Reflections on Pakistan

Gulf News, March 14, 2007

Reality is catching up furiously with those who believe that Pakistan’s principal problem is a poor international image. The world can hardly be expected to admire a country where, in addition to frequent terrorist attacks and violence, the executive branch of government succeeds in sacking three chief justices in less than a decade.

Apolitical Pakistani professionals and technocrats often join the establishment in arguing that if only everyone highlighted the positive, things would look good and the flaws and weaknesses of the Pakistani State would somehow disappear.

But how can anyone find anything positive in General Pervez Musharraf’s sacking of Supreme Court Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry, the latest assault on an already weakened and docile judiciary?

Here are the facts as an outsider would see them: Pakistan’s army chief, who took power seven-and-a-half years ago after sacking an elected prime minister because the prime minister wanted to replace the army chief, has now “suspended” the country’s chief justice. The chief justice was allegedly involved in misconduct, just as the sacked prime minister was termed “corrupt” and “undermining national security”.

Earlier, the sacked prime minister had got rid of another chief justice by getting supporters of the ruling party to storm the supreme court building. And the army chief who removed the latest chief justice had earlier got rid of another chief justice by insisting that the chief justice and his fellow judges swear an oath of loyalty to him before the court could decide the constitutionality (or otherwise) of the army chief’s coup d’etat.

How many countries in recent times have a track record like that?

Musharraf appointed Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry as chief justice almost two years ago and clearly found nothing wrong with him at that time. But Justice Chaudhry proved to be a maverick, all too willing to take cases that the government did not want heard. He gave judgments that made life complicated or plain embarrassing for the military-intelligence bureaucracy (such as the one relating Pakistan’s “disappeared”.)

This unprecedented event — the firing of the chief justice followed by keeping him incommunicado — proves that regime survival has trumped national survival under Pakistan’s authoritarian rulers. The result has been the erosion of all Pakistani institutions, including the army, which has lost effectiveness through politicisation.

The uproar resulting from the removal of the chief justicecomes on the heel of a burgeoning loss of credibility in Pakistan’s status as a frontline American ally in the war against terrorism.

Pakistani officials arrested Taliban official Mullah Obaidullah Akhund in Quetta while the US Vice-President Dick Cheney was visiting Pakistan to encourage Musharraf’s fulfillment of his promises in dealing with the Al Qaida and Taliban menace. Instead of impressing the Americans, Mullah Obaidullah’s arrest raised several questions.

For the last four years, Pakistani officials had denied reports, including statements by Afghan officials, about the presence of senior Taliban figures in Quetta.

Now suddenly, with Cheney in Islamabad, the Taliban No. 3 appeared as if out of nowhere in the city where for four years no Taliban presence was known to Pakistani authorities.

It is contradictions such as these, in addition to the general lack of adherence to constitutional or legal norms reflected in the chief justice’s high-handed removal.

Apart from his role in the war against terrorism, Musharraf has invoked the economic performance of his regime as a substitute for legitimacy and as justification for his remaining in power. But concerns are now surfacing over the rapidly increasing trade deficit and simultaneously declining textile exports.

It now appears that the much touted economic miracle of the last five years was less a function of the wizardry of Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz and more a reflection of America’s largesse towards a crucial ally.

In addition to the over $5 billion received from the US in economic and military assistance, Musharraf’s regime has been receiving an additional $100 million per month from Washington as reimbursement for costs incurred on Pakistan’s counter-terrorism activities.

That brings the transfer of funds from the US to Pakistan to a total of at least $10 billion. The exact amount of covert payments is not known even to the US researchers and most Congressional aides.

Pakistan’s image cannot improve until its elite understands the value and importance of straightening out the country’s politics — deciding once and for all who will wield power, under what terms and for how long — as the central question facing the country. At this point in time, Pakistan’s image is a secondary issue that can be addressed once the reality improves.

ndian Express, March 14, 2007

Reality is catching up furiously with those who believe that Pakistan’s principal problem is a poor international image. The world can hardly be expected to admire a country where, in addition to frequent terrorist attacks and violence, the executive branch of government succeeds in sacking three chief justices in less than a decade.

Apolitical Pakistani professionals and technocrats often join the establishment in arguing that if only everyone highlighted the positive, things would look good and the flaws and weaknesses of the Pakistani state would somehow disappear. But how can anyone find anything positive in General Pervez Musharraf’s sacking of Supreme Court Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry, the latest assault on an already weakened and docile judiciary?

Here are the facts as an outsider would see them: Pakistan’s army chief, who took power seven and a half years ago after sacking an elected prime minister because the prime minister wanted to replace the army chief, has now “suspended” the country’s chief justice. The chief justice was allegedly involved in misconduct, just as the sacked prime minister was termed “corrupt” and “undermining national security.”

Earlier, the sacked prime minister had got rid of another chief justice by getting supporters of the ruling party to storm the Supreme Court building. And the army chief who removed the latest chief justice had earlier got rid of another chief justice by insisting that the chief justice and his fellow judges swear an oath of loyalty to him before the court could decide the constitutionality (or otherwise) of the army chief’s coup d’etat.

How many countries in recent times have a track record like that?

General Pervez Musharraf appointed Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry as chief justice almost two years ago and clearly found nothing wrong with him at that time. But Justice Chaudhry proved to be a maverick, all too willing to take cases that the government did not want heard. He gave judgments that made life complicated or plain embarrassing for the military-intelligence bureaucracy (such as the one relating to Pakistan’s “disappeared.”)

This unprecedented event — the firing of the chief justice followed by keeping him incommunicado — proves that regime survival has trumped national survival under Pakistan’s authoritarian rulers. The result has been the erosion of all Pakistani institutions, including the army, which has lost effectiveness through politicisation.

The uproar resulting from the removal of the chief justice of Pakistan comes on the heel of a burgeoning loss of credibility in Pakistan’s status as a frontline American ally in the war against terrorism.

Pakistani officials arrested Taliban official Mullah Obaidullah Akhund in Quetta while US Vice President Dick Cheney was visiting Pakistan to encourage General Musharraf’s fulfillment of his promises in dealing with the Al-Qaeda and Taliban menace. Instead of impressing the Americans, Mullah Obaidullah’s arrest raised several questions.

For the last four years, Pakistani officials had denied reports, including statements by Afghan officials, about the presence of senior Taliban figures in Quetta. Now suddenly, with Cheney in Islamabad, the Taliban No. 3 appeared as if out of nowhere in the city where for four years no Taliban presence was known to Pakistani authorities. It is contradictions such as these, in addition to the general lack of adherence to constitutional or legal norms, that are reflected in the chief justice’s high-handed removal.

Apart from his role in the war against terrorism, General Musharraf has invoked the economic performance of his regime as a substitute for legitimacy and as justification for his remaining in power. But concerns are now surfacing over the rapidly increasing trade deficit and simultaneously declining textile exports.

It now appears that the much touted economic miracle of the last five years was less a function of the wizardry of Shaukat Aziz and more a reflection of America’s largesse towards a crucial ally. In addition to the over 5 billion dollars received from the US in economic and military assistance, General Musharraf’s regime has been receiving an additional $100 million per month from Washington as reimbursement for costs incurred on Pakistan’s counter-terrorism activities. That brings the transfer of funds from the US to Pakistan to a total of at least $10 billion. The exact amount of covert payments is not known even to US researchers and most Congressional aides.

Pakistan’s image cannot improve until its elite understands the value and importance of straightening out the country’s politics — deciding once and for all who will wield power, under what terms and for how long — as the central question facing the country. At this point in time, Pakistan’s image is a secondary issue that can be addressed once the reality improves.

Indian Express, March 1, 2007

Developments of the last fortnight can be seen as a sort of balance sheet reflecting the strengths and weaknesses of the Pakistani state. Pakistan successfully tested the latest version of its long-range nuclear-capable missile, Shaheen II. It has the capability to hit major cities in India, according to Pakistan’s military. For those who measure Pakistan’s success in terms of a military balance against India, this addition to Pakistan’s arsenal is a sign of the country’s expanding strength.

Other events, however, indicate that Pakistan’s supposed ability to externally project its power is not matched with the potency of an effective state at home. Up to 17 people, including a senior civil judge, were killed and 30 wounded in a powerful suicide bombing in the Quetta district courts compound on February 17. The next day, two children were killed and three security force personnel seriously injured in two landmine explosions in Balochistan. The same day, at least 67 people were killed and over 50 wounded in a fire that swept through two coaches of the India-Pakistan Samjhauta Express. In the relatively sleepy central Punjab town of Cheechawatni, three suspected militants were killed when a bomb they were carrying on a bicycle accidentally exploded.

On February 20 an Islamist “fanatic” shot and killed the Punjab provincial Social Welfare Minister Zile Huma Usman in an open court in Gujranwala. The attacker said he wanted to punish the woman minister for not covering her face, which he considers obligatory in his interpretation of Islam’s concept of hijab.

A couple of days later, at least seven people were seriously injured in two separate landmine explosions in Balochistan while unknown assailants blew up a gas pipeline in the restive province. Several hundred female students from an Islamic seminary in the centre of Islamabad have been holed up for the last month inside a public library, and their supporters have threatened a campaign of suicide bombings if forcibly evicted from the occupied library.

Five private English medium schools providing co-education in Peshawar were told that suicide bombers might target co-education private schools. A school for girls in Mardan was warned that its building would be bombed if teachers and students did not start observing hijab or wearing veils. In other news with bad implications, an editor of an Urdu daily, Sohail Qalander, and his friend, Mohammad Niaz, managed to escape from captors who had kidnapped them almost two months ago. Their kidnappers demanded the journalists “stop writing against smugglers, kidnappers and mafia groups.”

The negative news stories of the last fifteen days affirm what official Pakistan refuses to acknowledge, the gradual weakening of the Pakistani state. Notwithstanding the possession of nuclear weapons and missiles, Pakistan is far from being an effective state. In fact, in the process of building extensive military capabilities, Pakistan’s successive rulers have allowed the degradation of essential internal attributes of statehood.

An important attribute of a state is its ability to maintain monopoly, or at least the preponderance, of public coercion. The proliferation of insurgents, militias, mafiosi and high ordinary criminality reflect the state’s weakness in this key area.

Discussions of Pakistan’s politics are almost always about personalities rather than the issues. As the Pakistani state falters, it is time not to talk only in terms of whether one individual is better for the country or another. It is time to identify where the Pakistani state has lost its direction.

A modern state is distinguished by impersonal rule. Personalisation, corruption, familial dominance and re-tribalisation are considered signs of weakening of the state. Failures of rule of law, weak judiciaries, failures of regulation and the dominance of a lawless executive, coupled with the failure to maintain public goods (education, environment, public health, electricity and water supply) are all considered indicators of state failure. Autonomists, secessionists, irredentists and vacuum fillers emerge wherever the dimensions of being a state begin to weaken.

Instead of focusing all their energies on maintaining military power, Pakistan’s rulers must recognise the weakening of essential qualities of being a state. Adherence to the constitution, restoration of rule of law, normal contestation for power, and the rebuilding of civilian institutions are essential if Pakistan is to avoid a slide into anarchy.

Gulf News, February 28, 2007

Developments of the last fortnight can be seen as a sort of balance sheet reflecting the strengths and weaknesses of the Pakistani state. During this period, Pakistan successfully tested the latest version of its long-range nuclear-capable missile.

The Hatf VI (Shaheen II) ballistic missile, launched from an undisclosed location, is said to have a range of 2,000 kilometres and has the capability to hit major cities in India, according to Pakistan’s military.

For those who measure Pakistan’s success in terms of a military balance against India, this addition to Pakistan’s missile arsenal is a sign of the country’s expanding strength.

Other events, however, indicate that Pakistan’s supposed ability to externally project its power is not matched with the potency of an effective state at home.

Up to 17 people, including a senior civil judge, were killed and 30 wounded in a powerful suicide bombing in the Quetta District Courts compound on February 17.

The next day, two children were killed and three security force personnel were seriously injured in two separate landmine explosions in Balochistan. The same day, at least 68 people were killed and over 50 wounded in a fire that swept through two coaches of the India-Pakistan Samjhauta Express.

In the relatively sleepy central Punjab town of Cheechawatni, three suspected militants were killed when a bomb they were carrying on a bicycle accidentally exploded.

Shot and killed

On February 20 an Islamist “fanatic” shot and killed the Punjab provincial social welfare minister, Zile Huma Usman, in an open court in Gujranwala. The attacker said he wanted to punish the woman minister for not covering her face, which he considers obligatory under his interpretation of Islam’s concept of hijab.

Usman’s killer also revealed that he wanted to kill Benazir Bhutto, the Muslim world’s first woman prime minister, for offending him by keeping her face uncovered.

A couple of days later, at least seven people were seriously injured in two separate landmine explosions in Balochistan while unknown assailants blew up a gas pipeline in the restive province.

Several hundred female students from an Islamic seminary in the centre of Islamabad have been holed up for the last month inside a public library. The protesters’ supporters have threatened that a campaign of suicide bombings would follow if they are forcibly evicted from the occupied library.

Five private English medium schools providing co-education in Peshawar were forced to remain closed after they were told that suicide bombers might target co-education private schools.

A school for girls in Mardan was warned that its building would be bombed if teachers and students did not start observing hijab or wearing veils.

In other news with bad implications, an editor of an Urdu daily, Sohail Qalander, and his friend, Mohammad Niaz, managed to escape from captors who had kidnapped them almost two months ago.

Qalander said he and his colleague were held somewhere in the tribal areas along Pakistan’s border with Afghanistan and were tortured and threatened. The kidnappers demanded the journalists “stop writing against smugglers, kidnappers and mafia groups”.

The negative news stories of the last 15 days affirm what official Pakistan refuses to acknowledge, the gradual weakening of the Pakistani state. Notwithstanding the possession of nuclear weapons and missiles, Pakistan is far from being an effective state.

In fact, one can argue that in the process of building extensive military capabilities, Pakistan’s successive rulers have allowed the degradation of essential internal attributes of statehood.

An important attribute of a state is its ability to maintain monopoly, or at least the preponderance, of public coercion. The proliferation of insurgents, militias, Mafiosi and high ordinary criminality reflect the state’s weakness in this key area.

Discussion of Pakistan’s politics, especially its successes and failures, is almost always about the personalities rather than the issues. As the Pakistani state falters, it is time not to talk only in terms of whether one individual is better for the country or another. It is time to identify where the Pakistani state has lost its direction.

A modern state is distinguished by impersonal rule. Personalisation, corruption, familial dominance and re-tribalisation are considered signs of weakening of the state.

Failures of rule of law, weak judiciaries, failures of regulation and the dominance of a lawless executive, coupled with the failure to maintain public goods (education, environment, public health, electricity and water supply) are all considered indicators of state failure by political scientists.

Autonomists, secessionists, irredentists and vacuum fillers emerge wherever the dimensions of being a state begin to weaken.

Instead of focusing all their energies on maintaining military power, Pakistan’s rulers must recognise the weakening of essential qualities of being a state reflected in the general lawlessness and widespread violence in the country.

Adherence to the constitution, restoration of rule of law, normal contestation for power, and the rebuilding of civilian institutions are essential if Pakistan is to avoid a slide into anarchy.

Indian Express, February 21, 2007

The outgoing US Ambassador to Pakistan, Ryan Crocker, has attempted to resolve the apparent contradiction between Washington’s view of General Pervez Musharraf as a critical ally in the war against terrorism and intelligence about terrorists still operating out of Pakistan.

“Pakistan has been fighting terrorists for several years and its commitment to counterterrorism remains firm,” Crocker told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee at the hearing on his nomination as US ambassador to Iraq. The challenge faced by Pakistan in coming to terms with Taliban fighters along its border with Afghanistan, he explained, lies in a lack of ‘capacity.’

As suicide bombings and general lawlessness illustrate the insecurity of millions of Pakistanis, Pakistan’s self-congratulating elite can now sit in the comfort of its drawing rooms and debate a new issue: What is worse — being doubted for lack of commitment as an American ally or being recognised as an incapable one?

Clearly, from the US point of view the task expected of Pakistan is not being accomplished. One implication of Crocker’s assessment is that Pakistan must now brace itself for pressure in improving its capacity. Alternatively, it would have to allow other US allies, possibly NATO, to complete the task to which General Musharraf is committed but which Pakistan’s military and law enforcement machinery are unable to do.

The underlying message in Crocker’s faint praise for Pakistan must not go unheeded. Finding friendly rulers and then bolstering their capacity to fulfil strategic objectives has been the mainstay of US foreign policy in the greater Middle East for years. For this policy to work, US diplomats must gloss over the flaws and weaknesses of allies and ensure a constant flow of military and economic assistance. The aid, and the dependence that results from it, is supposed to buy the US influence.

Concerns about democracy and human rights must be played down and critics must be assured that “slow but sure reform” is on its way. The economic growth that results from injection of large doses of aid, coupled with stage-managed elections and some diversity in a semi-controlled media, are useful instruments of convincing sceptics that the glass is half full. Many smart people would argue that this model of US policy has by and large worked.

They argue that US support of the region’s rulers, capable or incapable, has prevented the entire region from going up in flames. But others argue, quite effectively on the basis of the existing record, that the capacity of America’s allies from Morocco to Indonesia to live up to Washington’s expectations, especially in the war against terrorism, is diminishing.

Sooner or later, US policy will end up combining the “constructive instability” paradigm, which causes US intervention on the scale of Iraq with attendant consequences, and the “island of stability” exemplar that led the US to ignore the turbulence brewing under the Shah’s rule in Iran.

Ambassador Crocker has conducted himself successfully in Pakistan, retaining General Musharraf’s confidence and helping the general preserve his lifeline to Washington. The only thing the realists in the United States seek from Pakistan is full cooperation in tracking down Al-Qaeda operatives and shutting down the Taliban who have become a serious threat to stability in Afghanistan.

As he leaves Pakistan to deal with the mess in Iraq, Ambassador Crocker has communicated a subtle message to the military regime in Islamabad, which he has done much to save from the wrath of America’s “constructive instability” visionaries.

General Musharraf and his colleagues need to redefine their priorities and rebuild the capacity of the Pakistani state in the areas where it is lacking — counter-terrorism, law enforcement, limiting non-state armed groups.

The Pakistani state has become weak as its functionaries have expanded their role to include being the manipulators of domestic politics and dealers in urban real estate. Pakistan must become an effective state run under its constitution and the rule of law. Otherwise, it will continue to be a victim of terrorism as well as an alleged safe haven for terrorists.

Gulf News, February 21, 2007

The outgoing US ambassador to Pakistan, Ryan Crocker, has attempted to resolve the apparent contradiction between Washington’s view of General Pervez Musharraf as a critical ally in the war against terrorism and intelligence about terrorists still operating out of Pakistan.

“Pakistan has been fighting terrorists for several years and its commitment to counterterrorism remains firm,” Crocker told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee at the hearing on his nomination as US ambassador to Iraq.

The challenge faced by Pakistan in coming to terms with Taliban fighters along its border with Afghanistan, he explained, lies in a lack of “capacity”.

As suicide bombings and general lawlessness illustrate the insecurity of millions of Pakistanis, Pakistan’s self-congratulating elite can now sit in the comfort of its drawing rooms and debate a new issue. What is worse, being doubted for lack of commitment as an American ally or being recognised as an incapable one?

Clearly, from the US point of view, the task expected of Pakistan is not being accomplished. One implication of Crocker’s assessment is that Pakistan must now brace itself for pressure in improving its capacity.

Alternatively, it would have to allow other US allies, possibly Nato, to complete the task to which Musharraf is committed but which Pakistan’s military and law enforcement machinery are unable to do.

There is an underlying message in Crocker’s faint praise for Pakistan that must not go unheeded. Crocker is an old-school diplomat who wants to deal with the world as it exists.

He opposed the Iraq war, rejecting the idea of some neoconservatives that instability can somehow be constructive. Traditional, “realist” diplomacy hinges on preserving the status quo in the interest of the United States.

Finding friendly rulers and then bolstering their capacity to fulfil strategic objectives has been the mainstay of US foreign policy in the greater Middle East for years. For this policy to work, US diplomats must gloss over the flaws and weaknesses of allies and ensure a constant flow of military and economic assistance.

The aid, and the dependence that results from it, is supposed to buy the US influence.

Concerns about democracy and human rights must be played down and critics must be assured that “slow but sure reform” is on its way.

The economic growth that results from injection of large doses of aid, coupled with stage-managed elections and some diversity in a semi-controlled media, are useful instruments of convincing sceptics that the glass is half full. Many smart people would argue that this model of US policy has by and large worked.

Existing record

They argue that US support of the region’s rulers, capable or incapable, has prevented the entire region from going up in flames. But others argue, quite effectively on the basis of the existing record, that the capacity of America’s allies from Morocco to Indonesia to live up to Washington’s expectations, especially in the war against terrorism, is diminishing.

Sooner or later, US policy will end up combining the “constructive instability” paradigm, which causes US intervention on the scale of Iraq with attending consequences, and the “island of stability” exemplar that led the US to ignore the turbulence brewing under the Shah’s rule in Iran.

Austro-Hungarian ruler Francis I is said to have adopted the maxim “Rule and Change Nothing” and advocates of the stability school in US foreign policy would do well to remember the result of that grand strategy.

Francis and his successors did succeed in ruling without changing their outlook for many decades but while they did not change, things around them did. Eventually the Austro-Hungarian Empire collapsed and the clever diplomacy of its many smart statesmen, including Prince Metternich, failed to save the day.

Crocker has conducted himself successfully in Pakistan, retaining Musharraf’s confidence and helping the general preserve his lifeline to Washington. The only thing the realists in the US seek from Pakistan is full cooperation in tracking down Al Qaida operatives and shutting down the Taliban who have become a serious threat to stability in Afghanistan.

As he leaves Pakistan to deal with the mess in Iraq, Crocker has communicated a subtle message to the military regime in Islamabad, which he has done much to save from the wrath of America’s “constructive instability” visionaries.

Musharraf and his colleagues need to redefine their priorities and rebuild the capacity of the Pakistani state in the areas where it is lacking – counter-terrorism, law enforcement, limiting non-state armed groups.

The Pakistani state has become weak as its functionaries have expanded their role to include be

Indian Express, January 25, 2007

General Pervez Musharraf’s well-wishers had expected him to legitimise his rule and put Pakistan firmly on the road to constitutional democracy by holding free and fair elections in 2007. Instead, Musharraf will be “elected” president by Parliament and provincial legislatures that were elected in the tainted 2002 elections just as their term enters its last days. Some observers see Musharraf’s decision as reflective of his total hold on power in Pakistan. In fact, it indicates the weakness of a military ruler embattled at home and abroad.

The president, under the Pakistani Constitution, is head of state and symbol of the unity of the federation. He is elected by an electoral college comprising the National Assembly, Senate and four provincial assemblies and derives his authority from the mandate given by the people to their elected representatives.

The four presidents elected under the Constitution since its adoption in 1973 were elected by newly-elected assemblies at the beginning of their five-year terms. Musharraf, on the other hand, is seeking election from assemblies whose own flawed mandate is about to end.

Legal experts known for facilitating military rule in Pakistan, notably former Law Minister Sharifuddin Pirzada, claim the manoeuvre is in accordance with the letter of the Constitution. But such technical legality is no substitute for legitimacy.

As of now Musharraf is ‘president’ because he decreed himself so as a result of the rigged referendum held before the legislative elections of 2002, deemed by the US State department as “flawed.” Then, too, Musharraf did not seek election under the terms of the Constitution and gave himself a waiver from the constitutional bar on employees of the state (a concept that includes serving military officers) holding elective office. Musharraf’s term of office ends on November 16, 2007.

Official spokesmen have claimed that Musharraf’s “term as president” would end a week before the completion of the five-year term of the present assemblies on November 16. Therefore, if the next presidential election is held between September and October 2007 then the outgoing assemblies can rubber-stamp Musharraf as president without risking a proper election.

Such quasi-legal manoeuvres, aided by notions such as the doctrine of necessity and the concept of a military coup being its own legal justification, have been used by Pakistan’s military rulers since the country’s first coup in 1958. But legitimacy is a political, not a technical, matter. If history is any guide, Pakistan’s coup-makers have always become politically weaker after manipulating themselves into a second term. Their first term is followed by a presidential election of some sort, with minimal pretence of genuine democracy and political contestation, and it is at this stage that the absence of legitimacy of the ruler comes to the fore.

Field Marshal Ayub Khan sought “re-election’ through Basic Democrats, an electoral college of 80,000 local council members. He had hoped for a walkover but had to rig even that poll when the sister of Pakistan’s founder, the late Mohtarma Fatima Jinnah, challenged Ayub Khan as the combined Opposition candidate and showed her popular support at huge public rallies.

General Ziaul Haq ruled from 1977 to 1984 on the strength of his coup d’etat and gave himself a 5-year term through a referendum that hardly anybody bothered to vote in. But a relatively free election, albeit on non-party basis, returned a Parliament in 1985 that cramped Zia’s style, leading to its premature dissolution three years later.

During negotiations in 2003 with parliamentarians over constitutional amendments, Musharraf had explained that he did not want to contest presidential elections because that would be beneath his dignity. Lowly politicians run for office. Generals are a higher breed and must not stoop to their level.

But by failing to chart a new course Musharraf is setting himself up for the same failures that were faced by his military predecessors.

Gulf News, January 24, 2007

General Pervez Musharraf’s well wishers had expected him to legitimise his rule and put Pakistan firmly on the road to constitutional democracy by holding free and fair elections in 2007.
Instead, Musharraf has decided not to risk his position and power at a free poll. He will be “elected” president by the parliament and provincial legislatures that were elected in the tainted 2002 elections just as their term enters its last days.

Some observers see Musharraf’s decision as reflecting his total hold on power in Pakistan. In fact it indicates the weakness of a military ruler embattled at home and abroad.

The Pakistani constitution envisions a parliamentary system of government, with directly elected legislatures at the federal and provincial levels. The president, under the constitution, is head of state and the symbol of the unity of the federation.

He is, therefore, elected by an electoral college comprised of the National Assembly, the Senate and the four provincial assemblies. Under the constitutional scheme, the president derives his mandate from the mandate given by the people to their elected representatives.

The four presidents elected under the constitution since its adoption in 1973 (Chaudhry Fazal Elahi, Gulam Ishaq Khan, Farooq Leghari and Rafiq Tarar) were elected by newly elected assemblies at the beginning of their five-year terms.

Musharraf, on the other hand, is seeking election from assemblies whose own flawed mandate is about to come to an end. Legal experts known for facilitating military rule in Pakistan have said that the manoeuvre is legal. But such technical legality is not a substitute for legitimacy.
Waiver from charter ban

As of now Musharraf is “president” because he decreed himself so as a result of a referendum held before the legislative elections of 2002, which were deemed by international observers and Musharraf’s friends in the US State Department as “flawed”.

Then, too, Musharraf did not seek election under the terms of the constitution and gave himself a waiver from the constitutional bar on employees of the state (a concept that includes serving military officers) holding elective office.

Musharraf’s term of office, if it can be called that given that he secured the position by fiat and not by election, ends on November 16, 2007. His manoeuvre is an attempt to ensure that he remains president without having to seek election from legislatures elected by the people.

Official spokesmen claim that Musharraf’s “term as president” would end a week before the completion of the five-year term of the present assemblies on November 16.

Therefore, if the next presidential election is held between September and October 2007 then the outgoing assemblies can rubber-stamp Musharraf as president without risking a proper election.

Such quasi-legal manoeuvres have been used by Pakistan’s military rulers since the country’s first coup in 1958. But legitimacy is a political, not a technical, matter. Even after the rubber stamping by an emasculated parliament and weakened provincial legislatures it is doubtful whether Musharraf can overcome his regime’s crisis of legitimacy.

In fact, if history is any guide, Pakistan’s coup makers have always become politically weaker after manipulating themselves into a second term.

Rigged referendum

The pattern of Pakistan’s coup makers has been that the general seizing power rules for a few years with the help of a Supreme Court judgment approving his military takeover followed by a first presidential term based on a rigged referendum.

This is followed by a presidential election of some sort, with minimal pretense of genuine democracy and political contestation, and it is at this stage that the absence of legitimacy of the ruler comes to the fore.

Field Marshal Ayoub Khan sought “re-election’ through Basic Democrats, an electoral college of 80,000 local council members. He had hoped for a walkover but had to rig even that poll when the sister of Pakistan’s founder, the late Mohtarma Fatima Jinnah, challenged Ayoub Khan as the combined opposition candidate and showed her popular support at huge public rallies.

General Zia-ul Haq ruled from 1977 to 1984 on the strength of his coup d’etat and gave himself a 5-year term through a referendum that hardly anybody bothered to vote in.

But a relatively free election, albeit on non-party basis, returned a parliament in 1985 that did cramp Zia’s style, leading to its premature dissolution three years later.
Popular support for Fatima Jinnah and the refusal of Zia-ul Haq’s protege Mohammad Khan Junejo to be his puppet showed that Pakistan’s politicians might be too weak to remove military rulers from power but they can withhold legitimacy from the rulers.

Like Ayoub Khan and Zia-ul Haq before him, Musharraf remains fearful that once he becomes a civilian and takes off his general’s uniform, he will be susceptible to coups d’etat like all civilian rulers of Pakistan.

But by failing to chart a new course Musharraf is setting himself for the same failures that were faced by his military predecessors.

Gulf News, January 3, 2007

The day Saddam Hussain was executed, Americans paid tribute to their 38th president, Gerald R. Ford, who died at the age of 93 a few days earlier.

The dissimilarity between the circumstances and aftermath of the deaths of Saddam Hussain and Gerald Ford highlights the contrast between two distinctive political cultures.

Saddam Hussain represented the pursuit and reverence for absolute power that prevails in most of the Muslim world. Gerald Ford, on the other hand, was the product of a political system that emphasises legitimacy rather than the notion of a powerful ruler.

The US role overseas has often been mired in controversy. But even the critics of America’s power-based foreign policy acknowledge that at home, the United States is by and large a nation of laws that attempts to restrain the power of individuals and institutions.

Saddam Hussain was Iraq’s absolute ruler for over a quarter century whereas Ford governed for a little over two years. Saddam lost power only after the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. Ford had not wielded political office since losing an election in 1976, some 30 years ago.

Saddam’s life and death both polarised Iraq. Ford healed the wounds of Vietnam and Watergate while in office and was hailed for his contribution by members of all political parties when he died. Ford’s most controversial decision was to pardon disgraced former president Richard Nixon, whose resignation prompted by the Watergate scandal had brought Ford to office.

Saddam Hussain came to power through a series of coups d’etat and palace intrigue. Instead of being accountable under the law, he made the laws of Iraq while he wielded power. Having risen to power as a coup-maker and intriguer, he trusted no one.

Lack of remorse

In Saddam Hussain’s mind, his “contribution” to Iraq’s security and economy conferred a special status on him. He considered himself as Iraq’s saviour, the man who held the country together against external conspiracies and domestic rebels.

Saddam’s lack of remorse and his defiant attitude even during his last hours confirms that he did not feel he had done anything wrong. To him, human rights violations and brutality were merely a small price that had to be paid to rule Iraq with a firm hand.

As he saw it, Saddam Hussain had a plan for Iraq’s greatness and he would be damned if he allowed niceties of law or morality come in the way.

His supporters and apologists were either too timid to disagree with him or believed that a difficult country such as Iraq needed a strong man whose excesses had to be overlooked in “the national interest.”

President Ford had no delusions of grandeur. The highest office he aspired to was Speaker of the US House of Representatives.

He was nominated vice-president after Nixon’s vice-president, Spiro Agnew, resigned after pleading guilty to tax evasion charges. When Nixon was forced to resign, Ford was elevated to the presidency, the only US president who was not elected to either the presidency or vice-presidency.

Ford was not a charismatic man. His modesty and humble ways were mocked by comedians and critics. Thirty years after he left office, Ford is being praised after his death for saving America from greater polarisation.

System in place

The United States has a system in place that allows continuity in leadership and respect for departed leaders, which is not possible in countries where rulers rise to power through coups and conspiracies.

The contrast between the political cultures of absolute power and systemic legitimacy goes beyond the comparison between Saddam Hussain and Gerald Ford.

When India’s former prime minister Narasimha Rao died last year, he received a ceremonial burial accorded to all deceased elected Indian prime ministers even though he had been indicted on corruption charges and convicted by a lower court, awaiting judgment by the superior judiciary at the time of his demise.

On the other hand, when Pakistan’s former president Gulam Ishaq Khan died not long ago, his life of public service did not receive the tribute it deserved.

The last time a civilian Pakistani head of government received a ceremonial state funeral was in 1951, following the assassination of Pakistan’s first prime minister Liaquat Ali Khan.
Since then Pakistan’s leading politicians have been dismissed from office and jailed or, in the case of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, executed after a dubious trial.

The different ways nations treat their past rulers is partly related to the manner in which the rulers behave while in office. The Muslim world needs to review its political culture of reverence for power.

The Lebanese poet-philosopher Kahlil Gibran observed, “Pity the nation that welcomes its new ruler with trumpetings, and farewells him with hootings, only to welcome another with trumpetings again.”

According respect to all on the basis of constitutional legitimacy would offer a chance for Muslim countries to build viable and successful systems of governance that have not evolved due to the current preoccupation with charismatic and all powerful rulers.

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Gulf News, January 17, 2007

Pakistan’s Opposition leader and former prime minister Benazir Bhutto has made it clear that she will return to Pakistan in time for the 2007 elections and that her Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) would not accept any deal with the present government that allows General Pervez Musharraf to retain his military uniform. “The raison d’etre of the PPP is to end military rule, not to perpetuate it,” Bhutto recently told this columnist.

Given the PPP’s long history of opposition to military rule and the sacrifices of Bhutto and her family for the restoration of democracy, this categorical stance should surprise no one. Bhutto’s return to Pakistan will likely lead to massive mobilisation against military rule, much like her 1986 return from exile marked the beginning of the end for General Zia-ul Haq’s entrenched military regime.

The rumours of an impending deal between the PPP and Musharraf have been periodically spread by the Pakistani establishment and denied by the PPP. These rumours served the purpose of confusing and dividing the opposition, in addition to making Musharraf look invulnerable. The persistence of these rumours was partly a reflection of the establishment’s effective media manipulation and partly a manifestation of the willingness of some elite Pakistanis to believe the worst about the PPP and the Bhuttos.

Pakistan’s elite loves to hate the Bhutto family. Before Bhutto’s father, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, founded the PPP in 1967, Pakistan’s politics were confined to the drawing rooms of Karachi and Lahore.

He brought the unwashed masses of present-day Pakistan into the political equation, a “sin” for which he has not been forgiven by the country’s oligarchy of senior military officers, civil servants, international bankers, industrialists, major landowners and multinational corporation executives.

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, and for that matter the PPP and other members of his family, were not perfect and much can be (and is) said about their mistakes, especially while in power. But the fact remains that the real reason for the Pakistani establishment’s resentments towards the Bhuttos and the PPP has little to do with their real and perceived flaws.

Major challenge

Since General Zia-ul Haq deposed Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in a military coup in 1977, the establishment has recognised the Bhutto name and the PPP as the major challenge to the establishment’s dominance of Pakistan. After executing Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in what is now universally recognised as a show trial, Zia-ul Haq initiated a major campaign of demonisation against the PPP and the Bhuttos.

Zia-ul Haq’s successors continued the vilification of the Bhutto family and persisted with efforts to divide and break the PPP. Benazir Bhutto’s two terms in office were cut short by establishment-orchestrated dismissals from power. She lost both her brothers to assassinations under mysterious circumstances that are still unresolved. Her husband, Asif Ali Zardari, has been a target of particular disparagement. He was first imprisoned from 1990 to 1993 on corruption charges, only to be released without being convicted in any of the 18 cases brought against him. Not learning any lessons from the failed prosecutions of 1990-93, Zardari was imprisoned again in 1996, only to be released eight-and-a-half years later on bail. None of the charges against him has yet been proven and Zardari is quite confident that his persecutors will end up with egg on their faces once again.

Since assuming power in a coup d’etat in 1999, Musharraf has tried to use the prosecutions against Zardari as a bargaining tool to seek the PPP’s cooperation. But having paid the high price in personal suffering, it is clear that Benazir Bhutto will not accept Musharraf’s uniform in return for the withdrawal of cases against herself and Zardari.

It seems that the people of Pakistan are willing to give Benazir Bhutto and the PPP another chance because they have never been given the opportunity to vote out the party after voting it into office. For once, the Pakistani establishment should give the people of Pakistan a free choice in selecting their leaders.