Monthly Archives: June 2007

Indian Express , June 20, 2007

The Pakistani people continue to vote with their feet against General Musharraf’s military regime. The crowds turning up to hear ousted Chief Justice Chaudhry are getting larger even as the summer heat is becoming more oppressive.

The popular sentiment favours restoration of the Pakistani constitution and establishment of rule of law under civilian leadership. Justice Chaudhry has become a hero simply for defying a uniformed head of state, who is viewed as having overstayed his welcome as interim ruler after eight years in power.

The campaign, waged by activists of existing political parties, reflects the ground reality of Pakistani politics. The political forces Musharraf claims are discredited remain alive and well, and are stronger than they were in 1999 when Musharraf seized power in a military coup.

Pakistani public opinion appears to have matured. Whereas in 1999 there were expressions of relief at the toppling of a civilian government that seemed to be committing excesses, there is widespread recognition now that military intervention is not the solution to Pakistan’s political problems.
Only continued constitutional rule and an uninterrupted political process will bring stability to Pakistan.

For his part Musharraf is relying on support from the army and the United States to ride through the current crisis. The army needs the US and the US needs the army, the argument goes, and both need Musharraf.

The dilemma for US policy was summed up by Daniel Markey, in an article in Foreign Affairs. “Washington should not rely on Musharraf alone, but it cannot assume that his departure would advance America’s main goals of fighting terrorism and promoting democracy,” he wrote. “In order to achieve long-term success, Washington needs to build trust with the Pakistan army as it works to expand the capacity of civilian institutions.”

There is no question of the army’s pre-eminence in Pakistan and most thoughtful people would not recommend ignoring the army as an institution. But as the peaceful protests increase in frequency and size, the Pakistan army also cannot ignore the sentiment of the Pakistani people and neither can US policy makers seeking “to build trust with the Pakistan army.”

For five decades, Pakistan’s army has played a role in Pakistan’s politics with the acquiescence of the people. But now there is widespread questioning of the army’s objectives and contribution — a situation military officers are most likely viewing with justified concern. If resentment against one of its generals spills over into resentment for the institution as a whole, far greater harm could come to the army’s ability to defend Pakistan than even the most ardent Musharraf backer says is likely in case of Musharraf’s removal from power.

An orderly withdrawal from politics might actually be more in the army’s institutional interest right now than is conceded by those who see the Pakistan army being indefinitely tied to Musharraf’s absolute power.

Major General Sher Ali Khan advised Pakistan’s second military ruler, General Yahya Khan that that the reason the military was able to snatch the initiative from politicians after the fall of Field Marshal Ayub Khan was not because of its fire power but because of its charisma.

Sher Ali wrote words to the effect that “If we had to shoot our way through Nawabpur Road (the main road in Dhaka) we would have had a conflagration on our hands that no amount of fire power in our control could have handled.”

According to General Sher Ali, the Pakistan army’s charisma was “the precious political resource that once lost would not be easily retrieved. It existed because the mass of the people had not actually encountered the army directly. For them it was a mythical entity, a magical force, that would succor them in times of need when all else failed. In the minds of the people, unlike the bureaucracy and the politicians with whom they had daily contact and whom they knew to be corrupt and oppressive, the army was the final guarantor of Pakistan and its well-being.”

What the army, as an institution, will most likely take into account in the next few months is whether it can retain its charisma without disengaging from politics and without persuading its chief to pursue politics separately from the normal functions of the army.

Few people believe that a free and fair election can be held in Pakistan as long as Musharraf rules in uniform. In a sign of how an election under Musharraf would not solve any problem, the number of registered voters seems to have declined by 20 million since the last election — foreshadowing the crisis that will come once the chief justice issue is resolved.

Gulf News, June 20, 2007

The Pakistani people continue to vote with their feet against General Pervez Musharraf’s military regime. The crowds turning up to hear ousted Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhary are getting larger even as the summer heat is becoming more oppressive.

The popular sentiment favours restoration of the Pakistani constitution and establishment of rule of law under civilian leadership.

The campaign on behalf of the Chief Justice is being waged by activists of existing political parties. It reflects the ground reality of Pakistani politics. The political forces Musharraf claims are discredited remain alive and well, and are stronger than they were in 1999 when Musharraf seized power in a military coup.

Pakistani public opinion appears to have matured. Whereas in 1999 there were expressions of relief at the toppling of a civilian government that seemed to be committing excesses, there is widespread recognition now that military intervention is not the solution to Pakistan’s political problems.

Only continued constitutional rule and an uninterrupted political process, which enables the people to vote out governments, will bring stability to Pakistan.

For his part Musharraf is relying on support from the army and the US to ride through the current crisis. The army needs the US and the US needs the army, the argument goes, and both need Musharraf.

The dilemma for US policy was summed up by Daniel Markey, a fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, in an article in Foreign Affairs. “Washington should not rely on Musharraf alone, but it cannot assume that his departure would advance America’s main goals of fighting terrorism and promoting democracy,” he wrote. “In order to achieve long-term success, Washington needs to build trust with the Pakistan Army as it works to expand the capacity of civilian institutions.”

No question

There is no question of the army’s pre-eminence in Pakistan and most thoughtful people would not recommend ignoring the army as an institution. But as the peaceful protests increase in frequency and size, the Pakistan army also cannot ignore the sentiment of the Pakistani people and neither can US policy makers seeking “to build trust with the Pakistan army”.

For five decades, Pakistan’s army has played a role in Pakistan’s politics with the acquiescence of the people. But now there is widespread questioning of the army’s objectives and contribution – a situation military officers are most likely viewing with justified concern.

The Pakistan army is a national institution and if resentment against one of its generals spills over into resentment for the institution as a whole, far greater harm could come to the army’s ability to defend Pakistan than even the most ardent Musharraf backer says is likely in case of Musharraf’s removal from power.

An orderly withdrawal from politics might actually be more in the army’s institutional interest right now than is conceded by those who see the Pakistan army being indefinitely tied to Musharraf’s absolute power.

Major General Sher Ali Khan advised Pakistan’s second military ruler, General Yahya Khan that that the reason the military was able to snatch the initiative from politicians after the fall of Field Marshal Ayub Khan was not because of its fire power but because of its charisma.

What the army, as an institution, will most likely take into account in the next few months is whether it can retain its charisma without disengaging from politics and without persuading its chief to pursue politics separately from the normal functions of the army.

Few people believe that a free and fair election can be held in Pakistan as long as Musharraf rules in uniform. Already there is a major controversy brewing ove

Indian Express , June 13, 2007

Since the day he joined the Pakistan Military Academy (PMA) as a cadet, General Pervez Musharraf has been used to taking orders from his superior officers and giving orders to those below him. Based on his lifelong career as a soldier, he considers the people of Pakistan his troops and the civilian politicians who joined the King’s Party formed after Musharraf’s 1999 military coup as junior and non-commissioned officers. Those protesting against him are seen by Musharraf as the enemy.

The general is now beginning to voice the worry that his ‘subordinate officers’ are failing to motivate ‘the troops’ sufficiently. He is afraid that the failings of his officers’ corps will cause him to lose the most important battle of his life.

The training of a military officer prepares him for waging war not for effecting compromises or conducting politics. Former Pakistan army chief, General Musa Khan, used to say that he was trained to “locate the enemy and liquidate the enemy.” He found this training useless when dragged into politics as governor of West Pakistan during the late 1960s.

Protests broke out against Field Marshal Ayub Khan’s military dictatorship soon after Musa Khan became governor. The retired general found himself at a loss, he later said, in “figuring out how to deal with my own people, angry with our government and refusing to take our orders.”

General Musharraf recently complained that the more than one thousand elected officials of the ruling coalition who enjoy state patronage because of their membership of the King’s Party, are doing little to defend their benefactor. Musharraf’s complaint reflected the surprise Ayub Khan had expressed when members of his party disappeared after the popular agitation against his rule began in 1968.

Both Ayub Khan and Musharraf never grew into politicians and could not see that those who join the King’s Party for perks and privileges are risk-averse individuals in search of benefits. They should not be expected to jeopardise their political futures in times of political crisis for their patron.

Musharraf has been as contemptuous of Pakistani politicians as were generals Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan and Zia-ul- Haq. He once spoke of how he would “rather kick” Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto than negotiate with them if these leaders with considerable following did not show signs of “seriousness.”

The difference between General Musharraf, on the one hand, and Bhutto and Sharif, on the other, is irreconciliable not because of the alleged corruption of the former prime ministers, but because of where each comes from. The general derives his power from his command whereas the political leaders have a voluntary following. Every general president’s rise to power is an accident of history.

In their cantonments, generals learn to ensure that the walls of buildings are whitewashed, their unit gets its funds, exercises are conducted in an orderly fashion and the goings-on remain confidential. They extrapolate this experience to running the country.

Technocrats are brought in to ensure that funds are plentiful. Summary justice is introduced to eliminate ‘corruption’.
Obedience is sought from everyone. But nations are not military units. They need someone to aggregate interests and the inter-play of these interests, rather than the good intentions of the commander, determine a nation’s long-term direction.

Two years ago, when most people saw Musharraf as firmly entrenched in power, I had written: “Pakistan’s politicians have many flaws but without politics, Pakistan cannot have a stable future. The general remains a general and under his stewardship Pakistan is on the path of further institutional erosion. It seems that a military leader simply will not write out the military from the script of Pakistan’s power game. Military intervention is part of Pakistan’s problem, not its solution.”

Today, as Pakistan reels from the mass movement instigated by the removal from office of the chief justice, those words seem eerily prescient.

Gulf News, June 13, 2007

Since the day he joined the Pakistan Military Academy (PMA) as a cadet, General Pervez Musharraf is used to taking orders from his superiors and giving orders to those below him.

Based on his lifelong career as a soldier, he considers the people of Pakistan his troops and civilian politicians who joined the “king’s party” formed after Musharraf’s 1999 military coup as junior and non-commissioned officers.

Those protesting against him are seen by Musharraf as the enemy. The general is now beginning to voice the worry that his “subordinate officers” are failing to motivate “the troops” sufficiently. He is afraid that the failings of his officers’ corps will cause him to lose the most important battle of his life.

The training of a military officer prepares him for waging war not for effecting compromises or conducting politics. Former Pakistan army chief General Musa Khan used to say that he was trained to “locate the enemy and liquidate the enemy”.

He found this training useless when dragged into politics as governor of West Pakistan during the late 1960s.

Musharraf recently complained that the more than 1,000 elected officials of the ruling coalition are doing little to defend their benefactor.

His complaint reflected the surprise Ayub Khan had expressed when members of his Convention Muslim League disappeared soon after the popular agitation against his rule began in 1968.

Both Ayub Khan and Musharraf never grew into politicians and could not see that those who join the “king’s party” for perks and privileges are risk-averse individuals in search of benefits.

Contemptuous

Musharraf has been as contemptuous of Pakistani politicians as were generals Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan and Ziaul Haq. He once spoke of how he would “rather kick” Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto than negotiate with them if they did not show signs of “seriousness”.

Judging by history, Musharraf’s definition of seriousness would probably be to give in to his command, which is what Pakistani generals have always sought from politicians.

Ayub Khan “kicked” Pakistan’s first generation of politicians, only to be forced to resign amid turmoil after a decade in power. Pakistan has remained a football field ever since, with generals kicking politicians but never being able to build anything resembling a stable country.

The difference between Musharraf, on the one hand, and Bhutto and Sharif, on the other, is irreconcilable not because of the alleged corruption of the former prime ministers but because of where each comes from. The general derives his power from his command whereas the political leaders have a voluntary following.

The lack of understanding of politics leads Pakistan’s military rulers to believe that they are better suited to run the country than politicians.

In their long career in cantonments, generals learn to ensure that the walls of cantonment buildings are whitewashed, their unit gets its funds, no one steals the rations, exercises are conducted in an orderly fashion and the goings on in the unit remain confidential. They extrapolate this experience into running the country.

Technocrats are brought in to ensure that funds are plentiful. Summary justice is introduced to eliminate “corruption”. Obedience is sought from everyone.

But nations are not military units. They need someone to aggregate various interests (i.e. politicians) and the inter-play of these interests, rather than the good intentions of the commander, are what determine a nation’s long-term direction.

Two years ago, when most people saw Musharraf as firmly entrenched in power, I had written: “Pakistan’s politicians have many flaws but without politics Pakistan cannot have a stable future.

“The general remains a general and under his stewardship Pakistan is on the path of further institutional erosion … It seems that a military leader simply will not write out the military from the script of Pakistan’s power game. Military intervention is part of Pakistan’s problem, not its solution.”

Today, as Pakistan reels from the mass movement instigated by the removal from office of the Chief Justice, those words seem eerily prescient.

Indian Express, June 6, 2007

Facing massive popular disapproval at home and abroad, General Pervez Musharraf’s military regime is trying to find comfort in support from the Bush administration and Pakistan’s top military commanders. But Musharraf’s problems do not stem from lack of US government support or the absence of backing from the Pakistani military. They are the result of disenchantment of the Pakistani people with the authoritarian order.

Just to prove that they were unlikely to be swayed by assurances of loyalty by senior military commanders, tens of thousands of demonstrators continued with their protests in support of Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry even after the imposition of new restrictions on the media and the much-publicised statement issued after the 101st Corps Commanders Conference.

As several Pakistani commentators have pointed out, it is expected that military commanders express loyalty to their chief. If the army chief asks them to tell the press that they stand for the “security of their country under the leadership and guidance of the president and the chief of army staff,” they will. How does a statement showing support for the army chief by officers under his command resolve the issue of Musharraf’s political legitimacy?

The generals’ statement took “serious note of the malicious campaign against institutions of the state launched by vested interests…” This is a clear reference to the increasing questioning by Pakistani civilians of the military’s dominance over Pakistani public life and its alleged privileges. Musharraf’s civilian minions, such as Citibanker and prime minister, Shaukat Aziz, have been saying for a while that statements against the armed forces would “not be allowed or tolerated,” with ruling party president, Chaudhary Shujaat Hussain, going so far as to demand that those criticising the army be shot to death.

There is no doubt that civilised, modern governance requires respect for institutions of state. But it is wrong, as is common in Pakistan, to think of the armed forces and the security services as the only institutions worth protecting. A state comprises an executive, a legislature and a judiciary. Political parties and the media are other institutions that support the contemporary state.

A cursory glance at Pakistan’s history would reveal that Pakistan’s judicial and legislative institutions of state have been under relentless attack since 1951 — when General Ayub Khan became the country’s first indigenous army chief. History was significantly rewritten by Ayub Khan and the various new offshoots of the executive branch he created (such as the ministry of information and broadcasting) to make it seem that he was gradually sucked into politics by the incompetence of civilian politicians.

The fact remains, however, that as early as 1953 he had written out a plan for restructuring the Pakistani state, and the erosion of the country’s legislative branch and the political parties that supported it began at his behest.

The first frontal attack on a state institution came in 1954 when Governor General Ghulam Mohammed dissolved the Constituent Assembly just because it would not give him viceregal powers. Since then, no elected assembly in Pakistan’s history has been allowed to function normally.

Over the years, Pakistan has become a state that stands only on one pillar — of one part of the executive branch of government represented by the military and the intelligence services.

The judiciary’s standing was diminished by making it repeatedly endorse extra-constitutional interventions and pledging oaths to military coup-makers. Only now, with Justice Chaudhry’s stance against General Musharraf, is the judiciary recovering some of its prestige.

The military sub-branch of the executive also constantly circumscribes the legislature in its functions, if and when the legislature is allowed to exist at all. Political parties operate in the shadow of larger than life figures, slandered, jailed or exiled with alarming frequency. And then there are the ubiquitous intelligence agencies, hidden from public view but frequently seen pulling the strings in Pakistan’s complex political drama.

Claims by the military regime that criticism of one sub-branch of the state is a malicious campaign against state institutions, without recognising the constant battering of other institutions, will not resolve Pakistan’s crisis.

Gulf News , June 6, 2007

Facing massive popular disapproval at home and abroad, General Pervez Musharraf’s military regime is trying to find comfort in support from the Bush administration and Pakistan’s top military commanders.

But Musharraf’s current problems do not stem from lack of US government support or the absence of backing from the Pakistani military. They are the result of disenchantment of the Pakistani people with the authoritarian order.

As several Pakistani commentators have pointed out, it is expected that military commanders express loyalty to Musharaf. Just to prove that they were unlikely to be swayed by assurances of loyalty by senior military commanders, tens of thousands of demonstrators continued with their protests in support of Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry even after the imposition of new restrictions on the media and the much publicised statement issued after the 101st Corps Commanders Conference.

As several Pakistani commentators have pointed out, it is expected that military commanders express loyalty to their chief.

If the army chief asks them to tell the press that they stand for the “security of their country under the leadership and guidance of the president and the chief of army staff,” they will. How does a statement showing support for the army chief by officers under his command resolve the issue of Musharraf’s political legitimacy and lack of public support?

The generals’ statement had one other dimension that is significant. It took “serious note of the malicious campaign against institutions of the state launched by vested interests …”

This is a clear reference to the increasing questioning by Pakistani civilians of the military’s dominance over Pakistani public life and its alleged privileges. Musharraf’s civilian minions, such as Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz have been saying for a while that statements against the armed forces would “not be allowed or tolerated,” with ruling party president, Chaudhary Shujaat Hussain going so far as to demand that those criticising the army be shot to death.

There is no doubt that civilised, modern governance requires deference to and respect for institutions of state. But it is wrong, as is common in Pakistan, to think of the armed forces and the security services as the only institutions worth protecting.

A cursory glance at Pakistan’s history would reveal that Pakistan’s judicial and legislative institutions of state have been under relentless attack since 1951 – when General Ayub Khan became the country’s first indigenous army chief.

Frontal attack

The first frontal attack on a state institution came in 1954 when Governor General Ghulam Mohammad dissolved the Constituent Assembly just because it would not give him viceregal powers.

Over the years, Pakistan has become a state that stands only on one pillar – that of one part of the executive branch of government represented by the military and the intelligence services.

The judiciary’s standing was diminished by making it repeatedly endorse extra-constitutional interventions and pledging oaths to military coup-makers. Only now, with Justice Chaudhry’s stance against Musharraf, is the judiciary recovering some of its prestige.

The military sub-branch of the executive also constantly circumscribes the legislature in its functions. Political parties operate in the shadow of larger than life figures, slandered, jailed or exiled with alarming frequency. And then there are the ubiquitous intelligence agencies, hidden from public view but frequently seen pulling the strings in Pakistan’s complex political drama.

The assault on Pakistan’s institutions of state that started with Ayub Khan’s intervention in politics will come to an end only if all institutions – the judiciary, the legislature, political parties and the media – are allowed to function independently under the constitution.

Claims by the military regime about criticism of one sub-branch of the state as a malicious campaign against state institutions, without recognising the constant battering of other institutions will not resolve Pakistan’s crisis.