Monthly Archives: November 2007

Wall Street Journal, November 29, 2007

Pervez Musharraf was sworn in as Pakistan’s civilian president today after doing what opposition leaders in his country and the Bush administration have been asking him to do for some time — resign as army chief. The move has helped clear the way for elections early next year. But those elections will be neither free nor fair unless Mr. Musharraf does much more to restore the rule of law, and repair the damage he’s done to Pakistan’s civil society and constitution.

Mr. Musharraf’s desire to change Pakistan’s politics — the justification for a 1999 coup ousting then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif — remains unfulfilled. Indeed, Mr. Sharif’s return to Pakistan on Sunday, after eight years in exile, points out the poverty of Mr. Musharraf’s idea of reforming Pakistani politics without democratic political participation. Mr. Sharif, it would seem, was allowed to return in the hope that his old rivalry with another former prime minister, Benazir Bhutto, would be rekindled and ideological polarization would enable Mr. Musharraf to remain in power.

Although Ms. Bhutto and Mr. Sharif agreed to a “charter of democracy” last year and represent strong populist constituencies, their ideological differences are quite pronounced. Ms. Bhutto stands for modernity and identifies closely with the West. Her Pakistan Peoples Party is the country’s largest political organization that describes itself as Social-Democratic, and has feuded often with Pakistan’s entrenched civil-military oligarchy. She spent her years in exile writing in American and English publications, and lecturing at U.S. universities. Her opposition to Islamist extremism and jihadism is unequivocal.

Mr. Sharif, on the other hand, is a religious conservative who started his political career as a protégé of former military dictator Gen. Zia-ul-Haq. In his tenure as prime minister, plagued by accusations of corruption, he tried to impose Shariah law in the country. After the 1999 coup, he was jailed and then exiled to Saudi Arabia after promising to stay out of politics for 10 years. He returned to Pakistan on a special plane provided by King Abdullah.

Overall, Mr. Sharif is more acceptable to the religious elements within Pakistan’s army and intelligence services that ran Pakistan before 9/11, and remain influential within the country. He, too, is opposed to Islamist terrorism, but is likely to be more compromising towards extremist groups. The fact that Ms Bhutto’s homecoming rally was targeted by suicide bombers, while Mr. Sharif faced no such threat, highlights the different attitude of Islamist terrorists towards the two leaders.

Mr. Sharif’s Pakistan Muslim League is divided into two factions, one led by him and the other supporting Mr. Musharraf. Even if Mr. Musharraf seems averse to the idea, many in the Pakistan army and intelligence services would like the two factions to unite, in the hope that pro-jihadi elements within the security services could then reassert their influence.

While the U.S. appears to be giving mixed signals to Mr. Musharraf, the British Commonwealth’s decision, to suspend Pakistan’s membership until certain benchmarks for the restoration of democracy are met, is the right message for Pakistan’s military leadership. Although Mr. Musharraf has stepped down as army chief, he has not lifted the Nov. 3 imposition of martial law disguised as a state of emergency. He has also issued decrees that allow him to wield draconian powers even after he lifts the state of emergency. Mr. Musharraf’s hand-picked Supreme Court has rubber-stamped all his decisions, while the majority of judges of the original court remain under house arrest.

Yes, legislative elections have been scheduled for Jan. 8 and more than 5,000 of the estimated 8,000 people arrested under the emergency decree have been released. But these partial steps are meant to silence critics without changing the reality on the ground.

Few Pakistanis believe that a free and fair election can be held without a free judiciary, a free media or freedom for political parties to campaign. Many candidates and campaign workers of major opposition parties remain in prison. Mr. Musharraf has stacked the Election Commission and the caretaker cabinet, which under Pakistani law must be neutral during the run-up to elections, with his own supporters.

U.S. public opinion is solidly against Mr. Musharraf’s autocratic measures. According to a poll by Opinion Dynamics released by Fox News this week, 50% of those surveyed said “yes” in response to the question, “Do you think the United States should cut off aid to Pakistan until the state of emergency is lifted and democracy is restored?” Thirty four percent disagreed and 16% expressed no opinion.

The Bush administration, however, seems willing to let Mr. Musharraf get away with suspending Pakistan’s constitution and sacking independent Supreme Court judges now that he’s resigned his army post and promised to hold elections. The administration’s reasoning appears to be based on the limits of U.S. influence within Pakistan, and the need for gratitude toward an ally in the war against terror. But Mr. Musharraf’s stepping down as army chief and holding elections in an atmosphere of intimidation would not make Pakistan a democracy. It would make Pakistan resemble many of America’s Middle Eastern allies, notably Egypt, where elections are routinely held and a weak civil society survives at the sufferance of a dictatorship subsidized with American aid.

For his part, Mr. Musharraf is unhappy with even the limited criticism of his policies by U.S. officials. He has said that he feels “let down by the West” and “betrayed by the media.” He recently spoke of Ms. Bhutto as “the darling of the West” — a disparaging reference to stalled U.S. efforts for a negotiated transition to democracy that would have accommodated Mr. Musharraf as a civilian president and allowed Ms. Bhutto’s election as prime minister.

Yet it is Mr. Musharraf, not Ms. Bhutto, who has received billions of dollars in aid from “the West” and personal praise from a long list of U.S. luminaries ranging from President Bush to former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. Mr. Musharraf has been proud of his American connections, citing on more than one occasion U.S. support since 9/11 as somehow conferring legitimacy on his military regime. Now, however, it is useful for him to pretend the West has turned its back on him and through no fault of his own.

In doing so, Mr. Musharraf is following in the footsteps of the Shah of Iran, Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines and Manuel Noriega of Panama. Challenged by their own people, each one of these U.S.-backed authoritarian rulers blamed the America for failing to understand their compulsions, and for creating the circumstances that eventually led to their downfall.

The uproar against Mr. Musharraf has been caused by his disregard for Pakistan’s constitution and his disrespect for the rule of law — not by his support of U.S. policy in the region and the war on terror. Last Saturday’s deadly terrorist attacks outside Pakistan’s military headquarters prove that martial law has not improved the Pakistani government’s ability to fight terrorists.

The way forward does not lie in legal or political maneuvers by Mr. Musharraf, or for the military to cling to power. This would only result in greater instability. A better course would be the creation of a government of national consensus, comprising secular and moderate politicians and civic leaders. Such a government could mobilize popular support for the war against terrorism and prosecute that war effectively, while ushering in a transition to democracy through free, impartial and fair polls.

Yesterday, President Bush helped clarify U.S. policy by saying Mr. Musharraf has “got to suspend the emergency law before elections.” He might also make it clear to Mr. Musharraf that foreign policy cooperation does not give him license to trample Pakistan’s constitution underfoot.

Indian Express , November 28, 2007

The return of former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to a popular welcome after seven years of exile, on a special plane provided by the King of Saudi Arabia, serves as a reminder of the folly that is military intervention in politics.

Sharif should have been allowed to return to his homeland when the Supreme Court ruled that he had an inalienable to do so. But soon after the Supreme Court’s judgement, the government unlawfully bundled him out of the country.

Having failed to implement the law of the land, General Musharraf has belatedly enabled the same outcome that would have resulted from implementing the apex court’s ruling. Quite clearly, international factors are more important in the eyes of Pakistan’s ruling generals than Pakistan’s own institutions.

General Musharraf took power in a 1999 military coup after toppling Sharif. After first jailing and then exiling the ousted prime minister, the general vowed that he and another popular former prime minister, Benazir Bhutto, would never be allowed to return to Pakistan’s politics.

Bhutto returned to Pakistan on October 18 to a tumultuous welcome and now Sharif has also returned. Apologists of military rule ridiculed this columnist — and many others — for repeatedly advocating the return of both major party leaders. Now it is our turn to ridicule those who think that a coup-making general’s ‘vision’ trumps the fundamental rules of politics.

Politicians with a support base can never be kept out of a country’s politics forever. If only Pakistan’s generals and the oligarchy that supports them understood that, Pakistan would actually get on with normal politics with all its flaws and weaknesses and get somewhere. Right now, we are simply going around in circles.

Sharif’s return should end the unjustified attacks on Bhutto for negotiating her return to the country. Every politician must know how to negotiate and Sharif has leveraged himself with the help of his mentors just as Bhutto effectively deployed western public opinion in her favour to create political space.

It is already apparent that at least one segment of the Pakistanis establishment now wants Sharif to work towards reunification of the two factions of the Pakistan Muslim League (PML). Sharif might be less acceptable to Musharraf personally but there is greater acceptance among Pakistan’s conservative military-intelligence establishment for him than for Bhutto and the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP).

Bhutto’s welcome rally was targeted for a suicide terrorist attack and the government has yet to investigate that crime. Fortunately, Sharif faces no extremist threats and the civil-military bureaucracy appears keen to look after him.

If Sharif can avoid the temptation of trying to upstage Bhutto and stay true to his new image as the establishment’s rebel, the Charter of Democracy signed by the two major party leaders last year can be implemented.

If, on the other hand, the establishment is able to work its magic and revive the spirit of IJI or calls for PML unity, the traditional pro- and anti-establishment divisions in Pakistani society would stand revived.

As important as the domestic dimension of Sharif’s return to Pakistan are, external factors are quite obviously at play in Pakistani politics. Since its inception, Pakistan has been mired in global great power politics at the expense of building up domestic institutions and internal cohesion.

Pakistanis must learn to conduct their politics within their country. Then, Pakistan could emerge as a normal country with predictable patterns of political change. And the rulings of Pakistani courts as well as the wishes of Pakistani voters would carry more weight than the intervention of foreign diplomats and potentates.

Gulf News , November 28, 2007

The return of former prime minister Nawaz Sharif to a popular welcome after seven years of exile, on a special plane provided by the King of Saudi Arabia, serves as a reminder of the folly that is military intervention in politics.

Sharif should have been allowed to return to his homeland when the Supreme Court ruled that he had an inalienable right to do so. But soon after the Supreme Court’s judgement, the government unlawfully bundled Sharif out of the country.

Having failed to implement the law of the land, President General Pervez Musharraf has belatedly enabled the same outcome that would have resulted from implemented the apex court’s ruling. Quite clearly, international factors are more important in the eyes of Pakistan’s ruling generals than Pakistan’s own institutions.

Musharraf took power in a 1999 military coup after toppling Sharif. After first jailing and then exiling the ousted prime minister, the general vowed that he and another popular former prime minister, Benazir Bhutto, would never be allowed to return to Pakistan’s politics.

Bhutto returned to Pakistan on October 18 to a tumultuous welcome and now Sharif has also returned. Apologists of military rule ridiculed this columnist – and many others – for repeatedly advocating the return of both major party leaders.

Now it is our turn to ridicule those who think that a coup-making general’s “vision” trumps the fundamental rules of politics.

Politicians with a support base can never been kept out of a country’s politics forever. If only Pakistan’s generals and the oligarchy that supports them understood that, Pakistan would actually get on with normal politics with all its flaws and weaknesses and get somewhere. Right now, we are simply going around in circles.

Sharif’s return should end the unjustified attacks on Bhutto for negotiating her return to the country. Every politician must know how to negotiate and Sharif has leveraged himself with the help of his mentors just as Bhutto effectively deployed Western public opinion in her favour to create political space.

It is already apparent that at least one segment of the Pakistanis establishment now wants Sharif to work towards reunification of the two factions of the Pakistan Muslim League (PML).

Less acceptable

Sharif might be less acceptable to Musharraf personally but there is greater acceptance among Pakistan’s conservative military-intelligence establishment for him than for Bhutto and the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP).

Bhutto’s welcoming rally was targeted for a suicide terrorist attack and the government has yet to investigate that crime. Fortunately, Sharif faced no extremist threats and the civil-military bureaucracy appears keen to look after him.

If Sharif can avoid the temptation of trying to upstage Bhutto and stay true to his new image as the establishment’s rebel, the Charter of Democracy signed by the two major party leaders last year can be implemented.

If, on the other hand, the establishment is able to work its magic and revive the spirit of Islamic Democratic Alliance or calls for PML unity, the traditional pro and anti-establishment divisions in Pakistani society would stand revived.

As important as the domestic dimension of Sharif’s return to Pakistan are the external factors quite obviously at play in Pakistani politics. Since its inception, Pakistan has been mired in global great power politics at the expense of building up domestic institutions and internal cohesion.

Pakistanis must ponder why international actors have to mediate domestic political issues and instead of blaming our foreign friends should blame the ruling oligarchy that makes such intervention possible.

The way Pakistani military officers are trained, they believe they have the right to give orders to subordinates and an obligation to take orders from superiors.

In the view of Pakistan’s ruling generals, all Pakistanis are their subordinates. The only people superior to the Pakistani generals in their own eyes are those who pay for Pakistan’s militarisation and development – the aid donors and investing countries.

Pakistanis must learn to conduct their politics within their country.

Alternatively, if Pakistan’s external patrons and friends make it clear that they do not want Pakistan to become Myanmar-like, a nation politically dominated by the military forever, Pakistan’s military would start negotiating with the country’s political parties and civil society instead of dictating to them.

Then, Pakistan could emerge as a normal country with predictable patterns of political change. And rulings of Pakistani courts as well as the wishes of Pakistani voters would carry more weight than the intervention of foreign diplomats and potentates.

Indian Express , November 21, 2007

After imposing martial law disguised as a state of emergency, General Pervez Musharraf has cracked down on Pakistan’s judiciary, media, moderate political opposition and nascent civil society. His actions have been universally condemned by the international community. But instead of recognising the error of his ways, he feels “let down by the West” and “betrayed by the media.”

Musharraf is following in the footsteps of the Shah of Iran, Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines, and Manuel Noriega of Panama. In their final days, each one of these US-backed authoritarian rulers blamed the United States for failing to understand their compulsions and for creating the circumstances eventually leading to their downfall.

In the days to come, Musharraf and his remaining loyalists can be expected to whip up anti-Americanism in an effort to deflect blame for their predicament. Things were going well until the US demonstrated its legendary fickleness and showed a soft spot for Benazir Bhutto, Musharraf’s apologists will argue vehemently.

Musharraf recently spoke of Bhutto as “the darling of the West,” completely forgetting that he, and not Bhutto, was the recipient of billions of dollars in aid and personal praise from a long list of luminaries ranging from President Bush to Donald Rumsfeld. If, as Samuel Jackson asserted, “patriotism is the last refuge of the scoundrel”, then anti-Americanism is the last refuge of US-backed dictators.

The Shah’s problems were of his own making, as were those of Marcos. Manuel Noriega mistakenly believed that his status as US ally would allow him to get away with anything, including drug smuggling. Given the general misgivings about US foreign policy in third world countries, these rulers thought that all they had to do to retain US support was to raise the spectre of joining the ranks of America haters within their societies against whom they were originally supposed to help Washington. But the crash of dictatorships comes from mistaken domestic policies; it is not always a function of foreign policy.

Even now, the uproar against General Musharraf has been caused by his disregard for Pakistan’s Constitution and his disrespect for rule of law. After all, of the UN’s 191 member states, why is it that Pakistan is the only country where the chief of the army staff has got rid of the country’s Supreme Court to thwart a judicial verdict against his person?

But, accustomed as he is to turning to America for support, Musharraf is trying to persuade the international community that he is indispensable for the US-led war against terrorism and given his services for the West, his coup against Pakistan’s constitution should be treated as a minor matter. Soon after the 1999 coup d’etat that brought him to power, Musharraf telephoned General Anthony Zinni, Commander of the US Central Command (CentCom). Both Generals Musharraf and Zinni have publicly confirmed their conversation. In his book Battle Ready, written with Tom Clancy and published in 2004, General Zinni says that Musharraf told him “what had led to the coup and why he and the other military leaders had no choice other than the one they took.” Zinni also mentions Musharraf’s help, two months later, in arresting some terrorists sought by the US, which led Zinni to tell Washington, “now do something for Musharraf.”

In the aftermath of a military coup that entailed toppling an elected government, General Musharraf found it expedient, possibly necessary, to seek advice and support from the top American general dealing with the Middle East and Central Asia. Musharraf has been proud of his American connections, citing on more than one occasion US support since 9/11 as somehow conferring legitimacy on his military regime. But now it is useful for him to pretend that the West has turned its back on him.

For almost seven years, Musharraf has had a free ride with international public opinion by pretending to be a reformer without delivering much by way of internal reform. Now that he has exposed himself in the aftermath of martial law/emergency, Musharraf should be prepared to lose the international support he assiduously cultivated.

The US is being nice to Musharraf by giving him time to rectify his mistake instead of putting its full weight behind Pakistan’s political opposition and civil society. So, if someone should be complaining right now, it should be the thousands of civilians jailed without cause, not Musharraf. The US has already done more than its fair share for Pakistan’s ruler and all that largesse has still not prevented Musharraf from turning against America. It is time for America to do something for the democratic aspirations of the people of Pakistan.

Gulf News , November 21, 2007

After imposing martial law disguised as a state of emergency, General Pervez Musharraf has cracked down on Pakistan’s judiciary, media, moderate political opposition and nascent civil society.

His actions have been universally condemned by the international community. But instead of recognising the error of his ways, the general says he feels “let down by the West” and “betrayed by the media”.

Musharraf is following in the footsteps of the Shah of Iran, Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines and Manuel Noriega of Panama. In their final days each one of these US-backed authoritarian rulers blamed the US for failing to understand their compulsions and for creating circumstances eventually leading to their downfall.

In the days to come, Musharraf and his remaining loyalists can be expected to whip up anti-Americanism in an effort to deflect blame for their predicament. Things were going well until the US demonstrated its legendary fickleness and showed a soft spot for Benazir Bhutto, Musharraf’s apologists will argue vehemently.

Musharraf recently spoke of Bhutto as “the darling of the West”, completely forgetting that he, and not Bhutto, was the recipient of billions of dollars in aid and personal praise from a long list of luminaries ranging from President George W. Bush to Donald Rumsfeld. If, as Samuel Jackson asserted, “patriotism is the last refuge of the scoundrel” then anti-Americanism is the last refuge of US-backed dictators.

The uproar against Musharraf has been caused by his disregard for Pakistan’s constitution and his disrespect for rule of law.

After all, of the UN’s 191 member states why is it that Pakistan is the only country where the chief of the army staff has got rid of the country’s Supreme Court to thwart a judicial verdict against his person?

But, accustomed as he is to turning to America for support, Musharraf is trying to persuade the international community that he is indispensable for the US-led war against terrorism and given his services for the West, his coup against Pakistan’s constitution should be treated as a minor matter.

Soon after the 1999 coup d’etat that brought him to power, Musharraf telephoned General Anthony Zinni, Commander of the US Central Command.

Both Musharraf and Zinni have publicly confirmed their conversation. In his book Battle Ready, written with Tom Clancy and published in 2004, Zinni says that Musharraf told him “what had led to the coup and why he and the other military leaders had had no choice other than the one they took.”

Zinni also mentions Musharraf’s help, two months later, in arresting some terrorists sought by the US, which led Zinni to tell Washington, “Now do something for Musharraf.”

In the aftermath of a military coup that entailed toppling an elected government, Musharraf found it expedient, possibly necessary, to seek the advice and support from the top American general dealing with the Middle East and Central Asia.

Subsequently, too, Musharraf has been proud of his American connections, citing on more than one occasion US support since 9/11 as somehow conferring legitimacy on his military regime. But now it is useful for him to pretend that the West has turned its back on him and for no fault of his.

Full weight

The US is being nice to Musharraf by giving him time to rectify his mistake instead of putting its full weight behind Pakistan’s political opposition and civil society. Instead of blaming Washington for betraying him, Musharraf should be grateful that the last act of his theatre play is unfolding somewhat slowly.

If someone should be complaining right now, it should be the thousands of civilians jailed without cause not Musharraf.

The US has already done more than a fair share for Pakistan’s ruler and all that largesse has still not prevented Musharraf from turning against America. It is time for America to do something for the democratic aspirations of the people of Pakistan.

Gulf News , November 17, 2007

Between them, Pakistan’s four military rulers since 1958 have virtually created a new concept in political science that can best be termed “the divine right of army chiefs”.

It is patterned on the “divine right of kings”, the absolutist doctrine that asserted that a monarch derived his right to rule from the will of God.

A similar philosophy appears to be at work in the political thinking of Pakistan’s military rulers.

Only a belief in the divine right of army chiefs can explain some of the assertions made by General Pervez Musharraf in his press conference over the weekend. He claimed that “I did not violate the Constitution and law of this land”, even after suspending the constitution. Quite clearly, he sees his decisions as the law of the land.

Similarly his statement that the Supreme Court judges who refused to accept his Provisional Constitution Order (PCO) were not “above the law” indicates Musharraf’s belief that the army chiefs, and not judges, have the ultimate authority to interpret the law. In normal jurisprudence and political science the law is what the judges say it is.

Musharraf is not the first Pakistani military chief to consider himself above the law and constitution and yet insist that he was not violating the law.

Field Marshal Ayoub Khan abrogated the 1956 constitution and then introduced a constitution in 1962, which began with words to the effect, “I, Field Marshal Ayoub Khan, do hereby give the Islamic Republic of Pakistan the following constitution.”

That language was unusually similar to the one used by King John of England in the preface of the Magna Carta in 1215 wherein he said he had “granted, for us and our heirs for ever, all the liberties written out below” to the people. In 1969, Ayoub Khan abrogated even the 1962 constitution and handed power over to the next army chief in a move akin to abdication in a monarchy.

Yahya Khan held elections in the hope of securing a fragmented and pliant parliament and was surprised by the emergence of two strong civilian leaders, one in each wing of a Pakistan which then included today’s Bangladesh.

After the elections had determined whom the people supported, Yahya Khan believed that he had been assigned a mission by the Almighty to save Pakistan from politicians he believed to be corrupt and unsuited to lead the nation. That led to civil war, Indian intervention and military defeat as well as the division of Pakistan in 1971.

The lesson should have been to acknowledge that the complex problems of a nation such as Pakistan cannot be solved by the simple though straightforward approach of a soldier with a sense of God-given mission.

But that did not prevent General Zia ul Haq from assuming power in 1977 and ruling with an iron hand. Zia ul Haq added enforcement of Islam and promotion of violent jihadism to the list of his God-given tasks, creating many of the problems Pakistan is today trying to tackle.

Demonstrated

Musharraf, too, has repeatedly demonstrated that his status as army chief somehow places him above the rest of the citizenry in understanding and solving Pakistan’s problems.

Musharraf has, however, never shown much awareness of matters political and constitutional. His ignorance of history was revealed when, while visiting the Gandhi memorial during the course of the Agra summit in 2001, he asked his Indian hosts, “So how did Gandhi die?”

Even now he has expelled three reporters from Britain’s Daily Telegraph because of an editorial in the paper that used “foul and abusive language” to allude to Musharraf.

The Telegraph editorial referred to language reportedly used by former US president Franklin D. Roosevelt in expressing Washington’s grudging support for Nicaragua’s then dictator Anastasio Somoza.

Anyone well versed in political history and debates over US support for strongmen would have known the reference and taken it in its political context.

In 1999, Musharraf explained his military takeover by blaming Pakistan’s politicians and insisted that he needed to correct the country’s course by changing its politics. Now he maintains that he alone knows how to correct the course of Pakistan’s judiciary.

Musharraf must recognise sooner rather than later that he and the rulers of Myanmar are the only ones left in the world who believes that a coup-making general can successfully lead a country forever. The rest of the world left behind ideas about the divine right of rulers, whether kings or generals, a long time ago.

Indian Express , November 16, 2007

Between them, Pakistan’s four military rulers since 1958 have virtually created a new concept in political science that can best be termed ‘the divine right of army chiefs’. It is patterned on the ‘divine right of kings,’ the absolutist doctrine that asserted that a monarch derived his right to rule from the will of God.

According to the doctrine of divine right, a king’s authority could not be restricted by the will of his subjects, the aristocracy, the judiciary or a Constitution. Any attempt to depose the king or to restrict his powers was deemed as rebellion against the will of God. A similar philosophy appears to be at work in Pakistan. Only a belief in the divine right of army chiefs can explain some of the assertions made by General Pervez Musharraf in his press conference over the weekend. Quite clearly, he sees his decisions as the law of the land.

His statements also indicate his belief that the army chiefs, and not judges, have the ultimate authority to interpret the law. But he is not the first military chief to consider himself above the law. Field Marshal Ayub Khan abrogated the 1956 Constitution and then introduced a Constitution in 1962, which began with words to the effect, “I, Field Marshal Ayub Khan, do hereby give the Islamic Republic of Pakistan the following Constitution.”

That language was unusually similar to the one used by King John of England in the preface of the Magna Carta in 1215! In 1969, Ayub Khan abrogated the 1962 Constitution and handed power over to the next army chief in a move akin to abdication in a monarchy.

And after elections in 1970 created a split mandate, Major General Yahya Khan came to believe that he had been assigned a mission by the Almighty to save Pakistan from politicians he believed to be corrupt. That led to civil war, Indian intervention and ultimately the division of Pakistan in 1971.

The lesson should have been to acknowledge that the complex problems of a nation such as Pakistan cannot be solved by the simple though straightforward approach of a soldier with a sense of God-given mission. But that did not prevent General Zia ul Haq from assuming power in 1977 and ruling with an iron hand. Zia ul Haq added enforcement of Islam and promotion of violent jihadism to the list of his God-given tasks, creating many lasting problems in Pakistan.

General Musharraf, too, has repeatedly demonstrated that his status as army chief somehow places him above the rest of the citizenry in understanding and solving Pakistan’s problems.

Musharraf has, however, never shown much awareness of matters political and constitutional. His ignorance of history was revealed when, while visiting the Gandhi memorial during the course of the Agra summit in 2001, he asked his Indian hosts, “so how did Gandhi die?” Even now, he has expelled three reporters from Britain’s Daily Telegraph because of an editorial in the paper that used “foul and abusive language” to allude to General Musharraf. The Telegraph editorial referred to language reportedly used by former US president Franklin D. Roosevelt in expressing Washington’s grudging support for Nicaragua’s then dictator Anastasio Somoza. Anyone well versed in political history and debates over US support for strongmen would have known the reference and taken it in its political context.

In 1999, General Musharraf explained his military takeover by blaming Pakistan’s politicians and insisted that he needed to correct the country’s course by changing its politics. Now he maintains that he alone knows how to correct the course of Pakistan’s judiciary. Musharraf must recognise, sooner rather than later, that he and the rulers of Myanmar will be the only ones left in the world who believe that a coup-making general can successfully lead a country forever. The rest of the world left behind ideas about the divine right of rulers, whether kings or generals, a long time ago.

Wall Street Journal , November 8, 2007

When Gen. Pervez Musharraf suspended Pakistan’s Constitution, declared a state of emergency and put the nation once again under martial law, he expected limited civilian resistance and only ritual international condemnation, in view of his role in the war against terrorism. On both counts, Mr. Musharraf appears to have badly miscalculated.
Police officers clash with lawyers outside the district courts in Multan, Pakistan, on Nov. 6, 2007.
Pakistan’s burgeoning civil society, led by lawyers and encouraged by judges ousted from the Supreme Court, is refusing to be cowed. Protests are spreading despite thousands of arrests and the use of tear gas and batons against peaceful demonstrators. More than 1,700 attorneys have been jailed but still more are taking to the streets. University students have joined the lawyers, and former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto has vowed to violate a ban on public meetings by leading a rally on Friday.

There are a number of important reasons why Pakistan’s attorneys are leading the protests against Mr. Musharraf. They have a long tradition of activism for rule of law and human-rights issues. In 1968-69, the lawyers started the campaign that resulted in the ouster of Pakistan’s first military ruler, Field Marshal Ayub Khan. They also were at the forefront of the campaign against Mr. Zia-ul-Haq, whose 11-year military rule ended when he died in a 1988 plane crash.

The legal fraternity has another advantage, in that they can afford to confront the government without fearing starvation for their families. Some 65 million of Pakistan’s 160 million people subsist on less than $1 a day, while another 65 million survive just above the poverty line. The poor are willing to participate in organized rallies, such as the one that welcomed Ms. Bhutto back to Pakistan on Oct. 18 (and was targeted by a suicide terrorist), but they generally avoid protest demonstrations where getting arrested and missing work is almost inevitable.

That could change in the days and weeks to come. Although Mr. Musharraf has taken all private and international television channels off the air, images of the protests are being seen all over Pakistan through the Internet and with satellite dishes. Middle-class Pakistanis, and increasingly the poor, are making it clear that they want political freedom, along with an improvement in their economic prospects, and do not consider prosperity and democracy to be mutually exclusive.

The international community has also responded more strongly than Mr. Musharraf expected. The Netherlands has suspended aid, and several donors are reviewing their policy on military and economic assistance. The Bush administration is hoping to defuse the situation through assertive diplomacy. But withdrawal of aid, supported by several congressional leaders, remains a possibility.

Since 9/11, Mr. Musharraf has positioned himself as the key Western ally in the global war against terrorism. But in recent months, he has been too distracted with domestic politics to play an effective role. The U.S., in particular, does not want anti-Musharraf sentiment to result in a fresh wave of anti-Americanism in Pakistan that further fuels terrorism. While some in the U.S. argue about America’s limited options in dealing with the crisis in Pakistan, one could argue that Mr. Musharraf’s options are even more limited.

The more he has to repress critics and political opponents, the less Pakistan will be able to fight terrorism. After all, when troops have to be deployed to detain Supreme Court judges, journalists, lawyers and politicians, there are fewer troops available to fight terrorists. Pakistan’s intelligence services can either spy on dissenting Pakistani civilians or focus their energies on finding Osama bin Laden and his ever increasing number of deputies and operatives around Pakistan. But Pakistan needs to fight terrorism for Pakistan’s sake. Mr. Musharraf cannot endlessly blackmail Washington by hinting that he would withdraw antiterror cooperation if the U.S. pressures him on other issues, including democracy and human-rights violations.

One thing is clear: Mr. Musharraf’s authoritarianism is being challenged by diverse elements in Pakistani society. His self-cultivated image as a benign dictator is a thing of the past, and his recent harsh measures have failed to frighten Pakistan’s civil society and political opposition into submission.

The defiance of the judiciary and the media might not immediately topple Mr. Musharraf, but it could render him ineffective to a point where the military rethinks its options. The army will soon recognize that the only thing keeping the general and his civilian cronies in power is the army’s support. It risks further alienating the Pakistani people and losing their respect as long as it continues to act solely in the interests of Mr. Musharraf and his small band of political allies. At some point, the professional soldiers will wonder whether they should risk their institution’s position to keep him in power.

The army is Mr. Musharraf’s support base. It is a major beneficiary of U.S. security assistance, having received $17 billion since 1954 with equipment worth several hundred million dollars currently in the pipeline. Since 2002, the U.S. has subsidized the Pakistani army to the tune of $150 million per month. The army is also a stakeholder in Pakistan’s growing economy, which benefits from international aid and investment. If Mr. Musharraf’s autocratic policies threaten Pakistan’s prosperity, the army is likely to be less unanimous in its support of its commander.

Already, there are signs of economic fallout from the political turmoil. Rumors of an anti-Musharraf military coup on Monday caused the biggest one-day decline in 16 months on the Karachi Stock Exchange, resulting in losses of an estimated $1.3 billion. Pakistan’s credit rating has been revised downward in anticipation of further civic unrest and international sanctions.

Pakistanis are used to coups d’état where the army takes the helm of government. Things are different this time. In the past, generals have suspended the constitution to remove from power unpopular rulers, usually weakened civilians rightly or wrongly accused of corruption (as was the case when Mr. Musharraf ousted Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in October 1999). This is the first time an unpopular military ruler has suspended the constitution to preserve his own rule. In doing so, Mr. Musharraf has clearly overplayed his hand.

Mr. Musharraf cannot blame a civilian predecessor for bringing the country to the brink. If there is internal chaos in Pakistan today, it is of the general’s making. After all, it was his arbitrary decision to remove Supreme Court Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammed Chaudhry in March that initiated the political crisis which has led to the current “state of emergency.”

Justice Chaudhry, on the other hand, has become a symbol of resistance to arbitrary rule — the man who refused to roll over and disappear, unlike earlier judges who cooperated with military rulers or simply went home when their conscience dictated otherwise. Justice Chaudhry’s call upon the legal fraternity to “Go to every corner of Pakistan and give the message that this is the time to sacrifice” for the supremacy of Pakistan’s Constitution has drawn elements disillusioned with existing political leaders to anti-Musharraf protests.

Among Pakistani political leaders, Ms. Bhutto has emerged as the viable civilian alternative to Mr. Musharraf, with public support at home and acceptance abroad. As the only politician in Pakistan to publicly describe Islamist extremism and terrorism as the principal threat to the nation, Ms. Bhutto was initially measured in her response to Mr. Musharraf’s reckless actions. She demanded that he restore the constitution and call elections as scheduled. She hoped to change his attitude with the threat of putting hundreds of thousands of supporters in the streets, without actually doing so. But Mr. Musharraf’s stubbornness is changing that position.

Like many in the U.S., Ms. Bhutto appears worried about directing attention away from fighting terrorism and destabilizing Pakistan further. But leaving the anti-Musharraf campaign leaderless is not an option. She has positioned herself as an opposition leader who represents the sentiment of the people, but is also willing to accept a negotiated settlement that restores the constitution, ends persecution, and results in free and fair elections leading to full civilian rule.

So far Mr. Musharraf has shown no inclination to negotiate in good faith with Ms. Bhutto or the international community. With each passing day, the Bush administration’s hopes — that with its help there could be a transition to democracy in Pakistan with a continuing role for Mr. Musharraf — are diminishing. Unless Mr. Musharraf changes course quickly, the U.S. will be compelled to start looking beyond him to a more legitimate leader.

Mr. Musharraf seems determined to put his own political survival before the rule of law — actions that warrant the label dictator. Pakistan’s attorneys, and increasingly the rest of its citizenry, seem equally determined to prevent this from happening.

Gulf News November 6, 2007

While effectively placing Pakistan under martial law last weekend, General Pervez Musharraf used words similar to those used by another military ruler, General Yahya Khan, when he ordered the 1971 crackdown against civilians in erstwhile East Pakistan. Musharraf said that he had imposed martial law “for the good of Pakistan” and “to preserve the unity of Pakistan” – the exact words used by Yahya Khan 36 years ago.

Like Yahya Khan he insisted that the country faced a “critical and dangerous situation” and argued that “extremists are becoming confident” and “security forces demoralised”. And as if quoting directly from Yahya Khan, Musharraf said: “It would have been suicidal not to act.”

For those who remember Pakistani history, Yahya Khan’s decision to ignore the results of the December 1970 elections and instead to use force against popular political forces led, nine months later, to the transformation of East Pakistan into the independent state of Bangladesh.

Things might not turn that dire this time around but Musharraf has risked dividing an already polarised nation further.

His decision to suspend the constitution, shut down the independent media and arrest everyone he does not like, whether liberal or Islamist, has cancelled his self-cultivated image as a benign authoritarian ruler at a time when his need for a positive aura was greater than when he first took power.

It might be too late for Musharraf to be able to act sufficiently harshly to frighten Pakistan’s civil society and political opposition into submission.

It is apparent to most people that Musharraf’s action was motivated by his desire to keep himself and his civilian cronies in power and had little to do with saving Pakistan from terrorism or internal chaos. If Musharraf’s position was not threatened by the prospect of an adverse Supreme Court judgment against him holding the dual offices of president and chief of army staff, he would most likely not have acted. Musharraf has been in charge for eight years and cannot blame anyone else for anarchy in the country. If there is internal chaos in Pakistan today, it is of Musharraf’s making.

Bad advice

Ironically, Musharraf has turned to the army and his position as army chief to bail him out of a crisis created by the bad advice of his civilian advisers. Even now, the virtual imposition of martial law appears to be aimed at protecting the interests of the unelectable Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz and the King’s Party, Pakistan Muslim League (PML-Q).

Musharraf’s civilian allies are incapable of winning a free and fair election and have resented the prospect of any arrangement that allows Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif to contest, and defeat them at the polls.

Bhutto has pointed out the incongruence of Musharraf’s decision to purge the Supreme Court while keeping the parliament, provincial legislatures and ministries in their position. How can legislatures and ministries continue to exist when “the constitution under which they were created has itself been suspended?” she asked.

But for Musharraf the weakness of his argument hardly matters. His actions reflect the calculation that he can get away with anything as long as the Pakistan army remains behind him.

Musharraf also seems to assume that the international community would not go beyond ritual condemnation of his decision. But the US could reach the conclusion that Musharraf is too distracted with domestic politics to play an effective role in fighting terrorism any longer and the army might feel that it is getting blamed for one man’s power play.

Washington does not need or want anti-Musharraf sentiment to result in a fresh wave of anti-Americanism in Pakistan that further fuels terrorism. The more Musharraf has to repress critics and political opponents at home, the less Pakistan will be able to fight terrorism.

Pakistan is being described by some around the world as “the most dangerous country” on Earth. That characterisation can be contested by Pakistanis only if Pakistan moves along the path of certainty. A sudden suspension of the constitution, and images of mistreatment of judges and lawyers, add to the doubts already being expressed about Pakistan’s future.