Dialogue Needs a Common Language

The Indian Express, April 15, 2006

When Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh spoke recently of a “treaty of peace, security and friendship” with Pakistan, he inadvertently highlighted the different visions of India-Pakistan relations prevailing in Delhi and Islamabad. India sees normalization as a means of addressing disputes and issues that have proved intractable over more than five decades. Pakistan, on the other hand, continues to insist that normalization would be the end result, rather than the means, of resolving disputes, especially the Kashmir question.

Manmohan Singh accorded priority to normalization of relations between the two nuclear armed South Asian neighbors, hoping that their dispute over Jammu and Kashmir would be resolved as a result of normalization. Singh envisaged ‘‘a situation where the two parts of Jammu and Kashmir can, with the active encouragement of the Governments of India and Pakistan, work out cooperative, consultative mechanisms.’’

The Pakistani response, articulated by a glib but not brilliant foreign office spokeswoman, was predictable. She said that it would be ‘‘unrealistic’’ to expect Pakistan to move forward without progress on the Kashmir issue. ‘‘The ground reality from Pakistan’s point of view’’, she explained, ‘‘is that status quo meaning LOC was not acceptable to Pakistanis or Kashmiris so a viable solution has to be found.’’

Foreign Minister Khurshid Kasuri welcomed the ‘‘positive tone’’ of Prime Minister Singh’s statement. But he, too, emphasized the need to resolve outstanding issues, including Kashmir, as a precondition to normalization of relations.

This exchange, with India calling for normalization and Pakistan insisting on ‘‘resolving’’ Kashmir first, miniaturizes the dilemma of India-Pakistan negotiations. The international community, and sensible people within both countries, wants the India-Pakistan dialogue to continue. But once dialogue gets under way, it sooner or later ends with both sides sticking to stated positions, with little scope for a substantive breakthrough.

Negotiations usually involve reconciling maximum demands — what one side says it desires — with its minimal expectation, what it will settle for. Most observers agree that India’s maximum demand is that Pakistan gives up its claim on all of Jammu and Kashmir, and its minimal expectation would probably be that Pakistan accepts the status quo without further violence and a de facto partition of Kashmir along the Line of Control. An Indian negotiating team would try to secure more than the minimum and would probably settle for less than the maximum.

In recent public pronouncements, Indian officials have made more or less official their preference for settling the Kashmir issue on the basis of legitimizing the status quo, a de facto “take it or leave it” offer albeit with minor sweeteners. But in Pakistan’s case, there has never been much discussion of a ‘bottom line’ national position on the Kashmir conflict.

It is true that an overwhelming majority of Pakistanis feel strongly that they were cheated at the time of partition, when a contiguous Muslim majority state was not allowed to become part of Pakistan. But now, given the price Pakistan has paid in military setbacks and internal crises for trying to secure Kashmir, realism must dictate Pakistan’s foreign policy priorities.

Normalization of relations with India, an emerging global power that is also the strategic partner of the world’s sole superpower, is far more important for Pakistan today than it was in the early years of its life as an independent state. Pakistan no longer has the strategic options of playing one cold war rival against the other to help compensate for its military and economic disparity with India. Pakistan has tried, and failed, to change the territorial status quo in Jammu and Kashmir through both conventional and sub-conventional warfare. Efforts to secure international support against India by emphasizing India’s violations of human rights in Jammu and Kashmir have also yielded little result.

The problem for Pakistan’s ruling elite is that after 58 years of describing Kashmir as Pakistan’s primary national ‘cause’ it is not easy, especially for an unelected military regime, to effectively manage a major shift in national priorities. A feeling of insecurity against a much larger and hostile neighbour was the original source of Pakistani apprehensions about its nationhood. But over the years, structures of conflict have evolved, with the Pakistani establishment the major beneficiary of maintaining hostility.

It is clearly in India’s interest to help Pakistan gain sufficient confidence as a nation to overcome the need for conflict or regional rivalry for nation building. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s vision of a comprehensive treaty of peace, friendship and security is a step in helping bolster the confidence of Pakistanis in normal ties between India and Pakistan. It is important for Pakistani civil society to acknowledge that normal relations with India are the key to normalization of politics and policy in Pakistan as well.

Democracy for Musharraf

Gulf News, April 12, 2006

During his recent visit to Pakistan, US Assistant Secretary of State Richard Boucher tried to balance American support for democracy in Pakistan with the Bush administration’s support for General Pervez Musharraf’s military regime.

Like other American officials before him, Boucher suggested that support for Musharraf and democracy might not be incompatible. Washington is hoping that, without Musharraf relinquishing power, Pakistan could inch forward towards civilian supremacy and democratic rule with the 2007 parliamentary elections.

The US wants these elections to be a little less tainted and a bit more acceptable both at home and abroad than previous electoral exercises under Musharraf’s rule. But so far there is no indication that the next election will be any fairer than previous ones.

Change will come only if the US recognises that the basic attitudes of Musharraf and Pakistan’s military leadership are inconsistent with what is universally considered democracy, and then sets clear criteria for what Musharraf must do to pass America’s democracy test.

The fundamental realities in Pakistan are that the country is ruled by a general in uniform who has shown no inclination for giving up power; The Pakistani constitution has already been altered beyond recognition; and the country’s political parties remain at the mercy of the country’s intelligence services. As the 2007 election approaches, Musharraf and the politicised military have stepped up their war against popular opposition leaders.

Instead of fudging the issue, the US and others in the international community should make it clear that a free and fair election would be possible in Pakistan only if some basic conditions are fulfilled.

An independent Election Commission, with full powers to challenge the actions of everyone including Musharraf, is necessary as is the presence of competent international observers, such as those provided by the Carter Centre and the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) in several contentious elections around the world.

If Pakistan is to become a democracy in spirit and not only in form then the gimmickry that has characterised the political conduct of Pakistan’s military-led establishment for years must come to an end. So must the hypocrisy of Pakistan’s western friends, including the United States.

Musharraf must relinquish his position as Chief of the Army Staff and secure election as a civilian president under the terms of Pakistan’s constitution.

Popular support

The constitution bars a member of Pakistan’s professional armed forces from running for elective office until two years after his retirement from this office of profit. In a parliamentary form of democracy, politics is reserved for those seeking popular support and accepting the risk of being voted out.

There can be no free expression of the people’s will at the ballot box until and unless the constitutionally mandated separation between state functionaries and elected politicians is restored.

In addition, Musharraf and the armed forces must be restrained from pre-determining the outcome of elections by mandating the exclusion of known political figures and declaring that certain personalities will never be allowed to be elected. How can there be a free and fair election when a coup-making general arbitrarily decides who can or cannot participate in the electoral process?

The question of the competence or integrity of Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto has no relevance to their right of inclusion in the political process. Democracies do not give the executive branch of government the right to disqualify candidates on grounds of charges not proven in a court of law. In a democracy, the people are the sovereign and they should have the right to decide the fate of their leaders.

With its eye on the 2007 elections, the National Accountability Bureau (NAB) is pretending to have found new evidence of corruption against Bhutto, who was last in power ten years ago. If the prosecutions brought a decade ago have not yielded any convictions, how can new cases filed more than ten years after the fact have credibility?

Another fundamental requirement of a free and fair poll in Pakistan is the termination of all covert operations by Pakistan’s intelligence services in the domestic political arena.

The ISI’s unlawful mobilisation of funds for preferred parties and candidates in the 1990 elections is the subject of a case that has been pending before the Supreme Court without hearings since 1995.

During Musharraf’s rule, the intelligence services have created the PML (Q) and the Patriots faction of the PPP through arm-twisting and outright corruption. Manipulating the political process is not a legitimate function for any country’s security services and in the presence of such manipulative capacity it is unrealistic to expect a fair poll.

Different visions of India-Pakistan peace

Gulf News, April 5, 2006

When Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh spoke recently of a “treaty of peace, security and friendship” with Pakistan, he inadvertently highlighted the different visions of India-Pakistan relations prevailing in Delhi and Islamabad. India sees normalisation as a means of addressing disputes and issues that have proved intractable over more than five decades. Pakistan, on the other hand, continues to insist that normalisation would be the end result, rather than the means, of resolving disputes, especially the Kashmir question.

Manmohan Singh accorded priority to normalisation of relations between the two nuclear armed South Asian neighbours, hoping that their dispute over Jammu and Kashmir would be resolved as a result of normalisation. Singh envisaged “a situation where the two parts of Jammu and Kashmir can, with the active encouragement of the governments of India and Pakistan, work out cooperative, consultative mechanisms.”

The Pakistani response, articulated by a glib but not brilliant foreign office spokeswoman, was predictable. She said that it would be “unrealistic” to expect Pakistan to move forward without progress on the Kashmir issue. “The ground reality from Pakistan’s point of view,” she explained, “is that status quo meaning LOC was not acceptable to Pakistanis or Kashmiris so a viable solution has to be found”.

The Indian prime minister had observed that both countries should jointly address problems such as poverty, disease and ignorance. But the Pakistani foreign office spokeswoman unimaginatively declared, “We have always stated that the resolution of the Jammu and Kashmir issue can release the full potential of the peoples of South Asia to make progress and fight poverty, disease and ignorance.”

Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Khurshid Kasuri welcomed the “positive tone” of Singh’s statement. But he, too, emphasised the need to resolve outstanding issues, including Kashmir, as a precondition to normalisation of relations.

Dilemma

This exchange, with India calling for normalisation and Pakistan insisting on “resolving” Kashmir first, miniaturises the dilemma of India-Pakistan negotiations. The international community, and sensible people within both countries, wants the India-Pakistan dialogue to continue.

The alternative to dialogue is tension, spiked now with the prospect of nuclear confrontation. But once dialogue gets under way, it sooner or later ends with both sides sticking to stated positions, with little scope for a substantive breakthrough.

Negotiations usually involve reconciling maximum demands what one side says it desires with its minimal expectation what it will settle for. In recent public pronouncements, Indian officials have made their preference for settling the Kashmir issue on the basis of legitimising the status quo more or less official, a de facto “take it or leave it” offer albeit with minor sweeteners.

But in Pakistan’s case, there has never been much discussion of a “bottom line” national position on the Kashmir conflict.
It is true that an overwhelming majority of Pakistanis feel strongly that they were cheated at the time of partition, when a contiguous Muslim majority state was not allowed to become a part of Pakistan. But now, given the price Pakistan has paid in military setbacks and internal crises for trying to secure Kashmir, realism must dictate Pakistan’s foreign policy priorities.

Normalisation of relations with India, an emerging global power that is also the strategic partner of the world’s sole superpower, are far more important for Pakistan today than they were in the early years of its life as an independent state.
Pakistan no longer has the strategic options, of playing one Cold War rival against the other, to help compensate for its military and economic disparity with India.

Pakistan has tried, and failed, to change the territorial status quo in Jammu and Kashmir through both conventional and sub-conventional warfare. Efforts to secure international support against India by emphasising India’s violations of human rights in Jammu and Kashmir have also yielded little result.

The problem for Pakistan’s ruling elite is that after 58 years of describing Kashmir as Pakistan’s primary national “cause” it is not easy, especially for an unelected military regime, to effectively manage a major shift in national priorities. A feeling of insecurity against a much larger and hostile neighbour was the original source of Pakistani apprehensions about its nationhood.

But over the years, structures of conflict have evolved, with the Pakistani establishment as the major beneficiary of maintaining hostility.

It is clearly in India’s interest to help Pakistan gain sufficient confidence as a nation to overcome the need for conflict or regional rivalry for nation building. Singh’s vision of a comprehensive treaty of peace, friendship and security is a step in helping bolster the confidence of Pakistanis in normal ties between India and Pakistan. It is important for Pakistani civil society to acknowledge that normal relations with India are the key to normalisation of politics and policy in Pakistan as well.