Even if Musharraf Wins the Polls

Indian Express , September 26, 2007

Not long ago, General Pervez Musharraf was quoted in newspaper reports as telling parliamentarians of the King’s Party (the PMLQ) that he would remain president for the next five years, come what may. Now with a presidential “election” looming, it is clear what he meant. Musharraf is depending on legal wizardry and shuffles in the army command to promote personally loyal officers, backed by an iron hand and a lot of bluster to keep him in power.

The arrest over the weekend of several major opposition figures reflects the iron hand. Legal wizardry is mirrored in the amendment to the rules by the Election Commission. The promotions and postings in the army’s senior ranks are ongoing. The claims by the minister for parliamentary affairs that Musharraf can be “elected” even if supported by only one assembly out of the five (plus the senate), which constitute the presidential electoral college, fall under the category of bluster. But the entire process is devoid of that most essential ingredient of contemporary governance: legitimacy.

Musharraf appears to have rejected the prospect of a negotiated settlement that would open up the political process in return for him retaining the presidency, but without absolute power. If there is no breakthrough in his talks with Benazir Bhutto and the PPP, the window for an orderly transition would narrow. The PPP would, in that case, join the other opposition parties in resigning from the assemblies. The emergence of a joint opposition would boost the morale of anti-Musharraf forces and expand the protests against one-man rule.

Even if Musharraf wins this current round, too, as he has won previous power plays dating back to his 1999 coup, he will not overcome the crisis of legitimacy. That crisis will be aggravated as he declares himself elected president, with or without uniform.
If the electoral college has significant vacancies and some provinces are inadequately represented in it, as might be the case with resignations by the opposition, Musharraf will glaringly lack support in parts of the country even in elections on his own terms. Legal challenges to his staying in office will persist as will political questioning. International support, already waning, will shrink further. If Musharraf lasts another five years he will be considerably diminished in authority and respect, though not necessarily in power.

Legitimacy is an important attribute of government. The kings of old invoked the divine right of kings simply to secure legitimacy. Communists tried to legitimate themselves with the epithet “people’s democracy” under the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Free, fair and inclusive elections have been the pre-requisite for legitimacy in the democratic world. Military takeovers have been justified as an interim measure to lay the foundations of a more legitimate order.

Initially, Musharraf sought legitimacy through claims that he had allowed a freer media and relatively free political discourse. The military coup of 1999 was described as an unusual measure. Musharraf claimed he was putting down the groundwork for a stable Pakistani democracy.

Many people were fooled by the rhetoric of gradual evolution to democracy. True, Musharraf, unlike Zia ul Haq, did not execute a former PM or order the public whipping of journalists or opponents. But he also did nothing to initiate the withdrawal of the military from politics.

Musharraf and the Pakistani military will soon have to make a choice. They can continue to be seen as a praetorian military that wields power but no longer commands respect at home or abroad. Or they can give up political power, embrace the concept of civilian control and alternation in authority, and secure legitimacy.

Musharraf’s Growing Crisis of Legitimacy

Gulf News, September 26, 2007

Not long ago General Pervez Musharraf was quoted in newspaper reports as telling parliamentarians of the King’s Party (the Pakistan Muslim League – Qaid-e-azam) that he would remain president for the next five years at all costs. Now with a presidential “election” looming, it is clear what he meant.

Musharraf is depending on legal wizardry and shuffles in the army command to promote personally loyal officers, backed by an iron hand and a lot of bluster to keep him in power.

The arrest over the weekend of several major opposition figures reflects the iron hand. Legal wizardry is mirrored in the amendment to rules by the Election Commission. The promotions and postings in the army’s senior ranks are ongoing.

Claims by the minister for parliamentary affairs that Musharraf can be “elected” even if supported by only one assembly out of the five (plus the senate), which constitute the presidential electoral college, fall under the category of bluster.

But the entire process is devoid of that most essential ingredient of contemporary governance: Legitimacy. Musharraf appears to have rejected the prospect of a negotiated settlement that would open the political process in return for him retaining the presidency but without absolute power.

If there is no breakthrough in his talks with Benazir Bhutto and the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), the window for an orderly transition would narrow.

The PPP would, in that case, join the other opposition parties in resigning from the current assemblies. The emergence of a joint opposition would boost the morale of anti-Musharraf forces and expand the protests against one-man rule.

Even if Musharraf wins this current round, too, as he has won previous power plays dating back to his 1999 military coup, he will not overcome the crisis of legitimacy that surrounds his government for quite some time. In fact, that crisis will be aggravated as he declares himself elected president, with or without uniform.

Vacancies

If the electoral college has significant vacancies and some provinces are inadequately represented in it, as might be the case with resignations by the opposition, Musharraf will glaringly lack support in parts of the country even in elections on his own terms. Legal challenges to his staying in office will persist as will political questioning.

International support, already waning, will shrink even further.

If Musharraf lasts another five years he will be considerably diminished in authority and respect though not necessarily in power.

For the first few years, Musharraf sought legitimacy in claims that he had allowed a freer media and relatively free political discourse. The military coup of 1999 was described as an unusual measure in unusual times. Musharraf claimed that he was putting down the groundwork for a stable Pakistani democracy.

In what can be construed as a direct negation of the Musharraf definition of a Pakistani democracy, the State department primer clearly states, “Democracies conduct regular free and fair elections open to all citizens. Elections in a democracy cannot be facades that dictators or a single party hide behind, but authentic competitions for the support of the people… [The] idea of civilian control and authority over the military is thus, fundamental to democracy.”

Musharraf and the Pakistani military would soon have to make a choice. They can continue to rule as it is and be seen as a praetorian military that wields power but no longer commands respect at home or abroad.

Myanmar (Burma) falls in that category. Or they can give up political power, beginning by embracing the concepts of civilian control and alternation in authority, and secure the legitimacy they now lack.

Religion is a touchy subject

Gulf News, September 20, 2007

Relations between the Muslim world and the west have seldom been good since European nations replaced Muslim empires as the dominant power in the Middle East, South Asia and parts of Southeast Asia.

But there is no need for western leaders to take the bait offered by extremist jihadists who wish to revive the tensions originally created during the course of medieval crusades.

The only way the West can win the global war against terrorism is with the marginalisation of extremist jihadis within the Muslim world and by widening of the circle of Muslim moderation and reform.

In this context, Pope Benedict XVI made a serious blunder when he cited a medieval Christian source to wonder aloud whether Islam’s message was inherently violent.

The Pope has now expressed regret over his remarks and explained that he did not intend to cause offence. But the damage is done.

Perceived attacks on Islam and on Muslims as a whole tend to galvanise the cause of Islamist hardliners who seek to gain new recruits for their ranks with calls of “Islam is in danger”.

Islamist sensibilities cannot and should not lead to self-censorship within the West. At the same time, Christian leaders such as the Pope should be sensitive to the likely impact of their words.

This sensitivity is all the more important in the context of the global war against terrorism and the need to convince the world’s 1.4 billion Muslims that the effort to root out the crescentade of people such as Osama Bin Laden is not, in fact, a thinly disguised plot to revive the European Christian crusades that attempted to overwhelm the Muslims between 1095 and 1291.

Any student of history knows that none of the world’s major religions have a monopoly over bigotry, prejudice and violence in the name of God.

Followers of all religions have killed heretics, apostates and followers of other religions at different times and justified their actions on the basis of their own religion.

Antagonise

To paint Islam alone as the religion of the sword and to insult Islam’s Prophet has been one of the ways in which the predominantly Christian West has managed, in the past, to antagonise large numbers of Muslims.

But at this juncture, when Western Civilisation is meant to represent secular pluralism and includes a growing number of Muslims within its fold, reviving old stereotypes is certainly not a good idea.

By all accounts, the Pope’s offending speech titled Faith, Reason, University at Regensburg University need not have contained the reference to Islam at all.

The speech was meant to elaborate the nature of reason from the Christian perspective.
Pope Benedict seeks to be the restorer of Europe’s ethical values and his primary concern so far has been the excessive secularism he sees as having seeped into the lives of western Christians during the 20th century.

The mention of Islam in the Pope’s speech came only to try and compare what he thought is the Muslim concept of God (as the Almighty above human reason) and the Christian view that equates God with reason.

Only a sense of prejudiced superiority could have encouraged Pope Benedict XVI to venture into such a comparison at a time when inter-faith dialogue with Islamic scholars and reform within the Muslim world are considered vital for global peace and security.

Direct attacks

Muslims have historically always reacted to direct attacks on their faith by embracing fundamentalist theology. Literalism in interpreting religion and admiration for defiant militants has followed whenever Islam’s ummah (community of believers) has been humiliated by non-Muslims.

With over one billion Muslims around the globe, the swelling of fundamentalist ranks poses serious problems for the major western powers.

If only one per cent of the world’s Muslims accept radical ideology and ten per cent of that one per cent decide to commit themselves to a militant agenda, we are looking at a one million strong recruitment pool for terrorism.

In the interaction with the West, especially since the end of the 19th century, Muslims have found themselves in the midst of successive defeats and repeated humiliation. Widely publicised pronouncements about Islam’s early history, coming from leaders such as the Pope, contribute to the sense of weakness of contemporary Muslims that plays straight into the hands of religious radicals.

Winning Muslim hearts and minds, inviting Islam’s theologians to adopt new ideas of religious tolerance and encouraging larger numbers of the world’s Muslims to embrace modernity without seeing it as a threat to their faith are important elements in any strategy to combat the extremist streak.

Under such circumstances, the world cannot afford comments by the Pope and other religious leaders that provide grounds for renewed religious extremist frenzy in the world of Islam.

The militant interpretation of Islam has usually failed to penetrate the thinking of over-whelming numbers of Muslims, especially in recent times.

But this could change if leading personalities in the West themselves provide the grist for Islamist propaganda mills by insulting Islam’s Prophet or by suggesting that Islam is inherently flawed and violent.

Upside of A Constitution

Indian Express , September 19, 2007

Pakistan is going through many convulsions to ensure that General Pervez Musharraf remains in office. The general believes he is indispensable for Pakistan. His sycophants encourage him in this. As a result, the Supreme Court is hearing several petitions challenging the constitutionality of his election bid while the supremely docile Election Commission is busily amending and reinterpreting rules to approve a Musharraf candidacy.

The opposition says it would not accept Musharraf’s election by an electoral college that has already endorsed him as president once before. One wonders, why can’t Pakistan go through leadership changes like mature nations, with a clearly defined election process that is periodically implemented by an undisputed mechanism?

The difference, of course, lies in Pakistan’s failure to ensure constitutional governance and rule of law that is, in turn, the result of frequent military interventions in the country’s politics. As a result of the military’s culture of unified command flowing over into the political realm, Pakistan’s governance revolves around the man in power, and not a political system.

Nations with evolved political systems do not always have great and charismatic leaders. But their constitutions and commitment to follow pre-determined rules provides stability and continuity in their governance.

The first president of the United States, George Washington, served two four-year terms as head of state and went into retirement. His successors have been elected at four-year intervals, with several being turned out of office after only one term.

The founder of France’s fifth republic, Charles de Gaulle, resigned office and preserved the constitutional order instead of seeking to prolong his rule at the expense of the constitution.

India’s first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, laid the foundations of Indian democracy by being prepared to risk losing power in open elections held periodically. The decisions of Washington, de Gaulle and Nehru have enabled their nations to evolve impressive political systems even though not all their successors have been impressive personalities.

For almost eight years, apologists for the Pakistani establishment tried to project Musharraf’s ad-hoc measures to consolidate his position in power as an elaborate plan to create a viable and self-sustaining political system in the country. The problem is, constitutional arrangements need national consensus and a willingness to submit one’s self to their scheme. The political consensus in Pakistan remains in favour of the parliamentary system of government with multiple political parties. The Pakistani military establishment has repeatedly conjured new constitutional arrangements with the specific objective of staying in charge, not to submit to rule of law.

Instead of continuing to believe in his indispensability, Musharraf still has the option of setting a new precedent for Pakistan. He could restore and abide by the constitution, respect the newly asserted independence of the judiciary, and revert to Parliament its legislative authority after free and fair elections.

Musharraf could start abiding by the notion of fixed tenures, without extension, of army generals (including him). He could also mandate special training programmes for military officers so that the current military culture of contempt for civilians, politics and constitutional governance is replaced by respect for democracy. As a result of these reforms, Pakistan would gain the good fortune of a self-sustaining democratic system that has become an absolute pre-requisite for the viability of nation-states in the present age.

Only if Musharraf accepts the risk of political competition (and be prepared to lose power), could he secure positive mention in Pakistan’s chequered history.

Folly and Hubris of Musharraf’s Rule

Gulf News, September 19, 2007

Pakistan is going through many convulsions to ensure that President General Pervez Musharraf remains in office. The general believes he is indispensable for Pakistan. His sycophants encourage him in that belief.

As a result, the Supreme Court is hearing several petitions challenging the constitutionality of Musharraf’s election bid while the supremely docile Election Commission is busily amending and reinterpreting rules to approve a Musharraf candidacy.

The opposition says it would not accept Musharraf’s election by an electoral college that has already endorsed him as president once before.

Why, one wonders, can’t Pakistan go through leadership changes like mature nations, with a clearly defined election process that is periodically implemented by an undisputed mechanism?

The difference, of course, lies in Pakistan’s failure to ensure constitutional governance and rule of law that is, in turn, the result of frequent military interventions in the country’s politics.

As a result of the military’s culture of unified command flowing over into the political realm, Pakistan’s governance revolves around the man in power and is not based on a political system.

Historically, Pakistan’s coup-makers have tried to avoid contesting an election for as long as possible. Pakistan’s misfortune has been that almost every Pakistani ruler thinks himself to be indispensable.

Pre-determined rules

Nations with evolved political systems do not always have great and charismatic leaders. But their constitutions and the commitment of everyone to follow pre-determined rules provides stability and continuity in their governance.

The first president of the US, George Washington, served two four-year terms as head of state and went into retirement. His successors have been elected at four-year intervals, with several being turned out of office after only one term.

The founder of France’s fifth republic, Charles de Gaulle, resigned office and preserved the constitutional order instead of seeking to prolong his rule at the expense of the constitution.

India’s first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, laid the foundations of Indian democracy by being prepared to risk losing power in open elections held periodically.

The decisions of Washington, de Gaulle and Nehru have enabled their nations to evolve impressive political systems even though not all their successors have been impressive personalities.

For almost eight years, apologists for the Pakistani establishment tried to project Musharraf’s ad-hoc measures to consolidate his position in power as an elaborate plan to create a viable and self-sustaining political system in the country.

These efforts at ascribing long-term value to an immediate power grab were not new.

The problem is, constitutional arrangements need national consensus and a willingness to submit one’s self to their scheme. The political consensus in Pakistan remains in favour of the parliamentary system of government with multiple political parties.

The Pakistani military establishment has repeatedly conjured new constitutional arrangements with the specific objective of staying in charge, not to submit to rule of law.

Instead of continuing to believe in his indispensability, Musharraf still has the option of setting a new precedent for Pakistan’s.

He could restore and abide by the constitution, respect the newly asserted independence of the judiciary and revert to parliament its legislative authority after free and fair elections.

As a result of these reforms, Pakistan would gain the good fortune of a self-sustaining democratic system that has become an absolute pre-requisite for the viability of nation-states in the present age.

Only if Musharraf accepts the risk of political competition, and like de Gaulle is ready to compete for (and be prepared to lose) power, could he secure positive mention in Pakistan’s chequered history.

Trapped in A Bad Script

Indian Express , September 12, 2007

Pakistan is a country run under the law of rulers, not one of which is subject to rule of law. If evidence was needed of this reality, it was provided on September 10, with the deportation of former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif.

The Musharraf regime claims that Sharif entered into an agreement seven years ago to stay out of the country and its politics for ten years. The agreement involved a foreign businessman, a foreign prince and the secret services of Pakistan and a foreign country. It is not even a written contract. Only in a state controlled by lawless coup-makers can an agreement of this nature trump the constitutional judgement of the country’s highest court. Sharif’s banishment was not unexpected, though on legal and moral grounds there is no justification for the government’s uncivil attitude towards the former prime minister.

That said, Sharif made an error in political judgement by failing to correctly estimate his strengths as well as his weaknesses. He was swayed by Pakistan’s many armchair revolutionaries into believing that his immediate return to the country would make him more popular than Benazir Bhutto. Sharif rejected Bhutto’s suggestion of following a two-track strategy of negotiating with the regime while at the same time opposing it. At a time when General Musharraf is almost universally hated as the symbol of authoritarianism in Pakistan, defiance of him could be the key to enhanced popularity.

But the armchair revolutionaries advocating defiance stayed at home on the day of Sharif’s arrival, leaving others to man the barricades. The regime shamelessly arrested hundreds of people and used a security blanket to block significant demonstrations of support for Sharif.

If the US needed a reminder that Musharraf is too distracted by domestic politics to continue the hunt for terrorists, it was provided by the mobilisation of thousands of security personnel to deal with a single political opponent.

The entire event exposed the weakness of Musharraf’s regime and the disastrous consequences of arbitrary governance. None of the military officers and civil servants engaged in the operation against Sharif had the moral courage to refuse the unlawful orders of their superiors.

Pakistan became the object of ridicule again, with images on television of plain-clothed men shoving a former elected prime minister. Had Musharraf obeyed the Supreme Court’s judgement and allowed Sharif to return, heavens would not have fallen. But Pakistan’s dictators have a set pattern as, unfortunately, do Pakistan’s political leaders.

Musharraf chose to stick to the authoritarian blueprint of tolerating no challenge to his absolute power. Sharif chose unplanned defiance as the route to instant popularity. The cause of democracy in Pakistan was hardly advanced.

For several weeks, Sharif’s supporters were attacking Bhutto for negotiating with Musharraf, even though Bhutto insists that she is only trying to work out an orderly transition to democracy. But Sharif’s view that there should be no talks at all amounted to posturing at the expense of substance.

After all, Sharif, too, was forced to deal with the Musharraf regime under duress and kept secret the terms of his arrangement involving the head of Saudi Intelligence, a Lebanese businessman and Musharraf’s security officials.

Given its turbulent political history, Pakistan needs a period of healing its national divisions. Polarisation between political forces has already diminished considerably and the country’s military-intelligence establishment also needs to end its ‘war’ against popular politicians.

Instead of breaking ranks with Bhutto over negotiating with an unlawful regime, it might have been better if Sharif had correctly estimated his ability to mount a street challenge and not exposed himself to a second deportation.

He could then have worked together with Bhutto to negotiate a settlement for return of democracy with the help of popular support. Musharraf’s regime looks weaker by the day because it lacks legitimacy. Pressure over Musharraf’s lack of legitimacy, rather than antics to show who is more capable of defiance, could make the general bow to the Pakistani nation’s desire for constitutionalism.

Sharif Done in By Absolute Power

Gulf News, September 12, 2007

Pakistan is a country run under the law of rulers not one that is subject to rule of law. If evidence was needed of this reality, it was provided on September 10 with the deportation of former prime minister Nawaz Sharif.

The Supreme Court of Pakistan had only recently recognised. Sharif’s “inalienable right” as a citizen to return to the country from an exile imposed on him by an unelected government. Instead of allowing Sharif to exercise his right, the government exiled him again.

The Musharraf regime claims that Sharif entered into an agreement seven years ago to stay out of the country and its politics for 10 years.

The agreement is not even a written contract. Only in a state controlled by lawless coup-makers can an agreement of this nature trump the constitutional judgement of the country’s highest court.

Sharif’s banishment is indeed a sad development but it cannot be said that it was unexpected. On legal and moral grounds there is no justification for the government’s uncivil attitude towards the former prime minister.

That said, Sharif made an error in political judgement by failing to correctly estimate his strengths as well as his weaknesses. He was swayed by Pakistan’s many armchair revolutionaries into believing that his immediate return to the country would make him more popular than Benazir Bhutto. But the armchair revolutionaries advocating defiance stayed at home on the day of Sharif’s arrival, leaving others to man the barricades. The regime shamelessly arrested hundreds of people and used a security blanket to block significant demonstrations of support for Sharif.

If the US needed a reminder that Musharraf is too distracted by domestic politics to continue the hunt for terrorists it was provided by the mobilisation of thousands of security personnel to deal with a single political opponent.

Commandos surrounded Sharif’s plane immediately after it landed in Islamabad, according to media reports, even though the US is paying top dollar for them to search and surround known Islamist terrorists.

The entire event exposed the weakness of Musharraf’s regime and the disastrous consequences of arbitrary governance. None of the military officers and civil servants engaged in the operation against Sharif had the moral courage to refuse the unlawful orders of their superiors.

Object

Pakistan became the object of international ridicule once more, with images on television of plainclothesmen shoving a former elected prime minister. Had Musharraf obeyed the Supreme Court’s judgement and allowed Sharif to return, heavens would not have fallen. But Pakistan’s dictators have a set pattern as, unfortunately, do Pakistan’s political leaders.

Musharraf chose to stick to the authoritarian blueprint of tolerating no challenge to his absolute power. Sharif chose unplanned defiance as the route to instant popularity. The cause of democracy in Pakistan was hardly advanced.

Instead of breaking ranks with Bhutto over negotiating with an unlawful regime, it might have been better if Sharif had correctly estimated his ability to mount a street challenge and not exposed himself to a second deportation.

He could then have worked with Bhutto to negotiate a settlement for return of democracy.

Musharraf’s regime looks weaker by the day because it lacks legitimacy – a precious commodity that may be the most important selling point for Pakistan’s popular politicians.

Pressure over Musharraf’s lack of legitimacy, rather than antics to show who is more capable of defiance, could make the general bow to the Pakistani nation’s desire for constitutionalism.

Many Versions of Democracy

Indian Express , September 5, 2007

The last three decades have seen the ouster from power of several entrenched authoritarian rulers around the world. The process of political change at the end of a dictatorship in most cases falls into two broad categories: the blood-in-the-streets outcome or the negotiated transition scenario.

In the first case, disillusionment with the autocrat leads to civil disturbance or mass protests. The successor regime is not guaranteed to be more democratic or inclusive than the outgoing one. In the second situation, a weakened regime negotiates a transition that protects some of the interests of its leading members but allows a new, usually more representative, government to emerge.

As General Pervez Musharraf’s grip on power slips, Pakistanis are contemplating the most effective way for the restoration of democracy. Given the pervasiveness of the military in Pakistan’s politics there is a widely expressed desire to ensure that Musharraf’s relinquishing of power should not be under circumstances that allow the military to continue to dabble in politics.

There is a widespread desire for systemic change. Former prime minister, Nawaz Sharif, has been allowed by the Supreme Court to return from exile, and he seems to believe that upon returning home he can bring the masses into the streets and force Musharraf’s resignation. The “let nobody talk to Musharraf and thereby oust the dictator” crowd is ecstatic. Sharif’s “courage” in deciding to return home, face the threat of arrest and challenge military rule is being praised on TV talk shows and in newspaper columns.

Negative comparisons are being made with the decision by the other exiled former prime minister, Benazir Bhutto, to negotiate with Musharraf the terms of her return to the country. Suddenly, Sharif is the paragon of democracy and Bhutto “the sell out.”

Those praising Sharif’s “principled” stance forget that he launched his national political career with the help of the military and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), on the shoulders of Pakistan’s Islamists. Without casting doubt on his current commitment to democracy, is it not relevant to at least wonder whether his enthusiasm in returning home to topple Musharraf could mark a repetition of the Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI) of 1988? Then, the ISI had encouraged Sharif to join forces with Jamaat-e-Islami to contain Bhutto and her Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP).

Even now, it is clear that the might and wrath of Pakistan’s establishment is reserved for the PPP and not for Sharif’s faction. Notwithstanding her recent negotiations with Musharraf, Bhutto is not known for being a protégé of Pakistan’s military or intelligence services. On the other hand, Sharif may have fallen afoul of General Musharraf but he is clearly acceptable to other rightwing generals who still regard him as their former ally.

Bhutto is also being denigrated for trying to achieve a deal with Musharraf without mention of the fact that negotiations are an integral part of politics. Bhutto would have been at fault if her negotiating points had excluded demands such as removal of Musharraf’s uniform and the abrogation of the notorious eighth amendment to the constitution.

Now that the talks between Bhutto and Musharraf’s emissaries have stalled over these key issues, it is clear that Bhutto is not just cutting a personal deal with Musharraf.

The general, on the other hand, has been trying to “create the illusion of a deal without actually pursuing one” (as I wrote in these columns, ‘No big deal’, IE, April 11). Part of the purpose, especially of the government’s covert operatives has been to undermine Bhutto’s credentials as a democrat and to pave the way for a new IJI that challenges Musharraf but not the military-ISI.

Sharif’s entire political career has comprised of deals with the military-intelligence establishment. One cannot grudge his decision to get out of jail in 2000 as a result of a deal with the Musharraf regime, facilitated by foreign albeit friendly-to-Pakistan emissaries. But surely that should disqualify him from being painted as an unbending champion of civilian-democratic rule on the verge of leading a peoples power revolution.

The better bet for Pakistan right now is a negotiated settlement that enables both Sharif and Bhutto to return to Pakistani politics while at the same time addressing the systemic and institutional problems that have blocked Pakistan’s path to democracy.

Best Bet for Pakistan

Gulf News, September 5, 2007

The last three decades have seen the ouster from power of several entrenched authoritarian rulers around the world. The process of political change at the end of dictatorship in most cases falls into two broad categories: the blood-in-the-streets outcome or the negotiated transition scenario.

In the first case, disillusionment with the autocrat leads to civil disturbance or mass protests. Either the arrogant ruler or the opposition refuses to engage in talks and the regime collapses after excessive violence. The successor regime is not guaranteed to be more democratic or inclusive than the outgoing one.

In the second situation, a weakened regime negotiates a transition that protects some of the interests of its leading members but allows a new, usually more representative, government to emerge.

As General Pervez Musharraf’s grip on power slips, Pakistanis are contemplating the most effective way for the restoration of democracy.

Given the pervasiveness of the military in Pakistan’s politics there is a widely expressed desire to ensure that Musharraf’s relinquishing of power should not be under circumstances that allow the military to continue to dabble in politics.

There is a widespread desire for systemic change. Hardly anyone wants a rerun of Pakistan’s troubled past, manifested in changes of faces at the helm without a weakening of the army’s overall control.

Former prime minister Nawaz Sharif has been allowed by the Supreme Court to return from exile and he seems to believe that upon returning home he can bring the masses into the streets and force Musharraf’s resignation.

The “let nobody talk to Musharraf and thereby oust the dictator” crowd is ecstatic.

Sharif’s “courage” in deciding to return home, face the threat of arrest and challenge military rule is being praised on TV talk shows and in newspaper columns.

Negative comparisons are being made with the decision by the other exiled former prime minister Benazir Bhutto to negotiate with Musharraf the terms of her return to the country. Suddenly, Sharif is the paragon of democracy and Bhutto “the sell out”.

Those praising Sharif’s “principled” stance forget that he launched his national political career with the help of the military and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), on the shoulders of Pakistan’s Islamists.

Without necessarily casting doubt on his current commitment to democracy, is it not relevant to at least wonder whether his enthusiasm in returning home to topple Musharraf could mark a repetition of the Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI) of 1988?

Then, the ISI had encouraged Sharif to join forces with the Jamaat-e-Islami to contain Bhutto and her Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP).

Reserved

Even now, it is clear that the might and wrath of Pakistan’s establishment is reserved for the PPP and not for Sharif’s faction. Notwithstanding her recent negotiations with Musharraf, Bhutto is not known for being a protege of Pakistan’s military or intelligence services. On the other hand, Sharif may have fallen afoul of Musharraf but he is clearly acceptable to other rightwing generals who still regard him as their former ally.

Now that the talks between Bhutto and Musharraf’s emissaries have stalled over these key issues, it is clear that Bhutto has been trying to work out a negotiated transition rather than just cutting a personal deal with Musharraf.

The general, on the other hand, has been trying to “create the illusion of a deal without actually pursuing one” (as I wrote in these columns on April 11). Part of the purpose, especially of the government’s covert operatives has been to undermine Bhutto’s credentials as a democrat and to pave the way for a new IJI that challenges Musharraf but not the military-ISI paradigm of state.

The better bet for Pakistan right now is a negotiated settlement that enables both Sharif and Bhutto to return to Pakistani politics while at the same time addressing the systemic and institutional problems that have blocked Pakistan’s path to democracy.