A General Decline

Indian Express, January 25, 2007

General Pervez Musharraf’s well-wishers had expected him to legitimise his rule and put Pakistan firmly on the road to constitutional democracy by holding free and fair elections in 2007. Instead, Musharraf will be “elected” president by Parliament and provincial legislatures that were elected in the tainted 2002 elections just as their term enters its last days. Some observers see Musharraf’s decision as reflective of his total hold on power in Pakistan. In fact, it indicates the weakness of a military ruler embattled at home and abroad.

The president, under the Pakistani Constitution, is head of state and symbol of the unity of the federation. He is elected by an electoral college comprising the National Assembly, Senate and four provincial assemblies and derives his authority from the mandate given by the people to their elected representatives.

The four presidents elected under the Constitution since its adoption in 1973 were elected by newly-elected assemblies at the beginning of their five-year terms. Musharraf, on the other hand, is seeking election from assemblies whose own flawed mandate is about to end.

Legal experts known for facilitating military rule in Pakistan, notably former Law Minister Sharifuddin Pirzada, claim the manoeuvre is in accordance with the letter of the Constitution. But such technical legality is no substitute for legitimacy.

As of now Musharraf is ‘president’ because he decreed himself so as a result of the rigged referendum held before the legislative elections of 2002, deemed by the US State department as “flawed.” Then, too, Musharraf did not seek election under the terms of the Constitution and gave himself a waiver from the constitutional bar on employees of the state (a concept that includes serving military officers) holding elective office. Musharraf’s term of office ends on November 16, 2007.

Official spokesmen have claimed that Musharraf’s “term as president” would end a week before the completion of the five-year term of the present assemblies on November 16. Therefore, if the next presidential election is held between September and October 2007 then the outgoing assemblies can rubber-stamp Musharraf as president without risking a proper election.

Such quasi-legal manoeuvres, aided by notions such as the doctrine of necessity and the concept of a military coup being its own legal justification, have been used by Pakistan’s military rulers since the country’s first coup in 1958. But legitimacy is a political, not a technical, matter. If history is any guide, Pakistan’s coup-makers have always become politically weaker after manipulating themselves into a second term. Their first term is followed by a presidential election of some sort, with minimal pretence of genuine democracy and political contestation, and it is at this stage that the absence of legitimacy of the ruler comes to the fore.

Field Marshal Ayub Khan sought “re-election’ through Basic Democrats, an electoral college of 80,000 local council members. He had hoped for a walkover but had to rig even that poll when the sister of Pakistan’s founder, the late Mohtarma Fatima Jinnah, challenged Ayub Khan as the combined Opposition candidate and showed her popular support at huge public rallies.

General Ziaul Haq ruled from 1977 to 1984 on the strength of his coup d’etat and gave himself a 5-year term through a referendum that hardly anybody bothered to vote in. But a relatively free election, albeit on non-party basis, returned a Parliament in 1985 that cramped Zia’s style, leading to its premature dissolution three years later.

During negotiations in 2003 with parliamentarians over constitutional amendments, Musharraf had explained that he did not want to contest presidential elections because that would be beneath his dignity. Lowly politicians run for office. Generals are a higher breed and must not stoop to their level.

But by failing to chart a new course Musharraf is setting himself up for the same failures that were faced by his military predecessors.

Musharraf makes a farce of democracy

Gulf News, January 24, 2007

General Pervez Musharraf’s well wishers had expected him to legitimise his rule and put Pakistan firmly on the road to constitutional democracy by holding free and fair elections in 2007.
Instead, Musharraf has decided not to risk his position and power at a free poll. He will be “elected” president by the parliament and provincial legislatures that were elected in the tainted 2002 elections just as their term enters its last days.

Some observers see Musharraf’s decision as reflecting his total hold on power in Pakistan. In fact it indicates the weakness of a military ruler embattled at home and abroad.

The Pakistani constitution envisions a parliamentary system of government, with directly elected legislatures at the federal and provincial levels. The president, under the constitution, is head of state and the symbol of the unity of the federation.

He is, therefore, elected by an electoral college comprised of the National Assembly, the Senate and the four provincial assemblies. Under the constitutional scheme, the president derives his mandate from the mandate given by the people to their elected representatives.

The four presidents elected under the constitution since its adoption in 1973 (Chaudhry Fazal Elahi, Gulam Ishaq Khan, Farooq Leghari and Rafiq Tarar) were elected by newly elected assemblies at the beginning of their five-year terms.

Musharraf, on the other hand, is seeking election from assemblies whose own flawed mandate is about to come to an end. Legal experts known for facilitating military rule in Pakistan have said that the manoeuvre is legal. But such technical legality is not a substitute for legitimacy.
Waiver from charter ban

As of now Musharraf is “president” because he decreed himself so as a result of a referendum held before the legislative elections of 2002, which were deemed by international observers and Musharraf’s friends in the US State Department as “flawed”.

Then, too, Musharraf did not seek election under the terms of the constitution and gave himself a waiver from the constitutional bar on employees of the state (a concept that includes serving military officers) holding elective office.

Musharraf’s term of office, if it can be called that given that he secured the position by fiat and not by election, ends on November 16, 2007. His manoeuvre is an attempt to ensure that he remains president without having to seek election from legislatures elected by the people.

Official spokesmen claim that Musharraf’s “term as president” would end a week before the completion of the five-year term of the present assemblies on November 16.

Therefore, if the next presidential election is held between September and October 2007 then the outgoing assemblies can rubber-stamp Musharraf as president without risking a proper election.

Such quasi-legal manoeuvres have been used by Pakistan’s military rulers since the country’s first coup in 1958. But legitimacy is a political, not a technical, matter. Even after the rubber stamping by an emasculated parliament and weakened provincial legislatures it is doubtful whether Musharraf can overcome his regime’s crisis of legitimacy.

In fact, if history is any guide, Pakistan’s coup makers have always become politically weaker after manipulating themselves into a second term.

Rigged referendum

The pattern of Pakistan’s coup makers has been that the general seizing power rules for a few years with the help of a Supreme Court judgment approving his military takeover followed by a first presidential term based on a rigged referendum.

This is followed by a presidential election of some sort, with minimal pretense of genuine democracy and political contestation, and it is at this stage that the absence of legitimacy of the ruler comes to the fore.

Field Marshal Ayoub Khan sought “re-election’ through Basic Democrats, an electoral college of 80,000 local council members. He had hoped for a walkover but had to rig even that poll when the sister of Pakistan’s founder, the late Mohtarma Fatima Jinnah, challenged Ayoub Khan as the combined opposition candidate and showed her popular support at huge public rallies.

General Zia-ul Haq ruled from 1977 to 1984 on the strength of his coup d’etat and gave himself a 5-year term through a referendum that hardly anybody bothered to vote in.

But a relatively free election, albeit on non-party basis, returned a parliament in 1985 that did cramp Zia’s style, leading to its premature dissolution three years later.
Popular support for Fatima Jinnah and the refusal of Zia-ul Haq’s protege Mohammad Khan Junejo to be his puppet showed that Pakistan’s politicians might be too weak to remove military rulers from power but they can withhold legitimacy from the rulers.

Like Ayoub Khan and Zia-ul Haq before him, Musharraf remains fearful that once he becomes a civilian and takes off his general’s uniform, he will be susceptible to coups d’etat like all civilian rulers of Pakistan.

But by failing to chart a new course Musharraf is setting himself for the same failures that were faced by his military predecessors.

The contrast between two political cultures

Gulf News, January 3, 2007

The day Saddam Hussain was executed, Americans paid tribute to their 38th president, Gerald R. Ford, who died at the age of 93 a few days earlier.

The dissimilarity between the circumstances and aftermath of the deaths of Saddam Hussain and Gerald Ford highlights the contrast between two distinctive political cultures.

Saddam Hussain represented the pursuit and reverence for absolute power that prevails in most of the Muslim world. Gerald Ford, on the other hand, was the product of a political system that emphasises legitimacy rather than the notion of a powerful ruler.

The US role overseas has often been mired in controversy. But even the critics of America’s power-based foreign policy acknowledge that at home, the United States is by and large a nation of laws that attempts to restrain the power of individuals and institutions.

Saddam Hussain was Iraq’s absolute ruler for over a quarter century whereas Ford governed for a little over two years. Saddam lost power only after the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. Ford had not wielded political office since losing an election in 1976, some 30 years ago.

Saddam’s life and death both polarised Iraq. Ford healed the wounds of Vietnam and Watergate while in office and was hailed for his contribution by members of all political parties when he died. Ford’s most controversial decision was to pardon disgraced former president Richard Nixon, whose resignation prompted by the Watergate scandal had brought Ford to office.

Saddam Hussain came to power through a series of coups d’etat and palace intrigue. Instead of being accountable under the law, he made the laws of Iraq while he wielded power. Having risen to power as a coup-maker and intriguer, he trusted no one.

Lack of remorse

In Saddam Hussain’s mind, his “contribution” to Iraq’s security and economy conferred a special status on him. He considered himself as Iraq’s saviour, the man who held the country together against external conspiracies and domestic rebels.

Saddam’s lack of remorse and his defiant attitude even during his last hours confirms that he did not feel he had done anything wrong. To him, human rights violations and brutality were merely a small price that had to be paid to rule Iraq with a firm hand.

As he saw it, Saddam Hussain had a plan for Iraq’s greatness and he would be damned if he allowed niceties of law or morality come in the way.

His supporters and apologists were either too timid to disagree with him or believed that a difficult country such as Iraq needed a strong man whose excesses had to be overlooked in “the national interest.”

President Ford had no delusions of grandeur. The highest office he aspired to was Speaker of the US House of Representatives.

He was nominated vice-president after Nixon’s vice-president, Spiro Agnew, resigned after pleading guilty to tax evasion charges. When Nixon was forced to resign, Ford was elevated to the presidency, the only US president who was not elected to either the presidency or vice-presidency.

Ford was not a charismatic man. His modesty and humble ways were mocked by comedians and critics. Thirty years after he left office, Ford is being praised after his death for saving America from greater polarisation.

System in place

The United States has a system in place that allows continuity in leadership and respect for departed leaders, which is not possible in countries where rulers rise to power through coups and conspiracies.

The contrast between the political cultures of absolute power and systemic legitimacy goes beyond the comparison between Saddam Hussain and Gerald Ford.

When India’s former prime minister Narasimha Rao died last year, he received a ceremonial burial accorded to all deceased elected Indian prime ministers even though he had been indicted on corruption charges and convicted by a lower court, awaiting judgment by the superior judiciary at the time of his demise.

On the other hand, when Pakistan’s former president Gulam Ishaq Khan died not long ago, his life of public service did not receive the tribute it deserved.

The last time a civilian Pakistani head of government received a ceremonial state funeral was in 1951, following the assassination of Pakistan’s first prime minister Liaquat Ali Khan.
Since then Pakistan’s leading politicians have been dismissed from office and jailed or, in the case of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, executed after a dubious trial.

The different ways nations treat their past rulers is partly related to the manner in which the rulers behave while in office. The Muslim world needs to review its political culture of reverence for power.

The Lebanese poet-philosopher Kahlil Gibran observed, “Pity the nation that welcomes its new ruler with trumpetings, and farewells him with hootings, only to welcome another with trumpetings again.”

According respect to all on the basis of constitutional legitimacy would offer a chance for Muslim countries to build viable and successful systems of governance that have not evolved due to the current preoccupation with charismatic and all powerful rulers.

Home

Benazir Will Be Back

Gulf News, January 17, 2007

Pakistan’s Opposition leader and former prime minister Benazir Bhutto has made it clear that she will return to Pakistan in time for the 2007 elections and that her Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) would not accept any deal with the present government that allows General Pervez Musharraf to retain his military uniform. “The raison d’etre of the PPP is to end military rule, not to perpetuate it,” Bhutto recently told this columnist.

Given the PPP’s long history of opposition to military rule and the sacrifices of Bhutto and her family for the restoration of democracy, this categorical stance should surprise no one. Bhutto’s return to Pakistan will likely lead to massive mobilisation against military rule, much like her 1986 return from exile marked the beginning of the end for General Zia-ul Haq’s entrenched military regime.

The rumours of an impending deal between the PPP and Musharraf have been periodically spread by the Pakistani establishment and denied by the PPP. These rumours served the purpose of confusing and dividing the opposition, in addition to making Musharraf look invulnerable. The persistence of these rumours was partly a reflection of the establishment’s effective media manipulation and partly a manifestation of the willingness of some elite Pakistanis to believe the worst about the PPP and the Bhuttos.

Pakistan’s elite loves to hate the Bhutto family. Before Bhutto’s father, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, founded the PPP in 1967, Pakistan’s politics were confined to the drawing rooms of Karachi and Lahore.

He brought the unwashed masses of present-day Pakistan into the political equation, a “sin” for which he has not been forgiven by the country’s oligarchy of senior military officers, civil servants, international bankers, industrialists, major landowners and multinational corporation executives.

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, and for that matter the PPP and other members of his family, were not perfect and much can be (and is) said about their mistakes, especially while in power. But the fact remains that the real reason for the Pakistani establishment’s resentments towards the Bhuttos and the PPP has little to do with their real and perceived flaws.

Major challenge

Since General Zia-ul Haq deposed Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in a military coup in 1977, the establishment has recognised the Bhutto name and the PPP as the major challenge to the establishment’s dominance of Pakistan. After executing Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in what is now universally recognised as a show trial, Zia-ul Haq initiated a major campaign of demonisation against the PPP and the Bhuttos.

Zia-ul Haq’s successors continued the vilification of the Bhutto family and persisted with efforts to divide and break the PPP. Benazir Bhutto’s two terms in office were cut short by establishment-orchestrated dismissals from power. She lost both her brothers to assassinations under mysterious circumstances that are still unresolved. Her husband, Asif Ali Zardari, has been a target of particular disparagement. He was first imprisoned from 1990 to 1993 on corruption charges, only to be released without being convicted in any of the 18 cases brought against him. Not learning any lessons from the failed prosecutions of 1990-93, Zardari was imprisoned again in 1996, only to be released eight-and-a-half years later on bail. None of the charges against him has yet been proven and Zardari is quite confident that his persecutors will end up with egg on their faces once again.

Since assuming power in a coup d’etat in 1999, Musharraf has tried to use the prosecutions against Zardari as a bargaining tool to seek the PPP’s cooperation. But having paid the high price in personal suffering, it is clear that Benazir Bhutto will not accept Musharraf’s uniform in return for the withdrawal of cases against herself and Zardari.

It seems that the people of Pakistan are willing to give Benazir Bhutto and the PPP another chance because they have never been given the opportunity to vote out the party after voting it into office. For once, the Pakistani establishment should give the people of Pakistan a free choice in selecting their leaders.

Musharraf’s Democracy Riddle

Indian Express, January 12, 2007

General Pervez Musharraf recently told a public gathering in Dera Ismail Khan that “for the first time, the assemblies are completing their tenure. The year 2007 is the election year and people should elect progressive and moderate people.” Musharraf asserted naively, “The uniform has nothing to do with democracy. It must not be confused and vested interests are out to mislead the nation.”

In reality, Musharraf’s uniform has everything to do with Pakistan not being on the road to democracy. Former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto shares the hope with many Pakistanis, is that a transitional arrangement could somehow emerge that would allow Musharraf to wield power for a while and then allow him to fade away.

However, in Pakistan, phased transitions from military to civil rule have faltered in the past. For a power-sharing arrangement to be meaningful it is important that it should be more than an arrangement between individuals and parties but rather a social contract between Pakistan’s all-powerful military and its political parties.

Those who cite the models of Chile and South Korea for Pakistan should not forget that the military’s political intervention there did not come to a complete end until Generals Pinochet and Chun Do Hwan were detained or tried, thereby establishing civilian accountability over coup-making security services.

The problem with having a uniformed president is two fold. First, it represents politicisation of an institution — the army — that should be above politics. A professional military’s main task is to defend the country against external aggression. As has happened many times in Pakistani history, military decisions are made with politics on the mind and political decisions end up aiming at eliminating “enemies” rather than accommodating opponents.

The second problem with a uniformed president is that it leads to the degradation of national institutions. Neutral state institutions, such as the army, civil service, judiciary and intelligence agencies, end up taking the side of the uniformed incumbent.

Pakistan has become a highly militarised state under its four military rulers, who have collectively ruled the country for 31 of its 59 years in existence. There is a tendency among experts to divide the blame equally among its generals, politicians, religious leaders, and feudal elites for Pakistan’s democratic failure.

Undoubtedly, Pakistan’s politics is complex. Mistakes by several institutions and individuals have preceded the breakdown of each of Pakistan’s experiments with democracy. But if there is a common thread running through Pakistan’s chequered history, it is the army’s perception of itself as the country’s only viable institution and its deep-rooted suspicion of civilian political processes. The generals have refused to let politics take its course.

Although generals have ruled Pakistan for over half of the state’s existence, Pakistanis have still clearly considered democracy to be the only legitimate system of governance for the country. Acknowledging this reality, each of Pakistan’s four military rulers — Generals Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan, Zia ul-Haq, and Pervez Musharraf — has tried to redefine democracy and claim that he and the army were building democracy instead of bypassing it. The result is a carefully crafted system of political manipulation, which empowers covert agencies and individuals working at their behest.

If Musharraf remains in uniform, it is this system that would be perpetuated instead of a genuine democracy, which allows genuine debate and real alternation of power among contending parties. So far, Musharraf and the military have strayed little from the script of Pakistan’s earlier generals.

Not until the army’s institutional thinking changes or its hold becomes weaker can Pakistan be expected to make a transition to democratic rule.

Military rule stifles democracy

Gulf News, January 10, 2007

President General Pervez Musharraf does not seem to see a contradiction between his decision to retain his military uniform and his claims of transforming Pakistan into a democracy.

He recently told a public gathering in Dera Esmail Khan that his uniform has nothing to do with democracy. “For the first time, the assemblies are completing their tenure. The year 2007 is the election year and people should elect progressive and moderate people,” he was quoted by the media as saying.

Musharraf asserted naively, “The uniform has nothing to do with democracy. It must not be confused and the vested interest is out to mislead the nation.”

In reality, Musharraf’s uniform has everything to do with Pakistan not being on the road to democracy. Recently former prime minister Benazir Bhutto was reported to be prepared to accept Musharraf as president in uniform in return for a free, fair and inclusive parliamentary election.

Bhutto has denied a deal between her Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) and Musharraf. But her hope, shared by many Pakistanis, is that a transitional arrangement could somehow emerge that would allow Musharraf to wield power for a while longer and then allow him to fade away.

Supporters of this transitional mechanism cite the examples of Chile and South Korea, where power sharing arrangements between democratic politicians and coup making generals paved the way for constitutional, democratic government over a period of time.

In Pakistan’s case, however, phased transitions from military to civil rule have faltered in the past. For a power-sharing arrangement to be meaningful it is important that it should be more than an arrangement between individuals and parties but rather a social contract between Pakistan’s all powerful military and the country’s political parties.

Those who cite the models of Chile and South Korea for Pakistan should not forget that the military’s political intervention in those countries did not come to a complete end until Generals Pinochet and Chun Dohwan were detained or tried, thereby establishing civilian accountability over coup making security services.

The problem with having a uniformed president is two-fold. First, it represents politicisation of an institution the army that should be above politics.

A professional military’s main task is to defend the country against external aggression. Soldiers are trained to locate and liquidate enemies.

When a serving general runs the country in addition to commanding the army, his political and soldierly interests collide.

As has happened many times in Pakistani history, military decisions are made with politics on the mind and political decisions end up being soldier-like, aimed at eliminating “enemies” rather than accommodating opponents.

The second problem with a uniformed president is that it leads to the degradation of national institutions as supposedly neutral state institutions, such as the army, the civil service, the judiciary and the intelligence agencies, end up taking the side of the uniformed incumbent.

Pakistan has become a highly militarised state under its four military rulers, who have collectively ruled the country for 31 of its 59 years in existence.

The military is an important institution in the life of any country but it should not dominate aspects of life for which soldiers have no training or aptitude. Allowing a serving general to be head of state, in violation of the country’s constitution, encourages militarisation and undermines civil society.

There is a tendency among experts to divide the blame equally among Pakistan’s generals, civilian politicians, religious leaders and feudal elites for Pakistan’s democratic failure.
Undoubtedly, Pakistan’s politics are complex. Mistakes by several institutions and individuals have preceded the breakdown of each of Pakistan’s experiments with democracy.

But if there is a common thread running through Pakistan’s checkered history, it is the army’s perception of itself as the country’s only viable institution and its deep-rooted suspicion of civilian political processes. The generals have refused to let politics take its course.

Although generals have ruled Pakistan for over half of the state’s existence, Pakistanis have still clearly considered democracy to be the only legitimate system of governance for the country.

Acknowledging this reality, each of Pakistan’s four military rulers generals Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan, Zia-ul Haq, and Pervez Musharraf has tried to redefine democracy and claim that he and the army were building democracy instead of bypassing it.

The result is a carefully crafted system of political manipulation, which empowers covert agencies and individuals working at their behest instead of allowing people’s representatives to conduct open and accountable politics.

If Musharraf remains in uniform, it is this system that would be perpetuated instead of a genuine democracy, which allows genuine debate and real alternation of power among contending parties.

So far, Musharraf and the military have strayed little from the script of Pakistan’s earlier generals. Not until the army’s institutional thinking changes or its hold becomes weaker can Pakistan be expected to make a transition to democratic rule.

The contrast between two political cultures

Gulf News, January 3, 2007

The day Saddam Hussain was executed, Americans paid tribute to their 38th president, Gerald R. Ford, who died at the age of 93 a few days earlier.

The dissimilarity between the circumstances and aftermath of the deaths of Saddam Hussain and Gerald Ford highlights the contrast between two distinctive political cultures.

Saddam Hussain represented the pursuit and reverence for absolute power that prevails in most of the Muslim world. Gerald Ford, on the other hand, was the product of a political system that emphasises legitimacy rather than the notion of a powerful ruler.

The US role overseas has often been mired in controversy. But even the critics of America’s power-based foreign policy acknowledge that at home, the United States is by and large a nation of laws that attempts to restrain the power of individuals and institutions.

Saddam Hussain was Iraq’s absolute ruler for over a quarter century whereas Ford governed for a little over two years. Saddam lost power only after the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. Ford had not wielded political office since losing an election in 1976, some 30 years ago.

Saddam’s life and death both polarised Iraq. Ford healed the wounds of Vietnam and Watergate while in office and was hailed for his contribution by members of all political parties when he died. Ford’s most controversial decision was to pardon disgraced former president Richard Nixon, whose resignation prompted by the Watergate scandal had brought Ford to office.

Saddam Hussain came to power through a series of coups d’etat and palace intrigue. Instead of being accountable under the law, he made the laws of Iraq while he wielded power. Having risen to power as a coup-maker and intriguer, he trusted no one.

Lack of remorse

In Saddam Hussain’s mind, his “contribution” to Iraq’s security and economy conferred a special status on him. He considered himself as Iraq’s saviour, the man who held the country together against external conspiracies and domestic rebels.

Saddam’s lack of remorse and his defiant attitude even during his last hours confirms that he did not feel he had done anything wrong. To him, human rights violations and brutality were merely a small price that had to be paid to rule Iraq with a firm hand.

As he saw it, Saddam Hussain had a plan for Iraq’s greatness and he would be damned if he allowed niceties of law or morality come in the way.

His supporters and apologists were either too timid to disagree with him or believed that a difficult country such as Iraq needed a strong man whose excesses had to be overlooked in “the national interest.”

President Ford had no delusions of grandeur. The highest office he aspired to was Speaker of the US House of Representatives.

He was nominated vice-president after Nixon’s vice-president, Spiro Agnew, resigned after pleading guilty to tax evasion charges. When Nixon was forced to resign, Ford was elevated to the presidency, the only US president who was not elected to either the presidency or vice-presidency.

Ford was not a charismatic man. His modesty and humble ways were mocked by comedians and critics. Thirty years after he left office, Ford is being praised after his death for saving America from greater polarisation.

System in place

The United States has a system in place that allows continuity in leadership and respect for departed leaders, which is not possible in countries where rulers rise to power through coups and conspiracies.

The contrast between the political cultures of absolute power and systemic legitimacy goes beyond the comparison between Saddam Hussain and Gerald Ford.

When India’s former prime minister Narasimha Rao died last year, he received a ceremonial burial accorded to all deceased elected Indian prime ministers even though he had been indicted on corruption charges and convicted by a lower court, awaiting judgment by the superior judiciary at the time of his demise.

On the other hand, when Pakistan’s former president Gulam Ishaq Khan died not long ago, his life of public service did not receive the tribute it deserved.

The last time a civilian Pakistani head of government received a ceremonial state funeral was in 1951, following the assassination of Pakistan’s first prime minister Liaquat Ali Khan.
Since then Pakistan’s leading politicians have been dismissed from office and jailed or, in the case of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, executed after a dubious trial.

The different ways nations treat their past rulers is partly related to the manner in which the rulers behave while in office. The Muslim world needs to review its political culture of reverence for power.

The Lebanese poet-philosopher Kahlil Gibran observed, “Pity the nation that welcomes its new ruler with trumpetings, and farewells him with hootings, only to welcome another with trumpetings again.”

According respect to all on the basis of constitutional legitimacy would offer a chance for Muslim countries to build viable and successful systems of governance that have not evolved due to the current preoccupation with charismatic and all powerful rulers.