarchy would like things to remain that way.

This approach distracts Pakistan’s rulers and their Western supporters from recognising the depth of Pakistan’s problem with Islamist extremism.

Extremism Still Thrives in Pakistan

International Herald Tribune, July 19, 2005

Just as the 9/11 terrorist attacks highlighted Saudi Arabia’s responsibility in encouraging Islamist extremism, the July 7 bombings in London must lead to scrutiny of Pakistan’s role in fomenting global jihad. Three of the four London bombers were Britons of Pakistani origin and had visited Pakistan recently. The Pakistan connection to the bombings is as significant as the nationality of the 9/11 attackers, fourteen of whom were Saudi nationals.

Pakistan’s pro-Western ruler, General Pervez Musharraf, has responded to the London attacks by ordering a crackdown on extremist groups. Pakistan’s suave diplomats, Western-educated technocrats and articulate generals will be busy over the next few days highlighting their government’s cooperation in the war against terrorism since Musharraf abandoned support for Afghanistan’s Taliban regime in 2001.

There is no doubt that Musharraf has selectively cooperated with Western governments since 9/11, and Pakistan has made some high-profile Al Qaeda arrests. But Pakistan has yet to acknowledge, let alone deal with, the ideology of hatred and militancy that has been cultivated as state policy for over four decades.

Some of Pakistan’s religious schools, the madrassas, are no longer just bastions of medieval theology. They have evolved into training centers for radical anti-Western militancy. Pakistan’s school curriculum cultivates the sentiment of Muslim victimhood and inculcates in young minds the hatred of non-Muslims in general and Jews and Hindus in particular.

When it emerged as an independent state in 1947, Pakistan was considered a moderate Muslim nation that could serve as a model for other emerging independent Muslim states. Pakistan’s founder, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, was a Shia Muslim. Its first law minister was a Hindu. Its foreign minister belonged to the Ahmadiyya sect, which opposes jihad. Although Pakistan’s birth was accompanied by religious riots and communal violence, the country’s founders clearly intended to create a nonsectarian state that would protect religious freedoms and provide the Muslims of South Asia an opportunity to live in a country where they constituted a majority.

Over the years, however, Pakistan became a major center of Islamist extremism. The Ahmadis were declared non-Muslims through an amendment to Pakistan’s constitution during the 1970s. Shia-Sunni sectarian violence has plagued the country since the 1980s. Religious minorities, like Hindus and Christians, complain of discrimination and have periodically been subjected to violent attacks by extremists. The disproportionate influence wielded by fundamentalist groups in Pakistan is the result of state sponsorship of such groups.

Pakistan’s rulers have played upon religious sentiment as an instrument of strengthening Pakistan’s identity since soon after the country’s inception. Fears of Indian domination were addressed by embracing an Islamist ideology. Islamist militants were cultivated, armed and trained during the 1980s and 1990s in the Pakistani military’s efforts to seek strategic depth in Afghanistan and to put pressure on India for negotiations over the future of the Himalayan territory of Jammu and Kashmir.

In an effort to justify the ascendancy of the military in the country’s affairs, a national ethos of militarism was created. An environment dominated by Islamist and militarist ideologies is an ideal breeding ground for radicals and exportable radicalism: In their search for identity, British-born Pakistanis, like the July 7 bombers, have been drawn into the whirlpool of their parents’ homeland.

The United States and other Western nations have put their faith in the promises of Musharraf’s military to move Pakistan away from its Islamist radical past and toward “enlightened moderation.” But the London attacks point out the deep-rooted problems there.

The major Kashmiri jihadist groups retain their infrastructure because the Pakistani military has not decided to give up the option of battling India at a future date. The Taliban have also continued to find safe haven in parts of Pakistan. Afghan and American officials complain periodically of their still training and organizing in Pakistan’s border areas. But American officials also continue to express the belief that Pakistan has turned the corner and that Musharraf must be trusted as an American ally.

Western policy makers would rather see Pakistan’s glass as half full rather than half empty. This approach distracts Pakistan’s rulers, and their Western supporters, from recognizing the depth of Pakistan’s problem with Islamist extremism.

Sharif has a Right to a Passport

Gulf News, July 13, 2005

The hesitation of the Pakistani authorities in issuing a new passport to Nawaz Sharif, a former prime minister, highlights Pakistan’s greatest weakness. Pakistan is a country run on the whims of its rulers rather than on the basis of its constitution and laws enacted by elected legislatures.

Under Pakistani law, every citizen is entitled to a passport upon presentation of proof of citizenship, usually a national identity card.

There is no dispute that Sharif is a Pakistani citizen. The government’s claim that he agreed on December 9, 2000, under a deal brokered by Saudi Arabia, to live in exile for an unspecified period is irrelevant to his right to a passport as a citizen.

How can an unlawful deal between a captor and a captive trump one’s citizenship rights?

In any case, the government has failed to produce the agreement it claims was reached between the Sharif family at the time he was released from prison and sent into exile.

Sharif was toppled in a coup d’etat in 1999 and imprisoned, later to be charged with several “crimes”. If he was, as the military government claimed, a criminal, Pakistan’s President General Pervez Musharraf had no right to release and pardon him without completing the due process of law.

If, however, he was innocent, there was no justification in imprisoning him simply because the military found him to be unworthy of running the country.

In either case, where does Pakistan’s constitution (even after its many mutilations) empower the chief of army staff to deprive a Pakistani of the right to return to his country or to secure a passport for travel abroad?

Even if Musharraf’s claim is right and Sharif went into exile voluntarily, the alleged agreement was political rather than a legally binding one.

If Musharraf can go back on his political agreement with the opposition regarding relinquishing his military uniform at the end of 2004 due to changed circumstances, what prevents Sharif from backing out of his unwritten commitment not to return to Pakistan?

In any case, what does any of this have to do with his right to possess a Pakistani passport?

Not long ago, Pakistani authorities appeared to link renewing the passport of Benazir Bhutto, another former prime minister, to knowing her travel plans.

Not the first time

The reluctance of the government to issue Sharif his passport is not the first time in Pakistan’s history that citizenship rights have been arbitrarily determined by the country’s rulers.

In 1971, after the creation of Bangladesh, several hundred thousand Pakistani citizens were stranded in their country’s former Eastern wing. These people and their families had migrated from India to Pakistan at the time of the 1947 partition to become Pakistani citizens.

When the country was torn into two, they chose to remain Pakistanis and demanded the right to return to the remaining part of Pakistan.

Any other country would have recognised that right without any argument and arranged for their repatriation. But successive Pakistani governments argued that the repatriation of stranded Pakistanis from Bangladesh would upset the ethnic balance in West Pakistan and put an undue burden on the country’s economy.

In a tragic farce, General Zia-ul Haq’s military regime tied repatriation of Pakistanis stranded in Bangladesh to availability of international assistance.

Saudi Arabia helped create a trust to fund the return of Pakistanis stranded in Bangladesh to Pakistan. But since when are citizenship rights a matter of economics?

The Pakistanis in Bangladesh should have been issued Pakistani passports based on their citizenship and their inalienable right of return to their country of citizenship. They would have found a way of eking out a living just as tens of millions of other Pakistanis do.

The disregard for law in relation to passports, but in the reverse direction, was witnessed in 1993 when the Pakistani military wanted to install Mo’en Qureshi as caretaker prime minister.

Qureshi had lived in the United States for several decades, had taken up US citizenship and by most accounts had neither regularly renewed his Pakistani passport nor obtained a Pakistani national identity card.

He was issued his national identity card and passport in Singapore so that he would not arrive in the country without these documents before becoming the prime minister.

He was, of course, entitled to Pakistani citizenship and there is no reason to either impugn his commitment or services to Pakistan. The issue is that it was not Qureshi’s right as a dual citizen but rather the desire of the army commander at the time to name him caretaker prime minister that secured him his passport.

Had it been a matter of right, Sharif’s right to a passport would have received the same attention at the Pakistani consulate in Jeddah that Qureshi’s did at the Pakistan embassy in Singapore.