General View from US Changing

Indian Express, June 28, 2006

Pakistan’s military regime might take comfort in the Bush administration’s support for reinstating the $ 300 million in U.S. aid cut by the American Congress due to Pakistan’s inadequate efforts for establishing democracy and respecting human rights.

But the very fact that the House of Representatives voted to cut aid by a 373-34 vote indicates that the phase of unquestioning support for General Pervez Musharraf in Washington is now over. Foreign aid appropriations are often the major foreign policy lever available to the American government’s legislative branch.

Under the U.S. constitution, U.S. Congress is a co-equal branch of government along with the executive, headed by the President, and the judiciary.

Unlike Pakistan where almost all power is concentrated in the hands of the country’s chief executive, who is a uniformed army chief and unelected president, the U.S. system recognizes multiple power centres. While making foreign policy is the prerogative of the U.S. President, budget-making falls within the purview of the Congress. Quite often, Congress draws attention to what it considers as lapses of judgment by the President and his foreign policy team by using its power of the purse.

During the 1980s, Congress showed disapproval of American policy in Central America by barring covert military support for the Contras fighting the left-wing regime in Nicaragua.

The Pressler amendment to the foreign aid bill, which followed the Symington and Glenn amendments, introduced the concerns of Congress about nuclear proliferation into U.S. aid policy. Pakistanis are all too familiar with the consequences of the Pressler amendment coming into effect. But at the time the Pressler amendment was originally approved, Pakistani officials had seen as a reprieve from aid cuts.

Then, the Reagan administration had lobbied heavily in Pakistan’s favour as continuing aid was crucial to ensure Islamabad’s participation in the ongoing anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan.

This time, too, the Bush administration will cite the importance of General Musharraf’s support for the war against terrorism to ensure that its quid pro quo aid package remains unaffected. The US ambassador to Islamabad, Ryan Crocker, was quick in reassuring Pakistani officials that there would be no cut to the full amount of aid — $ 3 billion — promised for the five year period ending in 2009.

“We are a democracy,” Crocker was cited as saying. “Congress has its views, but I would like to make very clear that this administration is totally committed to providing the full amount.”

But even if the Bush administration ensures the flow of aid, it cannot ignore the issues cited in the bill that cut the aid.
An overwhelming majority of U.S. congressmen, 373 from both parties to be precise, noted “increasing lack of respect for human rights, especially women’s rights, and the lack of progress for improving democratic governance and the rule of law’’ in Pakistan under General Musharraf.

Only 34 representatives in the U.S. House appeared to buy the Pakistani government’s claim that it was in the process of establishing “genuine democracy.” Even these 34 cannot be said to approve of Musharraf’s domestic policies and could have voted against the bill only because they did not want to embarrass a current American ally.

No Pakistani can celebrate a proposed reduction in the flow of external resources to their homeland. But given the Musharraf regime’s tendency to cite international, particularly American, support to justify its undemocratic domestic policies, it is natural for Pakistani democrats to take heart from the changing mood in Washington.

Pakistan will probably receive the full amount of aid and the Congressional aid cut will most likely be reversed through the intervention of the Bush administration for now.

But the concerns about human rights and democracy expressed by Congress are only likely to continue to grow. The Musharraf regime’s ostensible help in the hunt for international terrorists cannot remain an indefinite excuse for ignoring what is clearly a deteriorating human rights situation.

The suspicious disappearance and subsequent brutal murder of journalist Hayatullah Khan in the federally administered tribal areas highlights a dirty war like those fought against their people in the 1970s and 1980s by Latin American military regimes.
Hayatullah had embarrassed the government by revealing, with pictures, the falsehood of an official claim that an Al-Qaeda member had been killed while making a bomb. The terrorist had, in fact, been hit by a U.S. missile.

An opposition figure, Dr Safdar Sarki of the Jeay Sindh Qaumi Mahaz (JSQM), has been missing for days and one need not agree with his political views to feel the pain of his family.

Incidentally, Dr Sarki is a U.S. citizen and General Musharraf should not have difficulty in figuring out that his disappearance at the hands of Pakistan’s invisible political enforcers is unlikely to endear the Musharraf regime further with the U.S. Congress.

The Freedom to say No

Indian Express, June 8, 2006

Official Pakistan has responded to the buzz generated by the opposition’s Charter for Democracy in characteristic manner. Supporters of military rule are currently busy mocking the alliance between former rivals Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto. Allegations of misrule under Bhutto and Sharif are being repeated and, in some cases, rehashed. General Pervez Musharraf is sticking to his previous line that the two former prime ministers will never be allowed to return to power.

All this begs the question: Why not let the people of Pakistan decide? After all, in a functioning democracy, elections are held periodically to determine whom the people want to wield executive office and legislative power. The people vote against politicians who failed to deliver and occasionally forgive their transgressions because of some other redeeming quality.

Furthermore, politics is about making a choice from available options. People can elect a leader in one election, vote them out in the next, only to elect them back under different circumstances. If someone is convicted of a crime by a court of law, the law takes its course.

Only last week, Peru’s voters elected Alan Garcia as president even though his tenure as president 16 years ago had been marked by a failing economy and a violent rebellion. An Associated Press report on Peru’s election explained the voters’ choice in terms of rejection for a candidate supported by Venezuela’s radically anti-American president Hugo Chavez. ‘‘I want our party this time to demonstrate to the Peruvian people, who have called it to the highest responsibilities, that it will not convert the state into booty,’’ Garcia was reported as saying—a reference to the corruption that had marked his first term from 1985-90. Garcia may or may not deliver on his promises. But at least Peru’s military, or a shadowy establishment representing security and intelligence services, did not usurp the right of deciding whether a man whose term in office was ruinous in the eyes of some could run again or not.

The Pakistani people deserve the same right to decide upon the qualifications of their politicians as the people of Peru. The people could choose to trust General Musharraf and his allies or revert to Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto. By signing the Charter for Democracy, the two leaders have agreed to follow certain rules of the political game in the future.

Their commitment to a new pattern of behaviour might appeal to the people or they could find that their popular support has eroded. Either way, the people must be trusted to deliver the final judgement, not General Musharraf and a coterie of unelected generals, international bankers and businessmen who benefit from military rule.

But Pakistan is still in the grip of a vice-regal system under which the purpose of elections is merely to identify intermediaries between the people and a permanent State establishment. The State establishment monopolises executive power and retains a veto over legislation. On the few occasions when elected governments have been allowed to take office, the State establishment has tried its best to circumscribe the power of elected officials.

Between 1972 and 1977, an elected government managed to wield full authority because the permanent State structure simply could not stay in power after the bifurcation of the country under military rule. Students of Pakistan’s political history know that soon after the 1958 coup d’etat, Pakistan’s military leadership started searching for ‘forms of democracy’ that would allow the generals to retain control of policy while allowing civilians an illusion of political power and some control over patronage.

The military establishment and its apologists argue that the military’s direct political intervention in 1999 was necessitated by the widely discussed incompetence and corruption of the politicians that held power during the 1990s. But Pakistan’s history did not begin in 1988 and with the political competition between Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, both of whom have been systematically maligned by Pakistan’s establishment.

Pakistan’s army chiefs, beginning with Ayub Khan, have disqualified a generation of politicians at ten-year intervals, claiming that through local government and “grassroots democracy”, duly controlled by the ISI, they will produce a stable, democratic system over time. Pakistan’s problem, quite clearly, does not lie with specific politicians and their flaws. It is the product of an attitude that puts generals on a pedestal, refuses to recognise politics as a legitimate occupation and refuses to allow the will of the people to manifest itself in free and fair elections. General Musharraf’s claims of building ‘real democracy’ ring hollow in the absence of real elections.

Let Pakistanis elect their leader

Gulf News, June 7, 2006

Official Pakistan has responded to the buzz generated by the opposition’s Charter for Democracy in characteristic manner. Supporters of military rule are currently busy mocking the alliance between former rivals Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto.

Allegations of misrule under Bhutto and Sharif are being repeated and, in some cases, rehashed. General Pervez Musharraf is sticking to his previous line that the two former prime ministers will never be allowed to return to power.

All this begs the question: Why not let the people of Pakistan decide? After all, in a functioning democracy, elections are held periodically to determine whom the people want to wield executive office and legislative power. The people vote against politicians who failed to deliver and occasionally forgive their transgressions because of some other redeeming quality.

Furthermore, politics is about making a choice from available options. People can elect a leader in one election, vote them out in the next, only to elect them back under different circumstances. If someone is convicted of a crime by a court of law, the law takes its course.

Only last week, Peru’s voters elected Alan Garcia as president even though his tenure as president 16 years ago had been marked by a failing economy and a violent rebellion. An Associated Press report on Peru’s election explained the voters’ choice in terms of rejection for a candidate supported by Venezuela’s radically anti-American president Hugo Chavez.

“I want our party this time to demonstrate to the Peruvian people, who have called it to the highest responsibilities, that it will not convert the state into booty,” Garcia was reported as saying a reference to the corruption that had marked his first term from 1985-90.

Garcia may or may not deliver on his promises. But at least Peru’s military, or a shadowy establishment representing security and intelligence services, did not usurp the right of deciding whether a man whose term in office was ruinous in the eyes of some could run again or not.

The Pakistani people deserve the same right to decide upon the qualifications of their politicians as the people of Peru. The people could choose to trust General Musharraf and his allies or revert to Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto. By signing the Charter for Democracy, the two leaders have agreed to follow certain rules of the political game in the future.

Their commitment to a new pattern of behaviour might appeal to the people or they could find that their popular support has eroded. Either way, the people must be trusted to deliver the final judgment, not General Musharraf and a coterie of unelected generals, international bankers and businessmen who benefit from military rule.

But Pakistan is still in the grip of a vice-regal system under which the purpose of elections is merely to identify intermediaries between the people and a permanent State establishment.
The State establishment monopolises executive power and retains a veto over legislation. On the few occasions when elected governments have been allowed to take office, the State establishment has tried its best to circumscribe the power of elected officials.

Between 1972 and 1977, an elected government managed to wield full authority because the permanent State structure simply could not stay in power after the bifurcation of the country under military rule.

Students of Pakistan’s political history know that soon after the 1958 coup d’etat, Pakistan’s military leadership started searching for “forms of democracy” that would allow the generals to retain control of policy while allowing civilians an illusion of political power and some control over patronage.

The military establishment and its apologists argue that the military’s direct political intervention in 1999 was necessitated by the widely-discussed incompetence and corruption of the politicians that held power during the 1990s. But Pakistan’s history did not begin in 1988 and with the political competition between Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, both of whom have been systematically maligned by Pakistan’s establishment.

Pakistan’s army chiefs, beginning with Ayub Khan (who took power in 1958), have disqualified a generation of politicians at ten-year intervals, claiming that through local government and “grassroots democracy”, duly controlled by the ISI, they will produce a stable, democratic system over time.

Pakistan’s problem, quite clearly, does not lie with specific politicians and their flaws. It is the product of an attitude that puts generals on a pedestal, refuses to recognise politics as a legitimate occupation and refuses to allow the will of the people to manifest itself in free and fair elections. General Musharraf’s claims of building “real democracy” ring hollow in the absence of real elections.

Why Pakistan Should Look at Nigeria Nepal

Indian Express, June 2, 2006

Recent developments in Nepal and Nigeria offer an example for Pakistan on how to overcome entrenched authoritarian structures through popular mobilisation and thoughtful political action.

Nepal’s parliament, restored by King Gyanendra after massive street protests, has voted to strip the King of all substantive powers. That paves the way for Nepal’s transition, hopefully on a more stable basis, towards constitutional democracy under a titular monarch.

King Gyanendra’s effort to use his nation’s difficulties, including the brutal Maoist insurgency that plagues the countryside, to concentrate power in his own hands appears to have been thwarted. It took a combination of international pressure, manifestation of the people’s opposition to the King in the streets of Katmandu and cooperation among Nepal’s various political parties to ensure the diminution of the King’s authority. Nepal still has a long way to go in its transition to democracy but its political leaders have clearly agreed on a roadmap for that transition.

In Nigeria, the Senate threw out a proposed constitutional amendment that would have allowed retired General Olusegun Obasanjo to seek a third term as the country’s president. Like Pakistan, Nigeria has also had a chequered history of intermittent civilian and military rule. General Obasanjo had been Nigeria’s military ruler from 1976 to 1979. Then, he handed over power to an elected civilian government that was subsequently overthrown by the military. Obasanjo entered politics and was elected president in 1999 as a popular civilian politician after a round of disastrous military dictators.

Nigeria’s constitution limits elected presidents to two terms of office. But Obasanjo’s colleagues campaigned hard to change the constitution to enable their leader to secure the presidency again. The decision of the Nigerian parliament to reject the proposition is likely to strengthen democracy in Africa’s most populous country.

Educated Pakistanis who are equally disillusioned with the country’s military and political leaderships must look at the experiences of Nepal and Nigeria to identify prospects for change within their own country. King Gyanendra had justified his own power grab on grounds of the ineffectiveness and ineptitude of Nepal’s civilian politicians. But the politicians turned to the masses and were eventually able to demonstrate greater popular support for their messy democracy than for King Gyanendra’s ‘efficient autocracy.’ Pakistan’s politicians, too, would have to do the same.

Once Nepal’s people took to the streets, Gyanendra’s international support vaporized. The international community backed the demand for restoration of parliamentary government and it is unlikely that the cantankerous nature of Nepal’s politics will change the world’s commitment to constitutional democratic rule in Nepal.

The “Charter for Democracy” recently signed by Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif offers hope that the still popular exiled politicians might return to Pakistan in time for the 2007 parliamentary election. A popular uprising is more difficult to organize in Pakistan than in Nepal.

People power is more easily manifested in countries where the commercial center, political and cultural hub and state capital are all in one city or close to each other. In Pakistan’s case, the federal capital (Islamabad) is a city mostly of diplomats and civil servants while centers of commercial and political activity are widely dispersed. Unless an agitation campaign is organized in several Pakistani cities simultaneously it is unlikely to be effective.

The last such campaign, in 1977, succeeded because it was encouraged by the refusal of the military-intelligence complex to put it down with force. Since 1977, Pakistan’s military and intelligence services have ensured through manipulation that each of Pakistan’s major cities is controlled by a different political faction. Since the 1999 coup d’etat, General Pervez Musharraf has benefited from disagreements within opposition ranks and the lack of sufficient organization of Pakistan’s mainstream political parties.

‘‘The Charter for Democracy’’ marks the end of acrimony between the major parties, which was accentuated by the military-intelligence combine between 1988 and 1999 and then cited as justification for the military’s continuous meddling in politics. The supporters of the two mainstream parties would be encouraged to mobilize by the return to the country of their leaders. That would make it difficult for the Musharraf regime to stage-manage the results of the 2007 election.

If only Pakistan’s parliament acts like the Nigerian Senate and turns down any attempt by Musharraf to change the rules of the game again by amending or reinterpreting the constitution then Pakistan might also get another chance of becoming a democracy.