US Grand Strategy for South Asia

The Nation (Pakistan),May 25, 2005

American policy makers believe that they finally have new grand strategy toward South Asia. The strategy is outlined by Ashley Tellis in a new Policy brief published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. The U.S. objective is to enable India to become a great power while at the same time assisting Pakistan in attaining security and stability. “By expanding relations with both states in a differentiated way matched to their geostrategic weights,” Tellis argues, “the Bush administration seeks to assist Pakistan in becoming a successful state while it enables India to secure a trouble free ascent to great-power status.” According to Tellis, these objectives would be achieved “through a large economic and military assistance package to Islamabad and through three separate dialogues with New Delhi that will review various challenging issues such as civil nuclear cooperation, space, defense co-production, regional and global security, and bilateral trade.”

In his policy brief Tellis outlines American thinking and points out some of the potential challenges in realizing the new strategic goals. The major problem I see with an American grand strategy for the region is that it might be based on assumptions about the intentions of regional players that prove incorrect over time. Is Pakistan, for example, reconciled to India’s status as the region’s pre-eminent power? Can India or the United States deal with the inevitable divergence between Pakistan’s stated and actual policies that stem from its multi-layered decision making process?

This may be the first time the U.S. is basing its South Asia strategy on positive engagement with Pakistan coupled with a clear acknowledgement of India’s ascendance. In the past, American policy makers have been afraid that support for one would upset the other – and, in fact, it did. Right now, General Pervez Musharraf appears amenable to acceptance of Indian concerns. But the general lacks a popular mandate. The possibility of a populist politician whipping up anti-Indian sentiment, and thereby jeopardizing the current peace process, cannot be ruled out.

It is true that Pakistan’s only powerful institution, the military, appears to support Musharraf’s policy of securing U.S. assistance and engaging in dialogue with India. But there is no evidence that the military has given up the traditional perception of its own role as the only obstacle to “Indian hegemony.” Musharraf’s rise to power was enabled by his hard-line stance towards India. Even now, he gives mixed signals about what he has in his mind as the realistic basis of stable relations in South Asia.

 

Last week, General Musharraf indicated his willingness to take into account India’s sensitivities on a Kashmir settlement based on religious division. It was the first time a Pakistani ruler had indicated his willingness to overcome the strong sentiment over the 1947 partition that has divided the two countries. During the last 58 years, Indians have felt compelled to delegitimize the wisdom of partition while Pakistanis have insisted on defending the “logic of partition” as the basis of their nation’s existence. It would be a major breakthrough in India-Pakistan relations if General Musharraf could transform his random thoughts about a new equation in South Asia into state policy. His inability to do so indicates that either he faces serious resistance to these ideas or voices them to please his Indian and American audiences without really having given up Pakistan’s traditional policy paradigm.

Until a year and a half ago, General Musharraf made it plain that he did not trust or like India and the rhetoric of the peace process initiated under American encouragement notwithstanding, there is no explanation for why he should have changed his mind. In an interview with the Washington Post in May 2002, General Musharraf said that India wanted “to destabilize Pakistan” and “to isolate Kashmir and then crush whatever is happening with all their force.” Asked if India wanted “a stable modernizing Pakistan as its neighbor”, he replied, “Not at all. They want a subservient Pakistan which remains subservient to them.” If, as is being suggested in Washington, the new American strategy towards South Asia is to aid Pakistan but at the same time recognize India’s pre-eminence one wonders to what extent that would be acceptable to General Musharraf and his fellow military commanders.

That India is the much larger power in South Asia has never been in doubt. Pakistan’s traditional objection has not been to the fact of India’s size but its implications. Pakistani ideologues have argued that India acting as a great power is unacceptable to them. Pakistan has tried to make common cause with other South Asian nations to defy Indian pre-eminence. Efforts have been repeatedly made to define Pakistan as a Middle Eastern or Central Asian power, to avoid being “boxed in” by India in South Asia. A U.S. policy that rests on facilitating India’s emergence as a great power is hardly one that fits in with this entrenched way of thinking. Could we, then, be headed for another round of U.S.-Pakistan alliance based on the two sides working on different assumptions or divergent expectations?

In 1954, soon after signing up Pakistan as an American ally, U.S. Secretary of State of John Foster Dulles tried to persuade legendary columnist Walter Lippmann of the value of his new strategic partner. Dulles told Lippmann, “I’ve got to get some real fighting men into the south of Asia. The only Asians who can really fight are the Pakistanis. That’s why we need them in the alliance. We could never get along without the Gurkhas.”

“But Foster,” Lippmann countered, “the Gurkhas aren’t Pakistanis, they’re Indians.” Of course, Lippmann was also wrong as the Gurkhas are from Nepal but that is less important than the lack of knowledge of the U.S. Secretary of State. “Well,” responded Dulles, unperturbed by such details, “they may not be Pakistanis but they’re Moslems.”

“No, I’m afraid they’re not Moslems, either; they’re Hindus,” Lippmann stated.

“No matter,” the secretary of state retorted and proceeded to lecture Lippmann for half an hour on the virtues of SEATO in stemming communism in Asia, writes a biographer of Walter Lippmann.

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, who has been described by Ashley Tellis as the main author of the new U.S. South Asia strategy is clearly better informed about the world than John Foster Dulles was in the 1950s. The U.S. has been extensively engaged with the world now for over five decades. There is a much larger U.S. foreign policy and intelligence gathering establishment and a re-run of the type of exchange that took place between Dulles and Lippmann in 1954 is unlikely. But the U.S. could be basing its new strategic plan for South Asia on optimistic expectations and mistaken assumptions about Pakistan just as Dulles did.

Pakistan’s military leaders have historically been willing to adjust their priorities to fit within the parameters of immediate U.S. global concerns. The purpose has been to ensure the flow of military and economic aid from the United States. Contrary to the American assumption that aid translates into leverage, Pakistan’s military rulers have always managed to take the aid without ever fully giving the United States what it desires. During the 1950s and 1960s, Ayub Khan over-sold Pakistan’s willingness to help the United States in containing Communist expansion. Pakistan provided significant intelligence gathering facilities for a while but never provided the “centrally positioned landing site” the U.S. sought. Zia ul-Haq’s cooperation in bleeding the Soviets in Afghanistan came with Pakistan’s plan to install a client regime in Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal. The U.S. never controlled Pakistan’s ISI, or far that matter the Mujahideen, even though it paid for their operations. Pakistan’s role in the Jihad against the Soviet Union also inspired Pakistani Jihadis to expand Jihad into Kashmir.

Before embarking on a new plan for “remaking South Asia”, American policy makers would do well to understand the dynamics that have driven the region’s players since the U.S. first got involved.

The Dynamics of South Asia

Gulf News,May 25, 2005

American policy makers believe that they finally have a new grand strategy for South Asia. The strategy is outlined by Ashley Tellis in a new policy brief published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. The US objective is to enable India to become a great power while at the same time assisting Pakistan in attaining security and stability.

“By expanding relations with both states in a differentiated way matched to their geostrategic weights,” Tellis argues, “the Bush administration seeks to assist Pakistan in becoming a successful state while it enables India to secure a trouble-free ascent to great-power status.”

According to Tellis, these objectives would be achieved “through a large economic and military assistance package to Islamabad and through three separate dialogues with New Delhi that will review various challenging issues such as civil nuclear cooperation, space, defence co-production, regional and global security, and bilateral trade.”

In his policy brief, Tellis outlines American thinking and points out some of the potential challenges in realising the new strategic goals.

The major problem I see with an American grand strategy for the region is that it might be based on assumptions about the intentions of regional players that prove incorrect over time. Is Pakistan, for example, reconciled to India’s status as the region’s pre-eminent power? Can India or the United States deal with the inevitable divergence between Pakistan’s stated and actual policies that stem from its multi-layered decision-making process?

This may be the first time the United States is basing its South Asia strategy on positive engagement with Pakistan coupled with a clear acknowledgement of India’s ascendance. In the past, American policy makers have been afraid that support for one would upset the other and, in fact, it did. Right now, General Pervez Musharraf appears amen-able to acceptance of Indian concerns. But he lacks a popular mandate. The possibility of a populist politician whipping up
anti-Indian sentiment, and thereby jeopardising the current peace process, cannot be ruled out.

It is true that Pakistan’s only powerful institution, the military, appears to support Musharraf’s policy of securing US assistance and engaging in dialogue with India. But there is no evidence that the military has given the traditional perception of its role as the only obstacle to “Indian hegemony”. Musharraf’s rise to power was enabled by his hard-line stance towards India. Even now, he gives mixed signals about what he has in his mind as the realistic basis of stable relations in South Asia.

In 1954, soon after signing up Pakistan as an American ally, US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles tried to persuade legendary columnist Walter Lippmann of the value of his new strategic partner. Dulles told Lippmann, “I’ve got to get some real fighting men into the south of Asia. The only Asians who can really fight are the Pakistanis. That’s why we need them in the alliance. We could never get along without the Gurkhas.”

“But Foster,” Lippmann countered, “the Gurkhas aren’t Pakistanis, they’re Indians.” Of course, Lippmann was also wrong as the Gurkhas are from Nepal but that is less important than the lack of knowledge of the US Secretary of State. “Well,” responded Dulles, unperturbed by such details, “they may not be Pakistanis but they’re Muslims.”
“No, I’m afraid they’re not Muslims, either; they’re Hindus,” Lippmann stated.

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, who has been described by Ashley Tellis as the main author of the new US South Asia strategy, is clearly better informed about the world than Dulles was in the 1950s. But Washington could be basing its new strategic plan for South Asia on optimistic expectations and mistaken assumptions about Pakistan just as Dulles did.
Pakistan’s military leaders have historically been willing to adjust their priorities to fit within the parameters of immediate US global concerns. The purpose has been to ensure the flow of military and economic aid from the United States. Contrary to the American assumption that aid translates into leverage, Pakistan’s military rulers have always managed to take the aid without ever fully giving the United States what it desires.

During the 1950s and 1960s, Ayoub Khan oversold Pakistan’s willingness to help the United States in containing Communist expansion. Pakistan provided significant intelligence gathering facilities for a while but never provided the “centrally positioned landing site” the Americans sought. Zia ul-Haq’s cooperation in bleeding the Soviets in Afghanistan came with Pakistan’s plan to install a client regime in Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal.

Before embarking on a new plan for “remaking South Asia”, US policy makers would do well to understand the dynamics that have driven the region’s players since they first got involved.

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An unstable kind of stability

The Indian Express , May 19, 2005

An isolated terrorist attack in Egypt, a violent uprising in Uzbekistan and riots in Pakistan and Afghanistan against the alleged desecration of the Koran all point towards the potential for instability in the region American policy makers now describe as the greater West Asia. The regimes in each of these countries are closely allied to the US. With the exception of President Hamid Karzai, who won an open and contested election in Afghanistan, none of them is ruled by an elected leader. Perhaps it is for that reason that Karzai alone had the confidence to describe the protests over the now discredited Newsweek report about the desecration of the Koran at the American prison in Guantanamo as ‘‘manifestations of a fledgling democracy.” The other American allies simply ducked for cover while figuring out ways to repress the sentiment of their own people.

The Egyptian authorities remain reluctant to publicly discuss the recent revival of terrorist attacks against tourists and maintain their tight lid on dissent. For a quarter of a century, the US has under-written Air Force General Hosni Mubarak’s iron-fisted governance in the name of maintaining stability in Egypt and saving that country from Islamist extremists. But the jailing of thousands of Islamists and a virtual ban on open political activity has clearly not eliminated the threat that has been used to justify personalised and repressive rule. Surely there is a lesson here if anyone is willing to learn it. Authoritarian regimes initially secure external backing on the basis of legitimate threats to stability but after some time, if they do not become more inclusive and open, they simply serve as the lid on a tinder box.

Uzbekistan’s Islam Karimov is a Stalinist dictator who signed on as a US ally immediately after 9/11, offering bases to the US military for the war in Afghanistan. He also rails against Islamist extremists and, judging by the number of people he has jailed or executed, should by now have eliminated that threat to Uzbekistan’s stability. But recently protests have broken out in the Ferghana valley that have been violently put down. Karimov hopes to get away with butchering his people by accusing the protesters of being Islamist extremists.

Afghanistan is currently a work in progress. Karzai has the benefit of American military presence, which serves as the ultimate guarantee of stability for his government. But he also had the courage to contest an open election and compete for power with formidable political rivals.Karzai won the first round by securing election as president. He still faces the challenge of parliamentary elections and the potential of either an unmanageably divided legislature or one dominated by his opponents.But Karzai’s approach remains inclusive and political. When allegations of desecration of the Quran by American interrogators in Guantanamo brought people out in the streets of Afghanistan and the protests turned violent, Karzai was not easily rattled. Karzai knew the potential for Taliban and other Islamist opponents of his regime to exploit such a sensitive religious issue. His government asked the Americans, especially officers of the U.S. central Command that operate from Afghanistan, to clarify the matter. The violence during the riots was unfortunate but Afghan authorities acted wisely. They did not follow it up with a crack down on Islamic activists resembling Mubarak’s methods in Egypt or Karimov’s pattern in Uzbekistan.

Pakistan under America’s post 9/11 ally General Pervez Musharraf is not as politically repressive as Mubarak’s Egypt or Karimov’s Uzbekistan. But its stability is far from secure. Within the same week that Islamists hit Pakistan’s streets to protest the alleged desecration of the Quran, Pakistani authorities manhandled human rights activists involved in a road run aimed at making the point that men and women have the right to participate in sports events together. Musharraf’s security apparatus was dealing with Islamist protesters one day and the secular ones the next. His claim of enlightened moderation notwithstanding, it is significant to note that it was the secular protesters that got beaten up and hauled away by the police.

The sensible choice for Musharraf (and those who wish him well) would be to encourage him to become inclusive voluntarily and to reach out to Ms Bhutto, not to dictate terms but with genuine respect for her popular support. If he does not do so, I for one would not criticize her for risking instability after so much caution. After all, why should we expect her to become irrelevant like the secular opposition in Egypt and Uzbekistan?

An Unstable Kind of Stability

Gulf News, May 18, 2005

An isolated terrorist attack in Egypt, a violent uprising in Uz-bekistan and riots in Pakistan and Afghanistan against the alleged desecration of the Quran all these incidents point towards the potential for instability in the region that American policy-makers now describe as the greater Middle East.

The regimes in these countries are closely allied to the United States.

With the exception of Afghan President Hamid Karzai, who won an open and contested election, none of these countries is ruled by an elected leader.

Perhaps it is for that reason that Karzai alone had the confidence to describe the protests over the now discredited Newsweek report about the desecration of the Quran at the American prison in Guantanamo as “manifestations of a fledgling democracy”.

The other American allies simply ducked for cover while figuring out ways to repress the sentiment of their own people.
Egyptian authorities remain reluctant to publicly discuss the recent revival of terrorist attacks against tourists, and maintain their tight lid on dissent.

For a quarter of a century, the United States has underwritten President Hosni Mubarak’s iron-fisted governance in the name of maintaining stability in Egypt and saving that country from Islamist militants.

But the jailing of thousands of Islamists and a virtual ban on open political activity have clearly not eliminated the threat that has been used to justify personalised and repressive rule.

Surely there is a lesson here if anyone is willing to learn it. Authoritarian regimes initially secure external backing on the basis of legitimate threats to stability, but after some time, if they do not become more inclusive and open, they simply serve as the lid of a tinderbox.

Pakistan, under America’s post-9/11 ally General Pervez Musharraf, is not as politically repressive as Mubarak’s Egypt or Karimov’s Uzbekistan.

But its stability is far from secure. Within the same week that Islamists hit Pakistan’s streets to protest about the Quran issue, Pakistani authorities manhandled human rights activists involved in a road run aimed at supporting the rights of men and women to participate in sports events together.

Musharraf’s security apparatus was dealing with Islamist protesters one day and secular ones the next. His claim of enlightened moderation notwithstanding, it is significant to note that it was the secular protesters that got beaten up and hauled away by the police.

Unlike Uzbekistan and Egypt, Pakistan’s secular opposition is not dead.

The Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), led by Benazir Bhutto, managed to get more popular votes than any other party in the restricted election of 2002, even though its leader was in exile and the target of persistent hostility by Pakistan’s permanent establishment.

Gerrymandering

The Nawaz Sharif faction of the Pakistan Muslim League secured more popular votes than the MMA, though the gerrymandering by the Musharraf regime left it with far fewer seats in the National and provincial assemblies.

Add to that the votes of the left wing ethnic parties and we have more than half the electorate. In fact, the Islamist alliance MMA managed its much talked about electoral success with only 11 per cent of the popular vote.

The current superficial stability in Pakistan is the result not of Musharraf’s policies but the realisation on the part of the secular political leaders (notably Benazir Bhutto) that Pakistan faces two parallel battles.

The first is the struggle for civilian supremacy in which the Islamist parties and the secular democrats have a common cause.
The other is the conflict between obscurantist forces and those seeking Pakistan’s adherence to contemporary values.

Benazir appears to have decided not to align with the Islamists to press Musharraf on relinquishing power. By doing so, she hopes to avoid a rerun of Pakistan’s past political campaigns against entrenched dictators.

Cooperation between secular political forces and the Islamists in the past empowered the Islamists even as it helped create political space for secular democrats.

Musharraf and the Pakistani establishment have refused to reciprocate the goodwill of the secular political forces. The Americans continue to ignore Benazir and other secular leaders with popular support, putting all their eggs in General Musharraf’s basket.

But what would happen if Benazir throws caution to the wind, accepts the demand of her party’s base and joins a grand alliance for the restoration of constitutional rule? The facade of stability in Pakistan would begin to erode.

The sensible choice for Musharraf (and those who wish him well) would be to encourage him to become inclusive voluntarily and to reach out to Benazir, not to dictate terms but with genuine respect for her popular support.

If he does not do so, she should not be criticised for risking instability after so much caution. After all, why should we expect her to become irrelevant like the secular opposition in Egypt and Uzbekistan?