Monthly Archives: July 2007

Gulf News, July 26, 2007

For more than five decades Pakistan’s military rulers have depended on the country’s judiciary to provide a fig leaf of legitimacy for their arbitrary decisions.

Last week’s judgement by the Supreme Court to restore Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry as Chief Justice and to declare General Pervez Musharraf’s decision to remove him from office as unlawful brings to an end that arrangement between the courts and the military.

The Supreme Court ruling weakens an embattled Musharraf further and demonstrates the unwillingness of Pakistan’s civilians to endlessly obey the military’s commands. Musharraf now has two options.

He could he recognise the emerging reality and initiate a process of national reconciliation that allows civilian institutions – from courts and the civil services to political parties and civil society organisations – to function independently within their respective spheres.

Or he could persist with the doctrine of the military’s supremacy that has polarised Pakistan along several lines.

Musharraf recently told newspaper editors that he believed in “unified command”, which indicates that he has yet to understand how he and his military predecessors have obstructed the emergence of a consensus system of governance that absorbs differences within society without widespread resort to violence and tearing apart the country.

The notion of a single individual leading the nation to greatness is embedded in the Pakistan army’s thinking ever since Field Marshal Ayoub Khan introduced it as a substitute for national consensus, constitutional rule and rule of law.

Unified command

In his quest for unified command, Ayoub Khan fragmented the Pakistani nation within the first few years of its creation. So deep-rooted was Ayoub Khan’s belief in the army as Pakistan’s saviour that when he was forced to resign in 1969 amid massive street demonstrations, he chose not to transfer power to a civilian under the terms of the constitution he had himself ordained in 1962.

Musharraf’s humiliation at the hands of the Supreme Court should be cause for him and his fellow army officers to review their fundamental approach to governance. The doctrine of unified command should be abandoned in favour of governance by national reconciliation and consensus.

The people must have the right to vote governments in and out. The politicians they elect must be able to govern according to the constitution until their term runs out.

Judges should adjudicate disputes according to law and not as per the doctrine of necessity. The army should defend the country against enemies identified by the elected parliament and army chiefs should have fixed terms.

Musharraf sees no contradiction in his assertion that Pakistan is in a state of war with Islamist extremists and his desire to have his way on all issues big or small.

Nations must unite at times of war but Musharraf has not done anything to overcome any of Pakistan’s divisions to focus exclusively on fighting terrorists and militants.

Pakistan is polarised between rich and poor, Islamist and secularist, pro-military and pro-civilian rule. Ethnic divisions not only persist, they seem to have aggravated over the last eight years.

Democracies subsume disagreements and diversity by allowing the majority to have its way until the next election while protecting the rights of the minority under law. Authoritarianism, or “unified command” as Musharraf describes it, simply hardens the divisions in society.

Indian Express , July 24, 2007

For more than five decades Pakistan’s military rulers have depended on the country’s judiciary to provide a fig leaf of legitimacy for their arbitrary decisions. Last week’s judgment by the Supreme Court to restore Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry as chief justice, and General Musharraf’s decision to remove him from office as unlawful, brings to an end that arrangement between the courts and the military.

The Supreme Court ruling weakens an embattled Musharraf further and demonstrates the unwillingness of Pakistan’s civilians to endlessly obey the military’s commands.

Musharraf now has two options. He could recognise the emerging reality and initiate a process of national reconciliation that allows civilian institutions to function independently within their respective spheres. Or he could persist with the doctrine of the military’s supremacy that has polarised Pakistan along several lines. Musharraf recently told newspaper editors that he believed in “unified command”, which indicates that he has yet to understand how he and his military predecessors have obstructed the emergence of a consensus system of governance that absorbs differences within society without widespread resort to violence and tearing the country apart.

Musharraf sees no contradiction in his assertion that Pakistan is in a state of war with Islamist extremists and his desire to have his way on all issues big or small. Nor has he done anything to overcome any of Pakistan’s divisions to focus exclusively on fighting terrorists and militants.

For Musharraf, Pakistan’s politicians and their alleged petty corruptions — or a dozen other things he dislikes about Pakistani civilians — are as much the enemy as terrorism. He has not hesitated to use force against ethnic political groups refusing to toe the line, while allowing his allies a free hand in unleashing violence against his opponents. Pakistan is polarised between rich and poor, Islamist and secularist, pro-military and pro-civilian rule. Ethnic divisions not only persist, they seem to have aggravated over the last eight years.

Democracies subsume disagreements and diversity by allowing the majority to have its way until the next election while protecting the rights of the minority under law. Authoritarianism, or “unified command” as Musharraf describes it, simply hardens the divisions in society. In Pakistan’s case, the military-intelligence complex that runs the country has periodically played up various schisms to justify strong-arm, centralised rule.

The Supreme Court’s rebuke to Musharraf could be seen by him as a blessing in disguise because it ends a distracting crisis of his own making, giving him the opportunity to concentrate on dealing with jihadist extremism. But that is not Musharraf’s personality.

He suffers from a messiah complex, believes the army alone has the right to run Pakistan and is very self righteous. Musharraf will read this judgment as a snub and will most likely get into further confrontations with the judiciary as well as other elements of Pakistan’s civilian society.

Musharraf has received accolades from the US for finally beginning to show resolve against Pakistan’s homegrown extremists. He painted the recent Lal Masjid incident in Islamabad as the beginning of a wider war against extremism. But Musharraf has declared war on militant extremists several times since September 11, 2001, only to compromise or negotiate with them.

Under Musharraf, Pakistan’s Islamist militancy has grown, not diminished, as have the country’s other problems. Recent US intelligence assessments that the Al-Qaeda has reorganised itself primarily from Pakistan also confirm that Musharraf has failed to accomplish what the Bush administration publicly praises him for. But it seems he only wants to stay in power and to that end he has made governing Pakistan a massive juggling act.

Musharraf tries to fit in several contradictory policies in his agenda, and is often willing to incur great cost to simply maintain the status quo. And for the moment the Supreme Court may have won the recent turf war with General Musharraf but Pakistan’s many battles within are far from over.

Indian Express , July 18, 2007

The military operation against Islamabad’s Lal Masjid has brought into focus the price Pakistan is paying for its past sponsorship and tolerance of Islamist militants as an instrument of foreign policy. When Pakistan’s first military ruler, Field Marshal Ayub Khan, moved the capital to Islamabad he envisaged a quiet city inhabited by diplomats and government servants and untouched by the political upheavals in the rest of the country.

For most of its history, Islamabad has lived up to that expectation. During the 1990s, for example, when Sindh was torn by ethnic violence, one hardly felt its reverberations in Islamabad. In this context, the very fact that the first major urban clash between Islamist militants and Pakistan’s military has taken place in Islamabad indicates the depth of Pakistan’s extremism problem.

For his part, General Pervez Musharraf has described the operation as part of a war on extremists. But he made similar assertions soon after taking power in 1999, then immediately after 9/11 and subsequently in his famous speech of January 12, 2002. Then, Musharraf had declared. “Whoever is involved with such (terrorist) acts in the future will be dealt with strongly whether they come from inside or outside the country.”

Five and a half years since that declaration, terrorist attacks in Pakistan have reached an all-time high. If Musharraf has been waging a war against terrorism for the last several years, Pakistan is clearly losing it.

Now US intelligence assessments indicate that the Al-Qaeda has reconstituted itself and is planning attacks around the world from its new base in Pakistan. Optimists say that the Lal Masjid operation reflects renewed resolve within the Musharraf regime to root out terrorism. Pessimists point out that there have been several similar turning points in the past and the overall picture has not changed. If Musharraf could not tackle the problem when he was relatively new to the job, how can he be expected to crack down effectively against militants at a time when his lack of domestic political support is widespread?

Islamist extremism, nurtured by the Pakistani state, especially since the days of General Zia-ul-Haq, cannot be eliminated by the use of force alone though military action would have to be part of any strategy to deal with trained terrorists.

Pakistan’s army can be a part of the solution in dealing with extremists provided it recognises how it has so far been part of the problem. Pakistan’s extremist problem is a creation of the Pakistani military’s ill-considered strategic decisions of the past.

Until now, Musharraf and his associates simply did not see the threat of militancy and terrorism even as they considered their civilian political opponents a threat. Assuming that Pakistan’s interest is their prime motivation, the ruling generals failed to treat the jihadis as a force inimical to Pakistan’s interest notwithstanding statements to the contrary since 2001. Almost every action that was taken against the jihadis was taken reluctantly and in response to international pressure.

Musharraf’s “betrayal” of the Taliban in Afghanistan made Pakistan’s jihadis aware of their need for caution in depending on governments they do not control. This means that while they would not be averse to cooperation from state actors, they would not trust them. Thus, while Pakistan’s rulers simply wanted to hold the jihadis in reserve for another thrust in Kashmir, the jihadis themselves did not refrain from attacks inside Pakistan or against Pakistan’s allies such as the US and Afghanistan under Hamid Karzai.

For five and a half years, Musharraf has been declaring war against jihadis who were initially organised, armed and trained to engage in jihad in Afghanistan and Indian-controlled Jammu and Kashmir. But unless the military acknowledges that it was wrong earlier, and concedes space to Pakistani civilians in spheres of decision-making that are reserved for civilians in other countries, it cannot create the national consensus that is needed to do away with the residue of years of strategic misdirection.

As it is, the standing of the Pakistan army in the eyes of Pakistan’s citizenry is at its lowest in sixty years. Critics are pointing out that Pakistan’s military has conducted more military operations inside Pakistan in the last five decades than it has fought wars against external enemies.

It is difficult to deny this contention, counting the three operations in Balochistan (1960s, 1970s and last year), East Pakistan (1971), interior Sindh (1983-88), Karachi (1992), Federally Administered Tribal Areas (ongoing) and Islamabad (July 2007). No army can afford to alienate several segments of its population and hope to succeed in its mission of ensuring national security.

Only by accepting to work under civilian direction, in accordance with Pakistan’s Constitution, can the Pakistan army regain the stature it needs to have before it can successfully prosecute a war against Islamist extremists within the country.

Gulf News, July 18, 2007

The military operation against Islamabad’s Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) has brought into focus the price Pakistan is paying for its past sponsorship and tolerance of Islamist militants as an instrument of foreign policy.

When Pakistan’s first military ruler, Field Marshal Ayub Khan, moved the capital to Islamabad he envisaged a quiet city inhabited by diplomats and government servants and untouched by the political upheavals in the rest of the country.

For most of its history, Islamabad has lived up to that expectation. During the 1990s, for example, when Sindh was torn by ethnic violence, one hardly felt its reverberations in Islamabad.

In that context, the very fact that the first major urban clash between Islamist militants and Pakistan’s military has taken place in Islamabad indicates the depth of Pakistan’s extremism problem.

For his part, General Pervez Musharraf has described the operation as part of a war on extremists. But he made similar assertions soon after taking power in 1999, then immediately after 9/11 and subsequently in his famous speech of January 12, 2002.

Then, Musharraf had declared, “Whoever is involved with such [terrorist] acts in the future will be dealt with strongly whether they come from inside or outside the country.”

Five and a half years since that declaration, terrorist attacks in Pakistan have reached an all-time high. If Musharraf has been waging a war against terrorism for the last several years, Pakistan is clearly losing it.

Now US intelligence assessments indicate that Al Qaida has reconstituted itself and is planning attacks around the world from its new base in Pakistan. Optimists say that the Lal Masjid operation reflects renewed resolve within the Musharraf regime to root out terrorism.

Pessimists point out that there have been several similar turning points in the past and the overall picture has not changed.

If Musharraf could not tackle the problem when he was relatively new to the job, how can he be expected to crack down effectively against militants at a time when his lack of domestic political support is widespread?

Islamist extremism, nurtured by the Pakistani state especially since the days of General Zia ul Haq, cannot be eliminated by the use of force alone though military action would have to be part of any strategy to deal with trained terrorists.

Political rivalry

Until now, Musharraf and his associates simply did not seem to see the threat of militancy and terrorism the same way as they considered their civilian political opponents a threat.

Assuming that Pakistan’s interest is their prime motivation, the ruling generals failed to treat the jihadis as a force inimical to Pakistan’s interest notwithstanding statements to the contrary since 2001.

Almost every action that was taken against the jihadis was taken reluctantly and in response to international pressure.

As it is, the standing of the Pakistan army in the eyes of Pakistan’s citizenry is at its lowest in 60 years. Critics are pointing out that Pakistan’s military has conducted more military operations inside Pakistan in the last five decades than it has fought wars against external enemies.

No army can afford to alienate several segments of its population and hope to succeed in its mission of ensuring national security.

Only by accepting to work under civilian direction, in accordance with Pakistan’s constitution, can the Pakistan army regain the stature it needs to have before it can successfully prosecute a war against Islamist extremists within the country.

Gulf News, July 18, 2007

The bloody end to the siege of Islamabad’s Lal Masjid speaks volumes about General Pervez Musharraf’s style of governance and decision-making. Musharraf alternates between promising much, delivering little, and finally, trying to make up for lost time with highly visible displays of force. His sporadic actions are timed to win support of the United States and other Western countries but, over the years, he has managed to alienate virtually every important domestic constituency in Pakistan.

The shootout at Lal Masjid is emblematic of Musharraf’s deadly inconsistencies.

Since January, the clerics of Lal Masjid used the government-run mosque in the heart of the capital, not far from the headquarters of Pakistan’s dreaded Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) as the centre for their Taliban-like movement to promote their brand of virtue.

They occupied a government library, sponsored raids on alleged brothels, ran vigilante squads that forcibly shut down video shops, and dispensed instant justice through unofficial Sharia courts. Their exhortations to jihad became the focus of the world’s attention.

Pakistan’s ubiquitous intelligence services, capable of spying even inside the home of the nation’s Chief Justice, could easily have determined the capabilities of Maulana Abdul Aziz and his brother Abdul Rashid Gazi, who died in the final showdown. They didn’t. Instead, for almost seven months, Musharraf gave them time to amass weapons and ammunition.

Uncharacteristic haste

Given the government’s track record of inaction, Pakistanis expected a negotiated settlement which would give the mosque’s leaders safe passage for evacuating the premises. However, the government imposed a curfew in surrounding areas and besieged the mosque.

After luring Maulana Aziz out of the mosque and arresting him, the government succeeded in persuading a majority of the unarmed madrassa students to come out of the complex and surrender. That left Abdul Rashid Gazi and a few die-hard militants, along with many women and children, whom the government claimed were hostages.

After a final round of negotiations, which Musharraf claims failed, army commandos from the Special Services Group (SSG) stormed Lal Masjid in an operation code-named Operation Silence. The ensuing gun battle killed 100 people, according to official figures. But more than 200 people, including women and children, have been missing since.

The government’s assertion that no women or children were killed in its operation contradicts its earlier claims that women and children were being held hostage.

The cloak of secrecy surrounding the operation — refusal to give the media access to Islamabad’s hospitals which are treating the injured, burying the dead with haste instead of handing over the bodies to the families, and the clean up of the mosque before allowing the media in — shows the government had something to hide.

Had it been a simple matter of the Pakistani state confronting monsters it nurtured for the Afghan and Kashmiri jihads, there would have been no need to cover things up. But Operation Silence was a massive show of force aimed at sending a message to the Pakistani military’s jihadi protégés. They must toe the government’s line or risk extermination.

Musharraf has painted the Lal Masjid incident as the beginning of a wider war against extremism. But Musharraf has declared war on militant extremists several times since 9/11 only to later compromise with them.

The manner in which Abdul Rashid Gazi made his last stand in the heart of Pakistan’s capital shows the militants are bolder and more fanatical than ever. Under Musharraf, Pakistan’s Islamist militancy has grown, not diminished.

Recent US intelligence assessments that Al Qaida has reorganised itself from Pakistan also imply Musharraf has failed to accomplish what the Bush administration publicly praises him for.

Double talk

Trained as an army commando, Musharraf thinks tactically rather than strategically. His only aim is to stay in power and to that end, he has made governing Pakistan a massive juggling act.

Musharraf tries to fit in several contradictory policies within his agenda. He wants to be seen as the man determined to save Pakistan from extremism but doesn’t want to end the close ties between the military and militant Islamists dating back to the jihad against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and the Pakistani-backed insurgency in Kashmir.

Although seen as promoting normalisation of relations with India, Musharraf is the same person who sabotaged the India-Pakistan peace process.

And, unlike his military predecessors who only jailed political opponents, Musharraf has kept two of his most significant challengers (Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif) in exile.

Musharraf allows media freedom but wants that freedom to be exercised only in his favour. More Pakistani journalists have been killed — or have disappeared — during the last five years than under any previous government.

Musharraf is seen as a key American ally. But in his book In the Line of Fire, Musharraf says he became an American collaborator only because he did not think Pakistan could fight the Americans and win.

Musharraf’s contradictions are endless. Even though he has brought a semblance of short-term stability and economic prosperity to Pakistan after years of relative chaos and limited economic growth, his failure to address any of Pakistan’s fundamental problems indicates that he may have laid the foundations of greater chaos, polarisation and violence in the years to come.

Indian Express , July 11, 2007

The siege that was at Islamabad’s Lal Masjid and the recent thwarted terrorist attacks in London involving an Iraqi-born doctor are the latest symptoms of what ails the Muslim world.

Unwilling to take stock of the causes of its decline, the global Muslim community is trapped between the rhetoric of thoughtless radical clerics, the hate and anger of their violence-prone followers and the opportunistic behaviour of governments lacking legitimacy.

The clerics of Lal Masjid encouraged their students to impose their brand of Islam through vigilante actions. They used their pulpit to imbue their disciples with violent rage against rival sects, other religions, the US, the trappings of a westernised life, the regime of Musharraf and those individuals they considered indulging in un-Islamic behaviour.

Over the last several months, young students of institutions attached to Lal Masjid, Jamia Fareedia and Jamia Hafsa (including women) forcibly took over a public library and kidnapped women they accused of prostitution. They forced video shops to close down their businesses and dispensed instant justice at an unofficial court. Maulana Abdul Aziz and Abdul Rashid Ghazi constantly exhorted their flock to Taliban-like vigilantism and terrorism, which they described as jihad.

The oratory of the two Lal Masjid clerics is similar to the hate-filled preaching of other self-styled jihadist Islamists around the globe. Sheikh Omar Bakri Muhammad and Abu Hamza al-Masri of London and Abubakar Basheer of Indonesia are other examples of radical clergy that urges Muslims to wage war against the west and use terrorism to somehow restore the past glory of Muslims.

At the heart of these clerics’ world view is an incorrect diagnosis of contemporary Muslim humiliation and weakness. The current state of the ummah — the Muslim community of believers — is the result of a failure to keep up with knowledge, science and technology, modern means of wealth generation and evolved systems of political and social organisation. But the rhetoric of the radicals attributes the Muslims’ decline to the power of the West and recommends random violence as a means of leveling the global playing field.

Their argument seems to be that since Muslims cannot beat the west on the terms of modernity, they should seek to eliminate modernity and revert to their glorious past by emulating the lifestyle of Islam’s pioneers. Instead of recognising the need to modernise the Muslim world, jihadists claim they can Islamise the modern world through furious speeches and violence.

Many ordinary Muslims, such as the Lal Masjid students and the Iraqi-born British doctor and his partners who plotted the recent foiled attacks in London, accept the flawed logic of the radical clerics and adopt terrorism as their line of attack in what they believe is a millennial struggle between Islam and un-Islam. But some of the radical clerics do not practice what they preach, like Maulana Abdul Aziz who opted to escape his besieged mosque in a burqa notwithstanding his exhortations to martyrdom. Others lead their followers to death and injury, with little to show as the positive outcome of their grandstanding.

The opportunism of rulers lacking in legitimacy further aggravates the tragedy caused for the Muslim world by radical clerics and their ill-motivated followers.

Musharraf’s government is not alone in allowing this radical menace to lurk as part of a grand design to convince the international community that the authoritarian ruler alone can keep the lid on a perilous pressure cooker. Other governments in the Muslim world have engaged in similar patterns of behaviour, alternately nourishing and fighting extremism with little regard for the long-term consequences. The crisis of the Muslim world continues to deepen.

Radical Islamists claim that “Islam is in danger”. But this danger comes primarily from terrorism, economic and knowledge poverty of Muslims and lack of progress that prevents Muslims from being equal partners in the contemporary world.

Gulf News, July 11, 2007

The siege at Islamabad’s Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) and the recent thwarted terrorist attacks in London involving an Iraqi-born doctor are the latest symptoms of what ails the Muslim world.

Unwilling to take stock of the causes of its decline, the global Muslim community is trapped between the rhetoric of thoughtless radical clerics, the hate and anger of their violence-prone followers and the opportunistic behaviour of governments lacking legitimacy.

The clerics of Lal Masjid encouraged their students to impose their brand of Islam through vigilante actions. Their oratory is similar to the hate-filled preaching of other self-styled jihadist Islamists such as Shaikh Omar Bakri Mohammad and Abu Hamza Al Masri of London, and Abu Bakr Basheer of Indonesia.

At the heart of these clerics’ world view is an incorrect diagnosis of contemporary Muslim humiliation and weakness.

The current state of the Ummah – the Muslim community of believers – is the result of a failure to keep up with knowledge, science and technology, modern means of wealth generation and evolved systems of political and social organisation.

But the rhetoric of the radicals attributes the Muslims’ decline to the rise and power of the West and recommends random violence as a means of levelling the global playing field.

Instead of recognising the need to modernise the Muslim world, the jihadists claim they can Islamise the modern world through furious speeches and violence.

The opportunism of rulers lacking in legitimacy further aggravates the tragedy caused for the Muslim world by radical clerics and their ill-motivated followers.

For several months, Musharraf’s military regime did little to stop Lal Masjid from becoming a radical stronghold.

Pakistan’s ubiquitous intelligence agencies clearly failed to correctly estimate the strength of armed men and potential suicide bombers holed up in it and the library occupied by the Pakistani Taliban.

Real problem

The fact that Pakistani intelligence operatives have been found tapping the Chief Justice’s telephone and taking pictures inside his home reveals the real problem of the Musharraf regime.

Its priorities are misplaced. If the energy spent on spying on judges and political opponents was focused on finding and fighting Islamist extremists and terrorists, the situation at Lal Masjid would have been pre-empted.

Musharraf is simply muddling through, instead of evolving a clear vision backed by a coherent strategy that makes Pakistan a normal (as opposed to a troubled) state.

Musharraf’s government is not alone in allowing menace to lurk as part of a grand design to convince the international community that the authoritarian ruler alone can keep the lid on a perilous pressure cooker.

Other governments in the Muslim world have engaged in similar patterns of behaviour, alternately nourishing and fighting extremism with little regard for the long-term consequences. As a result of these rulers’ self-serving attitudes the crisis of the Muslim world continues to deepen.

Radical Islamists often claim that “Islam is in danger”. But this danger comes primarily from terrorism, economic and knowledge poverty of Muslims and lack of progress that prevents Muslims from being equal partners in the contemporary world.