Paris attacks and the civil war between Islam’s medievalists and modernisers

The Paris attacks are the culmination of a 200-year-long battle over how Islam should respond to the rise of Western power

The latest terrorist attacks in Paris serve as a grim reminder that the threat of global terrorism is unlikely to end until the resolution of the civil war of ideas between Muslim modernisers and those adhering to an outmoded theology of Islamic dominance.
Just as the post-9/11 war against al-Qaeda degraded Osama bin Laden’s group but gave rise to the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Isil), extremist Islamist ideology will likely give birth to “Terrorism 3.0” once the world has fought, contained and eliminated Isil. Security will return only after the widespread embrace of pluralism by Muslims and the defeat and marginalisation of the idea that Muslims cannot move in an orbit set by another.

The Muslim world, ascendant for several centuries, has found it difficult to deal with its decline as a global power during modern times. Inspired by the notion that Muslims were chosen by God to lead the world, medieval Muslim law made freedom of religion conditional to Muslim rule. Religious coexistence in Muslim Spain, for example, reflected the tolerance of a dominant Islam, allowing non-Muslim subjects to survive and practice their faiths conditionally. Still, that medieval standard of tolerance falls far short of modern concepts of religious coexistence under secular states.

“Muslim leaders used to want to modernise the Muslim world. Now many want to Islamise the modern world”
The anti-Western ideology known today as “political Islam” is largely a response or reaction to the breakdown of the traditional Islamic order under the pressures of modernity. Unlike Europe and North America, Muslim territories did not get the opportunity to evolve into modern states over time. The British and the French in the Arabic-speaking lands, the Russians in Central Asia, the Dutch in Indonesia and the British in India and Malaya brought new ideas and technology to Muslim lands.

The Muslim elite responded to this change of fortunes in one of two ways. The first response, adopted by some Muslim elites especially in the 19th and early 20th centuries, was to learn from and imitate the west. Kemal Ataturk, the founder of modern Turkey, told a peasant who asked him what westernisation meant: “It means being a better human being.” Others, however, recommended “revivalism” or a search for glory through rejection of new ways and ideas.

At the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century, there was considerable emphasis among Muslim scholars and leaders on modernising the Muslim world. By the end of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st century, however, those seeking the reverse – to Islamise the modern world – appeared to have gained greater momentum.

Amb HH
Paris terrorist attacks aftermath Photo: Eddie Mulholland

Contemporary jihadists have chosen to use modern means, including the internet and state-of-the-art weapons, to impose their medieval beliefs. But their ideology cannot be defeated by a purely military strategy. Islamist movements see the humiliation of fellow believers as an opportunity for the mobilisation and recruitment of dedicated followers.

The resort to asymmetric warfare – the idea that a suicide bomber is a poor man’s F-16 – has often followed each significant Muslim military defeat. Yasser Arafat and his Al-Fatah captured the imagination of young Palestinians only after the Arab defeat and loss of the West Bank in 1967. Islamic militancy in Kashmir can be traced to India’s military victory over Pakistan in the 1971 Bangladesh war.

“The fundamentalist interpretation of Islam is not a common mode of thinking for most Muslims, but it is clearly driving the political agenda”

Revenge, rather than willingness to compromise or submit to the victors, is the traditional response of Islamist Muslims to the defeat of Muslim armies. And for them, this battle has no front line and is not limited to a few years or even decades. They think in terms of conflict spread over generations.
A call for jihad against British rule in India, for example, resulted in an underground movement that began in 1830 and lasted well until the 1870s, with remnants periodically surfacing well into the 20th century.

The fundamentalist interpretation of Islam is not a common mode of thinking for most Muslims, especially in recent times. But it is clearly driving the political agenda in Muslim countries. Not all Muslim modernisers are willing to confront the anti-Western and anti-Semitic beliefs that feed the Islamist narrative. The Islamists are dominating the discourse within the Muslim world by murdering secularists and forcing many of them to leave their countries.

With over 1.4 billion Muslims around the globe, the swelling of the fundamentalist ranks poses serious problems. If only 1 per cent of the world’s Muslims accepts this uncompromising theology, and 10 per cent of that 1-per cent decide to commit themselves to a radical agenda, we are looking at a one million strong recruitment pool for groups such as al-Qaeda, IS and whatever comes next.
Only a concerted ideological campaign against medieval Islamist ideology, like the one that discredited and contained communism, could turn the tide.

Let down by both carrot and stick

American readiness to offer aid has bred dependence, and the U.S. has ended up as an enabler of Pakistan’s dysfunction.

By inviting Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to the White House, President Obama may only have wanted to signal America’s continued interest in the nuclear-armed country. But in Pakistan it reignited the belief that Uncle Sam simply cannot manage the world without Pakistan’s help.

For years Pakistan’s policies have coincided with those of the U.S. only nominally. Pakistan’s support for the Taliban in Afghanistan is the main reason Mr. Obama had to reverse his decision of pulling out troops from that country. Pakistan’s development of battlefield nuclear weapons also runs contrary to U.S. plans for reducing nuclear proliferation. Diplomatic statements notwithstanding, the two sides have very different priorities.

Even after feting Pakistan’s democratically-elected leader, it is unlikely that Mr. Obama’s problems in Afghanistan or Pakistan will end anytime soon. Although he continues to retain popularity at home, according to recent polls, Mr. Sharif has little control over foreign policy. Pakistan’s powerful military, currently headed by General Raheel Sharif (no relation to the Prime Minister) persists with its obsessive competition with neighbouring India, which in turn shapes Pakistan’s worldview.

Lost opportunity

Mr. Obama lost the initiative on Afghanistan by relying on Pakistan’s ability to set up direct negotiations with the Taliban. He has spent the last seven years alternating between coaxing Pakistan’s leaders with economic and military assistance and delivering tough messages. The pretence of toughness has lacked credibility. Diplomacy and inducements have failed because they only reinforce the Pakistani view that the country’s geostrategic importance for the U.S. outweighs its resentment of negative Pakistani policies.

Pakistan has received $40 billion in U.S. military and economic aid since 1950, of which $23 billion were given after the 9/11 attacks to strengthen the country’s resolve in fighting terrorism. But Pakistan’s focus has always been its rivalry with India, against whom it has initiated (and lost) three wars, using U.S. equipment each time.

The recent Pakistani announcement about an ‘India-centric’ tactical nuclear programme indicates that despite serious threats to Pakistan’s security by Jihadi extremists, India — an American friend — remains the principal enemy in the eyes of Pakistan’s leaders.

Americans have several reasons to mistrust Pakistan, which also accuses the U.S. of being a fair weather friend. Pakistan acquired nuclear weapons while promising Washington that it won’t go nuclear if it gets U.S. assistance. Pakistan’s ongoing support of jihadi terrorists is part of its effort to expand regional influence in competition with India, especially in Afghanistan and the disputed Kashmir region.

Over the last 13 years, many U.S. soldiers have been killed in Afghanistan by the Taliban and the Haqqani network — trained, armed and supported by Pakistan. The recent surge in Taliban activity, manifested most blatantly during the occupation of the Afghan city of Kunduz, is attributed by U.S. and Afghan officials to Pakistani support.

It seems that while officially Pakistan was helping the U.S. and Afghan officials in peace talks with the Taliban, its covert support was preparing the latter for reoccupying Afghanistan after the U.S. withdrawal. Increased willingness to fight Pakistani Taliban has not diminished Pakistan’s support for the Afghan Taliban. Groups that target India — such as Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and its other incarnation, Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD) — are not even deemed terrorists by Pakistan’s establishment.

Conditions waived

In 2009, Congress made aid to Pakistan conditional to specific criteria. The administration was required to certify to Congress that Islamabad was meeting American terms in fighting terrorism and diminishing the military’s role in politics. But for several years, instead of certifying that Pakistan was doing what it was expected, the Secretary of State has invoked the right to waive the conditions on grounds that continuing aid to Pakistan was necessary for U.S. national security.

The Obama administration spent its first few years trying to convince Pakistan’s civil and military leaders of the virtues of changing their strategic calculus. In doing so, they praised Pakistan publicly and expressed optimism every time Pakistan took a positive step, however small.

Over the last two years, much optimism was expressed over Pakistan’s decision to militarily eliminate safe havens used by terrorists responsible for attacks inside Pakistan and against China. But now the administration appears to have woken up, once again, to the realisation that Pakistan’s decision to act against terrorists does not extend to all jihadi groups.

During a recent visit to Islamabad, National Security Adviser Susan Rice reminded Pakistan of its unfulfilled commitments about helping with the Afghan peace process. She also asked Pakistan to act against the Haqqani network, which has been involved in several attacks on American targets including one on the U.S. embassy in Kabul in 2011.

If things have not changed since 2011, one cannot help but question the administration’s intermittent hopefulness about a turnaround in Pakistani policies.

Pakistan is the sixth largest nation in the world by population but only 26th by size of GDP on PPP basis and 42nd in nominal GDP. It has the world’s sixth largest nuclear arsenal and eighth largest army but performs poorly in most non-military indices. It ranks 146 out of 187 countries in the world on the Human Development Index, which measures health, standard of living, and education.

The World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report ranks Pakistan’s primary education at 136 out of 144 countries. The country has one of the world’s lowest tax to GDP ratio, with international aid making up for low tax collection.

The military and intelligence services that dominate Pakistani national security decision-making have sacrificed the country’s progress and prosperity in their relentless pursuit of military parity with India. Forcing New Delhi’s hand on Kashmir has become more important than educating Pakistan’s children.

American readiness to offer aid has bred dependence and hubris. The U.S. has ended up as an enabler of Pakistan’s dysfunction by reinforcing the belief of its elite that it is too important to fail or be neglected.

The intermittent cycles of optimism and pessimism about Pakistan have led to confusion in Mr. Obama’s Afghan policy. It is time to finally accept Pakistan’s lack of cooperation in Afghanistan as a given while making plans for that country. The U.S. would help Afghanistan, and even Pakistan’s people, more by insisting consistently that Islamabad correct its course. Instead of telling Pakistan’s elite how important they are, it might be more useful to stop footing the bill for Pakistan’s failings.

U.S. Policies Aggravate Pakistan’s Dysfunction

By inviting Pakistan’s Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to the White House, President Obama may only have wanted to signal America’s continued interest in the nuclear-armed country. But in Pakistan it reignited the belief that Uncle Sam simply cannot manage the world without Pakistan’s help.

For years, Pakistan’s policies have coincided with those of the U.S. only nominally. Pakistan’s support for the Taliban in Afghanistan is the main reason Mr. Obama had to reverse his decision of pulling out troops from that country. Pakistan’s development of battlefield nuclear weapons also runs contrary to U.S. plans for reducing nuclear proliferation. Diplomatic statements notwithstanding, the two sides have very different priorities.

Even after feting Pakistan’s democratically-elected leader, it is unlikely that Mr. Obama’s problems in Afghanistan or with Pakistan will end anytime soon. Although he continues to retain popularity at home, according to recent polls, Mr. Sharif has little control over foreign policy. Pakistan’s powerful military, currently headed by General Raheel Sharif (no relation to the Prime Minister) persists with its obsessive competition with neighboring India, which in turn shapes Pakistan’s worldview.

Mr. Obama lost the initiative in Afghanistan by relying on Pakistan’s ability to set up negotiations with the Taliban. He has spent the last seven years alternating between coaxing Pakistan’s leaders with economic and military assistance and delivering tough messages. The pretense of toughness has lacked credibility. Diplomacy and inducements have failed because they only reinforce the Pakistani view that the country’s geostrategic importance for the United States outweighs its resentment of negative Pakistani policies.

Pakistan has received $40 billion in US military and economic aid since 1950, of which $23 billion were given after 9/11 to strengthen the country’s resolve in fighting terrorism. But Pakistan’s focus has always been its rivalry with India, against whom it has initiated (and lost) three wars, using US equipment each time.

Americans have several reasons to mistrust Pakistan, which also accuses the U.S. of being a fair weather friend. Pakistan acquired nuclear weapons while promising the US it won’t go nuclear if it gets US assistance. Pakistan’s ongoing support of Jihadi terrorists is part of Pakistan’s effort to expand regional influence in competition with India, especially in Afghanistan and the disputed Kashmir region.

Over the last 13 years, many US soldiers have been killed in Afghanistan by the Taliban and the Haqqani network trained, armed and supported by Pakistan. The recent surge in Taliban activity, manifested most blatantly during the Taliban occupation of the Afghan city of Kunduz, is attributed by US and Afghan officials to Pakistani support.

It seems that while officially Pakistan was helping US and Afghan officials in peace talks with the Taliban, its covert support was preparing the Taliban for reoccupying Afghanistan after the completion of the US withdrawal.

In 2009, Congress made aid to Pakistan conditional to specific criteria. The administration was required to certify to Congress that Pakistan was meeting American terms in fighting terrorism and diminishing the military’s role in politics. But for several years, instead of certifying that Pakistan was doing what it was expected, the Secretary of State has invoked the right to waive the conditions on grounds that continuing aid to Pakistan was necessary for US national security.

The Obama administration spent its first few years trying to convince Pakistan’s civil and military leaders of the virtues of changing their strategic calculus. In doing so, they praised Pakistan publicly and expressed optimism every time Pakistan took a positive step, however small.

Over the last two years, much optimism was expressed over Pakistan’s decision to militarily eliminate terrorist safe havens used by terrorists responsible for attacks inside Pakistan and against China. But now the administration appears to have woken up, once again, to the realization that Pakistan’s decision to act against terrorists does not extend to all jihadi groups.

During a recent visit to Islamabad, National Security Adviser Susan Rice reminded Pakistan of its unfulfilled commitments about helping with the Afghan peace process. She also asked Pakistan to act against the Haqqani network, which has been involved in several attacks on American targets including one on the U.S. embassy in Kabul in 2011.

Washington’s complaints against Pakistani support for the Haqqani network are not new. The former Chairman Joint Chiefs, Admiral Mike Mullen, who met with Pakistan’s army chief 26 times in an effort to ensure consistent Pakistani cooperation described the Haqqani network as a “veritable arm” of Pakistan’s security services at the end of his tenure.

If things have not changed since 2011, one cannot help but question the administration’s intermittent hopefulness about a turnaround in Pakistani policies.

Pakistan is the sixth largest nation in the world by population but only 26th by size of GDP on PPP basis and 42nd in nominal GDP. It has the world’s sixth largest nuclear arsenal and eighth largest army but performs poorly in most non-military indices. It ranks 146 out of 187 countries in the world on the Human Development Index, which measures health, standard of living, and education.

The World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report ranks Pakistan’s primary education at 136 out of 144 countries. The country has one of the world’s lowest tax to GDP ratio, with international aid making up for low tax collection.

The military and intelligence services that dominate Pakistani national security decision-making have sacrificed their country’s progress and prosperity in their relentless pursuit of military parity with India. Forcing New Delhi’s hand on Kashmir has become more important than educating Pakistan’s children.

American readiness to offer aid has bred dependence and hubris. The US has ended up as an enabler of Pakistan’s dysfunction by reinforcing the belief of its elite that it is too important to fail or be neglected.

The intermittent cycles of optimism and pessimism about Pakistan have led to confusion in Mr. Obama’s Afghan policy. It is time to finally accept Pakistan’s lack of cooperation in Afghanistan as a given while making plans for that country. The US would help Afghanistan, and even Pakistan’s people, more by insisting consistently that Islamabad correct its course. Instead of telling Pakistan’s elite how important they are, it might be more useful to stop footing the bill for Pakistan’s failings.

Reach out to the Other Side

Arab governments do not share the Barack Obama administration’s enthusiasm for the nuclear deal with Iran. Both sides publicly sidestepped the issue during the Washington visit by Saudi Arabia’s King Salman bin Abdel Aziz al-Saud earlier this month, but the difference of views on this subject is widely known.

Americans see the deal as a practical means of delaying, if not stopping forever, Iran’s ambitions of becoming a nuclear weapons power. In the Arab region, however, the nuclear deal — and the concomitant lifting of economic sanctions — raises the spectre of unleashing Iran’s divisive impact on the world’s Muslims at levels similar to the days immediately after the 1979 Iranian revolution.

Iran already has sympathetic regimes in Syria and Iraq and supports strong militant groups in Lebanon, Yemen and Bahrain. Only last February, the commander of the foreign wing of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, Qassem Suleimani, told a rally marking the 36th anniversary of the 1979 uprising that “we are witnessing the export of the Islamic revolution throughout the region”. Suleimani spoke proudly of Iran’s successes “from Bahrain and Iraq to Syria, Yemen and North Africa”.

President Obama has argued that the nuclear deal should not be judged on whether it “transforms Iran, ends Iran’s aggressive behaviour towards some of its Arab neighbours or leads to détente between Shiites and Sunnis”. He sees the deal solely as an instrument to “prevent Iran from breaking out with a nuclear weapon for the next 10 years” and as “a better outcome for America, Israel and our Arab allies than any other alternative on the table”.

That offers little comfort to governments and people in Muslim countries who anticipate a better funded Iranian campaign to exert more influence across the Muslim world than in the past. Such a campaign would result in renewed competition for influence between Iran and the Saudis, causing strife among Muslims from Morocco to Indonesia.

Even under sanctions, Iran managed to prop up Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria and make the Hezbollah in Lebanon a force to reckon with. Sanctions did not prevent Tehran from dominating politics in post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, even though the new order in Baghdad was created with American blood and treasure.

Iran’s influence is visible in the events in Yemen and Bahrain and pro-Iranian groups now exist in virtually every Muslim country. Arab governments wonder what Iran might be able to do once the sanctions are over and its coffers are full.

Contrary to assertions in the Western media, it is not a matter of some historic rivalry between Shia and Sunni Muslims. It is a question of existing states trying to defend their sovereignty and autonomy in a region that has often been dominated by larger external powers. In some places, where there are very few Shias (like North Africa), Iran has still managed to enrol radical allies for a potential Pax Iranica.

Historically, Arab states (particularly in the Gulf region) have seen the United States and other Western powers as their protectors, against communism from 1945 onwards and against Iran’s revolutionary regime since 1979. They now fear the end of that protection.

The Americans dealt with the aftermath of Iran’s revolution by simplifying their understanding of the Muslim world in a “Shias bad, Sunnis good” approach. Washington assumed that Islamist groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood and its affiliates were valuable allies against global communism. Arab countries helped the US mobilise Islamist ideology against the communists, culminating in the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan.

Ironically, the spread of puritanical madrasas in the Muslim world was partly a function of the fear generated around the Muslim world by Ayatollah Khomeini’s Iranian revolution. As Shia clerics created a theocracy in ancient Persia, Sunni clerics started nurturing ambitions of similar authority and power in other countries.

Support for conservative Islamic groups, such as the Wahhabis, inadvertently led to Islamist radicalism. But none of the regimes in Muslim countries became radical as a result and the ones that did — for example, the Taliban in Afghanistan, the Mohamed Morsi regime in Egypt — were forced out of power by one set of circumstances or another. That is very different from Iran, where radicalism is entrenched in the very nature of a revolutionary regime.

The US opening to Iran, coupled with the Obama administration’s neglect of the Middle East, has created a genuine fear that America might end up embracing Iran in a mistake similar to the one it made after 1979 by funding jihadis in Afghanistan. Encouragement of Iran and invoking of Shia-Sunni sectarian rivalry could undermine the ideological battle against Islamist radicalism that some Arab countries, notably the United Arab Emirates, have launched against Sunni radical groups in the aftermath of the rise of the Islamic State.

After Iran Deal, U.S. Needs to Reassure Arabs Over ‘Pax Iranica’

Although both sides publicly sidestepped the issue during the recent Washington visit by Saudi Arabia’s King Salman bin Abdul-Aziz Al Saud, it is clear that Arab governments do not share the Obama administration’s enthusiasm for the nuclear deal with Iran.

Many Americans see the deal as a practical means of delaying, if not stopping forever, Iran’s ambitions of becoming a nuclear weapons power. In the Arab world, however, the nuclear deal — and the concomitant lifting of economic sanctions — raises the specter of unleashing Iran’s divisive impact on the world’s Muslims at levels similar to the days immediately after the 1979 Iranian revolution.

Iran already has sympathetic regimes in Syria and Iraq and supports strong militant groups in Lebanon, Yemen and Bahrain. Only last February, the commander of the foreign wing of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, Qassem Suleimani, told a rally marking the 36th anniversary of the 1979 uprising that, “We are witnessing the export of the Islamic revolution throughout the region.” Suleimani spoke proudly of Iran’s successes “From Bahrain and Iraq to Syria, Yemen and North Africa.”

President Obama has argued that the nuclear deal should not be judged on whether it “transforms Iran, ends Iran’s aggressive behavior toward some of its Arab neighbors or leads to détente between Shiites and Sunnis.” As Thomas Friedman explains, the president sees the deal solely as an instrument to “prevent Iran from breaking out with a nuclear weapon for the next 10 years” and as “a better outcome for America, Israel and our Arab allies than any other alternative on the table.”

That offers little comfort to governments and people in Muslim countries who anticipate a better funded Iranian campaign to exert greater influence across the Muslim world than in the past. Such a campaign would result in renewed competition for influence between Iran and the Saudis, causing strife among Muslims from Morocco to Indonesia.

Even under sanctions, Iran managed to prop up Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria and make Hezbollah in Lebanon a force to reckon with. Sanctions did not prevent Tehran from dominating politics in post-Saddam Iraq even though the new order in Baghdad was created with American blood and treasure.

Iran’s influence is visible in the events in Yemen and Bahrain, and pro-Iranian groups now exist in virtually every Muslim country. Arab governments wonder what Iran might be able to do once the sanctions are over and its coffers are full.

Contrary to assertions in the western media, it is not a matter of some historic rivalry between Shia and Sunni Muslims. It is a question of existing states trying to defend their sovereignty and autonomy in a region that has often been dominated by larger external powers. In some places, where there is a smaller Shia population (like North Africa), Iran has still managed to enroll radical allies for a potential “Pax Iranica.”

Historically, Arab states (particularly in the Gulf region) have seen the United States and other western powers as their protectors, against communism from 1945 onwards and against Iran’s revolutionary regime since 1979. They now fear the end of that protection.

While Israel’s concerns about the Iran nuclear deal have been widely discussed in the U.S. media, there has been much less discussion about the Arab reaction. The Arabs have been understated in their opposition to the deal, possibly to avoid a public spat with the U.S. president. But their concerns are known to U.S. diplomats if not the American public.

The Americans dealt with the aftermath of Iran’s revolution by simplifying their understanding of the Muslim world in a “Shias bad, Sunnis good” approach. Washington assumed that Islamist groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood and its affiliates were valuable allies against global communism. Arab countries helped the United States mobilize Islamist ideology against the communists, culminating in the anti-Soviet “jihad” in Afghanistan.

Ironically, the spread of puritanical madrasas in the Muslim world was partly a function of the fear generated around the Muslim world by Ayatollah Khomeini’s Iranian revolution. As Shia clerics created a theocracy in ancient Persia, Sunni clerics started nurturing ambitions of similar authority and power in other countries. Some Arab governments made mistakes in dealing with this theocratic push for power by giving the clerics money for preaching their brand of Islam. But even then, so far, Iran-like theocracies have not swept Muslim countries.

Support for conservative Islamic groups, such as the Wahhabis, inadvertently led to Islamist radicalism. But none of the regimes in Muslim countries became radical as a result, and the ones that did (e.g. the Taliban in Afghanistan, the Morsi regime in Egypt), were forced out of power by one set of circumstances or another. That is very different from Iran where radicalism is entrenched in the very nature of a revolutionary regime.

The U.S. opening to Iran, coupled with the Obama administration’s neglect of the Middle East, has created a genuine fear that the U.S. might end up embracing Iran in a mistake similar to the one it made after 1979 by funding jihadis in Afghanistan. Encouragement of Iran and invoking of Shia-Sunni sectarian rivalry could undermine the ideological battle against Islamist radicalism that some Arab countries, notably the UAE, have launched against Sunni radical groups in the aftermath of the rise of the Islamic State.

American supporters of the Iran deal have suggested that after the deal Iran is somehow a lesser threat than the radicalism of the variety represented by groups such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS. When New York Times columnist Tom Friedman quoted me recently on the history of diminution of religious pluralism in the Muslim world, some of my Arab friends wondered if I had embraced the same binary view of one form of radical Islam being less of a menace than the other.

In fact, I believe that all radicalism in the name of Islam is damaging and threatens modernity, progress and prosperity of Muslims around the world. Unless Iran gives up its radical revolutionary ideology, it will continue to be perceived as a threat. In its zealous embrace of the nuclear deal with Iran, the United States should avoid the pitfall of considering Tehran’s radicalism any less dangerous than that of extremists such as ISIS.

Living in a Cocoon

Nations do not always like to recall their weaknesses and flaws even though they must do so to move forward. Americans do not like to discuss slavery or their ancestors’ treatment of Native Americans. The British seek to gloss over their excesses during the colonial era. Turks dispute to this day that genocide was attempted against Armenians in the Ottoman era. But few nations advance a rosy national narrative in an unqualified way as some Pakistanis insist on doing, not only in viewing history but also our current state.

The white man’s atrocities against Native Americans or Black slaves might not be the subject of daily discourse but it still finds its way into articles, books and movies in the United States. British scholars research, teach and publish about colonialism without fear of being branded traitors to king and country. Elsewhere, a different view of one’s own history or a critical analysis of a nation’s performance does not result in abuse of the variety that comes the way of critics in Pakistan.

The Pakistani state has long tried to force a particular narrative of history down the people’s throats and excluded from academia scholars who refuse to conform. It is as if only one set of ‘facts’ and one set of explanations of these facts would help us forge and maintain national identity. The rise of electronic and social media has widely popularised the pathology of describing citation of facts contrary to our particular national narrative as ‘anti-Pakistan.’

This hyper-patriotism is no longer limited to a conformist view of history and historic events. The mere suggestion that we might not be doing as well as we think attracts the label of being ‘negative towards Pakistan.’ It is as if a Pakistani must turn a blind eye to anything that reflects poorly on Pakistan’s image. Celebrate when we win a cricket or hockey match but do not highlight it if an international publication accuses our country of harbouring terrorists; Repeat government officials’ claims about potential economic success but do not cite figures that disprove them.

It is almost as if we want to live in our own cocoon. We will be okay if we think positively. Talk about bad scenarios, cite statistics that point to our decline, quote others on weaknesses of our foreign and security policies and our countrymen react angrily. By their logic, a Pakistani should only work on improving others’ view of Pakistan, not try to alter the substance that leads to a poor image in the first place.

On December 17, 1971, the day after ‘‘all Pakistani armed forces in Bangladesh” surrendered to “Lt General Jagjit Singh Aurora, GOC-in-C of the Indian and Bangladesh forces in the eastern theatre’’ according to the ‘instrument of surrender,’ none of Pakistan’s newspapers reported the surrender. Radio Pakistan had announced four days earlier that ‘‘the question of any surrender is ruled out because our troops are determined to lay down their lives.’’

The official statement on the momentous event comprised a total of 27 words. It read, ‘‘Latest reports indicate that following an arrangement between the local commanders of India and Pakistan, fighting has ceased in East Pakistan and the Indian troops have entered Dhaka.’’

The nation could not avoid facing the loss of more than half the country’s population and almost half its territory forever. But those in charge of the country’s fortunes at the time wanted to break bad news gently. In other matters, where the people might not find the facts out easily, keeping the bad news out of headlines is easier. Maintaining national morale and pride are often deemed more important than facing harsh realities.

The country might be served better by allowing reality to become part of national discourse, as is the case in most countries. Admittedly, nations need to feel good about themselves but those who talk about what went wrong or is likely to go wrong need not be dismissed as negative thinkers or anti-national. They are the much necessary antidote to contrived positivity and they make self-examination and self-correction possible.

Thus, it is important to remember every time we are in a self-congratulatory mood that we are the sixth largest nation in the world by population but only 26th by size of GDP on PPP basis and 42nd in nominal GDP. We have the world’s sixth largest nuclear arsenal and eight largest army. But our ranking in global firepower stands at 17th and Pakistan performs poorly in most non-military indices. Pakistan ranks 146 out of 187 countries in the world on the Human Development Index, which measures health, standard of living, and education.

The World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report ranks Pakistan’s primary education at 136 out of 144 countries. Pakistan’s higher education ranking is 98 out of 144 while in math and science education our ranking is 104 out of 144. DHL’s Global Connectedness Index places Pakistan at 114 out of 140 countries. This shows Pakistan less connected globally than many countries poorer than itself. Should we just feel good or start discussing our failings before figuring out how to rectify them?

Go on, Break the Cycle

The cancellation of scheduled talks between the national security advisors (NSAs) of India and Pakistan reflects the weak fundamentals of the relationship between the two countries. The talks had been scheduled because both wanted to show the rest of the world that they are willing to talk. But neither government had anything substantive to offer the other, beyond well-worn platitudes.

Although Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his Pakistan counterpart Nawaz Sharif had agreed to talks focused on terrorism, Nawaz could not afford to be willing completely to ignore Kashmir. The written statement issued after the meeting on the sidelines of an international summit in Ufa, Russia was not enough to overcome the dictates of domestic politics in either country.

Pakistan’s decision to announce NSA Sartaj Aziz’s plans to meet leaders of the Hurriyat Conference was likely predicated on the knowledge that India would react adversely to that move. The Indians reacted, as expected, prompting Pakistan to call off the talks on grounds of India’s “preconditions”. The talks’ cancellation saved Pakistan from a public discussion of its support for terrorism and gave Islamabad a face-saver. But even if the talks had gone ahead, Aziz would have only returned home to declare that he responded to India’s dossier on terrorism with one of his own about India’s alleged role in ethnic insurgencies in Balochistan and Karachi.

From India’s perspective, the main issue hindering bilateral relations between the two nuclear-armed neighbours is Pakistan’s support for terrorism. Pakistan blandly denies sponsoring Islamist terrorists, though the denial is hardly taken seriously by the international community. As if to create equivalence, Pakistan also blames India for fomenting trouble across their shared border.

The terrorism issue is now almost three decades old and Indians might be justified if they finally conclude that talks might not be the way to bring it to an end. Given that war is not an option, New Delhi may have to think of creative ways to coerce Islamabad, possibly with international reprimand. But Indian efforts to secure condemnation of Pakistan’s support for jihadis at the UN are likely to be blocked by China, which has a veto at the UN Security Council that India does not.

Pakistan continues to insist on the primacy of the Kashmir dispute — the “core issue” — in its ties with India. For the country’s all-powerful military and its religious conservative elements, this is an ideological question, a crucial part of nation-building and the consolidation of a Pakistani identity. But even the most ardent Pakistani hyper-nationalists know that they failed to wrest Kashmir from India in four wars and through the jihadi insurgency that has been waged from Pakistan since 1989.

Thus, India and Pakistan go through the motion of talks periodically, knowing they will get nowhere until the other budges from its position. For years, Pakistan has sought to internationalise the Kashmir dispute, which India does not see any reason to even discuss. Kashmir is an emotive issue in Pakistan because of the failure of its leaders to inform their people that Pakistan no longer enjoys international support on the matter. The average Pakistani is only told that Kashmir should have been part of Pakistan because of its Muslim majority and that India has reneged on its commitment to resolve the dispute through a plebiscite in the disputed territory.

What most Pakistanis do not know is that the last UN resolution on Kashmir was passed in 1957 and Pakistan could not win support for a plebiscite in Kashmir today if it asked for a new vote at the UN. Instead of accepting that it might be better for India and Pakistan to normalise relations by expanding trade and cross-border travel, Pakistani hardliners have stuck to a “Kashmir first” mantra, which they know is unrealistic.

On the other side, hardliners in an increasingly self-confident India play on Indians’ frustration with Pakistani support for jihadis, such as those responsible for the terrorist attacks in Mumbai in November 2008. There is empty talk of “teaching Pakistan a lesson”, without acknowledging that teaching military lessons to nations armed with nuclear weapons is never easy. Indians could learn something from the US’s frustrations with North Korea.

Posturing on Kashmir gets Pakistan nowhere, but its leaders pursue it to maintain support at home. Pakistan has serious internal issues. It is the sixth-largest country in the world by population, but only 26th by GDP on purchasing power parity and 42nd in nominal terms. Forty-two per cent of its schoolgoing-age children are out of school.

Pakistani leaders could open trade, education exchanges and travel with India, which is set to emerge as the third-largest economy in the world within 15 years, instead of insisting on the resolution of a dispute that hasn’t yet been resolved and can wait a bit longer.

India, on the other hand, could choose to engage (or even just disengage) with Pakistan without appearing to be petty and bent on rubbing its neighbour’s nose in the ground. Instead, India should wait patiently for public opinion in Pakistan to realise Pakistan’s increasing internal weakness. At the moment, weak civilian governments seeking to engage with India are not in a position to confront the hyper-nationalist sentiment that totally ignores harsh realities about Pakistan being unable to indefinitely compete with India.

The two countries need to break a familiar cycle: Pakistan tries to seek international attention for Kashmir, sometimes with terrorist attacks in India; both sides fire on each other along the Line of Control in Kashmir; public recrimination and sabre-rattling follows; both sides mobilise troops; both sides stand down under international pressure or through multilateral diplomacy; talks are scheduled; talks result in nothing or are cancelled. The cycle repeats itself.

But things could change if either side simply refuses to play that game. If Pakistan won’t change, perhaps India can.

Pakistani Hate, Indian Disdain

The recent cancellation of scheduled talks between the national security advisers (NSAs) of India and Pakistan is just the latest example of the two countries’ irreconcilable differences. Both sides needed to talk to show the rest of the world that they are ready to talk. Otherwise, many Pakistanis have been convinced by their government that India wants their country to cease to exist. Indians, on the other hand, see Pakistan only as the incubator and exporter of terrorism to their homeland.

The cancelled talks were the result of an agreement between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his Pakistani counterpart Nawaz Sharif on the sidelines of an international summit in Ufa, Russia in early July. The two leaders affirmed in a written statement that terrorism would be the main subject of discussions in Delhi between their NSAs. Talks between the two nuclear-armed neighbors have been erratic and this new round was expected to put the dialogue back on track.

But then, Pakistani NSA, Sartaj Aziz, announced plans to meet leaders of the Hurriyet Conference — an anti-India coalition from the disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir — during his visit to India. The Indians expressed displeasure over this, advising Pakistan to cancel the meeting with “separatists.” Pakistan called off the talks in response to India’s humiliating preconditions.

The United States, which wants India and Pakistan to move beyond their hostile relationship, has expressed disappointment over the cancellation of the talks even though it is likely that no one realistically expected concrete results from the meeting. The international community prefers unfruitful India-Pakistan talks over no talks, given the track record of four wars in 67 years and countless exchanges of fire along their shared border that did not explode into full-scale war.

Pakistan insists that the dispute over the Himalayan region of Kashmir is the core issue in its ties with India. The country’s all powerful military and its religious conservative elements insist that India unlawfully annexed Muslim majority Kashmir, which should have become part of Pakistan under the terms of the 1947 partition of British India. But Pakistan has failed to wrest Kashmir from India in four wars and through a terrorist insurgency that has been waged from Pakistan since 1989.

From India’s perspective, the main issue hindering bilateral relations between the two nuclear armed neighbors is Pakistan’s support for terrorism. Pakistan denies sponsoring Islamist terrorists though the denial is hardly taken seriously by the international community. As if to create equivalence, Pakistan also blames India for secular, ethnic insurgencies in various parts of the country, especially Balochistan, which borders Iran and Afghanistan.

For years Pakistan has sought international support for its position that Kashmir’s future must be resolved through dialogue between India and Pakistan and a plebiscite among the Kashmiri people. India does not even want to discuss the dispute without the end of Pakistan-sponsored terror. Kashmir is an emotive issue in Pakistan because of the failure of its leaders to inform their people that Pakistan no longer enjoys international support on the matter.

The average Pakistani is only told through textbooks and the media that Kashmir should have been part of Pakistan because of its Muslim majority population and that India has reneged on its commitment to resolve the dispute through a plebiscite in the disputed territory. Pakistani textbooks also teach children that India is Pakistan’s existential enemy, which does not accept Pakistan’s existence at heart.

What most Pakistanis do not know is that the last United Nations Security Council resolution on Kashmir was passed in 1957 and Pakistan could not win support for a referendum in Kashmir today if it asked for a new vote at the United Nations. Instead of accepting that it might be better for India and Pakistan to normalize relations by expanding trade and cross-border travel, Pakistani hardliners have stuck to a “Kashmir first” mantra, which they know is unrealistic.

On the other side, hardliners in an increasingly self-confident India play on Indians’ frustration with Pakistani state support for jihadis, such as those responsible for terrorist attacks in Mumbai in 2008. There is empty talk of “teaching Pakistan a lesson” without acknowledging that teaching military lessons to nations armed with nuclear weapons is never easy. Indians could learn from the United States’ frustrations with North Korea.

Posturing on Kashmir gets Pakistan nowhere but its leaders feel they need to do it any way to maintain support from Islamists and the military at home. Pakistan, besieged by jihadis, has serious internal issues. It is the sixth largest country in the world by population but only 26th by GDP on Purchasing Power Parity and 42nd= in nominal terms. Over 25 million children are out of school: 55 percent of whom are girls.

Pakistani leaders could open trade, education exchanges, and travel with India, which is set to emerge as the third largest economy in the world within fifteen years, instead of insisting on resolution of a dispute that hasn’t been resolved for decades and can wait a bit longer.

Indians, on the other hand, could choose to engage with Pakistan without appearing to be bent on rubbing their neighbor’s nose in the ground. So far, there is little sign that rationality will overcome Pakistan’s hate towards India and India’s disdain for Pakistan.

The India-Pakistan Treadmill

Consistent engagement with lowered expectations may be a better alternative to the drama of on-again, off-again dialogue India-Pakistan relations follow a familiar pattern.

Leaders of the two countries meet, usually on the sidelines of an international summit, and announce resumption of talks at the level of officials. Within a few days, they trade allegations of ceasefire violations. Every now and then there is a terrorist attack in India that is traced to a Pakistan-based jihadi group. Pakistan accuses India of supporting terrorists operating on its soil. A war of words ensues, talks get derailed only to be resumed with much fanfare after the next meeting of prime ministers.

The two sides also keep their foreign office wordsmiths busy, crafting statements that reassure the world while appearing to stand their ground in the eyes of their own citizens. Pakistan’s elected civilian leaders often have to respond to charges by opposition politicians and the media that they have “sold out” by failing to sufficiently emphasize Kashmir in whatever joint statement the wordsmiths crafted after the last high-level meeting.

Ironically , the Pakistani opposition that blames the government of the day for “selling out,” agreed to similar joint statements when it was in power and is likely to do the same if it ever returns to office. In case someone reminds us that the Pakistani military is to blame for hawkish positions, they need to be reminded themselves that dovish dialogue persisted even during the military-led regimes of Generals Zia-ul Haq and Pervez Musharraf.

Why does the dialogue between the two neighbours that share so much appear more like exercising on a verbal treadmill? Because the fundamentals of the relationship are frozen but as nuclear powers they cannot afford not to engage with one another.

Pakistani public opinion has been shaped in a way that makes it impossible for its leaders to move forward on normalizing trade and travel without `resolving’ the Kashmir issue. India, the larger power, has been more or less con sistent in its position on Kashmir since the 1950s and feels no compulsion to change that stance, except perhaps a few face-saving concessions.

Wars and terrorism have failed to compel a change in India’s standpoint on Kashmir. Each war has added a new layer to bilateral talks as prisoners of war and territory need to be exchanged and the status quo ante must be restored. Instead of being a tie-breaker or compelling agent, terrorism has become a fundamental issue itself.

Without much interaction at the people-to-people level, India and Pakistan are simply too distant from one another to be able to overcome the psychological factors that impede normal relations. The first generation of post-Independence Indians looked upon Pakistan as the country that never should have been. The current generation sadly sees Pakistan as the country of Hafiz Saeed, Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi and the terrorists that attacked Mumbai.

On the other side, Pakistanis continue to be told that India is an existential threat and a permanent enemy.Speaking at a seminar in Delhi or being photographed with an Indian actor is offered as evidence of treason for Pakistani public figures who might want to transcend hatred and animosity .

In such an environment, pigeons coming from Pakistan into Indian Punjab get ‘detained’ by police as potential Pakistani spies and what seems to be a Chinese-made plaything drone becomes the subject of protest by the Pakistan government.

The two neighbours have been intermittently engaged in a `Comprehensive Dialogue’ since May 1997, which was renamed `Composite Dialogue’ by the Pakistani side because Islamabad must always edit what Delhi conjures. This dialogue addresses eight issues: (1) Peace and Security, including confidence-building measures (CBMs); (2) Jammu and Kashmir; (3) Siachen Glacier; (4) Wullar BarrageTulbul Navigation project; (5) Sir Creek; (6) Economic and Commercial Cooperation; (7) Terrorism and Drug trafficking; and (8) Promotion of friendly exchanges in various fields.

For engagement between bureaucrats, and as reassurance to Americans who always worry about nuclear war on the subcontinent, this is definitely a logical list of discussion topics. But it does not address the psychological undercurrents that stop Pakistan and India from embracing the Canada-US model in their relations.

Perhaps it is best for the two sides to agree to continue on the treadmill while acknowledging that they are not going anywhere. Consistent engagement with lowered expectations might be a better alternative to the drama of on again, off-again dialogue.

Sporadic formal talks between diplomats does little to reassure Pakistanis that India’s acceptance of a united Pakistan is final and irreversible. It also fails to set Indian minds at rest that Pakistan would not, in the future, try to initiate war or encourage terrorism in its desire for parity with India or the pursuit for change in Kashmir.

What Pakistan Knew About the Bin Laden Raid

With a litany of unproved claims, veteran investigative journalist Seymour Hersh has revived discussion about the circumstances in which al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden was discovered and killed in May 2011 in the Pakistani garrison city of Abbottabad.

Some of Hersh’s assertions in a 10,000-word London Review of Books article border on fantasy. He claims that bin Laden lived under the protection of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), was given up for reward money by one of the agency’s officers, and was eventually eliminated in a U.S. raid covertly backed by Pakistan’s army commander and ISI chief.

According to Hersh, the Americans “blackmailed” Pakistan’s generals into helping them kill bin Laden but then stabbed them in the back for political reasons by denying them any credit for assisting in the raid by Navy SEALs. Instead of blaming ISI for sheltering bin Laden in Pakistan (which Hersh claims it did), he points the finger at the Obama administration for not acknowledging ISI’s role in the U.S. operation that killed the terrorist mastermind.

With the exception of the possibility of a Pakistani “walk in” selling information about bin Laden’s location, the other details of Hersh’s story simply do not add up. If the ISI had hidden bin Laden for five years, it would not have cooperated in the U.S. operation to kill him without demanding a serious quid pro quo.

Hersh explains the Obama administration’s eagerness to claim sole credit for finding and killing bin Laden in terms of domestic U.S. politics. But he offers no explanation as to why, after covertly helping the Americans, Pakistan’s generals would keep quiet about their role. The veteran reporter alludes to the idea that this might have been because of bin Laden’s popularity among the Pakistani public. But by 2011, bin Laden was no longer that popular — and in any case Pakistan’s military leaders have consistently ignored public opinion to ensure the flow of American aid. Hersh’s suggestion that Pakistan’s generals covertly helped Americans eliminate bin Laden simply to maintain the flow of U.S. dollars to the country — but kept it secret so as not to incur the wrath of the Pakistani street — does not hold water.

For several years before the bin Laden raid, Pakistan’s military and the ISI had been criticized in the U.S. media and Congress for double-dealing in the fight against terrorism. If the ISI had protected bin Laden (or held him prisoner) for five years before being found out by the Americans, the United States would have increased its leverage by going public with accusations of hiding bin Laden. But there’s no evidence that Washington held Islamabad’s feet to the fire.

If, however, a backroom deal had been negotiated to secure Pakistani cooperation in the raid on Abbottabad in return for U.S. silence, the ISI would have demanded some glory for its cooperation. Facilitating the raid, as narrated by Hersh, would have provided Pakistan’s military and ISI an opportunity to redeem themselves in American eyes. Hersh wants us to believe an entirely improbably scenario. According to him, Obama’s political requirements denied Pakistanis any credit and senior generals in Islamabad simply accepted that without pushing back.

Was the “walk-in” real?

To this day, there is no solid evidence of Pakistanis at the highest level of government knowing about bin Laden being in Pakistan — though there have been widespread suspicions. If, after being tipped off by a rogue Pakistani intelligence officer looking for personal reward, the United States planned a raid with covert help from Pakistani intelligence, why didn’t the cooperating Pakistani officials demand credit for assisting in targeting bin Laden in order to mitigate the bad press for previously protecting him? And what prevented the U.S. government from publicly acknowledging that they knew bin Laden had been officially protected? Was the need to keep the relationship with Islamabad on solid footing so important that the Obama administration would risk telling a lie this massive?

Hersh’s story is based on the fundamental premise that the U.S. government had bad intentions, including in their interactions with the Pakistan Army and the ISI. In an interview with the Pakistani newspaper Dawn, Hersh defends Pakistan’s generals. “Pakistan has a good army, not a bad army,” he declared, adding that the Obama administration’s cover story made the Pakistan army look incompetent because it didn’t know that bin Laden was residing in a garrison town just two miles from the country’s main military academy. But he still does not offer an explanation for why the Pakistan Army chief, Gen. Ashfaq Kayani, and ISI head, Lt. Gen. Ahmed Shuja Pasha, went along with the cover story.

The only point in Hersh’s story that seems plausible relates to the Pakistani officer who tipped off the Americans about bin Laden’s location. Further reporting by AFP and a story by NBC affirm the role of a Pakistani defector — though NBC later amended its story to clarify that while the defector provided information, it didn’t lead to finding bin Laden. The rumor that the CIA learned about bin Laden’s location through an ISI officer has been around since the Abbottabad raid. But I’ve also heard another version of the same story from Pakistani officials.

According to this version, the ISI officer only facilitated the CIA’s on-ground operation in Abbottabad after the U.S. spy agency started planning an operation based on intelligence obtained through other means. The CIA relocated the Pakistani officer — not because he was the man who tipped them off on bin Laden’s location — but because he acted without authority from his superiors in enabling the CIA to conduct an operation on Pakistani soil.

The NBC story also repeats the suspicion of U.S. officials — about Pakistani complicity in hiding bin Laden — though, obviously, there isn’t enough evidence for the U.S. government to formally and publicly make that charge. As a witness to Pakistan’s response after the bin Laden raid I find it difficult to believe Hersh’s conspiracy theory about so many people in both the U.S. and Pakistani governments and militaries telling a big coordinated lie.

In the middle of a diplomatic dance

I was serving as Pakistan’s ambassador to the United States at the time of the SEAL raid in Abbottabad. I was on my way to Islamabad via London and Dubai when the operation took place; I first found out about it upon landing at Heathrow airport in the early morning of May 2, 2011. My superiors in Islamabad instructed me to turn around immediately. I was back in Washington by around 5 p.m. local time.

My instructions were clear: to ensure that the U.S. government, Congress, and the media did not blame Pakistan’s government, armed forces, or intelligence services for allowing Osama bin Laden’s presence in the country, as that would have been a violation of U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1267 and 1373. My bosses, both civilian and military, were obviously concerned that Pakistan would be taken to task. But nothing in the conduct of Generals Kayani and Pasha (both of whom later forced me to resign as ambassador) hinted at their collusion with the U.S. in the Abbottabad raid.

They attributed their lack of response to the incursion by U.S. helicopters from Afghanistan to the absence of adequate radar coverage on the western border — a symptom of Pakistan’s view of India as the only threat to its national security. Kayani and Pasha also wanted to ensure that there would be no reprisals against Pakistan over allegations of official complicity in hiding bin Laden.

A bevy of damage diplomacy followed. A few days after the Abbottabad raid, then-chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee John Kerry visited Islamabad. Gen. Kayani was eager during that visit for a statement by the U.S. senator emphasizing Pakistan’s position as an American ally in the war against terrorism. Kerry agreed to the reassuring language proposed by Kayani. The Kerry visit was followed by a visit by Pasha to Washington during which he was keen to convince the CIA that the ISI had no knowledge of bin Laden being in Pakistan. In a meeting with CIA Director Leon Panetta, Pasha listed the CIA’s own failures over the years to advance his argument that intelligence gathering is often imperfect and that the enemy can hide within plain sight.

Notwithstanding my own disagreements with Kayani and Pasha, I found no reason to believe that either general was feigning ignorance or outrage while being secretly in league with the Americans. The Foreign Office also asked me to protest the violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty by U.S. forces in conducting the operation and to point out how it violated the norms of international conduct between two sovereign countries that were, at least officially, allies. I didn’t make much headway.

The U.S. officials I interacted with were not only unwilling to apologize for violating Pakistani sovereignty but demanded that Islamabad cooperate in giving Americans access to data and persons found at the house in Abbottabad where the raid was conducted. They also demanded the return of the wreckage of the stealth helicopter that had been damaged and left behind during the operation. Pakistan handed over the wreckage a few days later, though not without prodding by the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. Michael Mullen.

Security Council cover

Immediately after the raid, the U.S. government persuaded the president of the U.N. Security Council to issue a statement, “welcoming [the] end of Osama bin Laden’s ability to perpetrate terrorist acts.” Obama administration officials I spoke with pointed to UNSC resolutions and this statement by the Security Council president to justify their unilateral action in Abbottabad in disregard of Pakistani sovereignty.

Pakistan’s protests about violation of its sovereignty and against the U.N. Security Council president’s statement came within hours of the Abbottabad raid. Our side was stunned because it had not been kept in the loop. At the United Nations, the Security Council president was busy listing justifications under international law for the violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty. But none of these responses would have occurred if, as Hersh says, the cover story about the unilateral raid had been “manufactured” in the White House just two hours after the raid, in a cynical ploy to help Obama’s re-election bid.

On the evening of May 2, I was interviewed on CNN. There I made what remains a valid point: I said that it was obvious someone in Pakistan protected Osama bin Laden. The question was to determine whether bin Laden’s support system lay “within the government and the state of Pakistan or within the society of Pakistan.” I had asked for “a full inquiry into finding out why our intelligence services were not able to track him earlier.”

I never got an answer to my question. Pakistan created a commission that conducted its hearings in a non-transparent manner and declined to publish its findings. The Obama administration went back to business-as-usual with Pakistan — without insisting or pushing Islamabad for answers on the tough questions about bin Laden’s stay in Pakistan from 2006 to 2011. I understand how the failure of both Washington and Islamabad to disclose a more complete understanding of what transpired in the years leading up to the raid feeds conspiracy theories and the presumption that something is fishy.

But it is this failure — explaining bin Laden’s presence in Pakistan, not the elaborate conspiracies Hersh alleges on the say-so of a single retired U.S. counterterrorism official — which has been a major disservice to truth.

Both the people of Pakistan and the people of the United States would benefit from detailed answers to questions about bin Laden’s support network in Pakistan. But don’t hold your breath. It might not be in either Islamabad’s or Washington’s interest to wake sleeping dogs.