Monthly Archives: August 2006

Gulf News, August 30, 2006

This week’s protests in ’s Balochistan province following the killing of the most prominent tribal elder of the area, do not bode well for the region’s prospective gas explorers.
The death of Nawab Akbar Bugti at the hands of Pakistan’s armed forces serves as a metaphor for the war between politics and militarism that characterises Pakistan’s unfortunate history as a nation. One need not agree with all of Nawab Bugti’s views to acknowledge that he was a towering political figure in his life and a man who retained his pride and honour in his death. Only those schooled in the ways of colonial soldiers can feel pride in killing an 80-year-old tribal chieftain with the help of modern precision weapons.
Officials described Nawab Bugti and his companions as “miscreants”, a term brought to South Asia by the British East India Company. The term was last used widely in 1971 by the Pakistani establishment to describe the Bengali people of erstwhile East Pakistan.

The Bengalis had voted for Shaikh Mujibur Rehman’s Awami League in the 1970 elections, hoping that their votes would enable them to write the constitution of the country of which they were the majority of citizens. But the generals who ruled Pakistan then did not like the people’s verdict or their chosen representative. When Mujibur Rehman refused to give in to the generals’ demand to accept their views on the constitution as final and in the national interest, confrontation between the people and the army began.

Late Brigadier Siddiq Salik, who worked as an officer in the Pakistan army’s public relations directorate at the time, wrote an excellent account of events in Dhaka after the 1970 elections titled Witness to Surrender. In that book, he cites a comment that sums up the attitude of the army in East Pakistan. According to Salik, the General Officer Commanding, Major General Khadim Hussain Raja, who told an Awami League sympathiser within the hearing of fellow officers: “I will muster all I can tanks, artillery and machine guns to kill all the traitors and, if necessary, raze Dhaka to the ground. There will be no one to rule; there will be nothing to rule.”

The military cracked down on the politicians and the people they led. “Operation Searchlight”, began on the night of March 25, 1971 and its basis for planning clearly stated: “AL [Awami League] action and reactions to be treated as rebellion and those who support [the League] or defy ML [Martial Law] action be dealt with as hostile elements … As AL has widespread support even amongst EP [East Pakistani] elements in the Army the operation has to be launched with great cunningness, surprise, deception and speed combined with shock action.”

Troops moved with full force against Awami League supporters, students at the Dhaka University and Bengali Hindus. Shaikh Mujibur Rehman was arrested and moved to West Pakistan. Siddiq Salik offers the following account of the night of March 25, 1971: “The first column from the cantonment met resistance at Farm Gate, about one kilometre from the cantonment. The column was halted by a huge tree trunk felled across the road. The side gaps were covered with the hulks of old cars and a disabled steam-roller. On the city side of the barricade stood several hundred Awami Leaguers shouting Joi Bangla slogans.

“I heard their spirited shouts while standing on the verandah of General Tikka’s headquarters. Soon some rifle shots mingled with the Joi Bangla slogans. A little later a burst of fire from an automatic weapon shrilled through the air. Thereafter it was a mixed affair of firing and fiery slogans, punctuated with the occasional chatter of a light machine gun. Fifteen minutes later the noise began to subside and the slogans started dying down. Apparently, the weapons had triumphed”.

The triumph of weapons was, however, short-lived. After the first flush of victory, the Pakistan army in East Pakistan faced broader resistance. Bengali nationalism replaced demands for autonomy within a federal Pakistan as the Bengalis’ aspiration. Seeing themselves as freedom fighters, the Bengalis secured help from India and the Pakistan army faced an ignominious defeat and surrender. But even that experience has not made Pakistan’s generals wiser to the need for politics as opposed to their preference for the logic of brute power.

The consequences of Nawab Bugti’s assassination are likely to be monumental. Pakistan’s generals might think that the situation in Balochistan is different from that in East Pakistan because the army’s logistics and supply situation is better. More troops can be brought in from cantonments around the country to Balochistan and much faster than was possible during the civil war in East Pakistan.

Moreover, Balochistan does not border India and the prospect of a foreign military intervention in favour of the Baloch is unlikely. But these soldierly obsessions miss the crucial point. Should the conduct of the armed forces of a sovereign independent nation be the same as the behaviour of the British Indian army? Shouldn’t a modern independent state draw its legitimacy, not from force, but from the consent of the majority of its own citizens?

Indian Express, August 17 2006

The Bush administration has justified its decision to sell 36 F-16 Falcon fighter jets to Pakistan on grounds that it would increase US “access and influence” in Islamabad.

Pakistan’s military regime, which will incur a debt of $ 5 billion to purchase the planes made by Lockheed Martin, considers the deal a boost for Pakistan’s security. Close examination of the deal and of the history of similar US-Pakistan deals indicates that the stated goals of neither the US nor the Pakistani rulers are likely to be advanced with the F-16 purchase.

If anything, the F-16s are a pay off from Washington for General Pervez Musharraf’s military regime – a sort of “toys for the boys” gift – that is expected to extend the regime’s survival. That is all that concessional arms transfers under previous pro-US Pakistani military regimes have achieved

Let us first look at the F-16 deal from the perspective of Pakistani national security. Not long ago, General Pervez Musharraf declared that the greatest threat to Pakistani security comes from extremist ideologues and terrorists within the country.

Domestic extremism in Pakistan would be fought more effectively with investment in the neglected social sectors. Five billion dollars could go a long way in expanding education, healthcare and poverty alleviation programs.

If the purpose is to locate and liquidate hardened terrorists, the F-16 Falcon is not the best weapon to identify, isolate or even kill individual terrorists. Most major Al-Qaeda figures arrested in Pakistan and handed over to the US were arrested in major Pakistani cities.

The F-16’s sophisticated air-to-air, air-to-surface and anti-ship missiles have little to contribute in the battle in the neighbourhoods of Westridge, Rawalpindi (where Khalid Shaikh Muhammad was found) or Defence Society, Karachi (where Ramzi bin Al-Shibh was caught). They have limited value in Waziristan or other tribal areas on the Afghan border.

Pakistan’s traditional security threat is believed to come from India but here too Pakistan will not get a bang for its buck. The Pentagon’s statement accompanying notification of the F-16 sale to the US Congress has stated unequivocally that Pakistan’s F-16 purchase would “not significantly reduce India’s quantitative or qualitative military advantage” and that it would neither affect the regional balance of power nor introduce a new technology in the region.

Mr John Hillen, the US assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs told a recent congressional hearing that the version of the plane being sold to Pakistan “will not be nuclear capable” and explained that the Pentagon’s notification to Congress had “enumerated the technologies that were not, that would usually go with an F-16, that are not part of this deal.”

According to Mr Hillen, these withheld technologies “include ones that would allow the F-16 to be used in offensive ways to penetrate airspace of another country that was highly defended.”

If the F-16 will not enhance Pakistan’s military capability against domestic terrorism or confer it some qualitative or quantitative advantage in its unfortunate perennial conflict with India, why add to Pakistan’s debt burden for such expensive jets? Mr Hillen’s explanation, repeated in private and public conversations by other American officials, focuses on US influence over Pakistan.

The military is the most powerful institution in Pakistan and military sales, backed by large American credits, are a means of pleasing the Pakistani military. This, in turn, is supposed to secure leverage for the United States.

The US has dreamt of leverage over Pakistan’s foreign policy in return for military equipment and economic aid ever since the days of the cold war alliances, SEATO and CENTO.

Contrary to the assumption of American officials that military aid translates into leverage, Pakistan’s military has always managed to take military aid without ever fully giving the United States what it desires.

If Pakistan’s security policy was determined by a representative government and not by a Praetorian army, the ability to make independent foreign policy decisions would be a good thing from Pakistan’s point of view even if that is not what the Americans seek.

But given the ascendancy of the military in Pakistan’s decision-making, the military aid relationship with Washington has become a contributing factor to Pakistan’s internal dysfunction.

The availability of weapons systems that enhance the Pakistani military’s prestige and therefore its ability to continue to dominate national life — offered by the US to secure limited Pakistani cooperation in US grand strategy— allows Pakistan’s military rulers to believe that they can continue to promote risky domestic, regional, and pan-Islamic policies. It undermines the Pakistani military’s willingness to negotiate realistically with India without bolstering Pakistan’s actual military prowess against its much larger neighbour.

The people of Pakistan, and the long-term US-Pakistan relationship, would benefit far more if Washington made it clear that its support for Pakistan’s security would be contingent upon Pakistan having an elected government that determines Pakistan’s real security needs in a transparent manner.

Gulf News, August 9, 2006

The Bush administration has justified its decision to sell 36 F-16 Falcon fighter jets to Pakistan on grounds that it would increase American “access and influence” in Islamabad.
Pakistan’s military regime, which will incur a debt of $5 billion to purchase the planes made by Lockheed Martin, considers the deal a boost for Pakistan’s security. Close examination of the deal and of the history of similar US-Pakistan deals indicates that the stated goals of neither the US nor the Pakistani rulers are likely to be advanced with the F-16 purchase.
If anything, the F-16s are a pay off from Washington for General Pervez Musharraf’s military regime a sort of “toys for the boys” gift that is expected to extend the regime’s survival. That is all that concessional arms transfers under previous pro-US Pakistani military regimes have achieved.

Let us first look at the F-16 deal from the perspective of Pakistani national security. Not long ago, Musharraf declared that the greatest threat to Pakistani security comes from extremist ideologues and terrorists within the country. Domestic extremism in Pakistan would be fought more effectively with investment in the neglected social sectors. A sum of $ 5 billion could go a long way in expanding education, healthcare and poverty alleviation programmes.

If the purpose is to locate and liquidate hardened terrorists, the F-16 Falcon is not the best weapon to identify, isolate or even kill individual terrorists. Most major Al Qaida figures arrested in Pakistan and handed over to the US were arrested in major Pakistani cities.
The F-16’s sophisticated air-to-air, air-to-surface and anti-ship missiles have little to contribute in the battle in the neighbourhoods of Westridge, Rawalpindi (where Khalid Shaikh Mohammad was found) or Defence Society, Karachi (where Ramzi Bin Al Shibh was caught). They have limited value in Waziristan or other tribal areas on the Afghan border.

Pakistan’s traditional security threat is believed to come from India but here too Pakistan will not get a bang for its buck. The Pentagon’s statement accompanying notification of the F-16 sale to the US Congress has stated unequivocally that Pakistan’s F-16 purchase would “not significantly reduce India’s quantitative or qualitative military advantage” and that it would neither affect the regional balance of power nor introduce a new technology in the region.

John Hillen, the US Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs, told a recent Congressional hearing that the version of the plane being sold to Pakistan “will not be nuclear capable” and explained that the Pentagon’s notification to Congress had “enumerated the technologies that were not, that would usually go with an F-16, that are not part of this deal”. According to Hillen, these withheld technologies “include ones that would allow the F-16 to be used in offensive ways to penetrate airspace of another country that was highly defended”.

If the F-16 will not enhance Pakistan’s military capability against domestic terrorism or confer it some qualitative or quantitative advantage in its unfortunate perennial conflict with India, why add to Pakistan’s debt burden for such expensive jets? Hillen’s explanation, repeated in private and public conversations by other American officials, focuses on US influence over Pakistan.

Secure leverage

The military is the most powerful institution in Pakistan and military sales, backed by large American credits, are a means of pleasing the Pakistani military. This, in turn, is supposed to secure leverage for the United States.

The US has dreamt of leverage over Pakistan’s foreign policy in return for military equipment and economic aid ever since the days of the Cold War alliances, SEATO and CENTO. Contrary to the assumption of American officials that military aid translates into leverage, Pakistan’s military has always managed to take military aid without ever fully giving the US what it desires.

If Pakistan’s security policy was determined by a representative government and not by a Praetorian army, the ability to make independent foreign policy decisions would be a good thing from Pakistan’s point of view even if that is not what the Americans seek.
But given the ascendancy of the military in Pakistan’s decision-making, the military aid relationship with Washington has become a contributing factor to Pakistan’s internal dysfunction.

The availability of weapons systems that enhance the Pakistani military’s prestige and therefore its ability to continue to dominate national life offered by the US to secure limited Pakistani cooperation in US grand strategy allows Pakistan’s military rulers to believe that they can continue to promote risky domestic, regional and pan-Islamic policies. It undermines the Pakistani military’s willingness to negotiate realistically with India without bolstering Pakistan’s actual military prowess against its much larger neighbour.
The people of Pakistan, and the long-term US-Pakistan relationship, would benefit far more if Washington made it clear that its support for Pakistan’s security would be contingent upon Pakistan having an elected government that determines Pakistan’s real security needs in a transparent manner.

Gulf News, August 2, 2006

With an important coalition partner, the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), threatening to pull out of the government, Pakistan is once again on the brink of a major political crisis.
General Pervez Musharraf’s position is assured by his command of the Pakistan army and therefore it is not under immediate threat. But the illusion of parliamentary government under military direction, built over the last several years, could unravel if the weak civilian wing of Musharraf’s administration is further weakened. Recent developments are leading to the questioning of the military’s professions that it is the stabiliser of Pakistan’s polity.

Musharraf could persuade MQM to continue supporting his handpicked prime minister Shaukat Aziz and the Sindh government cobbled together through the machinations of the security services. But Pakistan’s current political crisis runs deeper than the challenge of an uneasy coalition partner that controls the country’s financial capital and major port city, Karachi.

Musharraf and the Pakistan army have consistently justified their toppling of an elected government in 1999 on grounds of the alleged failure of Pakistan’s civilian leadership. With rampant corruption scandals and constant intrigue sapping the strength of the Musharraf-Aziz regime, the army’s claim of cleaning up the stables and laying the foundations of “true democracy” are beginning to ring hollow.

Rightful authority

Musharraf is not the first Pakistani general to believe that the army has the rightful authority to run Pakistan, including management of any pretensions to democracy.

Undoubtedly Pakistan’s politics are complex. Mistakes by several institutions and individuals have preceded the breakdown of each of Pakistan’s several experiments with democracy. But if there is a common thread running through Pakistan’s chequered history, it is the army’s perception of itself as the country’s only viable institution and its deep-rooted suspicion of politics and political processes.

Musharraf benefited initially from the short memory of the public, which had forgotten the military interventions of the past but remembered the chaos of civilian rule in the decade preceding Musharraf’s takeover. But now an increasing number of Pakistanis is beginning to wonder if a handful of coup-making generals can truly serve Pakistan’s national interest. A group of retired generals (including two former ISI chiefs), sitting and former parliamentarians and academics wrote a letter to Musharraf recently that sought the army’s disengagement from political power and called for the separation between the offices of president and army chief.

During the 1990s, Pakistan’s establishment meticulously built the case for how Pakistan’s politicians were “corrupt” and therefore unqualified to rule. All allegations of corruption were not unfounded but it is now clear that these were grossly exaggerated.
The supposedly “clean” politicians brought in since 1999 to replace the ones Musharraf says will “never” be allowed to return have proven no better than their predecessors. To cite one example, several members of parliament including ministers have been proven to have lied while filing their assets declaration forms.

Perhaps the time has come to abandon the army’s efforts to breed a new civilian leadership and to allow political processes to advance gradually and even painfully. As the signatories to the recent letter to Musharraf pointed out, Pakistan could move forward if the army withdraws from politics, the 2007 elections are held under neutral caretaker governments at the centre as well as in the provinces and all the major political parties learn from their past mistakes.

If that does not happen, Pakistan will only move from crisis to crisis and none of the country’s fundamental issues will get resolved. Institutional governance will come to Pakistan only when one institution the army refuses to insist on being the final political arbiter and the country is allowed to go through the many stages of democratic evolution. These growing pangs of democracy may not be trouble-free but they are unavoidable.