Scholar

Pakistan’s embattled President Pervez Musharraf is touring European capitals to try and convince Western governments of the country’s stability, and his own good intentions. He should instead face the evaporation of support for his authoritarian regime at home.

Opinion polls show that 68% of Pakistanis want Mr. Musharraf to step down immediately. While he was in Davos, Switzerland, this week for the World Economic Forum, 100 retired senior military officers signed a statement in Pakistan describing him as an embarrassment to the powerful military that has so far been his power base. Western governments should no longer accept Mr. Musharraf’s sales pitch that he is a valuable ally in the war against terrorism. A ruler widely hated by his own people is unlikely to be effective in defeating the expanding insurgency waged by al Qaeda’s Taliban allies.

Pakistanis are increasingly uniting in their disapproval of Mr. Musharraf, and of the civil-military oligarchy he represents. The first opinion poll after Benazir Bhutto’s murder showed that nearly half of the sample suspected government agencies and government-allied politicians of killing the opposition leader. Mr. Musharraf’s unpopular domestic policies helped al Qaeda get a free pass in an assassination widely mourned throughout the country.

Mr. Musharraf must recognize the widening gulf between state and society, and address its ramifications. If he does not, his Western backers, especially British Prime Minister Gordon Brown (whom he meets on Monday) and President George W. Bush, must make him realize that his policies are undermining the war against terror.

Mr. Musharraf could end the controversy about Ms. Bhutto’s death by accepting an international inquiry under the aegis of the U.N., as demanded by Pakistan’s opposition as well as several U.S. senators from both parties. But he insists that as long as he knows the truth, there is no need for an independent investigation.

Yesterday, Mr. Musharraf told the BBC that he would leave power when he is convinced the people of Pakistan want him to quit. But it would only be based on his “feeling” and personal knowledge, not the results of an election, opinion poll or any other mechanism that would determine when the people no longer support him.

Pakistan’s armed forces have suffered a loss of reputation because Mr. Musharraf mired them in politics. In an attempt to forestall an expected electoral victory by Ms. Bhutto’s Pakistan Peoples Party in polls scheduled for Feb. 18, Mr. Musharraf recently claimed that Ms. Bhutto was very unpopular with the military. The new army chief, Gen. Ashfaq Kayani, says he wants to restore harmony between the army and the people. But Mr. Musharraf is making his task difficult by creating the perception of the military favoring or opposing a specific political faction or leader.

Mr. Musharraf wants the world to simply take his word that the polls would be free and transparent. But in a recent report, the independent Pakistani Citizens Group on Electoral Process has termed the pre-poll electoral process in Pakistan highly unfair, giving it a score of 26 on a scale of 100 for overall fairness of the pre-poll environment spanning the previous 12 months. The U.S. National Democratic Institute and the International Republican Institute, as well as the European International Crisis Group, have also identified several factors they say make honest elections unlikely. Since Mr. Musharraf’s decision to “fire” senior Supreme Court judges, the judiciary is not free to pronounce on the fairness of the election.

Mr. Musharraf rules with the help of intelligence services that have a track record of supporting extremist jihadists. The security apparatus has also tortured, blackmailed, pressured or undermined too many civilian politicians, journalists and civil society activists to be a credible protector of the state. Most Pakistanis now know about the covert machinations of an all-powerful intelligence community, which fixes elections, divides parties and buys off politicians at will.

Pakistan needs a compromise that will stop the demonization of politicians by the military, restore the military’s prestige and end its political role, limit the intelligence agencies to external security functions, and form a government that unites the Pakistani nation against terrorism and disintegration. Only a Pakistan that is run according to its constitution would have non-violent means of resolving its many disputes. An independent judiciary and a free media would then be the guardians against abuse of power by elected officials. A free and fair election, open to international observers and conducted by an independent election commission, could be a remedy for Pakistan’s domestic conflict.

Mr. Musharraf can become part of this compromise, salvage some respect, and agree to a free and fair election. Or he could remain the major wound that must be dealt with before Pakistan’s healing can begin.

Mr. Haqqani, professor of international relations at Boston University, was co-chair of the Hudson Institute’s Project on Islam and Democracy and author of “Pakistan Between Mosque and Military,” (Carnegie Endowment, 2005). He was an adviser to Benazir Bhutto

Article was published in Wall Street Journal on January 25, 2008

Asked by a journalist if he had “blood on his hands,” Pakistan’s President Pervez Musharraf said last week that it was “below my dignity” but his family background, beliefs and values were enough to prove that he was not involved in anyone’s murder. He may well be right.

People should have turned against Al Qaida and the extremist militants after the assassination of Benazir Bhutto. But instead there was a wave of anger and rage against the government. No ruler should ever have to answer the question whether he has blood on his hands.

The very fact that the question was even asked shows the depths to which the credibility of the present government has sunk. Pakistan’s rulers need to focus on mending their relationship with the people of Pakistan.

There is no doubt that there were many lapses in security arrangements for the slain popular opposition leader. The lapses that followed the assassination were even worse.

Scotland Yard sleuths have now been brought in to conduct an investigation but forensic evidence that might have helped crack the mystery was washed out within hours of the incident.

Scotland Yard has had no major successes in resolving the numerous politically significant murder mysteries in Pakistan’s chequered history.

When Bhutto brought in Scotland Yard detectives to help with the Murtaza Bhutto murder in 1996, it was expected that the impartial investigation would bring to an end finger-pointing and suspicion.

But Bhutto’s government was dismissed in November 1996 and the day after the dismissal the Scotland Yard team was sent back to London without completing its inquiry or publishing a report.

What could have been the purpose of shutting down the Scotland Yard probe except to keep alive allegations aimed at the destruction of the reputation of Asif Ali Zardari and splitting the Bhutto family?

This time, too, the forensic evidence is gone before Scotland Yard could investigate. Musharraf says that the decision to hose down the scene of the attack manifested “incompetence” resulting from a desire to keep the place clean.

The US Assistant Secretary of State, Richard Boucher, always eager to harmonise his words with those of Pakistan’s ruling oligarchy, concurred. At a briefing for journalists he was asked if the government was not involved, why it washed away all the evidence.

Boucher said, “I have no idea but based on what I’ve heard from other incidents that seems to be standard practice, unfortunately.”

A little research, however, shows that it is neither standard practice to immediately wash out the site of a terrorist act nor is the “incompetence” of the type seen in Karachi on October 18 (after the first attempt on Bhutto’s life) or in Rawalpindi on December 27 after Bhutto’s murder commonplace.

Secured the area

In fact, in all media reports tracked down by this columnist relating to earlier assassination attempts on high value Pakistani targets it is clearly stated that the police secured the area and collected DNA and other forensic evidence right after the attack.

A few days before the brutal assassination of Bhutto, former Interior Minister Aftab Sherpao was targeted by a suicide bomber during Eid prayers on December 21.

Wire services reported, “The worshippers rushed dozens of injured to a hospital while police sealed off the area and began gathering evidence.” Quite clearly the authorities in Charsadda are more competent than the ones in Karachi and Rawalpindi where Bhutto was the target.

On July 31, 2004, “prime minister” Shaukat Aziz escaped an assassination attempt while on an election campaign. The suicide bomb attack was staged in Fatah Jang, a small town in northern Punjab, where he was contesting a by-election. At least six people, including Aziz’s driver, were killed and 45 injured.

News reports at the time quoted a senior police official as saying that “Aziz was in the car which had just started moving slowly amid a tight security cordon when the car driven by suicide attacker detonated”. One could only wonder where the “tight security cordon” disappeared when Bhutto faced her attacker.

Other important assassination attempts were directed at Musharraf on December 14 and December 25, 2003, both in Rawalpindi. The fact that attackers could twice get so close to the heavily guarded leader raised serious concerns about Musharraf’s security.

“There has been a security lapse,” said Information Minister Shaikh Rashid Ahmad. The attack sites were secured on both occasions.

The purpose of pointing out this historic record is not to further inflame passions that have erupted since Bhutto’s assassination.

It is to point out to Pakistan’s arrogant establishment that its credibility problem is deeply rooted and is of its own making. If they really want to set things right, forget about clever statements and smart TV interviews. Repair the damage by facing and telling the truth.

The article was published in Gulf News on Jan 9, 2008

Asked by a journalist if he had “blood on his hands,” General Pervez Musharraf said last week that it was “below my dignity” to reply, but his family background, beliefs and values were enough to prove that he was not involved in anyone’s murder. He may well be right.

People should have turned against the Al Qaeda and the extremist militants after the assassination of Benazir Bhutto. Instead, there was a wave of anger against the government. No ruler should ever have to answer the question whether or not he has blood on his hands.

The very fact that the question was even asked shows the depths to which the credibility of the present government has sunk. Pakistan’s rulers need to focus on mending their relationship with the people of Pakistan.

There is no doubt that there were many lapses in security arrangements for the slain popular opposition leader. The lapses that followed the assassination were even worse. Scotland Yard sleuths have now been brought in to conduct an investigation but forensic evidence that might have helped crack the mystery was washed out within hours of the incident.

Scotland Yard has had no major successes in resolving the numerous politically significant murder mysteries in Pakistan’s chequered history. When Bhutto brought in Scotland Yard detectives to help with the Murtaza Bhutto murder in 1996, it was expected that the impartial investigation would bring the finger-pointing and suspicion to an end. But Ms Bhutto’s government was dismissed in November 1996 and the day after the dismissal the Scotland Yard team was sent back to London without completing its inquiry or publishing a report.

What could have been the purpose of shutting down the Scotland Yard probe except to keep alive allegations aimed at the destruction of the reputation of Asif Ali Zardari and splitting the Bhutto family?

This time, too, the forensic evidence is gone before Scotland Yard could investigate. General Musharraf says that the decision to hose down the scene of the attack manifested “incompetence,” resulting from a desire to keep the place clean.

The US Assistant Secretary of State, Richard Boucher, always eager to harmonise his words with those of Pakistan’s ruling oligarchy, concurred. At a briefing for journalists he was asked why the government washed away all the evidence if it was not involved. Boucher said, “I have no idea but based on what I’ve heard from other incidents that seems to be standard practice, unfortunately.”

A little research, however, shows that it is neither standard practice to immediately wash out the site of a terrorist act nor is the ‘incompetence’ of the type seen in Karachi on October 18 (after the first attempt on Bhutto’s life) or in Rawalpindi on December 27 after her murder commonplace.

In fact, in all media reports tracked down by this columnist relating to earlier assassination attempts on high value Pakistani targets it is clearly stated that the police secured the area and collected DNA and other forensic evidence right after the attack.

A few days before the brutal assassination of Benazir Bhutto, former Interior Minister Aftab Sherpao was targeted by a suicide bomber during Eid prayers on December 21, 2007. Wire services reported, “The worshippers rushed dozens of injured to a hospital while police sealed off the area and began gathering evidence.” Quite clearly the authorities in Charsadda are more competent than the ones in Karachi and Rawalpindi where Bhutto was the target.

On July 31, 2004, ‘prime minister’ Shaukat Aziz escaped an assassination attempt while on an election campaign. The suicide bomb attack was staged in Fatah Jang, a small town in northern Punjab, where he was contesting a by-election. At least six people, including Aziz’s driver, were killed and 45 injured.

News reports at the time quoted a senior police official as saying that “Aziz was in the car which had just started moving slowly amid a tight security cordon when the car driven by a suicide attacker detonated.” One could only wonder where the “tight security cordon” disappeared to when Benazir Bhutto faced her deadly attacker.

Other important assassination attempts were directed at General Musharraf on December 14 and December 25, 2003, both in Rawalpindi. The fact that attackers could twice get so close to the heavily guarded leader raised serious concerns about Musharraf’s security. “There has been a security lapse,” said Information Minister Sheikh Rashid Ahmed. The attack sites were secured on both occasions. DNA evidence was recovered.

The purpose of pointing out this record is not to further inflame passions that have erupted since Benazir Bhutto’s assassination. It is to point out to Pakistan’s arrogant establishment that its credibility problem is deeply rooted and is of its own making. If it really wants to set things right, forget about clever statements and smart TV interviews. Repair the damage by facing and telling the truth.

The article was published in Indian Express on January 9, 2008

Benazir Bhutto, the outstanding icon of Pakistan’s struggle for democracy, is gone. For those who only saw her as a distant political figure, her human dimension clearly did not matter. That applies to those who vilified her throughout her life, those who failed to protect her and those who actually killed her. But for everyone whose life she touched, her humanity transcended the politics.

I was among those who got to know Benazir Bhutto, the person — a daughter scarred by the assassination of her father, a sister injured by the killing of her brothers, a wife hurt by the disparagement and imprisonment without conviction of her husband, and a mother who was robbed of the opportunity to see her children grow into adulthood. With all the verbal and physical abuse hurled at her, she remained amazingly loving. Her loss is a personal loss to me and millions of others who admired her. Her assassination also creates serious challenges for the integrity and future of Pakistan.

Although many outsiders and most elite Pakistanis may not support the Pakistan Peoples Party’s decision to elect Benazir Bhutto’s son Bilawal Bhutto Zardari and husband Asif Ali Zardari as co-chairs of the party, this decision is absolutely the right one in the context of the PPP’s populist tradition. It will be welcomed by the majority of the party’s supporters — underprivileged Pakistanis who recognise the party as one that has consistently fought for the democratic rights of every Pakistani citizen.

Some view the Bhutto legacy as a thorn in Pakistan’s history. To the family’s supporters, the Bhutto name does not imply a dynasty. It means far more — a wealthy family that has stood up for the poor; that focuses on economic improvements through education and infrastructure rather than on religious dogma; a family that calls for democracy instead of seeking to protect its privileges by aligning itself with military dictatorship. The Bhuttos have not been perfect, as critics remind us on a regular basis but they have stood ready to integrate the largely moderate Pakistan into the world.

This visceral association with the Bhutto family and the PPP of millions of Pakistanis is not easily understood by those who do not take into account the value of sentiments in political choices. Drew Weston’s book, The Political Brain: The Role of Emotion in deciding the fate of the Nation demonstrates that Pakistan is not the only country where feelings influence political choices.

What Pakistan needs most right now is stability and a bringing together of a fractured nation. As the largest party in Pakistan, the PPP will play a critical role in stabilising Pakistan’s currently chaotic situation. While it may sound absurd to a western ear, the 19-year-old Bilawal and his father can bring this stability.

The PPP already has more support in Pakistan than any other faction. Benazir Bhutto’s tragic assassination has enhanced the aura of martyrdom that initially came with the execution of the PPP’s founder, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, at the hands of Islamist military dictator General Zia-ul-Haq. For the party to continue its success for the people of Pakistan, it is imperative that it win a majority of the votes in the upcoming election. Given the party’s legacy, party unity can best be maintained and votes garnered under the leadership of the Bhutto/Zardari family. Any other leader could have been a brilliant administrator or politician but none commands the same popularity and recognition as the family members of a martyr.

Although Bilawal has four years to go before graduating from Oxford University, Pakistan will benefit from young political leadership. Today’s younger generation has been disillusioned by politics. Bilawal can help spark a renewed faith in Pakistani politics in today’s younger generation — just the way Robert F. Kennedy did in the US, or Rahul Gandhi and Jyotiraditya Scindia are doing in India.

Now that the PPP and PML-N have agreed to participate in the polls, parliamentary elections scheduled for January 8 should not be delayed. The plans for poll rigging already in place for the benefit of the King’s Party, PML-Q, should be shelved to ensure that a rigged poll does not become the instigator of a new round of street violence. Musharraf has ruled alone for long enough. He should not put the country’s stability and prosperity in jeopardy by continuing with the political juggling that has kept him strong so far while making Pakistan weak.

There is no way the PPP will now lose the election, given the strong sympathy wave resulting from Mohtarma’s assassination. It led in the opinion polls, followed by Sharif’s PML-N even before the tragic episode. Cooperation between PML-N and the PPP, as well as other opposition parties, offers an opportunity to turn national sorrow into national unity. The establishment could hold on to power by use of force but that would only harm an already brittle nation further.

Indian Express , January 2, 2008

Benazir Bhutto’s tragic assassination highlights the fears about Pakistan that she voiced over the last several months. Years of dictatorship and sponsorship of Islamist extremism have made this nuclear-armed Muslim nation of 160 million people a safe haven for terrorists that threaten the world. Bhutto had the courage and vision to challenge both the terrorism and the authoritarian culture that nurtured it. Her assassination has already exacerbated Pakistan’s instability and uncertainty.
Riots have been reported from several parts of the country as grief has fanned anger against a government that is deeply unpopular. As Pakistanis mourn the death of a popular democratic leader, the United States must review its policy of trusting the military-dominated regime led by Pervez Musharraf to secure, stabilize and democratize Pakistan.

The U.S. should use its influence, acquired with more than $10 billion in economic and military aid, to persuade Pakistan’s military to loosen its grip on power and negotiate with politicians with popular support, most prominently Bhutto’s successors in her Pakistan People’s Party. Instead of calibrating terrorism, as Mr. Musharraf appears to have done, Pakistan must work towards eliminating terrorism, as Bhutto demanded.

The immediate consequence of the assassination will likely be postponement of the legislative elections scheduled for Jan. 8. Bhutto’s party led in opinion polls, followed by the opposition faction of the conservative Pakistan Muslim League (PML), led by Nawaz Sharif. Immediately after Bhutto’s assassination, Mr. Sharif announced that he is now joining the boycott of the polls called by several smaller political parties. If Mr. Musharraf goes ahead with elections, it is unlikely that it would have much credibility.

In her death, as in her life, Benazir Bhutto has drawn attention to the need for building a moderate Muslim democracy in Pakistan that cares for its people and allows them to elect its leaders. The war against terrorism, she repeatedly argued, cannot be won without mobilizing the people of Pakistan against Islamist extremists, and bringing Pakistan’s security services under civilian control.

Unfortunately, at the moment Bhutto’s homeland (and mine) remains a dictatorship controlled through secret police machinations. Mr. Musharraf’s regime has squandered its energies fighting civilian democrats instead of confronting the menace of terrorism that has now claimed the life of one of the nation’s most popular political figures. His administration will have to answer many tough questions in the next few days about its failure to provide adequate security to Bhutto, particularly after an earlier assassination attempt against her on Oct. 18.

The suicide bombing on that day, marking her homecoming after eight years in exile, claimed the lives of 160 people, mainly Bhutto supporters. But the government refused to accept Bhutto’s requests for an investigation assisted by the FBI or Scotland Yard, both of which have greater competence in analyzing forensic evidence than Pakistan’s notoriously corrupt and incompetent law enforcement.

The circumstances of the first assassination attempt remain mired in mystery and a complete investigation has yet to take place. Television images soon after Bhutto’s assassination showed fire engines hosing down the crime scene, in what can only be considered a calculated washing away of forensic evidence.

Bhutto had publicly expressed fears that pro-extremist elements within Pakistan’s security services were complicit in plans to eliminate her. She personally asked me to communicate her concerns to U.S. officials, which I did. But instead of addressing those fears, Mr. Musharraf cynically rejected Bhutto’s request for international security consultants to be hired at her own expense. This cynicism on the part of the Pakistani authorities is now causing most of Bhutto’s supporters to blame the Musharraf regime for her tragic death.

In her two terms as prime minister — both cut short by military-backed dismissals on charges that were subsequently never proven — Bhutto outlined the vision of a modern and pluralistic Muslim state. Her courage was legendary. She stepped into the shoes of her populist father, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, without much training or inclination for politics, after he was executed by an earlier military ruler, Gen. Zia ul-Haq.

She was demonized by the civil-military oligarchy that has virtually run Pakistan since 1958, the year of Pakistan’s first military coup. But she retained a hard core of popular support, and her social-democratic Pakistan People’s Party is widely regarded as Pakistan’s largest political party.

In 1988, at the age of 35, Bhutto became the youngest prime minister in Pakistan’s troubled history, and the first woman to lead a Muslim nation in the modern age. For her supporters, she stood for women’s empowerment, human rights and mass education. Her detractors accused her of many things, from corruption to being too close to the U.S.

During her second tenure as prime minister, Pakistan became one of the 10 emerging capital markets of the world. The World Health Organization praised government efforts in the field of health. Rampant narcotics problems were tackled and several drug barons arrested. Bhutto increased government spending on education and 46,000 new schools were built.

Thousands of teachers were recruited with the understanding that a secular education, covering multiple study areas (particularly technical and scientific education), would improve the lives of Pakistanis and create job opportunities critical to self-empowerment. But Pakistan’s political turbulence, and her constant battle with the country’s security establishment, never allowed her to take credit for these achievements.

For years, her image was tarnished by critics who alleged that she did not deliver on her promise. During the early days after Mr. Musharraf’s decision to support the U.S.-led war against terrorism in the aftermath of 9/11, conventional wisdom in Washington wrote her off. But Pakistan’s constant drift into extremism, and Mr. Musharraf’s inability to win Pakistani hearts and minds, changed that.

Earlier this year, the United States and the United Kingdom supported efforts for a transition to democracy in Pakistan based on a negotiated settlement between Bhutto and Mr. Musharraf. She was to be allowed to return to Pakistan and the many corruption charges filed against her and her husband, Asif Zardari, were to be dropped.

Mr. Musharraf promised free and fair elections, and promised to end a bar imposed by him against Bhutto running for a third term as prime minister. But on Nov. 3, his imposition of a state of emergency, suspension of Pakistan’s constitution, and arbitrary reshuffling of the country’s judiciary brought that arrangement to an end. He went back on his promises to Bhutto, and as elections approached, recrimination between the two was at its height.

Benazir Bhutto had the combination of political brilliance, charisma, popular support and international recognition that made her a credible democratic alternative to Mr. Musharraf. Her elimination from the scene is not only a personal loss to millions of Pakistanis who loved and admired her. It exposes her nation’s vulnerability, and the urgent need to deal with it.

Mr. Haqqani, a professor at Boston University and co-chair of the Hudson Institute’s Project on Islam and Democracy, is the author of “Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military” (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005). He has served as adviser to several Pakistani prime ministers, including Benazir Bhutto.

Wall Street Journal, December 28, 2007

Thailand’s parliamentary elections on December 23 provided fresh evidence (if evidence is still needed) of the futility of military intervention as a means of changing the fundamental political trends of a nation.

Thai voters gave the largest number of seats in parliament to the Peoples Power Party (PPP) which comprises supporters of exiled former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra who was overthrown in a September 2006 coup.

The Thai military barred Thaksin and 110 of his closest associates from contesting the polls. His Thai Rak Thai party (TRT) was also disbanded by the generals on grounds of “corruption”.

But the PPP, which campaigned on a platform of ending Thaksin’s exile and exclusion from politics, won convincingly despite the military’s opposition. Quite clearly, Thai officials did not go beyond skewing the election rules against Thailand’s PPP and the actual balloting was not significantly rigged.

Thailand has witnessed 18 military coups since 1932. The Economist recently referred to Thailand as “Southeast Asia’s Pakistan”.

The fundamental problem in both countries is the same. It has an overbearing military, which often receives support from the urban elite and professional middle class, and argues that the poor peasants simply do not elect the right people.

Thailand’s civilian politicians, including Thaksin, are obviously not perfect. But isn’t the point of democracy to let people choose whomever they like and then vote them out of power upon discovering that their chosen leaders did not fulfil the people’s aspirations?

The problem is that the populist politicians such as Thaksin (and in Pakistan’s case the Bhutto family or even Nawaz Sharif), whom the army and the professional elite dislikes, do not necessarily disappoint their voters.

As The Economist explains, “Middle-class Bangkokians, who are as snooty about their country cousins as any metropolitan elite anywhere, often say that ‘uneducated’ rural voters… were bribed and tricked into voting for Thaksin.

“But rural voters were quite rational in handing him landslide victories in 2001 and 2005. He was Thailand’s first party leader to promise and deliver a comprehensive set of policies aimed at the mass of voters.

“The allegations of corruption, conflicts of interest and vote-buying that surround him are serious but hardly unusual: such practices are endemic in Thai politics.”

In other words, the poor who vote for populist leaders actually benefit from their policies even though these might not impress army generals or World Bank economists.

Successful third world democracies are born out of cooperation between politicians with vote banks and middle class professionals with ideas about good governance. In countries such as Pakistan and Thailand, however, such cooperation is scant.

Middle class

The middle class dismisses politicians with refrains like “They are all the same” but is unable to create an alternative political leadership because vote banks are not easy to create or destroy.

“During the 1960s Pakistan’s urban middle class preferred Ayoub Khan and his top-down Convention Muslim League only to find that the party had no roots by the time of the 1970 general elections.

After the peasantry had voted the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto into office, during the 1970s, the middle class preferred Air Marshal Asghar Khan and his Tehrik-e-Istiqlal (TI).

The 1977 Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) campaign revealed that the anti-PPP vote bank was mobilised not by TI or Asghar Khan but by the Islamist religious parties.

After the end of Ziaul Haq’s military dictatorship in 1988, and a concerted decade-long effort by the military-intelligence combine to break the back of the PPP, Benazir Bhutto still commanded more votes than the middle class’s new choice, Nawaz Sharif.

By the time Sharif created his own vote bank, the urban professionals had turned on him and preferred Imran Khan and his Tehrik-e-Insaf.

Even now, it appears that the educated elite that supported Pervez Musharraf right after the 1999 coup has now shifted its loyalty to the anti-politician politicians rather than putting their support where the majority of voters seem inclined.

Popular politicians may not rise to the “high” standards of the educated elite but they have a way of connecting with the people. Instead of constantly judging politicians with an unrealistic yardstick, urban professionals should embrace the political process.

They can act as pressure groups within the major popular parties rather than a loose grouping that helps discredit popular leaders only to pave the way for further military intervention in politics.

Gulf News, December 26, 2007

Gulf News, December 19, 2007

A politician usually knows when his support has worn out. A general, however, must wait for intelligence reports or the siege of his command post to realise that he has lost a battle.

Even after declaring himself civilian president of Pakistan and getting an endorsement from India’s National Security Adviser to the effect that New Delhi considers him Pakistan’s “elected” leader, Pervez Musharraf remains a general at heart. Since his command post is intact and his intelligence machinery has not reported his rout to him, Musharraf continues to insist that he faces no political crisis.

If only the Western media would stop reporting bad things, he told Newsweek’s Lally Weymouth last week, things in Pakistan would be as stable as they have been since Musharraf took power in the 1999 military coup.

An opinion poll conducted by the International Republican Institute (IRI) in November showed that Musharraf’s approval ratings in Pakistan have sunk lower than those of US President George W. Bush.

Sixty seven per cent of Pakistanis want Musharraf to resign immediately whereas 70 per cent believe his King’s party (the Pakistan Muslim League-Q) does not deserve re-election. Benazir Bhutto’s Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), with 30 per cent support, emerges as the single largest party in Pakistan’s multi-party system.

Former prime minister Nawaz Sharif’s Pakistan Muslim League-N (PML-N) is in second position with 25 per cent support. Most people would prefer a Bhutto-Sharif coalition to rule the country rather then the Musharraf-Bhutto alliance favoured until recently in Washington.

Instead of facing the facts, Musharraf’s spokesman has turned around and made the absurd argument that a poll of a few thousand people cannot represent the views of 160 million Pakistanis. Until a year ago, the IRI polls showed Musharraf as quite popular in the country and at that time none of his supporters questioned the validity of opinion polling methodology.

Withdrawal

The unavoidable truth is that Musharraf’s political support in Pakistan has almost evaporated. Even after the official withdrawal of the state of emergency, Pakistan’s ruler is virtually ruling by the strength of the State, not on the basis of his personal credibility.

There is bad news even for Pakistan’s permanent institutions of State in the latest IRI poll. The Pakistan Army has long been the most respected institution in the country and it enjoyed a favourable rating of 80 per cent in IRI’s polls over the last several years. In the most recent polls, the Army’s rating first dropped 10 points to 70 per cent and now stands at 55 per cent.

The media and the judiciary, from whom Musharraf says he is now trying to save Pakistan, are now the most favourably rated institutions in the country. The media’s 78 per cent approval shows how out of touch Musharraf and his sycophants are with the current reality of Pakistan.

The Bush administration wants Musharraf to survive and has been willing to let him retrace some of his missteps. The withdrawal of the emergency was another occasion for the State Deptartment to speak of “positive” developments in Pakistan. But just as American officials called upon Musharraf to “do more” in fighting terrorism, they are now calling upon him to “do more” to restore democracy in the country.

Whether Musharraf does more in reversing his authoritarian course will depend largely on the domestic and international pressures building up against him. The legitimacy and credibility of the January 8 election is going to be a major test in this respect.

The government’s hopes of holding a partially credible election with results that change little in the power structure are unlikely to be fulfilled. Either Musharraf would have to take the risk of allowing opposition success at the polls to secure the election’s acceptability or he would ensure massive rigging to keep his party in power at the cost of all credibility.

It is bad enough to have little support at home. It will be worse when the lack of support at home is accompanied by a total absence of credibility abroad.

Indian Express , December 13, 2007

Musharraf’s language and demeanour are the same as that of Egypt’s ruler Hosni Mubarak at the time of the 1987 elections for the Egyptian parliament. Twenty years later, Mubarak is still in power and the Egyptian people still have no real choice between leaders.

Egypt is a nation of a thousand NGOs and several political parties but there is no serious political challenge to Mubarak’s authority. Mubarak marginalised the real opposition, allowed western funded NGOs to work within pre-defined spheres, and has regularly held elections without allowing alternation in power.

Musharraf’s guns are trained on Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif for a reason. Having served as prime ministers, the two are visible reminders that Pakistan can be ruled by someone other than Musharraf. Once they are out of the way, Musharraf can follow Mubarak in holding election after election, changing rules and judges as often as he likes, and control the country with the help of the security services and large amounts of US aid.

Incidentally, Mubarak (who started out as an air force general) has been a civilian and out of uniform for the last 25 years but that has not eased the grip of the military and the intelligence services on Egypt’s polity. Musharraf’s decision to continue to live in ‘army house’ after ostensibly handing over command to General Ashfaq Kayani reflects his desire to be Pakistan’s Mubarak.

The holding of free and fair elections is not a technical issue; it is a matter of intent. A ruler or government that has no intention of sharing or transferring power is unlikely to hold free and fair elections.

Most of the fix for the coming elections is already in — manipulated voters’ lists, gerrymandering, intimidation of opposition candidates and arm-twisting of local influentials to support the king’s party. The rigging will be selective on election day, outside of the view of foreigners and the media as far as possible.

The primary purpose of the regime would be to influence the outcome both in terms of who gets elected and how many seats each party gets. Thus, the opposition might get a significant number of seats but individuals with an independent mind could be made to lose.

After the elections, a second round of manipulation will take place to create factions within each party and to manage a pliant coalition. This would be similar to what happened in 2002. A coalition cobbled together in the same manner as 2002 after a fraudulent election euphemistically described as ‘flawed but acceptable’ by the US government will not advance democracy in Pakistan.

If the ban on a twice-elected prime minister running for a third term is not lifted, there will be no real choice for Pakistanis because then Musharraf would be able to appoint anyone he likes as prime minister.

Musharraf’s desire to exclude Bhutto and Sharif and thereby pave the way for choosing a prime minister himself is another sign that he is following the Hosni Mubarak role model. But while Musharraf may want to emulate the Egyptian model, Pakistani civilians will not roll over and play dead.

Prolonged unrest might follow a rigged poll in Pakistan.

By failing to understand the differences between the political history and aspirations of Egypt and Pakistan, Musharraf might be risking considerable and prolonged unrest in trying to emulate Mubarak.

Indian Express , December 13, 2007

A politician usually knows when his support has worn out. A general, however, must wait for intelligence reports or the siege of his command post to realise that he has lost the battle.

Even after declaring himself civilian president of Pakistan and getting an endorsement from India’s national security adviser to the effect that New Delhi considers him Pakistan’s ‘elected’ leader, Pervez Musharraf remains a general at heart. Since his command post is intact and his intelligence machinery has not reported his rout to him, Musharraf continues to insist that he faces no political crisis.

If only the western media would stop reporting bad things, he told Newsweek’s Lally Weymouth last week, things in Pakistan would be as stable as they have been since he took power in the 1999 military coup.

An opinion poll conducted by the International Republican Institute (IRI) in November showed that Musharraf’s approval ratings in Pakistan have sunk lower than those of President Bush in the United States. Sixty-seven per cent of Pakistanis want Musharraf to resign immediately whereas 70 per cent believe his King’s Party (the Pakistan Muslim League-Q) does not deserve re-election. Benazir Bhutto’s Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), with 30 per cent support, emerges as the single largest party in Pakistan’s multi-party system.

Former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s Pakistan Muslim League-N (PML-N) is in second position with 25 per cent support. Most people would prefer a Bhutto-Sharif coalition to rule the country rather then the Musharraf-Bhutto alliance favoured until recently in Washington.

Instead of facing the facts, Musharraf’s spokesman has turned around and made the absurd argument that a poll of a few thousand people cannot represent the views of 160 million Pakistanis. Until a year ago, the IRI polls showed Musharraf as quite popular in the country and at that time none of his supporters questioned the validity of opinion polling methodology.

The unavoidable truth is that Musharraf’s political support in Pakistan has almost evaporated. Even after the official withdrawal of the state of emergency, Pakistan’s ruler is virtually ruling by the strength of the state, not on the basis of his personal credibility.

There is bad news even for Pakistan’s permanent institutions of state in the latest IRI poll. The Pakistan Army has long been the most respected institution in the country and it enjoyed a favourable rating of 80 per cent in IRI’s polls over the last several years. In the most recent polls, the army’s rating first dropped 10 points to 70 per cent and now stands at 55 per cent — a further slippage of 15 percentage points.

The media and the judiciary, from whom Musharraf says he is now trying to save Pakistan, are now the most favourably rated institutions in the country. The media’s 78 per cent approval shows how out of touch Musharraf and his sycophants are with the current reality of Pakistan.

According to the IRI, “The drop in the Army’s prestige is likely due to the unpopularity of Musharraf. When Pakistanis were asked if the performance of Musharraf affected their opinion of the Army, 31 per cent said that they now had a higher opinion due to his actions and 20 per cent said that their opinion had not changed, while a plurality of 41 per cent said that Musharraf’s performance caused them to now have a lower opinion of the Army.”

The Bush administration wants Musharraf to survive and has been willing to let him retrace some of his missteps. The withdrawal of the emergency was another occasion for the State Department to speak of ‘positive’ developments in Pakistan. But just as American officials called upon Musharraf to ‘do more’ in fighting terrorism, they are now calling upon him to ‘do more’ to restore democracy in the country.

Whether Musharraf does more in reversing his authoritarian course will depend largely on the domestic and international pressures building up against him. The legitimacy and credibility of the January 8 election is going to be a major test in this respect.

International perception of the election process being unlawfully and unethically tilted in favour of the King’s Party is growing. As the Washington Post reported, “With less than a month to go before parliamentary elections in Pakistan, independent experts say that there is little chance the polls will be either free or fair — and that the result could be renewed tumult across the country.”

The government’s hopes of holding a partially credible election with results that change little in the power structure are unlikely to be fulfilled. Either Musharraf would have to take the risk of allowing opposition success at the polls to secure the election’s acceptability or he would ensure massive rigging to keep his party in power at the cost of all credibility.

It is bad enough to have little support at home. It will be worse when the lack of support at home is accompanied by a total absence of credibility abroad.

Gulf News , December 5, 2007

On November 28, 2007, General Pervez Musharraf stepped down as Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff, handing over a ceremonial baton to his successor, General Ashfaq Pervez Kiyani.
For several days now, beginning well before the change of command, Pakistani and international media have speculated about Kiyani’s personality and perceived opinions.
No such personality analysis took place when the United States swore in General George W. Casey, Jr as the 36th Chief of Staff of the US Army on April 10. Nor was there much speculation when on September 30, when the Indian army got its new chief, General Deepak Kapoor.
The US military is considered the world’s most powerful and the Indian army is ranked as the world’s second largest fighting force. But their outgoing chiefs received quiet farewells and their new commanders assumed command without commentary by political analysts and international affairs pundits.
Indeed, it is quite likely that most Americans and Indians probably do not even know the names of the incoming generals, or for that matter of their predecessors.
Soldiering is a noble profession and its practitioners around the world distinguish themselves on battlefields, away from controversy and the limelight usually attached to politicians.
In Pakistan, the army has been dragged into politics and that has hurt both Pakistan and its army. Field Marshal Ayoub Khan first introduced the notion that the army must save Pakistan from its own people with the help of ambitious civilians who were incapable of securing popular support but were good at palace intrigue.
Initially, he called for saving Pakistan from its politicians. Gradually, politically ambitious generals such as Yahya Khan, Zia ul Haq and Pervez Musharraf added to the list of categories of Pakistanis from whom the army had an obligation to save the country.
Soldiers have been called upon at different times to save Pakistan from “corrupt civil servants” to “secular and irreligious journalists and professors” and now “irresponsible Supreme Court Judges”.
Under Zia, secularism was the enemy and the soldiers’ guns were turned in the direction of anyone who was perceived as unorthodox in their religious beliefs. Under Musharraf, Islamist extremism cultivated by Zia has been described as the enemy and, once again, the army has been called upon to deal with the problem.
Not a substitute
The truth is that training as a soldier and promotion to the rank of general does not train an individual to run every aspect of life of a nation. As Kiyani settles in, he should shun civilians who tell him how the army is the only stabilizing institution in Pakistan.
The army is important, no doubt, but it is not a substitute for political parties, the judiciary, academia, civil society and the media. The army must protect national interest but it should be willing to recognise that civilians have an equal right to ponder what is, or is not, in the national interest.
Just as the solution to having a bad surgeon is not to invite an engineer to perform surgery, a nation must replace bad politicians with good ones if and when they are available.
Making politicians out of generals only breeds division within society and undermines the professionalism of the army while preventing the other institutions from becoming stronger through experience and over time.
Just as Ayoub Khan, Yahya Khan, Zia and Musharraf soiled the army’s professional stature by involving it in politics; many other Pakistani army chiefs understood the need for respecting the different spheres of civilian and the military.
Since Ayoub Khan, politicised military officers have bred contempt among their fellow officers for the country’s civilians. There may be reasonable grounds for criticism of the country’s traditional political class. But the solution to the problems of alleged political corruption and incompetence is not a military coup d’etat.
After every military intervention, Pakistan’s leadership crisis has deepened. Each military government has started out with perception of popular support and declarations of goods intentions. Each one has left office facing public resentment and little institutional change.
In the process, Pakistan political parties have been weakened and the judiciary emasculated. The reason for the army’s political intervention is not that other institutions are weak. It is the army’s intervention that has prevented any institution from gaining any strength.

It is time for Pakistan’s military officers to stop thinking of Pakistan’s own people as the enemy.