Monthly Archives: June 2005

Indian Express, June 20, 2005

The arrest in California of a Pakistani father and son allegedly linked to terrorism highlights, once again, the superficiality of the Pakistani regime’s rhetoric about changing the country’s direction.
So far, no evidence has been presented by US officials of the California detainees being linked to Al-Qaeda, except an affidavit by one of the accused admitting to attending a militant training camp near Rawalpindi. It is possible that the Pakistanis arrested in California turn out to be innocent of Al-Qaeda links, joining the ranks of hundreds of Muslims caught in America’s currently over-zealous law enforcement. It is equally possible, however, that they were associated with a Pakistani jehadi group, which in turn might be linked to the global network loosely described as Al-Qaeda.

The Pakistani foreign office was, as usual, quick in denying that any Al-Qaeda facility exists in Pakistan. Of course, it is the same foreign office that, through its permanent representative to the United Nations, has been periodically debating the definition of terrorism at the UN, even though Pakistan has ostensibly been a crucial ally in the US-led global war against terrorism.

One could ask Pakistani officials how they can be America’s partners in fighting terrorism if they do not agree with the US definition of terrorism but that argument is not the subject of our immediate concern. The same week that the California arrests served as a reminder of the jehadi presence in Pakistan, the famed victim of a gangrape, whose rapists had earlier been set free, was detained and forbidden from traveling abroad. The ‘‘enlightened moderate’’ State in Pakistan chose to extend its protection to the perpetrators of the gangrape rather than Mukhtar Mai, the victim.

With the passage of time, differences between the ‘‘Islamist’’ dictatorship of General Zia-ul-Haq and the ‘‘modernising’’ regime of General Pervez Musharraf are clearly a lot less pronounced than Musharraf’s supporters make them out to be. The military regime’s priority appears to be to suppress or deny bad news rather than to change the circumstances that give rise to it.

In case of the California arrests, the Pakistani authorities should have obtained full information and checked the facts on the ground before setting their spin machine in motion. One of the California accused reportedly told his interrogators that he attended a jehadi facility run by Maulana Fazlur Rehman at ‘‘Tamal in Rawalpindi’’. Given that the FBI officer writing the Pakistani detainee’s statement was unfamiliar with both Rawalpindi’s geography and the who’s who of Pakistani jehadism, it is perfectly possible that he simply failed to figure out the information he was given.

Maulana Fazlur Rehman Khalil, originally of Harkat-ul-Ansar, has maintained a jehadi facility at Dhamial in Rawalpindi for many years. Had the Pakistan government been serious in its claims of uprooting militancy and terrorism, it would have paid some attention to this possible link between last week’s arrests in California and a shadowy group that participated in the officially sanctioned Afghan and Kashmir jehads.

Maulana Khalil was one of the signatories of Osama bin Laden’s 1998 fatwa against the United States and was reportedly in the camp struck by US cruise missiles in Afghanistan in 1998. In January 2004, the Los Angeles Times reported that Maulana Khalil remained openly active despite government-imposed bans on him and his organisations. Khalil had survived the ban in 1995 on Harkat-ul-Ansar and re-named it Harkat-ul-Mujahideen. When Harkat-ul-Mujahideen was banned after September 11, 2001, he emerged as the leader of Jamiat-ul-Ansar.

Instead of doing anything about Maulana Khalil or his followers after the publication of the LA Times report, Pakistani security services threatened the newspaper’s Pakistani reporter. The reporter’s reporting, rather than Maulana Khalil’s activities, appeared to irk Pakistani officials more.

Maulana Khalil was finally arrested with considerable publicity in March 2004, only to be released quietly seven months later. He has reportedly gone underground after the recent arrests of his followers in California. Unlike Mukhtar Mai, the rape victim, Pakistani authorities are unable to find and detain him. Ironically, the same Pakistani officials who had no qualms about keeping Asif Ali Zardari (husband of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto) in prison without a conviction for almost eight years have never found sufficient reason to detain Maulana Khalil — or several other militant jehadi leaders for that matter.

It should be obvious to all but the most naive that Musharraf’s U-turn in the aftermath of September 11, 2001 has been selective and aimed more at pleasing the US than at ridding Pakistan of domestic militant groups. Musharraf made his views clear in an interview with The Washington Post in 2002, in which he made a distinction between various elements of Pakistan’s militant problem and stressed that the militants fighting in Kashmir were freedom fighters.

‘‘There are three elements of terrorism that the world is concerned about,’’ Musharraf said in that interview and went on to list these three elements. ‘‘Number one, the Al-Qaeda factor. Number two is what (the Indians) are calling cross-border terrorism and we are calling the freedom struggle in Kashmir. Number three is the sectarian (Sunni vs. Shia) extremism and sectarian terrorism in Pakistan… The third one is more our concern, and unfortunately, the world is not bothered about that. We are very much bothered about that because that is destabilising us internally,’’ he said.

Thus, in the General’s worldview, sectarian terrorists were the real source of trouble while Al-Qaeda’s Arab members had to be apprehended to ensure the flow of US support. Homegrown militants trained for operating in the region were the least of Musharraf’s concern at the time of that interview. But Pakistani authorities cannot eliminate the international terrorist network or the sectarian militias without decapitating the domestic jehadi networks. All Islamist militant groups sympathise with one another and in some cases, such as Kashmiri jehadi groups and sectarian militias, have overlapping memberships.

From the point of view of Pakistan’s Islamist militants and their backers in the establishment, jehad is only on hold but not yet over. The major Kashmiri jehadi groups retain their infrastructure that could be pressed into service at a future date. Afghanistan’s Taliban also continue to find safe haven in parts of Pakistan as recently as the Spring of 2005. Afghan and American officials complain periodically of the Taliban still training and organising in Pakistan’s border areas, but their protests are rejected summarily with rhetoric similar to the one about domestic militant groups.

The Musharraf regime has been careful to take all steps necessary to retain the goodwill of the US and its rhetoric of ‘‘enlightened moderation’’ has won it America’s support. President Bush described Musharraf as ‘‘a courageous leader’’ who had risked his life to crack down on the Al-Qaeda terrorist network. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice declared during a March 2005 visit to Pakistan that Pakistan ‘‘has come an enormously long way… This is not the Pakistan of September 11. It is not even the Pakistan of 2002.’’

American officials regularly express the belief that Pakistan had turned the corner and could now be trusted as an American ally. The US sees Pakistan’s glass as half full rather than half empty. For Pakistanis faced with on-ground realities, such as militants living in their midst and the treatment of gangrape victims like Mukhtar Mai, there is little in the glass that gives them satisfaction.

Gulf News, June 15, 2005

The arrest in California of a Pakistani father and son allegedly linked to terrorism highlights, once again, the superficiality of the Pakistani regime’s rhetoric about changing the country’s direction.

So far no evidence has been presented by the US officials to show that the California detainees are linked to Al Qaida, except an affidavit by one of the accused admitting to attending a militant training camp near Rawalpindi.

It is possible that the Pakistanis may turn out to be innocent of Al Qaida links, joining the ranks of hundreds of Muslims caught in America’s currently over-zealous law enforcement agencies. It is equally possible, however, that they were associated with a Pakistani jihadi group, which in turn might be linked to the global network loosely described as Al Qaida.

The Pakistani foreign office was, as usual, quick in denying that any Al Qaida facility exists in Pakistan. Of course, it is the same foreign office that, through its permanent representative to the United Nations has been periodically debating the definition of terrorism at the UN even though Pakistan has ostensibly been a crucial ally in the US-led global war against terrorism.

One could ask Pakistani officials how they can be America’s partners in fighting terrorism if they do not agree with the US definition of terrorism but that argument is not the subject of our immediate concern.

The same week that the California arrests served as a reminder of the jihadi presence in Pakistan, the famed victim of a gang rape, whose rapists had earlier been set free, was detained and forbidden from travelling abroad.

The “enlightened moderate” State in Pakistan chose to extend its protection to the perpetrators of the gang rape rather than Mukhtaran Mai, the victim.

With the passage of time, differences between the “Islamist” dictatorship of General Zia ul Haq and the “modernising” regime of General Pervez Musharraf are clearly a lot less pronounced than Musharraf’s supporters make them out to be. The military regime’s priority appears to be to suppress or deny bad news rather than to change the circumstances that give rise to it.

In the case of the California arrests, the Pakistani authorities should have obtained full information and checked the facts before setting their spin machine in motion. One of the California accused reportedly told his interrogators that he attended a jihadi facility run by Maulana Fazlur Rehman at “Tamal in Rawalpindi”.

Given that the FBI officer writing the Pakistani detainee’s statement was unfamiliar with both Rawalpindi’s geography and the who’s who of Pakistani jihadism, it is perfectly possible that he simply failed to figure out the information he was given.

Uprooting militancy

Maulana Fazlur Rehman Khalil, originally of Harkat-ul-Ansar, has maintained a jihadi facility at Dhamial in Rawalpindi for many years. Had the Pakistan Government been serious in its claims of uprooting militancy and terrorism, it would have paid some attention to this possible link between last week’s arrests in California and a shadowy group that participated in the officially sanctioned Afghan and Kashmir jihads.

Maulana Khalil was one of the signatories of Osama Bin Laden’s 1998 fatwa against the United States and was reportedly in the camp struck by US cruise missiles in Afghanistan in 1998.

In January 2004, the Los Angeles Times reported that Maulana Khalil remained openly active despite government-imposed bans on him and his organisations. Khalil had survived the ban in 1995 on Harkat-ul-Ansar and renamed it Harkat-ul-Mujahideen. When Harkat-ul-Mujahideen was banned after September 11, 2001, he emerged as the leader of Jamiat-ul-Ansar. Instead of doing anything about Maulana Khalil or his followers after the publication of the LA Times report, Pakistani security services threatened the newspaper’s Pakistani reporter.

The reporter’s reporting, rather than Maulana Khalil’s activities appeared to irk Pakistani officials more.

Maulana Khalil was finally arrested with considerable publicity in March 2004 only to be released quietly seven months later.
He has reportedly gone underground after the recent arrests of his followers in California.

Unlike Mukhtaran Mai, the rape victim, Pakistani authorities are unable to find and detain him.

Ironically, the same Pakistani officials who had no qualms about keeping Asif Ali Zardari (husband of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto) in prison without a conviction for almost eight years have never found sufficient reason to detain Maulana Khalil or several other militant jihadi leaders for that matter.

It should be obvious to all but the most naïve that Musharraf’s U-turn in the aftermath of September 11, 2001 has been selective and aimed more at pleasing the United States than at ridding Pakistan of domestic militant groups.

American officials regularly express the belief that Pakistan has turned the corner and can now be trusted as an American ally.

The United States sees Pakistan’s glass as half full rather than half empty. For Pakistanis faced with on-ground realities, such as militants living in their midst and the treatment of gang rape victims such as Mukhtaran Mai, there is little in the glass that gives them satisfaction.

Indian Express, June 9, 2005

The underlying message of statements made during his recent trip to Pakistan by Hindu nationalist leader L K Advani seems to be that India and Pakistan must get over the bitterness of their partition 58 years ago. They need to accept each other as neighbours and address the issues that face their people.

Different views of Partition have been the principal drivers in Indian-Pakistani relations since British India’s Muslim majority provinces emerged as the independent State of Pakistan in 1947. Indians have persistently lamented the tearing apart of their homeland along religious lines, looking upon the creation of Pakistan as a tragedy. Pakistanis, on the other hand, have evolved a State ideology to justify their founders’ decision to create a separate State, denying the common history of the two States in the process. Neither India nor Pakistan is about to be wiped off the face of the earth, unless both of them commit the folly of using nuclear weapons each has developed to secure its statehood. It is time for Pakistanis and Indians to treat Partition as a distant historic event rather than the basis of ongoing conflict.

Advani’s relatively positive remarks about the founder of Pakistan, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, and about Pakistan being a reality that cannot be undone should reassure Pakistanis who, since their country’s inception, have argued that in their heart of hearts Indians seek the restoration of undivided India (Akhand Bharat). The Hindutva ideology, which Advani’s BJP champions in the political arena, is widely perceived in Pakistan as the main driving force behind the idea of undoing Partition. In their dealings with India, however, successive Pakistani governments have made little distinction between the Indian nationalism of the Indian National Congress and the Hindu nationalism of the Sangh Parivar (family), of which the BJP is a part.

In some ways, India-Pakistan relations have been a continuation of the bitter pre-Partition feud between the Muslim League led by Jinnah and the Congress led by Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru. To mobilise Muslims in favour of its political agenda, the Muslim League had to demonise the Congress as anti-Muslim and to argue that the Hindus sought to deprive Muslims of their religious and cultural identity. The Congress built its argument on the basis of India’s historic unity and its Muslim leaders rebutted the Muslim League’s claim of separateness based on religion. During the independence struggle, the Hindutva movement’s emphasis on India’s Hindu identity helped the Muslim League make its case for Pakistan to South Asia’s Muslims. But the birth of Pakistan was neither easy, nor according to the original design of its founders.

The dominant Indian narrative of independence demonises Jinnah and speaks of Pakistan’s creation as a misfortune. In the years immediately after Partition, Indian intellectuals and officials routinely predicted that India and Pakistan would become one nation again. Magnanimity towards Pakistan was seldom contemplated, lest it encourage further partitions of India.

On the other hand, the communal basis of Partition and the religious frenzy generated by it, made religion more central to the new State of Pakistan than Jinnah may have originally envisaged. The campaign for Pakistan had, in its final stages, become a religious movement even though its leaders initiated it as a formula for resolving post-independence constitutional problems. This created confusion about Pakistan’s raison d’etre, which Pakistan’s leadership has attempted to resolve through a State ideology.

The commitment or otherwise of the ordinary Pakistani citizen to Islam has hardly been the major issue in Pakistan’s evolution. A large number of otherwise practicing Muslims have demonstrated in elections time and again their desire to embrace pragmatic political and economic ideas. Most Pakistanis would probably be quite content with a State that caters to their social needs, respects and protects their right to observe religion and does not invoke Islam as its sole source of legitimacy. But the military’s desire to dominate the political system and define Pakistan’s national security priorities has been the most significant though by no means the only factor in encouraging an ideological paradigm for Pakistan.

Persistent questioning of the wisdom of their nationhood bred insecurity among Pakistanis about the viability of their new State. The fears of dilution of Muslim identity that had defined the demand for carving Pakistan out of India became the new nation-State’s identity, reinforced over time through the educational system and constant propaganda. A military-dominated Pakistan has responded to these fears with the notion of an ideological State in eternal competition with ‘‘Hindu India’’.

While much thought might not have gone into plans for an independent Pakistan, considerable effort has been expended since independence on defining, justifying and protecting it. Disputes, including the one over Jammu and Kashmir, have been integrated into Pakistan’s ideological agenda. Pakistani insecurity has consistently been reinforced whenever Indians or other foreigners allude to the futility of Pakistan’s creation. Pakistanis were concerned about the prospect of India ‘‘undoing’’ the Partition and the attitude of India’s post-independence elite, which continued to speak in terms of the inevitability of ‘‘re-unification’’, did not help in allaying Pakistani fears; Nor did the breaking away of Pakistan’s eastern wing to become Bangladesh. But in addressing their insecurities through militarism, Pakistanis have only compounded their country’s internal problems.

India and Pakistan could remain trapped in the arguments over the 1947 Partition or decide to move beyond that moment in history. Pakistan has ‘‘secured’’ its existence with the acquisition of nuclear weapons and there is widespread recognition among Pakistanis of their domestic weaknesses. India, on the other hand, is developing rapidly and is recognised by the world as an emerging power. Pakistanis, too, must now recognise that fact.

Advani’s statement that Pakistan is a reality and that Akhand Bharat is no longer a realistic prospect probably reflects a widely held Indian view that needs to be reciprocated with Pakistani gestures of respect for the common history of the two countries. That does not mean, however, that Indians will not continue to view Partition as tragic and Pakistanis should not expect the acceptance by Indians of the Pakistani narrative of history.

Indians, on the other hand, should be prepared for Pakistanis making a strong argument about their nationhood. But Pakistan should set aside an ideology based on worrying about its unraveling. India needs to be generous towards Pakistan, while Pakistan must give up the rhetoric about completing the unfinished business of Partition.

We will know we’re in a new phase of India-Pakistan relations when we can walk on a Jinnah Road in New Delhi and visit the Gandhi Gardens in Islamabad. Unfortunately, we’re not there yet.

Gulf News, June 8, 2005

The underlying message of statements made during his recent trip to Pakistan by Hindu nationalist leader, L.K. Advani, seems to be that India and Pakistan must get over the bitterness of the partition of the subcontinent. They need to accept each other as neighbours and address the issues that face their peoples.

Different views of partition have been the principal driver in Indian-Pakistani relations since British India’s Muslim majority provinces emerged as the independent state of Pakistan in 1947. Indians have persistently lamented the tearing apart of their homeland along religious lines, looking upon the creation of Pakistan as a tragedy.

Pakistanis, on the other hand, have evolved a state ideology to justify their founders’ decision to create a separate state, denying the common history of the two states in the process.

It is time for Pakistanis and Indians to treat partition as a distant historic event rather than the basis of ongoing conflict.

Advani’s relatively positive remarks about the founder of Pakistan, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, and about Pakistan being a reality that cannot be undone should reassure Pakistanis who, since their country’s inception, have argued that in their heart of hearts Indians seek the restoration of undivided India (Akhand Bharat). The Hindutva ideology, which Advani’s BJP champions in the political arena, is widely perceived in Pakistan as the main driving force behind the idea of undoing partition.

The birth of Pakistan was neither easy, nor according to the original design of its founders. The Pakistan that was created was communally more homogenous but economically and administratively a backyard. Communal riots involving Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs resulted in massive migrations from Pakistan to India and vice-versa, although no such shifts of population had been envisaged by Pakistan’s founders.

To complicate matters further, when Pakistan was finally born, it faced an environment of insecurity and hostility, with many Indian leaders predicting the early demise of the new country. The dominant Indian narrative of independence demonises Jinnah and speaks of Pakistan’s creation as a misfortune. Magnanimity towards Pakistan was seldom contemplated, lest it encourage further partitions of India.

On the other hand, the communal basis of partition and the religious frenzy generated by it, made religion more central to the new state of Pakistan than Jinnah may have originally envisaged.

The campaign for Pakistan had, in its final stages, become a religious movement even though its leaders initiated it as a formula for resolving post-independence constitutional problems. This created confusion about Pakistan’s raison d’etre, which Pakistan’s leadership has attempted to resolve through a State ideology.

Major issue

The commitment or otherwise of the ordinary Pakistani citizen to Islam has hardly been the major issue in Pakistan’s evolution. A large number of otherwise practising Muslims have demonstrated in elections time and again their desire to embrace pragmatic political and economic ideas.

Most Pakistanis would probably be quite content with a state that caters to their social needs, respects and protects their right to observe religion and does not invoke Islam as its sole source of legitimacy. But the military’s desire to dominate the political system and define Pakistan’s national security priorities has been the most significant though by no means the only factor in encouraging an ideological paradigm for Pakistan.

Pakistani insecurity has consistently been reinforced whenever Indians or other foreigners allude to the futility of Pakistan’s creation. But in addressing their insecurities through militarism, Pakistanis have only compounded their country’s internal problems.

India and Pakistan could remain trapped in the arguments over the 1947 partition or decide to move beyond that moment in history. Pakistan has “secured” its existence with the acquisition of nuclear weapons and there is widespread recognition among Pakistanis of their domestic weaknesses. India, on the other hand, is developing rapidly and is recognised by the world as an emerging power. Pakistanis, too, must now recognise that fact.

Advani’s statement that Pakistan is a reality and that Akhand Bharat is no longer a realistic prospect probably reflects a widely held Indian view that needs to be reciprocated with Pakistani gestures of respect for the common history of the two countries.

That does not mean, however, that Indians will not continue to view partition as tragic and Pakistanis should not expect the acceptance by Indians of the Pakistani narrative of history. Indians, on the other hand, should be prepared for Pakistanis making a strong argument about their nationhood. But Pakistan should set aside an ideology based on worrying about its unravelling. India needs to be generous towards Pakistan, while Pakistan must give up the rhetoric about completing the unfinished business of partition.

We will know we’re in a new phase of India-Pakistan relations when we can walk on a Jinnah Road in New Delhi and visit the Gandhi Gardens in Islamabad. Unfortunately, we’re not there yet.